THE  "CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION" 

A  Realistic  Psychology 


BY 

ROBERT  CHENAULT  GIVLER,  Ph.  D. 

Instructor  in  Psychology 

in  the 
University  of  Washington 


PSTCH 


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BY   THE   DOCTRINE 

OF 

HARD   ATOMS   AND   SOFT   SOULS, 

BUT  WRITTEN 
FOR   THE    OTHERS 


332654 


INTRODUCTION 

Memories  of  Aristotle,  together  with  the 
latest  popular  information  about  the  nerves, 
make  up  the  bulk  of  the  usual  text-books  in 
psychology.  Faculty  psychology  is  still  with 
us,  however  much  we  may  have  renounced  it 
in  our  sane  and  critical  moments;  our  lan- 
guage flows  on  by  momentum  as  it  did  of  yore, 
and  the  old  nouns  still  call  seductively.  For  in 
the  midst  of  our  revolt  against  substantialism, 
we  know  not  yet  how  to  speak  in  a  constructive 
manner.  I  am  convinced  that  no  pussy-foot 
departures  from  this  type  of  psychology  will 
render  adequate  service  to  the  matter  involved, 
and  I  mean,  furthermore,  that  these  pages  shall 
bear  witness  of  that  conviction.  Even  in  some 
of  the  better  universities  of  this  country  there 
is  a  great  discrepancy  between  the  psychology 
verbally  taught  in  the  lectures,  and  that  which 
the  student  reads  in  the  assigned  references. 
Even  the  usual  book  on  the  subject  is  a  popular 
phrasing  of  the  enjoyable  lecture  material  of 
the  author's  previous  years,  and  not  that  psy- 
chology which  represents  the  best  of  his  pres- 
ent estimate  of  the  subject.     The  ways  of  men 


INTRODUCTION 
seem  to  be  so  incurably  pragmatic,  that  it  is  dan- 
gerous to  publish  the  untried. 

I  offer  this  outline  of  a  realistic  program  for 
psychology  as  something  but  partly  tried.  By 
realistic  I  mean  that  mind  is  treated  as  some- 
thing observable,  something  mentionable  in  all 
of  its  phases,  as  well  as  in  its  last  analysis. 
There  will  not  be  urged  any  non  possiunus  intel- 
legere  at  the  close  of  the  book,  however  many 
special  matters  must  be  left  untouched  for  lack 
of  space.  The  claim  here  made  is  that  mind, 
soul,  thought,  consciousness,  and  all  other  terms 
referring  to  personality,  are  in  no  need  of  being 
interpreted  by  way  of  Paddock,  but  rather  that 
they  mean  things  which  can  be  discussed  and 
understood  by  any  one  so  disposed.  Psychol- 
ogy is  a  natural  science, — that  is,  it  requires  no 
concept  of  trans-empirical  things  to  deal  with  it 
exhaustively.  This  will  heartily  displease  a 
host  of  readers,  and  those  who  "imagine  there 
must  be  the  indefinite  something  in  the  mys- 
sterious  all  this"  will  not  be  enthusiastic  about 
the  ideas  hereinafter  to  be  presented. 

There  are  two  ever-recurring  items  in  this 
book  to  which  signal  attention  may  be  called. 
The  one  is  the  special  form  of  analysis  used,  and 
the  other  is  the  continual  reference  to  deep- 
seated  errors  in  popular  psychology.     For  both 


INTRODUCTION 

of  these  characteristic  attitudes  I  am  glad  to 
acknowledge  my  indehtedness  to  Professor  Ed- 
win B.  Holt,  of  Harvard  University.  His  "Con- 
cept of  Consciousness,"  from  which  I  have  un- 
sparingly quoted  in  these  pages,  may  be  said  to 
have  furnished  the  foundation  upon  which  this 
whole  structure  has  been  laid.  The  title  of  this 
book  itself  is  one  of  his  keenest  phrases.  I  am 
not  sure  that  he  will  acknowledge  the  whole  pro- 
gram employed  herein  as  deducible  from  real- 
istic premises,  but  I  feel  sure  that  many  com- 
mon parts  exist  between  his  exposition  of  real- 
ism and  mine. 

Either  logic  or  flapdoodle.  This  is  the  thesis 
defended  in  this  book  with  regard  to  the  anal- 
ysis of  mind.  If  one  is  to  speak  at  all  about 
any  matter,  let  him  first  of  all  be  clear  and  de- 
finitive. Fusion  and  synthesis  come  fast  enough 
to  undo  the  work  of  separating  things  into  their 
elements  for  the  sake  of  a  clear  comprehension 
of  them.  For  the  business  of  speaking  in  gen- 
eral about  matters  that  are  particular  is  not 
only  avoiding  the  issue,  but  it  is  even  a  tacit 
attempt  to  traduce  the  factual  status  of  the 
terms  involved.  In  following  this  scheme,  the 
student  will  find  a  bit  of  ditficult  reading  here 
and  there.  Nevertheless,  the  ultimate  grounds 
of  logic  are  not  only  what  every  vigorous  stu- 
iii 


INTRODUCTION 
dent  deserves  to  know,  but  that  which  he 
straightway  asks  to  have  exhibited  to  him  as 
well.  This  method  may  be  altogether  too  am- 
bitious, but  if  logical  treatment  cannot  be  em- 
ployed in  psychology,  we  had  better  not  talk  of 
a  science  of  human  consciousness. 

For  the  general  polemical  tone  of  this  book 
no  apology  would  be  sincere.  Students  come 
into  psychology  with  all  sorts  of  quaint  notions 
about  themselves,  which  only  a  wholesale,  im- 
mediate house-cleaning  will  suffice  to  eliminate. 
Nothing  is  of  so  much  benefit  to  a  man  as  to 
realize  once  in  a  while  that  he  has  been  going 
by  momentum  rather  than  by  initiative,  and  a 
course  in  psychology  is  scarcely  beneficial  if  it 
does  not  pluck  one  clean  from  his  worst  ruts. 
In  fact,  the  writing  of  this  book  is  designed  to 
stimulate  to  that  end  rather  than  to  perpetuate 
drowsiness.  The  reader  is  hereby  assured  that 
all  of  the  notions  combated  in  these  pages  are 
combated  in  a  manner  specifically  meant.  As 
is  well  known,  realists  do  not  usually  have  the 
reputation  of  apologizing  for  their  directness, 
and  if  they  are  wrong,  no  one  need  hesitatingly 
whisper  back  the  verdict  of  error. 

As  a  last  special  item  to  be  mentioned,  this 
book  is  not  a  behavioristic  psychology,  however 
much  the  words  "organism"  and  "function"  may 


INTRODUCTION 
appear  in  it.  As  I  understand  it,  behaviorism 
is  a  theory  of  the  criteria  of  mind,  and  not  a 
system  that  can  be  substituted  for  psychology. 
It  is  rather  a  thesis  defending  the  notion  of 
continuity  in  the  animal  kingdom, — something, 
to  be  sure,  no  realist  would  sanely  controvert, — 
and  upon  inspection,  its  chief  motive  turns  out 
to  be  an  animism  with  the  "anima"  left  out.  It 
is  not  an  exhaustive  study  of  even  the  behaviors 
of  the  organisms  whose  tropisms  it  records. 
This  book  is  a  realistic  program  for  psychology 
and  thereby  holds  that  the  environment  is  al- 
ways to  be  kept  in  view  along  with  whatever 
the  organism  may  be  internally  or  externally 
accomplishing  upon  it. 

Not  all  has  been  accomplished,  however, 
that  was  in  the  original  plan.  As  a  text-book 
it  is  full  of  gaps.  But,  inasmuch  as  it  was  writ- 
ten solely  for  use  in  my  own  classes,  and  is  to 
be  supplemented  by  lectures  to  fill  in  these 
gaps,  only  the  general  plan  is  offered  for  crit- 
icism to  the  general  reader.  Few  signally  acute 
experiments  have  been  cited,  and  those  are  rep- 
resentative rather  than  exhaustive  reckonings 
with  the  data  involved.  The  empirical  status  of 
mind  is  the  central  item  of  this  book,  as  well 
as  the   continual    warnings    against  mysticism 


INTRODUCTION 

and  sentimentality  in  regard  to  the  science  of 
psychology. 

The  bibliography  included  in  this  book  has 
JDeen  devised  for  elementary  students  who  do 
not  readily  read  French  or  German.  It  contains 
but  few  references,  and  these  few  are  selected 
with  a  view  to  supporting  rather  than  inhibiting 
the  theses  contained  in  the  text. 

In  the  preparation  of  this  book  for  the  press 
I  have  been  assisted  in  various  ways  by  those 
to  whom  this  public  thanks  is  due.  To  my  col- 
league, Dr.  E.  R.  Guthrie,  1  am  indebted  for  very 
helpful  hints  as  to  some  of  the  logical  matters 
involved  in  the  first  two  chapters;  to  Margaret 
Givler,  for  a  thorough  inspection  and  criticism 
of  the  text  in  point  of  diction  and  rhetoric;  and 
to  Mr.  William  R.  Wilson,  of  the  University  of 
Washington,  for  assistance  in  proof-reading  as 
well  as  for  suggestions  as  to  clarity  of  expres- 
sion from  the  student's  standpoint. 

Seattle,  Aug.  1,  1915. 


VI 


Terniinolog 


CONTENTS 

Chapter  I.                          Page 
1 


Chapter  II. 
Psychological   Analysis    39 

Chapter  III. 
The  Sensitive  and  Perceptive  Organs 71 

Chapter  IV. 
The  Emotional  Complex  302 

Chapter  V. 
Matters  and  Minds   374 


THE  "CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION" 
CHAPTER   I. 

TERMINOLOGY 

1.  There  are  two  fallacies,  either  of  which 
usually  bothers  the  tyro  in  psychology:  the 
first  is,  that  since  everybody  has  a  mind,  each 
one  on  that  account  knows  more  than  any  one 
else  can  know  about  his  own  mind;  and  the 
other  is,  that  mind,  being  that  unique  and  most 
intricate  thing  in  the  whole  universe,  contains 
something  so  elusive  and  mysterious  that  it  can 
never  be  fully  known. 

2.  The  first  thing  to  do  is  to  surmount  both 
of  these  statements  so  that  they  will  not 
plague  us  any  longer.  They  are  both  samples 
of  reasoning  by  analogy,  rather  than  reasoning 
from  principles  concerning  which  there  is  no 
room  for  quibbling.  If  a  thing  can  be  dis- 
proven  by  the  same  sort  of  reasoning  by  which 
it  was  proven,  it  cannot  be  sound.  We  shall, 
then,  first  disprove  them  by  analogical  reason- 
ing, and  later  on,  by  another  and  better  kind, 
so  that  they  will  be  permanently  surmounted. 
Now,  everybody  not  only  has  a  mind,  but  a 
deceased  ancestor,  a  mesentery,  and  at  an  early 

1 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
age,  a  future.  But  who  would  claim  to  know 
his  own  deceased  ancestor  as  well  as  some  one 
else  might  have  known  him,  or  that  the 
healthy  or  diseased  state  of  his  own  mesentery 
were  as  plainly  before  him  as  the  news  of  to- 
day's paper?  Nor,  again,  can  it  be  maintained 
that  one  necessarily  knows  his  own  future  or 
what  its  development  will  be  as  well  as  those 
who,  having  followed  his  family  history,  might 
safely  predict  after  watching  his  habit  forma- 
tions ripen  into  maturity  beyond  voluntary  re- 
call. This  shows  sufficiently  the  purely  verbal 
character  of  the  first  fallacy  in  the  preceding 
paragraph. 

3.  For  the  second  one,  a  similar  treatment 
will  suffice.  The  mysterious  element  in  mind  is 
said  to  stand  in  the  way  of  a  scientific  psychol- 
ogy, inasmuch  as  mystery  is  a  word  usually 
employed  to  indicate  an  inherent  property  of 
things  not  yet  known.  But,  besides  this,  there 
is  no  reason  why  one  should  reserve  his  mys- 
teries until  the  last  chapter  of  psychology, 
rather  than  plant  them  squarely  at  the  begin- 
ning, or  why  that  part  of  psychology  which  is 
open  to  investigation  must  therefore  be  pes- 
tered by  some  beetling  mystery  which  comes 
ominously  near  and  provokingly  soon.  To 
carry  this  fallacious  argument  to  its  limits,  one 
2 


TERMINOLOGY 
would  be  permitted,  in  solving  a  mathematical 
problem,  to  excuse  his  errors  in  calculation  on 
the  ground  that  numbers  were  pure  figments  of 
the  imagination  anyway,  and  that  his  imagina- 
tion was  at  least  as  good  as  that  of  the  early 
Egyptians. 

4.  This  is,  however,  only  meeting  poor 
arguments  with  equally  poor  ones.  A  fallacy 
is  not  merely  something  that  can  be  laughed 
off,  but  in  these  cases  it  is  something  which 
needs  to  be  surmounted  by  an  appeal  to  exact 
principles  rather  than  to  the  playfulness  of 
words.  As  soon  as  one  begins  an  argument,  he 
lays  himself  open  to  the  perils  of  argument;  it 
will  also  be  public  information  whether  what 
goes  for  proof  can  withstand  all  inquiry  that  is 
brought  to  bear  upon  the  statements  uttered 
and  defended.  The  difficulty  with  these  two 
fallacies  is  that  they  contain  words  which  can- 
not be  pressed  for  their  meaning  within  the 
total  context  in  which  they  are  embedded;  lack- 
ing the  form  of  clear-cut  statements,  they  can- 
not be  pressed  for  conclusions.  Chaff  put  into 
a  hopper  will  not  grind  into  wheat  in  any  mill 
except  the  one  owned  by  Grimm  and  Grimm. 
Let  us  carefully  show  how  this  is. 

5.     Every  science  is  a  collection  of  observed 
facts  gathered  together  under  the  guidance  of 
3 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
a  permanent  interest,  plus  as  many  conjectures 
as  to  the  relationships  of  these  facts  to  one  an- 
other as  are  required  to  arrange  them  in  a  sys- 
tem or  to  apply  them  to  things  of  the  street. 
A  system  is  an  arrangement  of  things  from  sim- 
ple to  complex,  fundamental  to  variable;  a  pile 
of  rubbish  is  not  a  system,  while  the  plans  for 
building  a  pyramid  are.  The  facts  of  a  science 
must  first  be  supplied  with  names,  and  the  sig- 
nificance of  the  names  lies  in  what  the  things 
named  will  do  to  one  another  under  certatin 
fixed  conditions.  So  that  which  was  first 
named  by  means  of  a  noun,  implying  substance 
and  fixity,  often  later  on  comes  to  mean  what 
we  express  by  verbs, — valences,  chronic  in- 
stabilities, readiness  to  affect  or  be  affected  by 
other  things.  Over  the  terminology,  however, 
usually  not  much  difficulty  seriously  arises;  our 
language  is  not  so  petrified  as  to  forbid  a 
change  of  meaning  without  a  change  of  form. 
But  it  is  not  such  a  simple  matter  when  one 
comes  to  the  conjectural  part  of  a  science.  To 
formulate  the  laws  of  the  way  things  behave,  to 
be  sure  that  one's  sampling  of  behaviors  is 
broad  and  salient,  and  to  arrange  the  laws  in  a 
logical  system, — here  in  the  case  of  every 
science  there  is  much  difficulty,  more  disagree- 
ment and  a  maximum  of  doubt  as  to  what  can 
4 


TERMINOLOGY 
actually  be  deduced  from  a  system  so  formed, 
no  matter  what  the  science  may  be, — Geometry 
or  Ethics. 

6.  Every  science,  therefore,  might  be  said 
to  have  two  sides, — one  of  observation  and  the 
other  of  logic.  We  perceive  well  enough,  per- 
haps, what  is  before  us,  but  we  cannot  speak 
well  enough  to  cover  the  facts  or  to  convince 
the  audience.  To  offset  this  as  much  as  pos- 
sible, every  science  reducible  to  exact  termin- 
ology and  quantification  is  phrased  in  symbols 
peculiarly  specific  and  univocal  in  character. 
Words  of  many  meanings  will  not  do.  It  thus 
uses  expressions  which  are  defined,  or  limited 
in  scope  which  cover  precisely  the  data  in- 
volved and  have  the  same,  rather  than  a  differ- 
ent meaning  to  every  one  more  or  less  con- 
cerned. One  beginning  the  study  of  such  a 
science  often  is  disappointed  at  finding  himself 
in  the  dark  in  regard  to  the  thing  to  be  studied, 
— he  had  thought  that  it  was  to  have  much  more 
connection  with  his  daily,  pressing  needs.  The 
reason  for  this  is  that  those  who  have  devel- 
oped the  science  had  first  themselves  to  unlearn 
the  current,  metaphorical,  inexact  speech  in 
order  to  make  any  headway  in  it.  To  com- 
mand nature,  they  found  they  had  first  to  obey 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
it,  and  so  the  lesser  good  had  been  butchered 
without  a  public  ceremony  of  apolog>\ 

7.  Thus  every  science  aims  to  be  symbolical 
and  univocal  in  its  terminology.  However,  in 
psychology,  one  can  hardly  ever  be  said  to  be 
clear  of  that  realm  of  discourse  where  the  pri- 
vate interpretation  of  a  word  may  not  interrupt 
all  attempts  at  deductive  formulation.  Almost 
every  statement  can  be  challenged,  almost  ev- 
ery fact  be  named  in  several  fairly  satisfactory 
ways.  But  this  by  no  means  relegates  it  to  the 
realm  of  clannish  prejudice.  For  when  a  fact 
has  the  possibility  of  being  named  in  many 
ways,  it  means  only  one  thing, — that  it  is  no 
simple,  single  fact  that  is  before  one.  One  must 
then  look  to  his  terminology  to  see  how  much 
and  in  what  essentials  his  names  for  facts  have 
differences  irreconcilable  with  straightforward 
deductive  formulation.  Everything  is  equally 
a  matter  of  fact,  and  no  datum  has  any  special 
privileges.  If  one's  logic  cannot  take  care  of 
this  or  that  sufficient  statement,  it  is  time  for 
logic  to  be  amended  to  fit  a  world  whose  scien- 
tific battles  it  fights. 

8.     One  thing  more :    no  facts  have  the  plas- 
tic character  which  language  has.     One  goes  to 
the  facts,  observes   them,   analyses  and  orders 
them;    reconsiders,    re-observes    and    carefully 
6 


TERMINOLOGY 
names  them  over  again, — if  his  need  for  nam- 
ing comes  out  of  a  dominant  motive  in  his  en- 
deavors,—and  no  amount  of  juggling  with  the 
words  apart  from  the  facts  can  alter  their 
status  in  the  universe  whose  laws  they  exhibit. 
Hasty  conclusions,  private  uses,  idealistic  or 
theological  motives  may  seem  to  have  the  power 
of  twisting  out  of  their  orders  in  the  world  the 
brute  items  of  empirical  nature,  but  a  little 
watchfulness  will  serve  to  undermine  such 
traducing  of  things  empirical  and  render  again 
to  the  Caesar  of  organized  facts  the  things  that 
are  none  but  his.  Even  the  private  realm  of 
one's  own  thoughts  has  of  late  years  been  ob- 
liged to  yield  to  exact  statement.  Where,  too, 
formal  logic  was  insufficient  to  show  the  bear- 
ings of  private  thoughts  upon  behavior,  an  in- 
formal logic  has  been  used  to  suit  each  indi- 
vidual case,  thus  meeting  the  unique  and 
"mysterious"  upon  its  own  grounds.  The 
growth  of  abnormal  psychology  has  done  much 
to  tear  away  the  mask  from  the  so-called  "inner 
self"  and  render  its  crab-like  movements  pain- 
fully visible  to  any  curious  passerby. 

9.     But  to  the  theme.     The  first  two  state- 
ments of  this  chapter  were  called  fallacies  not 
only  because  of  their  being  controvertible  by  a 
mere  twist  of  words,  but  rather  because  they 
7 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
used  concepts  in  a  way  totally  inadequate  to 
their  logical  significance  in  psychology.  One 
argues  only  by  means  of  logic.  There  are  no 
"psychological"  or  "moral"  or  "economic"  rea- 
sons,— not  to  say,  of  course,  that  psychologists 
or  moralists  or  economists  do  not  argue.  Noth- 
ing powerful  or  superior,  however,  lies  in  any 
special  kind  of  reasoning.  All  reasons  are 
couched  in  "the  rules  of  the  game  of  talk,"  as 
my  colleague.  Dr.  Ducasse,  would  say,  and  have 
validity  only  in  so  far  as  they  conform  to  that 
pattern  of  expression.  Other  things  may  pro- 
voke belief,  or  persuade  the  lazy  not  to  stew 
any  longer  in  their  own  juice,  but  reasoning  is 
like  a  game  of  chess, — it  has  inviolable  rules. 
It  has  more,  since  every  science  is  a  case  of  ap- 
plied logic.  The  data  of  science  are  not  in- 
vented, but  discovered,  and  certain  few  things 
can  be  done  with  them  and  certain  others  can- 
not. Only  when  "dass  Lied  ist  auss,"  does  there 
come  a  hankering  after  any  "special"  type  of 
reasoning. 

10.  "Because  I  have  a  mind,  therefore  I 
should  know  more  about  it  than  any  one  else," 
— were  this  merely  a  verbal  fallacy,  one  could 
easily  laugh  it  down;  but  it  contains  a  more 
serious  fallacy  than  that.  The  expression,  "I 
have  a  mind,"  harmless  enough  in  itself,  is  a 
8 


TERMINOLOGY 
statement  from  which  nothing  can  be  argued, 
IF  THAT  STATEMENT    IS    THE    STARTING 
POINT.     The  speaker  of  it  considers  himself  a 
psychologist  and  intends  that  it  shall  be  valid 
for   psychology.     What   else   could   it   purport 
to  be?     But  as  formulated,  it  is  an  inexact  ob- 
servation, a  bit  of  random  thinking  that  needs 
to  be   drawn   and  quartered   rather  than   em- 
ployed  determinately.     It    is    really   a   coales- 
cence of  two  statements,  and  belongs  to  the  in- 
trospective psychology  of  selfhood  rather  than 
to  the  outspoken  formulations  of  mental  life. 
As  a  random  thought,  it  exhibits  the  informal 
logic  of  random  thinking;  but  statements  meant 
for  the  public  ear  must  be  couched  in  the  rules 
of  the  game  of  talk.     It  is  not  a  premiss  from 
which,  by  itself,  anything  whatever  can  be  con- 
cluded.    "Having,"  in  fact,  is  a   derivative  of 
other  things, — familiarity,  acquisition,  constant 
dealings  with,  something  spoken  or  spoken  of, 
and  the  like,  and  not  an  orginal,  first-hand  mat- 
ter at  all.     The  other  statement,— the  one  in- 
volving the  Mystery  and  tacitly  invoking  her  at 
the     same     time, — exhibits     several     fallacies, 
which  are:      (1)   that  a  mystery  would  not  re- 
main a  mystery  if  it  were  knowable,  and   (2) 
that  the  part  depends  upon  the  whole  for  its 
existence     and     significance.     It    will    be    seen 
9 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
later  on  in  the  chapter  on  psychological  anal- 
ysis that,  even  if  the  naming  of  all  the  parts  of  a 
whole  does  not  appear  to  exhaust  or  explain 
the  properties  of  that  whole,  it  is  not  due  to 
thinking,  but  to  the  organization  of  the  parts 
by  an  extra-mental  set  of  functions,  which  ac- 
counts for  the  "mysterious"  element  to  a  large 
degree.  The  first  of  these  statements  under  dis- 
cussion is  a  fallacy,  therefore,  because  it  is  an 
inexact  formulation.  The  second,  likewise,  be- 
cause it  violates  a  law  of  the  logic  of  organiza- 
tion. 

11.  It  will  be  advantageous,  then,  for  the 
student  to  approach  psychology  without  any 
presuppositions.  Other  assumptions  than  the 
aforementioned  fallacies  may  arise  in  the  read- 
er's mind;  some  of  these  coming  from  trivial, 
others  from  earnest  desires  in  regard  to  ones- 
self.  Yet  hasty  formulations  are  always  un- 
wise, and  usually,  wrong.  Psychology  is  a 
$tudy  of  facts,  facts  not  altered  by  thinking,  and 
only  the  inability  to  back  off"  from  them  as 
readily  as  from  the  facts  of  the  physical  sciences 
is  responsible  for  the  popular  view  of  it  as  be- 
ing a  study  of  the  way  one  "feels"  about  things. 
Only  because  psychological  things  make  up  to 
so  large  an  extent  the  tissue  of  human  afi'airs  is 
one  led  to  infer  that  the  naive  expressions  of 
10 


TERMINOLOGY 
popular  speech  can  become  the  terminology  of 
the  science  of  psychology  without  alteration  in 
meaning.  "Mind,"  "consciousness,"  "thought," 
"emotion"  and  the  like  are  all  terms  as  familiar 
to  the  psychologist  as  to  the  man  on  the  street, 
but  the  two  cannot  converse  scientifically  on 
the  slender  basis  of  this  familiarity.  Both  care- 
ful examination  and  redefinition  are  essential 
if  understanding  is  to  accompany  the  use  of 
such  words.  The  need  for  such  careful  exam- 
ination is  nowhere  so  revealed  as  in  cases  of 
naive  prediction  and  reasoning  about  things 
mental.  In  the  writings  of  certain  mental  heal- 
ers of  today,  for  example,  alliteration  is  the 
highest  "logical"  category;  "experience  proves" 
is  a  shibboleth  from  another  quarter,  from  per- 
sons blissfully  ignorant  of  the  fact  that  experi- 
ence is  both  a  noun  and  a  verb,  usually  em- 
ployed in  an  equivocal  sense.  "It  is  unthink- 
able" asserts  a  third  party,  and  then  he  goes  on 
to  state  just  how  carefully  the  "unthinkable" 
has  been  thought  out.  From  such  pitfalls  of  ex- 
pression one  needs  to  be  emphatically  warned 
in  psycholog\\ 

12.     Add  to  that  this:  there  is  as  yet  no  com- 
plete,    univocal     terminology     in     psychology. 
Modern   Logic  has    evolved  a   set  of  symbols 
which  avoid  careless  interpretation  of  the  pro- 
11 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
cesses  in  that  science.  The  physical  sciences, 
and,  to  a  large  extent  the  biological,  also,  need 
not  always  name  their  facts  by  such  terms  as 
can  be  quibbled  over  by  those  not  initiated. 
Psychology,  however,  lying  on  the  topmost  froth 
of  things,  has  never  been  and  can  never  be, 
wholly  free  from  the  errors  of  verbalism.  If 
it  had  radically  fashioned  its  own  set  terms,  and 
used  heiroglyphic  symbols  to  express  them,  this 
very  fact  might  be  a  sign  of  its  incapability  to 
serve  that  human  interest  out  of  which  it  sprang 
and  whose  evolution  it  seeks  to  register  daily. 
For  while  every  deductive  science  is  a  case  of 
applied  logic,  and  while  logic  and  mathematics 
are  basically  one,  the  universe  of  science  rests 
not  altogether  solidly,  but  rather  totters  on  the 
mathematical  foundations  to  which  we  ulti- 
mately appeal  for  proof. 

13.  For,  if  one  goes  to  the  facts  of  a  science 
to  find  out  what  shall  be  said  about  them,  and 
finds  there  a  number  of  curiously  enigmatical 
things,  yes,  even  "mysterious"  things,  as  one 
sometimes  does,  it  would  be  lazy-mindedness 
and  vanity  alone  which  would  lead  him  to 
call  by  simple  names  things  which  were  exceed- 
ingly complex.  Psychology  is  full  of  just  such 
complexities.  For  example,  one  starts  to  in- 
vestigate a  certain  phenomenon,  say  memory;  he 
12 


TERMINOLOGY 
names  it  by  its  accustomed  name  and  sets  an 
experiment  which  has  all  possible  control  over 
the  conditions  involved.  But  frequently  the 
simple,  first  name  given  to  it  begins  to  prove 
inadequate;  it  is  not  simple,  and  the  single 
noun,  such  as  memory,  adaptation  and  so  on, 
will  no  longer  do  at  all.  Together  with  this, 
frequently  conclusions  will  be  drawn  from  the 
fact  that  simple  words  seemed  to  fit  together  to 
make  conclusions  sought  for  as  words  usually 
do,  whereas  the  facts  referred  to  by  such  words 
had  need  of  being  reinterpreted  for  use  in  any 
other  context  than  the  small  one  determined  by 
the  rigid  conditions  of  a  single  experiment. 
The  interests  of  science  were  thus  curtailed. 
Clean  experimentation,  however,  cannot  be  sat- 
isfied with  such  methods.  If  the  simple  name 
first  given  to  the  phenomenon  is  inadequate, 
or  if  the  control  of  the  conditions  of  experiment 
interferes  with  the  free  operation  of  the  func- 
tions to  be  investigated,  the  work  is  dropped,  the 
experiment  reset,  and  the  old  categories  are  dis- 
carded. In  psychology,  as  the  signal  example 
of  a  science  whose  reagents  in  the  laboratory 
are  human  beings,  one  must  be  prepared  for 
any  emergency  of  this  kind.  Only  a  few  hu- 
man beings  make  good  subjects  in  psychology, 
and  even  those  must  go  through  a  serious  and 
13 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
long  training  in  accepting  the  instructions  given 
and  keeping  even-minded  in  order  to  be  valu- 
able for  the  work  under  investigation.  Psych- 
ology, as  a  record  from  which  general  state- 
ments can  be  made,  is  thus  a  study  of  the  re- 
actions of  selected  human  beings;  its  data  are 
gathered  from  persons  found  fit  to  accept  the 
conditions  of  experimentation,  and  not  others. 
Figuratively,  it  is  an  assay  of  the  highest  grades 
of  ore.  Life  is  too  short  to  evolve  a  deductive 
science  of  individual  meteors.  Not  to  say,  how- 
ever, that  with  brows  uplifted  and  eyes  aloft, 
psychology  neglects  those  unregenerates  who 
fail  to  come  up  to  strict  laboratory  require- 
ments; for  this  would  be  both  pharisaism  in 
science  as  well  as  unfairness  to  my  fellow 
psychologists.  Only  this  is  meant,  that  to  re- 
port specifically  upon  a  matter  requiring  selec- 
tive attention,  selective  attenders  of  such  a 
stripe  are  the  only  possible  grist.  When  the 
erratic  are  in  the  majority,  we  are  only  experi- 
menting upon  erratics  and  not  upon  the  in- 
tended datum  set  forth. 

14.  Coupled  with  the  above  warnings  in  the 
approach  to  psychology,  a  little  need  as  well 
be  said  about  the  use  of  proof  and  deduction 
after  the  data  of  the  science  have  been  correct- 
ly named,  the  experiments  cleanly  performed, 
14 


TERMINOLOGY 
and  the  chief  and  subsidiary  facts  arranged  in 
proper  order.  "This  fact  proves,"  it  is  some- 
times said,  and  about  such  statements  the  clans 
of  science  divide  and  dispute.  There  are  cases, 
of  course,  where  this  is  true,  but  one  needs  to 
be  wary.  All  the  sciences  are  of  two  kinds  on 
this  score, — those  which  are  altogether  deduc- 
tive and  those  which  are  slightly  deductive  and 
mostly  empirical.  Pure  mathematics  is  the 
only  strictly  deductive  science;  all  the  others 
are  of  the  latter  class. 

15.  Let  us  elucidate  this  difference.  Deduc- 
tion starts  with  principles,  which  when  in- 
volved, produce  results  and  conclusions  which 
are  new  in  the  sense  of  not  being  apparent 
from  the  original  principles,  but  are  "gener- 
ated" by  the  interaction  of  statements.  This 
does  not  mean  that  some  stater  behind  the 
statements  does  the  generating,  but  that  the 
empirical  properties  of  a  logical  statement  alone 
furnish  the  parts  out  of  which  the  new  formula- 
tion is  made.  For  the  stater  behind  the  state- 
ments is  but  a  mass  of  unformulated  material, 
which  must  come  out  and  "lie  flat  on  the  brush" 
before  it  can  be  claimed  to  have  the  persistent 
being  of  generating  things.  An  empirical 
science,  such  as  geology,  on  the  other  hand, 
first  gets  principles  from  observation,  and  in 
15 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
seeking  to  deduce  other  principles  from  them, 
MUST  ALWAYS  FIND  FACTS  OR  TERMS 
which  will  satisfy  the  conclusions  arrived  at. 
All  else  is  talking  in  the  air.  The  chemist  or 
the  physicist  can  see  how  the  conclusions  of  his 
statements  ought  to  reach  this  or  that  end,  but 
only  the  residues  in  the  retort  or  the  pattern  of 
crystallization  on  the  stone  shows  him  what 
the  upshot  of  his  statements  should  have  been. 
To  a  larger  extent  than  the  physicist  or  chem- 
ist will  admit,  also,  most  deduction  in  his 
science  is  just  plain  memory, — "it  will  happen 
again  because  it  has  happened  before,"  sums  up 
much  of  the  claims  for  deduction  in  most  of 
the  natural  sciences.  Their  power  lies  in  the 
control  of  conditions,  rather  than  in  the  ability 
of  their  conclusions  to  produce  the  facts  in  a 
presto  manner. 

16.  From  all  this  it  can  be  seen  that  the 
words  "logical"  and  "factual"  are  not  synon- 
ymous. Arguments  about  any  matter  may  en- 
tirely jump  the  track  and  evaporate  in  non- 
sense. They  may,  again,  run  parallel,  and,  in 
that  amount  of  a  science  which  survives  time, 
they  do.  But  one  needs  always  to  be  alert  for 
the  fact  that  will  exactly  fit  his  statements  as 
well  as  for  the  statement  that  will  exactly  fit 
his  facts,  facts  being  rather  hard  data  and  not 
16 


TERMINOLOGY 

to  be  treated  with  impugnity.  For  while  any 
statement  derived  from  logic  has  a  certain 
validity,  and  may  be  satisfied  with  terms  from 
some  sort  of  trans-experiential  realm,  unless 
the  terms  can  be  plainly  exhibited  to  all  comers, 
they  should  form  no  part  of  the  body  of  the 
science. 

17.  The  use  of  the  proper  language  and  the 
understanding  of  just  how  much  of  the  lan- 
guage one  uses  is  pertinent  to  the  matter  in 
liand  is  so  important  for  psychology,  that  I 
shall  give  on  the  next  few  pages  samples  of 
speech  containing  psychological  as  well  as  non- 
psychological  material,  some  of  which  will  be 
analysed  for  the  student,  the  remainder  being 
left  for  him  to  analyse  for  himself.  At  first,  of 
course,  he  will  not  be  able  to  see  the  full  drift 
of  it,  but  with  further  study,  new  insight  will 
come.  To  many  this  will  seem  a  curious  and 
backhanded  way  of  beginning  the  study  of 
mind,  for  most  text-books  start  in  with  an  eluci- 
dation of  neural  processes  and  the  gospel  of 
dendrites, — things  which  only  the  post-mortem 
anatomist  experiences  first  hand.  These  anal- 
yses we  shall  undertake  are  of  things  far  more 
of  the  now  and  always,  and  the  claim  is  here 
made  that  it  is  with  this  sort  of  thing  that 
psychology  is  after  all  mostly  concerned.  Let 
17 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
US  analyse  the  following  statements  in  common 
use: 

1.  The  action  of  the  heart  is  purely  me- 
chanical. 

Psychological  interest  is  here  focussed  on 
the  word  "purely."  First  compare  the  above 
statement  with  what  is  left  with  this  word 
omitted. 

The  action  of  the  heart  is  mechanical. 

The  action  of  the  heart  is  purely  mechanical. 

Logically  it  is  the  same,  unless  "purely" 
means  "nothing  but"  or  some  such  equivalence, 
gratia  verborum,  but  psychologically  this  word 
adds  one  of  several  items  to  the  situation,  (a) 
It  delays  the  utterance  of  the  adjectival  predi- 
cate "mechanical,"  and  in  so  doing  intensifies 
the  effect  of  that  predicate,  and  by  the  delay  it 
causes  also  allows  the  first  five  words  better 
to  be  assimilated  and  perceived  as  a  unit.  Or, 
(b)  the  word  "purely"  insinuates,  by  the  tone 
of  voice  used  in  uttering  it,  something  not  alto- 
gether complimentary  to  the  heart  action  and 
we  are  immediately  affected  by  this  bias  in  it. 

2.  Where  did  you  go  yesterday? 

The    answering   of    this   question   implies   a 
memory.     The  full  psychological  putting  of  the 
matter  would  be  something  like  this.     The  sen- 
sations  of   what   objects   and   movements   are 
18 


TERMINOLOGY 
restored  to  you   upon  the  mention   of  a   time 
twenty-four  hours  previous  to  this?     Of  course 
as  a  statement  in  psycholog>%  it  is  very  con- 
densed, and  does  not  ask  by  what  means  the 
memory  is  preserved,   whether  by  vision,   au- 
dition, movement,  or  speech;  nor  whether  there 
is  clarity  or  obscurity  in  the  content  of  con- 
sciousness provoked  by  the  question. 
3.     I  have  never  heard  of  it. 
We  are  concerned  here  wdth  three  things: 
(a)   the  past  tense  of  the  verb  "hear,"  (b)   the 
meaning  of  "never,"  and  (c)  the  use  of  the  prep- 
osition "of."     As  for  the  first  of  these,  it  refers 
again  to  memory;  the  second  differs  from  the 
word  "not"  by  temporal  extent,  drawn-outness, 
— "not"  meaning  a  single  point  of  time,  while 
"never"   means   many  "nots"   in   a   continuous 
stream.     The  word  "of,"  harmless  as  it  sounds, 
is  indicative   of  a  very  complex  relationship. 
Whatever  "it"  means,  whether  an  engagement 
between  two  lovers  or  a  "cat's-paw"  in  calm 
weather,  is  surely  a  datum  mentionable,  hap- 
pening somewhere,  and  more  or  less  related  to 
other  things.     But  we  do  not  say  "I  hear  of  a 
noise,"  as  the  Greek  language  says  it;  we  say 
hear  a  noise,  see  a  light,  smell  a  rose;  and  only 
a  few  verbs  in  English  are  followed  by  the  prep- 
osition  in   comparison   with   many   other  lan- 
19 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
guages  dead  or  living.  What,  then,  do  we  mean 
by  "hear  of  it,"  in  referring  to  a  thing  past? 
Why,  this,  that  the  observer  himself  told  it,  and 
we  heard  him  tell  it,  and  thus  we  use  the  word 
"of"  for  things  that  come  to  us  in  relays  rather 
than  directly  and  immediately.  But  this  does 
not  mean  that  the  expression  "think  of  it"  is  ex- 
plained in  the  same  way.  "Think"  is  not  al- 
ways followed  by  a  preposition,  nor  are  the 
words  which  follow  the  prepositions  necessarily 
things  relayed  to  the  thinker.  We  shall  take 
up  this  matter  vigorously  when  we  come  to  the 
old  bugaboo,  "consciousness  OF." 

4.  I  like  this  ever  so  much  more  than  that 
one. 

Liking  is  something  peculiarly  psychological, 
and  is  the  starting  point  for  choice.  It  cannot 
be  referred  to  logic,  for  people  "like"  that  which 
all  arguments  show  is  false,  dangerous,  and  sure 
to  produce  an  aftermath  of  ill.  "Ever  so 
much  more"  is  an  attempt  to  make  a  scale  of 
values,  and  is  an  example  of  the  only  "mental" 
arithmetic  there  is.  "Ever  so  much  more,"  also 
differs  from  plain  "more"  by  the  greater  num- 
ber of  syllables  intervening  between  "this  one" 
and  "that,"  allowing  the  voice  to  add  emotion 
to  the  comparison. 


20 


TERMINOLOGY 
5.     "Sicklied   o'er   with     a    pale     cast    of 
thought." 

This  line  from  Hamlet  is  an  hyperhole  in 
rhetoric,  while  it  is  a  case  of  empathy  in 
psychologj^  Empathy  differs  from  personifi- 
cation in  that  it  neither  capitalizes  the  import- 
ant word,  nor  does  it  imply  as  much  animation 
as  the  latter.  Thus,  empathically,  a  mountain 
bears  up  the  sky  above  it,  while  in  personifica- 
tion the  mountain  is  a  man  whose  shoulders 
are  overburdened  with  the  weight  of  sky  they 
support.  Two  of  the  words  in  this  expression 
are  strictly  poetical, — "sicklied"  and  "o'er." 
"O'er"  is  used  for  smoothness  and  fine  sound, 
while  "sicklied"  is  a  "new"  word,  psychological- 
ly. It  arose  from  the  mood  background  which 
dominated  the  author.  The  word  "cast"  is 
used  to  express  inertness,  referring  at  the  same 
time  to  the  fixity  and  whiteness  of  plaster;  the 
sound  of  the  w^ord  also  helps  to  convey  one  of 
these  meanings.  The  above  expression,  taken 
as  a  whole  and  apart  from  the  context  in  which 
it  was  uttered,  need  not  have  any  clear,  whole- 
some meaning  at  all,  for  it  was  not  uttered  as 
any  thing  to  be  formally  defined  or  analysed. 
Certain  sayings  are  indexes  of  moods,  and 
moods  are  not  always  possible  or  profitable  to 
press  for  their  signification. 
21 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 

18.  The  student  will  analyse  for  himself  as 
well  as  he  can  the  following  expressions: 

1.  Fatima  cigarettes  are  "Distinctively  Indi- 
vidual." 

2.  The  price  of  this  waist  is  $2.98. 

3.  He  completely  forgot  himself. 

4.  Friends,  Romans,  countrymen,  lend  me 
your  ears. 

5.  By  merit  raised  to  that  bad  eminence. 

6.  I  have  a  good  mind  to  do  it. 

7.  The  spirit  is  willing,  but  the  flesh  is 
weak. 

8.  Why,  then  the  devil  give  him  good  of  it. 

9.  He  thanked  his  stars. 
10.     I  only  hope  it  is  not  so. 

19.  Out  of  the  preceding  examples  much 
more  could  be  derived  than  has  been  indicated, 
but  the  analysis  of  a  thing  as  it  stands  is  quite 
different  from  an  historical  account  of  its  de- 
velopment. This  item  has  particular  point  in 
psychology,  for  here  one  has  to  explain  how 
things  started  as  well  as  why  they  continued 
and  what  they  are  now.  This,  of  course,  brings 
one  face  to  face  with  what  are  called  causes, 
and  every  science  is  supposed  to  have  ready- 
made  answers  to  every  question  beginning  with 
"why"  that  can  be  formulated.  And  while  this 
is  a  logical  matter  entirely,  this  much  needs  to 

22 


TERMINOLOGY 

be  said  about  it  at  this  point.  Some  questions 
beginning  with  "why"  are  answerable,  and  some 
others  are  not.  If  the  reader  will  look  into  a 
text-book  of  Logic  for  the  "fallacy  of  many 
questions"  and  study  the  examples  there  given, 
he  will  understand  that  every  question  begin- 
ning with  "why"  is  answerable  only  when  it 
contains  one  question  and  only  one.  Moreover, 
only  such  things  have  a  cause  as  can  be  ana- 
lysed where  at  least  one  of  the  elements  de- 
pends upon  a  temporal  sequence  for  its  specific 
effect  in  the  whole  to  which  it  contributes. 
Furthermore,  there  are  in  every  science  what 
are  called  "elements,"  "primary  facts,"  "irre- 
ducible first  principles,"  and  to  ask  the  reasons 
for  them  in  that  science  is  to  ask  a  question  to 
which  there  is  only  an  "old  wives'  fable"  for 
an  answer. 

20.  This  can  be  directly  shown  by  the  fol- 
lowing: As  the  writer  understands  it,  the  dif- 
ference between  mathematics  and  the  other 
sciences  is  Time.  There  is,  indeed,  no  mention 
of  time  in  either  Geometry  or  Algebra.  Their 
principles,  it  is  true,  were  found  out  by  cul- 
tured gentlemen  in  this  or  that  decade  or  cen- 
tury, but  there  is  no  t  or  t-  in  mathematics  as 
there  is,  for  example,  in  physics.  Time  being 
the  one  fundamental,  independent  variable  of 
23 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
science,  the  sciences  are  logically  arranged  in 
point  of  the  amount  of  dependence  they  show 
upon  this  temporal  factor.  In  such  an  arrange- 
ment the  sciences  based  on  psychology  are  at 
the  extreme  end  of  the  list,  farthest  from  mathe- 
matics,— that  is,  from  the  mathematics  which 
deals  with  general  data  and  does  not  need  to 
discount  its  answers  upon  meeting  with  the 
empirical  situation.  Less  and  less  intric- 
ately involved  in  the  temporal  dilemma 
than  is  psychology  are  first  the  biological 
sciences,  next  the  chemical,  and  next  the 
physical.  In  the  mathematical  sciences, 
which  come  next,  time  is  replaced  by  the  sort 
of  activity  which  generates  the  number  system. 
As  the  time  element  increases  in  complexity  in 
the  scale  of  sciences,  also,  less  and  less  do  they 
become  reducible  to  a  mathematical  or  equa- 
tional  form.  Now  the  questions  propounded  to 
the  physicist  which  ask  "why"  are  explained 
either  by  reference  to  mathematics,  or  by  the 
elements  of  his  own  science;  those  put  to  the 
chemist  are  referred  either  to  his  own  data,  to 
those  of  physics,  or  those  of  mathematics;  and 
so  on  throughout  the  list.  But  not  every  "why" 
in  any  one  science  is  necessarily  referred  be- 
yond that  science.  Some  things  are  chemical, 
and  that  ends  it.  Thus,  also,  some  things  are 
24 


TERMINOLOGY 
psychological  and  nothing  else,  and  the  answer 
is  vanity  that  attempts  to  find  a  first  cause  for 
them  in  the  realm  of  things  remote.  The  above- 
mentioned  order,  also,  of  the  sciences  is  not 
reversible.  One  does  not  go  to  psychology,  for 
instance,  to  find  out  the  fundamental  facts  of 
geology,  nor  to  the  realm  of  esthetics  for  the 
fact  that  there  are  but  three  laws  in  Newton's 
formulation  of  the  activity  of  moving  bodies. 

21.  Many  writers  call  these  "elements"  or 
"primary  facts"  assumptions,  and  mean  by  that 
word  something  not  altogether  complimentary 
to  the  science.  It  is  not  here  to  be  argued  why 
these  should  not  be  accepted  as  assumptions, 
with  all  the  unlovely  flavor  that  has  accrued  to 
the  word;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  re- 
membered that  no  one  starts  a  science,  and  that 
an  assumption  is  not  the  first  thing  sought  for 
by  scientists.  All  science  is  chasing  flying 
game,  and  no  fair-minded  scientist  "assumes" 
except  for  the  purpose  of  tentatively  arranging 
facts  in  a  probable  order. 

22.  The  principal  thing,  also,  in  answering 
the  question  "why,"  (which  is  far  less  important 
than  the  questions  "what"  or  "how"),  is  not  to 
explain  things  away  by  reference  to  something 
remote  or  forgotten,  but  to  point  out  the  func- 
tional  dependence    of   various   things   on    each 

25 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
other.  Cause  is  no  longer  a  live  word  in 
science.  Only  naive  minds  seek  for  a  cause. 
Just  as  the  words  "must"  and  "ought"  have 
finally  lost  their  zest,  even  in  Ethics,  so  the  word 
"cause"  is  nothing  to  conjure  with  today.  Cause 
always  had  the  ultimate  meaning  of  "who  made 
it?"  and  "making"  is  nothing  with  which  science 
has  to  do.  That  vis  viva  or  Anstoss  which  for- 
merly was  said  to  make  a  stone  in  the  air  fall 
to  the  ground,  or  make  a  man  follow  theft  with 
theft,  is  not  any  longer  harbored  in  scientific 
thinking.  Functional  dependence  has  replaced 
it  entirely,  and  by  functional  dependence  the 
following  things  are  meant:  (1)  that  all  nat- 
ural laws  are  laws  of  description  and  not  of 
necessity,  and  (2)  that  those  laws  are  exhibited 
only  when  terms  are  free  to  be  involved  in  the 
relations  they  entail.  If  a  room  is  full  of  il- 
luminating gas,  only  when  there  are  persons  in 
it  will  there  be  any  deaths  from  asphyxiation; 
similarly,  a  nation  will  be  successful  in  war 
only  when  patriotism  is  backed  by  a  purse. 
"Only  when,"  "when  this,  then  that,"  "the  con- 
ditions being  fulfilled,"— these  are  the  salient 
words  in  science  today.  Cause  is  nothing  to  be 
wept  or  argued  over;  the  question  "why"  is 
sheer  myth  and  biography. 

23.     It  is  by  means  of  this  principle  of  func- 
26 


TERMINOLOGY 
tional  dependence  that  the  empirical  sciences, 
incUiding  psychology,  become  deductive  as  well. 
We  shall  see  later  on  why,  (apply  the  func- 
tional meaning  from  now  on  to  this  word), 
psychology  is  not  a  science  of  the  "shreds  and 
clippings  of  other  things,"  nor  a  study  of  illu- 
sions or  of  brain  perspirations,  but  a  study  of 
the  functional  dependence  of  mind  upon  the 
objects  within  reach  of  the  sensitive  and  per- 
ceptive organs  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  the  ac- 
tion of  auto-catalysed  nerve  colonies  within  the 
body  on  the  other.  A  detailed  explanation  of 
the  meaning  of  these  expressions  will  be  given 
in  succeeding  pages.  Suffice  it  to  say  here,  that 
the  term  "functional  dependence"  does  not 
mean  any  chain-system  of  fore-ordained  hap- 
penings, but  rather  the  readiness  of  storehouses 
of  energy  to  discharge  upon  the  presentation 
of  an  excitant  sufTicient  to  arouse  such  dis- 
charge. The  old  idea  of  a  cause  (usually  cap- 
ital "C")  too  often  meant  a  subtle,  monistic 
push,  which  in  the  same  way  and  to  the  same 
end  brought  about  every  change  or  effect.  The 
idea  of  functional  dependence,  on  the  contrary, 
assumes  no  such  gratuities;  things  which  stand 
in  a  functionally  dependent  relationship  need 
have  nothing  in  common, — no  subtle,  interpene- 
trating power  which  on  the  one  hand  allows, 
27 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
and  on  the  other  hand  brings  to  bear,  the  act- 
ing force.  Every  change,  to  be  brief,  comes 
about  by  virtue  of  an  unstable  equilibrium;  but 
there  are  equilibria  of  continuity  as  well  as  of 
position.  This  is  the  same  as  saying  that  ev- 
erything in  the  cosmos,  unless  it  is  manifest- 
ing this  or  that  property  exhaustively,  is  not 
fixed  in  that  way  of  acting  indefinitely,  but  is 
subject  to  any  other  combination  of  things 
strong  enough  to  "capture"  it.  To  use  a  crass 
figure, — if  it  does  not  do  well  in  one  occupation, 
it  is  free  to  enter  another. 

24.  What  bearing  this  has  upon  psychology 
will  at  once  be  seen,  if  we  consider  that  all  such 
discussions  as  the  "dualism  of  mind  and  body," 
"the  eff"ect  one  mind  has  upon  another,"  or  "the 
way  mind  controls  the  body,"  have  absolutely 
no  meaning  under  the  concept  of  functional  de- 
pendence of  mind  both  upon  its  objects  and 
upon  the  neural  processes  which  grow  toward 
certain  independent  tendencies  within  the  body. 
In  this  book  no  word  will  be  said  either  for  or 
against  the  dualism  of  mind  and  matter,  for  or 
against  the  way  minds  control  bodies,  and  the 
like  outworn  doctrines.  Mind  shall  be  re- 
garded as  a  cluster  of  objects  and  a  colony  of 
functions,  and  not  as  some  hidden,  uncanny 
ghost  that  roosts  on  a  certain  gland  in  the  cere- 
28 


TERMINOLOGY 
brum,  dabbling  her  feet  in  a  puddle  of  lymph. 
The  reader  may  be  disappointed  at  not  being 
able  to  while  away  a  few  more  hours  of  his 
life  with  these  old,  old  questions  of  such  great 
moment.  But  a  science  does  not  begin  with 
that  sort  of  dawdling,  nor  is  it  furthered  by  per- 
sisting in  it.  We  shall  treat  of  mind  empirical- 
ly, as  something  that  is  just  as  patent  as  bricks 
and  barley,  and  for  such  a  treatment  the  reader 
is  invited  to  be  fully  prepared. 

25.  It  is  now  time  to  define  the  subject  of 
this  book — consciousness.  Consciousness  is  the 
objects  within  responsive  range  of  the  nervous 
system,  and  the  manner  in  which  they  are  re- 
sponded to  by  the  nervous  system.  It  is  thus  a 
content,  or  various  kinds  of  things  more  or  less 
organized  together,  as  well  as  degrees  of  closely 
knit  or  looser  organization.  The  most  accurate 
as  well  as  the  most  brilliant  putting  of  this  idea 
is  to  be  found  in  Edwin  Holt's  "The  Concept  of 
Consciousness,"  Chapter  IX,  from  which  1  shall 
quote  at  some  length,  (p.  168)  "Let  us  suppose 
that  a  plane  mathematically  true  but  one  milli- 
metre thick  passes  perpendicularly  through  the 
roots,  trunk  and  branches  of  a  tree;  and  let  us 
suppose  all  the  molecules  of  chemical  sub- 
stances belonging  to  the  tree  and  included  with- 
in the  section,  to  be  simply  enumerated.  It  is 
29 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
clear  that  this  collection  is  an  actual  part  of 
the  tree,  and  yet  one  that  in  itself  would  con- 
tribute very  little  to  the  life  and  development 

of  the  tree Yet  this  would  not  be  a 

random  collection,  for  it  would  include  none 
but  vegetable  molecules  included  within  the 
intersecting  millimetre  plane.  The  plane,  with 
what  it  includes,  is  exactly  defined  in  terms  of 
the  entire  tree  and  the  position  of  the  plane. 
Merely  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  vital  or- 
ganization of  the  tree  would  this  collection  be 
a  random  one.  The  law  that  defines  the  lie  of 
the  plane  is  not  among  the  laws  that  define  the 
anatomy  and  vegetable  economy  of  the  tree. 
Such  a  collection  may  be  called  a  'cross-section.' 
Similarly  the  prime  numbers  are  a  'cross-sec- 
tion.' 

"Again,  if  the  plane  is  a  geometrical  one  of 
no  thickness  and  passing  horizontally  through 
the  trunk,  it  defines  by  its  intersection  a  col- 
lection of  contours  that  is  a  true  portion  of  the 
tree,  but  one  that  is  even  less  significant  for 
the  total  economy  of  the  tree  than  the  collec- 
tion previously  defined.  A  complete  knowledge 
of  it  would  be  next  to  no  knowledge  of  the  tree 
as  a  whole.  It  would  be,  roughly  speaking, 
merely  a  circular  contour  containing  an  infinity 
of  minor  contours." 

30 


TERMINOLOGY 

"Now  the  cross-sections  so  far  adduced  are 
not  merely  insignificant  for  the  whole  of  which 
they  are  a  part,  but  they  are  also  rather  insig- 
nificant for  any  system,  howsoever  inclusive. 
There  are  other  cross-sections,  however,  which 
do  have  a  prime  significance  in  and  for  some 
manifold  more  complex  and  inclusive  than  the 
manifold  through  which  the  cross-section  is 
initially  made.  Thus  the  sum  total  of  all 
whales  living  in  certain  given  waters  is  a  cross- 
section  of  the  sea  that  is  significant  for  the 
whalers  who  are  trying  to  locate  and  gather 
them  in.  The  various  shafts  and  levels  of  a 
mine  are  a  cross-section  of  the  mountain,  and 
of  import  to  the  shareholders;  it  is  the  business 
of  the  engineer  so  to  direct  the  workings  that 
this  cross-section  shall  coincide  with  that  other 
cross-section  that  is  made  by  the  vein  of  ore. 

"Once  again,  a  navigator  exploring  his 
course  at  night  with  the  help  of  a  searchlight, 
illuminates  a  considerable  expanse  of  wave  and 
cloud,  occasionally  the  bow  and  forward  mast 
of  his  ship,  and  the  hither  side  of  other  ships 
and  of  buoys,  lighthouses,  and  other  objects 
that  lie  above  the  horizon.  Now  the  sum  total 
of  all  surfaces  thus  illuminated  in  the  course, 
say,  of  an  entire  night,  is  a  cross-section  of  the 
region  in  question  that  has  rather  interesting 
31 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
characteristics.  It  is  defined,  of  course,  by  the 
contours  and  surface  composition  of  the  re- 
gion, including  such  changes  as  take  place  in 
these  (specially  on  the  surface  of  the  waves), 
and  by  the  searchlight  and  its  movements,  and 
by  the  progress  of  the  ship.  The  manifold,  so 
defined,  however,  is  neither  ship  nor  search- 
light, nor  any  part  of  them,  but  is  a  portion 
(oddly  selected)  of  the  region  through  which 
the  ship  is  passing.  This  cross-section,  as  a 
manifold,  is  clearly  extended  in  space,  and  ex- 
tended in  time  as  well,  since  it  extends  through 
some  watches  of  the  night.  This  cross-section, 
furthermore,  is  in  no  sense  inside  the  search- 
light, nor  are  the  objects  that  make  up  the 
cross-section  in  any  wise  dependent  on  the 
searchlight  for  their  substance  or  their  being. 
"Now  cross-sections  that  in  many  respects 
resemble  the  one  just  described  are  found  in 
any  manifold  in  which  there  is  organic  life." 
"It  is  to  certain  features,  and  not  to  others,  of 
its  environment  that  the  living  organism  re- 
sponds, and  the  group  of  things  to  which  it 
thus  reacts  constitutes  a  cross-section  manifold 
that  is  of  prime  importance  to  one  who  is  study- 
ing the  organism  and  one  that  is  of  the  most 
vital  importance,  of  course,  to  the  organism 
itself." 

32 


TERMINOLOGY 
(p.  173)  "We  have  always  known,  of  course, 
that  plants  'respond'  in  a  general  way  to  sun- 
light, air  and  water.  More  recently  we  have 
become  acquainted  with  processes  that  are 
more  appropriately  named  responses.  Roots 
do  not  grow  downward  by  chance  nor  by  any 
pre-established  harmony,  nor  yet  by  instinct, 
but  they  respond  mechanically  to  the  attraction 
of  gravitation,  nor  is  this  merely  due  to  the 
general  weight  of  the  root,  since  by  a  compar- 
able mechanism  the  stems  grow  contrarily  to 
gravitation.  The  roots  are  positively  geotactic 
or  barotropic,  while  the  stems  are  negatively, 
and  many  kinds  of  branches  transversely  baro- 
tropic. Similarly,  and  by  virtue  of  a  distinct 
mechanism,  the  various  parts  of  a  plant  respond 
variously  to  light  of  different  colors  and  in- 
tensities, growing  toward  or  away  from  such 
light:  they  are  variously  heliotropic.  There  are 
similar  responses  in  vegetable  organisms  to 
thermal,  chemical  and  even  electrical  stimuli, 
and  we  are  gradually  coming  to  know  that  these 
involve  a  well-differentiated  and  oftentimes  a 
highly  elaborate  mechanism  of  response.  Now 
clearly  in  the  case  of  a  given  plant  these  baro-, 
helio-,  thermo-,  chemo-,  and  galvano-tropisms, 
these  several  mechanisms  of  response,  define  a 
certain  cross-section  of  the  plant's  environment 
33 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
that  is  comparable  with  the  cross-section  de- 
fined by  the  searchlight.  ,  .  .  And  these 
forces,  be  it  noted,  to  which  the  plant  responds 
are  distinct  from  the  mechanism  by  which  the 
response  is  effected;  they  are  a  portion  of  the 
environment." 

(p.  178)  "In  the  case  of  vegetable  organisms 
we  found  that  the  sum  total  of  entities  in  the 
surrounding  physical  system  t )  which  a  plant 
responds,  forms  an  intricate  and  in  some  re- 
spects an  interesting  cross-section  of  such 
physical  system.  And  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  plant,  clearly,  this  effective  environment 
is  all  the  environment  that  it  has;  and  this  en- 
vironment is  distinct  from  its  own  organic 
structure.  We  saw,  furthermore,  even  in  our 
earliest  cross-sections,  in  inorganic  manifolds, 
that  the  cross-section  often  so  cut  the  manifold 
as  to  reveal  the  conceptual  or  neutral  nature 
of  physical  objects;  the  velocities  of  all  flying 
projectiles,  and  the  section  of  a  tree  cut  by  a 
mathematical  plane,  were  such  cross-sections. 
They  are  true  parts  of  the  projectiles  and  the 
tree,  respectively,  yet  they  are  not  ponderable 
physical  bodies:  they  are  certain  neutral  com- 
ponents of  these  bodies.  The  same  is  a  fortiori 
true  of  the  cross-sections  defined  by  plant  re- 
sponses. The  leaflet  bends  toward  a  ray  of 
34 


TERMINOLOGY 
light  (a  physical  energy,  if  you  will),  but  it  re- 
sponds more  rapidly  to  a  more  intense  ray,  and 
to  a  very  weak  ray  it  will  not  respond  at  all. 
It  therefore  responds  not  merely  to  light,  but 
also  to  intensity.  In  responding  differently  to 
different  grades  of  intensity,  it  defines  grades  of 
intensity  as  well  as  light  energy,  as  components 
of  its  effective  enviromental  cross-section.  Now 
whatever  light  may  be,  grades  of  intensity  are 

not  physical  objects And  these  grades 

of  intensity  are  not  in  the  plant,  certainly  no 
farther  in  than  the  surface  of  the  leaves.  In  a 
similar  way  plants  respond  in  all  their  tropisms 
very  specifically  to  direction  'as  such';  and  di- 
rection is  a  neutral  entity.  It  too  is  not  in  the 
plant.  And  if  we  were  thus  to  study  plant  re- 
sponse in  detail,  we  should  find  that  very  few 
indeed  of  the  factors  to  which  the  plant  re- 
sponds are  such  entities  as  would  ordinarly  be 
said  to  have  'physical'  existence;  although  both 
the  plant  and  its  environment  are  plain,  phys- 
ical objects." 

(p.  182)  "We  have  seen  that  the  phenomenon 
of  response  defines  a  cross-section  of  the  en- 
vironment without,  which  is  a  neutral  mani- 
fold. Now  this  neutral  cross-section  outside  of 
the  nervous  system,  and  composed  of  the  neu- 
tral elements  of  physical  and  non-physical  ob- 
35 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
jects  to  which  the  nervous  system  is  respond- 
ing by  some  specific  response,— tliis  neutral 
cross-section,  I  submit,  coincides  exactly  with 
the  list  of  objects  of  which  we  say  we  are  con- 
scious. This  neutral  cross-section  as  defined  by 
the  specific  reaction  of  reflex  arcs  is  the  psychic 
realm : — it  is  the  manifold  of  our  sensations,  per- 
ceptions, and  ideas: — it  is  consciousness."  In 
this  conscious  cross-section,  furthermore,  let  it 
be  understood  once  and  for  all,  that  everything 
ever  called  mental,  psychical  or  any  other  term 
referring  to  knowledge,  awareness,  feeling  or 
judgment  is  unequivocally  and  thoroughly  con- 
tained. If  there  be  mystery,  also,  it  is  right 
there;  as  well  as  dreams,  hallucinations,  and 
the  other  twilight  phenomena  of  psychology. 
Those  "having  minds,  and  therefore  claiming 
an  a  priori  peek  into  their  nature,"  are  none  the 
less  referable  to  this  concept  of  consciousness 
for  an  explanation  of  their  sayings  and  think- 
ings. For  while  we  select  for  our  laboratories 
only  those  having  gumption  and  grandfathers, 
a  complete  psychology  accounts  satisfactorily 
for  the  whole  gamut  of  human  interests,  affec- 
tions and  disaffections.  Furthermore,  we  shall 
not  say  anything  about  the  'purely'  mechanical 
or  the  'purely'  mental;  things  will  be  just  plain 
mechanical  and  phiin  mental,  instead.  Hard 
36 


TERMINOLOGY 
atoms  and  soft  souls  may  suit  the  tempera- 
mentally minded,  but  whatever  vanities  science 
may  exhibit,  temperament  is  not  one  of  them. 
However,  psychology  being  the  realm  in  which 
temperaments  operate,  no  grudge  need  accom- 
pany the  task  of  explaining  them. 

26.  We  are  then  not  going  to  study  capital 
M  mind,  nor  are  we  to  treat  of  consciousness  as 
an  inner  imp.  We  shall  treat  of  it  as  a  vary- 
ing content,  as  a  shifting  process,  and  as  a  man- 
ifold with  a  highly  unstable  center  of  refer- 
ence,— the  pronoun  I.  The  language  by  which 
we  express  our  thoughts  has  been  shown  to  be 
now  too  abbreviated,  now  too  redundant  and 
oftener  than  either,  too  erratic  to  be  depended 
upon  for  scientific  purposes  without  pruning 
and  redirection.  Our  naive  view  of  mind,  also, 
must  for  a  time  be  passed  through  the  fine 
sieve  of  analysis  in  order  that  confusion  of 
words  be  avoided.  This  is  not  a  materialistic 
psychology,  but  a  realistic  one  which  is  here 
presented.  In  the  next  chapter  it  will  be  shown 
why  materialism  is  too  theological  for  scientific 
purposes.  A  scientific  psychology  has  neither 
intention  nor  power  to  deny  the  existence  of 
anything  which  humanity  has  found  meaning- 
ful, but  there  is  no  law  in  the  universe  which 
guarantees  that  accuracy  shall  be  evolved  from 
37 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
chronogenetic  thinking,  nor  that  what  we  are 
wont   to   say   about   ourselves   need   have   any 
truth  in  it  at  all. 

Bibliography. 

Holt,  E.  B.,  "The  Concept  of  Consciousness," 
especially  chapters  VI,  VII,  VIII  and  IX. 

James,  W.,  "Essays  in  Radical  Empiricism," 
especially  Chap.  I,  "Does  'Consciousness'  Ex- 
ist?" and  Chap.  Ill,  "The  Thing  and  its  Rela- 
tions." 

Mach,  E.,  "Contributions  to  the  Analysis  of 
the  Sensations,"  especially  the  "Introductory 
Remarks.    Antimetaphysical." 


38 


CHAPTER  U. 

PSYCHOLOGICAL  ANALYSIS 

1.  Whether  one  asks  "what"  the  mind  is, 
"how"  it  acts,  or  "why"  it  does  thus  or  so,  the 
answer  is  to  be  sought  for  only  in  analysis.  For 
all  such  questions  insinuate  either  a  content  or 
a  process  not  yet  discerned  in  its  parts  or  rela- 
tions, and  only  an  answer  that  is  explicative  will 
suffice  to  enlarge  our  knowledge  of  the  subject. 
The  test  of  analysis  also  rests  upon  its  giving 
such  answers  as  will  clarify  rather  than  be- 
cloud the  matter  under  investigation,  but  it 
scarcely  needs  to  be  said  that  the  goal  arrived 
at  does  not  gain  its  validity  from  squaring  with 
naive  expectation. 

2.  Psychological  analysis  concerns  only  the 
data  of  psychology.  We  do  not  analyse 
glaciers  by  it,  nor  do  we  seek  to  discover  by  its 
use  the  laws  of  thermo-dynamics.  But  the  col- 
ors of  glaciers  may  be  analysed  by  psychological 
means  without  any  reference  to  the  speed  of 
those  masses  of  moving  ice  which  are  colorful 
as  well  as  cold.  In  the  same  way,  the  manner 
in  which  the  laws  of  thermo-dynamics  were 
found  are  material  for  psycholog>',  since  the 
human  beings  who  struggled  to  know  them  rea- 

39 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
soned  from  the  data  as  minds  are  always  wont 
to  reason.     Notice  these  cases  of  such  analysis. 

(a)  Orange  is  a  mixture  of  red  and  yellow, 
while  violet  is  a  mixture  of  red  and  blue.  The 
position  of  these  colors  in  the  spectrum  tells 
nothing  about  their  properties  when  abstracted 
from  such  a  series,  Imt  by  means  of  the  eye 
alone  we  detect  something  both  reddish  and 
yellowish  about  orange,  and  something  both 
reddish  and  bluish  about  violet.  On  the  con- 
trary, we  cannot  analyse  either  green,  yellow, 
blue  or  red  into  anything  else,  and  so  for  phy- 
chology  these  are  ultimate  hues. 

(b)  One  closes  his  eyes,  and  tells  as  well 
as  he  can  the  direction  from  which  a  sound 
is  coming.  By  turning  his  head  this  way  and 
ttihat,  by  pausing  and  carefully  listening,  he 
Anally  decides  upon  the  general  direction  by 
means  of  his  ears  and  movements  alone.  Then, 
under  the  same  conditions,  two  sounds  are 
employed  which  he  is  to  distinguish  as  being 
equally  or  unequally  far  away,  symmetrically 
or  unsymmetrically  placed  with  reference  to 
the  head,  and  so  on.  Each  time  he  attends,  es- 
timates and  judges  by  the  same  means  and  thus 
is  said  to  analyse  the  situation  psychologically. 

(c)     While  we  are  sitting  in  a  hotel  lobby,  a 
scuffle  occurs  on  the  street  outside  and  some 
40 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  ANALYSIS 

one  is  badly  hurt.  The  matter  becomes  of  legal 
proportions  and  our  testimony  is  required  to 
determine  the  exact  status  of  the  offense.  We 
saw  something,  heard  something,  and  were 
somewhat  disturbed  over  it,  but  just  what  oc- 
curred that  we  can  swear  to  is  not  quite  clear 
and  plain.  Court-room  testimony  follows,  and, 
by  reason  of  agreement  among  veracious  wit- 
nesses, there  is  a  verdict.  The  process  of  re- 
calling what  happened,  how  it  developed,  and 
why  the  case  ended  as  it  did  is  entirely  a 
psychological  matter,  and  the  results  are  vainly 
appealed  to  other  than  psychological  beings, — 
justice  or  injustice  being  the  residue  of  seeing, 
hearing,  remembering,  feeling,  intending,  and 
so  on,  with  which  no  physicist,  chemist,  astron- 
omer or  other  scientist  is  able  to  deal  with  first 
hand  at  all.     Psychology  exhausts  it  utterly. 

(d)  An  old  and  wealthy  uncle  does  not 
shake  off  the  mortal  coils  soon  enough  to  suit 
his  prospective  legatees.  They  each  know  what 
his  will  provides  for  them,  but,  fearing  that  he 
may  change  his  mind  any  moment,  try  to  get 
him  committed  to  some  asylum  in  order  to  gain 
their  present  ends.  But  the  uncle  is  individual- 
istic, and  far  from  allowing  himself  to  be  beck- 
oned unresistingly  away,  fights  the  attempt  by 
legal  means.  Alienists  are  called  in  and  his 
41 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
mind  is  thoroughly  tested  by  analysis  to  prove 
or  disprove  the  charge  made  against  him  by 
his  relatives.  Whom  else  should  they  call  in 
except  psychological  analysers?  Psychological 
data  are  the  ultimate  things  in  the  case, — the 
uncle's  habits,  temper,  typical  manifestations 
of  all  kinds, — and  when  these  are  sifted  over 
and  over  again  to  a  conclusion,  there  is  no  ap- 
peal beyond  it.  The  uncle  is  what  he  does, 
says,  feels,  and  the  like,  and  the  result  is  total- 
ly in  and  of  psychology. 

These  will  suffice  as  a  preliminary  to  other 
analyses  which  must  be  delayed  until  later 
topics  in  the  book  introduce  them. 

2.  Just  what  analysis  properly  is  may  be 
shown  by  the  following  quotation  from  E.  G. 
Spauding's  "A  Defense  of  Analysis,"  from  the 
"New  Realism"  (p.  161) : 

" Given  a  whole  which,  for  one  rea- 
son or  another,  is  known  to  be  analysable,  then 
analysis  reveals  parts,  but  it  also  reveals  the  re- 
lations which  relate  and  so  organize  these  parts 
into  some  kind  of  a  whole.  Consider  also  those 
properties  which,  in  some  cases,  the  whole,  as 
a  whole,  may  have  different  from  those  of  the 
parts.  Of  course,  analysis  reveals  these  also. 
The  analysis  may  be  incomplete  in  the  sense 
that  there  may  be  further  parts,  that  is,  parts  of 
42 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  ANALYSIS 
parts,  which  are  not  yet  revealed;  but,  if  ana- 
lysis is  incomplete  only  in  this  sense,  that  is,  if 
there  have  been  revealed  parts,  their  organizing 
relations,  and,  in  some  cases,  the  possibly 
specific  properties  of  the  whole,  then  the  ana- 
lysis may  be  said  to  be  adequate.  It  exhausts 
the  whole  up  to  the  point  that  it  reaches,  in 
that,  while  the  specification  of  all  that  the 
analysis  reveals  does  not  specify  the  whole,  the 
whole,  nevertheless,  is  the  parts  and  their  prop- 
erties and  the  relations  relating  the  parts  and 
the  possibly  specific  properties  of  the  whole. 
There  may  be  further  parts  of  parts,  more  prop- 
erties, more  relations  to  be  revealed,  but  this  of 
itself  does  not  invalidate  the  position  that  the 
properties  of  the  parts  and  the  generating  re- 
lations which  are  revealed  are  quite  as  real  as 
is  the  whole  which  is  analysed,  are  not  con- 
tradictory of  the  whole,  and  exist,  or  subsist,  in- 
dependently of  the  discovery  and  of  the  speci- 
fication." To  apply  this  to  a  case  in  point  in 
psychology,  the  analysis  of  a  so-called  "mental" 
situation  into  object  and  response,  or  into  con- 
tent and  process,  does  not  make  it  "physical" 
or  "neurological"  to  the  exclusion  of  its  being 
"psychological";  no  more  than  does  the  analysis 
of  the  pictorial  representation  of  a  triangle  into 
three  straight  or  three  curved  lines  make  absurd 
43 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
or  impossible  the  mention  of  triangularity  along 
with  the  mention  of  the  lines.  This  also  is  a 
vital  point:  that  the  psychological  simplicity  of 
things  is  too  often  mistaken  for  logical  simplic- 
ity; for  it  shall  happen  that  ever  so  much  more 
than  we  suspect  is  blended  into  a  single  sensa- 
tion, emotion,  or  perception,  which  only  ana- 
lysis can  reveal.  But  we  shall  find  that  there 
is  nothing  "mental"  behind  the  psychological 
wholes  we  analyse  into  parts,  or  those  psy- 
chological things  we  split  into  their  attributes. 
The  "mental"  is  an  organizing  relation,  separ- 
able from  the  organized  elements,  and  in  no 
sense  bewitching  them  when  out  of  such  rela- 
tion. 

3.  There  is  today  in  some  quarters  much 
opposition  to  the  analytic  method  in  psychol- 
ogy. It  is  said  to  invent  rather  than  discover 
the  parts  and  relations  it  finds.  This  hails  from 
that  era  of  lazymindedness  when  a  "mental" 
substance  and  a  "physical"  substance  were  said 
to  irrevocably  dichotomize  the  universe;  from 
which  substances  bodies  and  souls,  matter  and 
mind  were  held  to  emanate.  Two  great  un- 
knowns were  hypothecated,  —  unknowns,  mind 
you,  and  yet  mentioned  with  all  the  toplofty 
grandiloquence  of  philosophy's  worst.  Objects 
and  thoughts  were  then  simply  the  scruff  of 
44 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  ANALYSIS 
these  mentioned  unmentionables  in  which  rea- 
son, value  and  stability  were  forever  snugly 
sequestered.  To  be  sure,  death  has  been  kind 
enough  to  remove  some  of  the  upholders  of  this 
doctrine  from  our  sight,  while  the  advance  of 
general  intelligence  has  revealed  the  unpleas- 
ant, ulterior  motives  lying  behind  it. 

4.  Even  today  a  timidity  characterizes  some 
of  those  who  defend  analysis.  One  defender  to 
whom  I  could  specifically  refer  asks  why  he 
shouldn't  use  it,  since  even  its  defamers  employ 
it  in  their  attacks.  Another  avers  that  for 
"scientific"  purposes  one  must  assume  the 
analysability  of  all  subject  matter, — for  since 
minds  are  free,  they  are  therefore  even  at  lib- 
erty to  consider  themselves  purely  or  grossly 
mechanical,  just  as  they  choose.  Both  of  these 
defenses  are  all  too  timid,  and  the  flank  attacks 
they  allow  and  invite  would  be  in  both  cases 
deadly,  if  undertaken.  Let  us  surmount  these 
arguments  as  we  have  done  former  ones. 
As  far  as  the  first  is  concerned,  it  is  a 
lame  excuse  to  claim  the  victory  on  a 
draw.  If  defamers  of  analysis  use  it,  of 
course  they  involve  themselves  in  a  net, 
but  that  is  hardly  the  point.  The  point  is 
whether  they  have  used  it  expressly  to  get  in- 
volved in  the  net,  for  if  this  can  be  shown,  we 
45 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
need  only  account  it  another  defeat  for  verbal- 
ism. And  verbalism  is  just  what  it  always  turns 
out  to  be.  This  is,  indeed,  being  almost  too 
generous;  for  having  to  extricate  from  their 
own  "mire  of  logic"  those  who  wilfully  fall 
therein,  would  not  be  half  so  pathetic  if  it 
might  only  show  in  this  case  that  analysis  had 
been  a  word  misunderstood, — a  name  much 
taken  in  vain.  To  show  where  analysis  is  ef- 
fective, one  has  only  to  point  to  those  cases 
where  it  neither  controverts  itself  nor  fails  to 
reveal  the  parts  or  relations  it  chases  hot-foot 
after. 

5.  As  for  the  second  of  the  above  state- 
ments, it  misses  the  whole  point  in  the  matter 
under  discussion.  Analysis  defines  neither 
freedom  nor  continuity.  It  arises  merely  from 
the  wholesome  suspicion  that  the  safest  and 
wisest  thing  to  do  is  to  continually  regard  as 
ultimately  compilex  that  which  appears  psy- 
chologically simple.  It  grants,  for  instance, 
that  looking  at  a  color  and  saying  nothing  about 
it  may  be  a  single,  illy  defined  state  of  mind. 
But  that  is  not  the  only  sort  of  color  experienc- 
ing we  find  in  the  cosmos.  Artists  and  physi- 
cists mention  their  colors  and  thereby  get  in- 
volved in  the  game  of  talk;  and,  curses  or  no 
on  the  man  who  discovered  logic,  the  mention- 
46 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  ANALYSIS 
ing  of  colors  even  throws  light  upon  the  ex- 
periencing of  colors  without  mentioning  them 
at  the  time!  Besides,  according  to  this  wisp  of 
a  sentence  about  "mental  freedom,"  almost  any 
sort  of  declaration  one  felt  eager  to  make  might 
have  a  place  in  the  sun.  1  vaguely  recall  read- 
ing somewhere  that  the  word  "Adam"  (the  gar- 
den variety)  means  "a  dam"  or  "obstruction," 
whence  is  proven  that  "mortal  mind"  is  very, 
very  impervious  to  spiritual  influences.  There 
was  a  day,  I  am  told,  when  word-juggling  such 
as  this  passed  for  logical  astuteness, 

6.  My  own  defense  of  analysis  is  as  follows. 
Even  if  there  should  be  in  everything  one  at- 
tempts to  analyse  two  series, — one,  an  indefinite 
continuity,  the  other  a  discrete  discontinuity; 
the  first  giving  it  thinghood  out  of  ineff"able 
substance,  the  second  giving  it  thinghood  out 
of  elements  in  relation, — only  the  latter  being 
reduced  to  parts  by  analysis, — then  it  is  high 
time  to  enquire  w^hat  is  the  difference  between 
them  in  the  aggregate  which  they  form.  If, 
for  example,  there  are  two  coats  in  the  coat  I 
wear, — the  one  made  up  of  the  pieces  of  cloth 
sewed  together,  and  the  other  a  something 
which  as  a  concept  or  idea  is  not  destroyed 
though  the  coat  be  cut  up  into  patches, — then 
of  course  what  I  analyse  in  this  and  in  other 
47 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
situations  is  made  of  parts,  and  not  that  coat 
"which  was  from  the  beginning  and  is  now." 
But  even  if  a  concept,  or  idea,  say  that  of  a 
coat,  can  be  shown  to  differ  from  another  con- 
cept, say  that  of  a  card-case  within  the  coat 
pocket;  and  if  their  differences  can  be  made 
specific,  then  what  is  different  must  differ  in 
nameable  ways.  And  if  the  difference  between 
concepts  is  such  a  one  as  this,  and  it  is,  then  all 
concepts  are  as  analysable  as  are  "things,"  for 
one  concept  will  differ  from  another  in  the 
same  way  as  one  "thing"  from  another.  Thus 
the  "mental"  and  the  "physical"  are  both  equal- 
ly mentionable  and  analysable.  We  shall  see 
presently  of  what  their  parts  are  made.  And 
if  any  one  says  that  the  science  of  psychologj^ 
does  not  come  within  three  miles  of  explaining 
his  mind,  I  shall  only  remand  him  either  to 
poetry  for  solace,  or  to  these  words  of  William 
James  for  reproof:  "Things  of  an  unexperi- 
enceable  nature  may  exist  ad  libitum,  but  they 
form  no  part  of  the  material  for  philosophic 
debate."  Again,  if  it  is  said  that  one  loses  most 
of  the  specific  properties  of  the  whole  in  the 
midst  of  analysis,  and  has  but  "shreds  and 
clippings"  for  his  pains,  one  then  but  sees  what 
a  powerful  logical  weapon  it  is,  for  by  means 
of  it  he  can  find  out,  as  his  analysis  proceeds, 
48 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  ANALYSIS 
just  where  this  or  that  property  of  an  organ- 
ized whole  vanishes  from  the  complex.  So  that 
along  with  the  "immoral  value"  of  destruction 
comes  the  cognitive  value  of  locating  and 
trouncing  the  "mysterious." 

7.  Rebounding  flabbily  from  these  argu- 
ments, the  adversary  once  more  challenges: 
"What  you  should  do  is  to  'synthesize'  rather 
than  analyse;  build  up  rather  than  destroy  in 
your  scientific  endeavor."  We  reply  with  a 
double  answer.  Things  are  first  found  synthe- 
sized, but  the  fusion  and  confusion  thereby  en- 
tailed is  quite  opposed  in  many  cases  to  the 
purposes  of  science.  You  cannot  make  a  Bot- 
any out  of  the  chronogenetic  order  of  trees  and 
flowers;  indeed,  you  can  just  passably  make  a 
garden.  And  this:  the  synthetic,  temporal  or- 
der of  nature  is  not  the  only  synthetic  order 
possible;  nor  is  it  the  order,  whether  or  no, 
which  makes  any  science  deductive.  So  that,  far 
from  avoiding  the  issue,  the  scientific  analyst 
accepts  the  task  of  two  lifetimes, — both  that 
of  following  the  chronogenetic  syntheses  of  na- 
ture and  that  of  planning  the  way  for  that 
synthesis  which  shall  best  suit  the  practical 
concerns  of  subduing  nature  for  his  own  spir- 
itual ends. 

8.  Psychology,  as  the  science  of  the  con- 

49 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
scious  cross-section,  is  stated  in  the  same  way 
as  any  other  science,  namely,  by  the  use  of 
terms  in  relation.  For  example,  Boyle's  Law 
states  that,  "For  the  same  temperature  the 
density  of  a  gas  is  directly  proportional  to  the 
pressure  acting  upon  it."  Now  as  it  stands,  the 
chief  relational  aspect  is  contained  in  the 
words  "directly  proportional."  Also  as  it 
stands,  the  terms  are  these  three:  (1)  For  the 
same  temperature,  (2)  the  density  of  a  gas,  and 
(3)  the  pressure  acting  upon  it.  But  (2)  and 
(3)  are  alone  immediately  related  to  the  ex- 
pression, "directly  proportional";  for  when  the 
temperature  varies,  another  relation  replaces  it. 
But  in  psychology,  one  frequently  finds  that 
the  expression  "other  things  being  equal"  (such 
as  equal  temperatures  in  physics)  does  not  often 
suffer  itself  to  be  used  in  a  formula.  That  is 
to  say,  that  one  difference  between  physics,  as 
a  fairly  deductive  science  throughout,  and  psy- 
chology as  a  science  deductive  only  in  point  of 
large  masses  of  terms  in  relation  being  con- 
strued as  units  of  functionation,  is  that  we  can- 
not confine  the  "proportionality"  of  terms  to 
that  immediate  relationship  in  which  we  seek 
to  embed  them.  For  instance,  one  can  predict 
the  actions  of  a  crowd  better  than  those  of  a 
single  individual,  on  account  of  the  motives 
50 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  ANALYSIS 
there  operative  having  a  maximum  of  impera- 
tive urgency.  The  problem  of  three  celestial 
bodies  perplexes  the  astronomer,  while  three 
"busy  bodies"  gives  the  psychologist  no  concern. 
It  is  the  business  of  psychological  analysis  to 
find  the  extent  to  which  deduction  of  one  kind 
or  another  pertains  to  the  whole  diameter  of 
the  conscious  cross-section. 

9.  The  use  of  relations  demands  that  they 
be  distinguished  from  one  another.  We  saw 
in  the  first  chapter  what  one  meaning  of  the 
"of"  relation  resolved  itself  into.  "Having"  is 
also  a  complex  set  of  relations  and  functions  all 
telescoped  together  in  language.  One  differ- 
ence between  legal  and  logical  form  may  be 
here  inserted  for  the  benefit  of  the  light  it 
throws  upon  psychology, — and  that  is  that  the 
law  repeats  the  psychology  entailed  in  a  situa- 
tion by  the  use  of  synonyms,  rather  than  it  de- 
fines unequivocally  any  term  or  relation  em- 
ployed. To  insure  the  "having"  relation,  one 
legally  gives,  bequeaths,  bestows,  etc.,  rather 
than  signifies  what  all  this  business  specifically 
means.  The  number  of  relations  is  well-nigh 
legion,  and  for  many  of  them  our  names  are 
inadequate.  "Before"  has  no  linguistic  differ- 
entiation when  used  as  a  temporal  expression 
from  what  it  has  when  used  as  indicating  log- 
51 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
ical  priority.  Likewise,  "next"  is  used  for  a 
spacial  as  well  as  a  temporal,  or  other  relation 
without  any  change  in  spelling.  Such  examples 
could  be  multiplied  ad  libitum,  but  suffice  it  to 
say  that  this  condition  of  inexact  definition  in 
language  is  what  makes  oratory  possible.  There 
are  spacial  relations,  temporal  relations,  logical 
relations,  and  still  other  relations,  not  a  few  of 
which  are  psychological;  for  which,  following 
the  example  of  symbolic  logic,  fit  expressions 
will  be  eventually  found.  But  before  this  is 
done,  we  can  still  point  out  a  few  character- 
istics of  relations  in  general  which  must  be  kept 
in  mind  in  order  to  understand  the  logic  of  any 
science.    As  follows: — 

(1)  Transitivity.  If  "R"  between  x  and  y 
indicates  that  they  are  in  relation,  then  the  re- 
lation is  a  transitive  one  if  .tRi/  and  yRz  togeth- 
er imply  xRz.  Otherwise  it  is  intransitive.  For 
example,  in  learning  some  complicated  opera- 
tion, such  as  piano  playing,  every  distinct  move- 
ment or  set  of  movements  is  serially  focal  in 
consciousness.  Whereas  later  on,  upon  the 
mere  mention  of  this  or  that  piece  of  music, 
consciousness  is  solely  involved  in  the  motor 
aspect  of  a  tidy  performance,  the  stages  of 
learning  having  been  looped  into  the  co-  or  sub- 


52 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  ANALYSIS 
conscious,    never    to    reappear    unless    aroused 
through  interruption. 

(2)  Symmetry.  If  xRy  implies  i/Rr,  the  re- 
lation is  said  to  be  symmetrical.  This  will 
have  bearing  for  us  in  the  phenomenon  of  sim- 
ultaneous as  opposed  to  successive  presenta- 
tions of  a  stimulus.  Indeed,  "before"  or  "after" 
in  psychology  always  involves  something  more 
complex  than  at  first  sight  seems.  The  touch 
of  velvet  after  the  touch  of  emery  paper  may 
arouse  one  kind  of  feeling-consciousness,  while 
the  result  of  reversing  the  process  may  produce 
another  or  even  the  same  kind.  Temporal  suc- 
cessions in  psychology  are  very  delicate  and 
intricate  things  to  handle.  But  the  very  same 
phenomena  are  found  in  other  sciences.  Even 
the  business  of  making  microscopic  slides  in- 
volves an  asymmetrical  temporal  series  of  in- 
filtrations. The  chef  also  uses  this  principle 
in  making  butter  sauces. 

(3)  Correlation.  This  is  of  two  kinds,  or- 
dinal and  mixed.  For  instance,  if  there  are  two 
series  of  measurements,  5  and  s,  the  terms  of 

which  are  A,  B,  C,  D,  E,  F N  and  a,  b,  c,  d, 

e,  f....n  respectively,  and  if  Aa,  Bb,  Cc,  Dd, 
etc.,  are  specifically  coupled  together  in  this  as 
well  as  in  the  reverse  order,  we  have  a  case  of 
ordinal  correlation.     In  some  cases  of  paired 

53 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
comparisons  with  steady  and  constant  subjects, 
such  a  correlation  has  been  approached  for  psy- 
chology in  a  limited  series.  Oftener,  indeed, 
the  mixed  correlation  is  derived,  which  consists 
in  the  coupling  of  any  term  of  one  series  with 
any  term  of  the  other  in  any  order. 

In  all  cases  of  relations,  the  domain  of  the 
relation  has  to  be  considered.  Consciousness 
of  we  shall  see  has  but  a  limited  use.  Likewise 
only  a  few  series  will  be  transitive,  symmetrical 
or  ordinally  correlated.  What  series  they  are 
as  well  as  the  precise  meaning  of  these  rela- 
tions in  psychology  should  be  at  all  times  clear- 
ly kept  in  view. 

10.  Before  sorting  the  conscious  cross-sec- 
tion into  its  different  compartments,  I  shall 
quote  from  an  article  by  R.  B.  Perry  entitled 
"A  Realistic  Theory  of  Independence,"  found  in 
"The  New  Realism,"  to  lay  the  ghost  of  some 
common  notions  in  regard  to  the  nature  of  com- 
plexes. This  will  be  the  last  mention  of  sub- 
stances in  this  book.  The  quotation  starts  on 
page  107  of  the  above  mentioned  book  with  an 
analysis  of  certain  further  relations  common 
to  the  material  of  psychology. 

"Whole-part. — A   whole  is  said    to    be   de- 
pendent on  its  parts, — on  what  it  contains,  and 
can  be  divided  into.     It  is  worth  while  to  in- 
54 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  ANALYSIS 
troduce  at  this  point  a  distinction  between  'ma- 
terial' and  'formal'  instances  of  the  whole-part 
dependence.  The  first  is  exhibited  in  the  re- 
lation between  the  present  city  of  London  and 
Trafalgar  Square.  .  .  .  The  second  is  ex- 
hibited between  a  city  and  its  streets.  .  .  . 
In  other  words,  a  material  relation  is  a  relation 
between  particular  values  of  variables,  while 
a  formal  relation  subsists  between  the  variables 
themselves.  The  dependence  of  whole  on  part 
may  be  of  either  type. 

"Part-whole. — Parts  are  said  to  be  depend- 
ent on  the  whole  to  which  they  belong  when 
these  wholes  are  'organic'  Thus  the  hypoth- 
enuse  of  a  right-angle  triangle  is  .  .  .  de- 
pendent on  the  definition  of  the  right-angle  tri- 
angle." ".  .  .  its  magnitude  is  determined 
by  its  interrelation  with  other  parts,  such  as 
the  opposite  angle  and  its  adjacent  sides." 
"Similarly,  an  organ  or  member  in  the  biolog- 
ical sense  is  said  to  be  dependent  ...  on 
the  integrity  of  the  organism  to  which  it  be- 
longs. 

"But  such  dependence  would  appear  to  be 
reducible  to  dependence  of  other  types"  .  .  . 
"we  are  virtually  naming  a  part  for  its  partici- 
pation in  a  whole."  "Or  it  may  be  construed 
as  meaning  that  a  part  cannot  be  a  part,  that  is, 
55 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
belonging  to  a  whole,  without  the  whole.  But 
this  is  equivalent  to  saying  that  the  complex 
relationship  of  part  and  whole  depends  on  the 
whole  as  one  of  its  terms.  And  this  is  a  case 
of  dependence  of  whole  on  part,  and  not  of 
part  on  whole." 

"The  dependence  of  members  of  a  living 
organism  may  be  disposed  of  in  the  same  man- 
ner. The  respiratory  system  cannot  be  a  vital 
function  without  the  whole  organism.  But 
this  is  merely  to  say  that  it  cannot  belong  to  an 
organism  without  an  organism  to  belong  to. 
To  make  the  dependence  of  the  part  evident 
one  must  describe  the  part  as  part-of-whole. 
But  the  dependence  of  member-of-organism  on 
organism  is  not  a  dependence  of  part  on  whole, 
but  rather  a  dependence  of  whole  on  part.  It 
asserts  the  dependence  of  a  complex  relation- 
ship on  one  of  its  terms. 

"Thing-attribute.— [This]  relation  presents 
no  novelties  in  connection  with  the  matter  of 
dependence."  "...  where  a  thing  is  re- 
garded as  dependent  on  its  attributes,  it  is 
either  'made  up'  of  them,  or  defined  'in  terms' 
of  them.  .  .  .  Both  would  be  instances  of  the 
whole-part  type  of  dependence  as  described 
above."     (This  has  an  insistent  bearing  upon 


56 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  ANALYSIS 
the  analysis  of  sensations  which  we  shall  take 
up  in  the  next  chapter.) 

""Attribute-thing. — The  question  of  the  de- 
pendence of  attributes  on  the  thing  to  which 
they  belong,  resembles  the  question  of  the  de- 
pendence of  part  on  whole.  Red  cannot  be 
attribute  of  the  rose  without  the  rose;  nor 
would  it  bear  the  peculiar  relation  that  it  does 
to  odor,  form,  and  growth  of  the  rose,  were  it 
not  for  the  nature  of  the  rose  as  a  whole.  But 
this  will,  I  think,  turn  out  to  mean  either  that 
a  rose  is  a  rose  (redundancy) ;  or  that  the  red- 
rose  relationship  depends  on  'rose'  as  one  of 
its  terms  (whole-part) ;  or  that  the  redness  of 
the  rose  is  determined  by  its  age,  chemical 
structure,  nutrition,  etc.  (causation).  We  may 
therefore  dispense  with  the  attribute-thing  re- 
lation as  a  primary  type  of  dependence. 

''Causation. — "  .  .  .  Causality  is  a  ma- 
terial relation  between  two  complexes,  derived 
from  a  primary  formal  relation  between  their 
constituent  variables."  (N.  B.  This  is  what 
I  meant  in  the  first  chapter  by  saying  that  ev- 
ery science  was  a  case  of  applied  logic.)  "Thus 
if  v=gt,  for  all  values  of  these  variables,  then 
any  given  velocity  (f),  is  dependent  on  the  con- 
stant of  gravity  {g),  and  some  magnitude  of 
time  (0-  The  formal  relation  among  the  vari- 
57 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
ables  is  called  the  'law,'  and  the  material  deter- 
mination of  the  values  of  the  variables,  as  pre- 
scribed by  the  law,  is  causation. 

".  .  .  it  is  customary  to  limit  the  adjec- 
tive 'causal'  to  laws  which  contain  time  as  a 
variable;  and  to  treat  time  in  the  positive  or 
forward  direction  as  the  independent  variable." 

"It  is  to  be  remarked  that  causation  is  con- 
ditioned by  the  law.  In  other  words,  it  takes 
place  only  within  the  system  which  the  law  de- 
scribes; [N.  B.  the  use  of  "only  when"  in  the 
first  chapter]  and  can  be  attributed  to  a  com- 
plex only  when  the  complex  is  identified  as  'a 
case  of  the  system.  .  .  Causes  and  effects 
are  thus  interdependent  within  the  given  sys- 
tem, or  under  the  law.  These  determine  their 
behavior  under  certain  conditions,  but  do  not 
prove  that  the  conditions  themselves  are  nec- 
essary. For  it  is  possible  that  a  given  complex 
should  be  accounted  for  in  terms  of  one  system, 
and  yet  conform  to  the  requirements  of  another 
system  as  well."  Or  not  conform,  equally  well 
either.  It  does  not  need  to  be  an  illusion,  or  a 
thing  to  be  apologized  for  that  some  things  are 
psychological  and  nothing  else.  My  uncle's 
house  can  well  be  mortgaged  and  part  of  my 
summer  night's  dream  world  at  the  same  time. 

"Reciprocity. — It  is  customary    to    use    the 
58 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  ANALYSIS 
term  'reciprocity'  to  express  a  relation  of  the 
same  type  as  causation,  but  without  the  same 
emphasis  on  temporal  antecedence  and  conse- 
quence. It  is  evident  that  the  relation  among 
the  various  values  of  the  variables  of  a  law  is 
mutual.  It  is  possible  not  only  to  predict  the 
future,  but  also  in  like  manner  to  infer  the 
past.  Similarly,  it  is  possible  to  infer  simul- 
taneities, as  e.  g.,  in  the  case  of  the  configura- 
tion of  the  planetary  system,  or  the  co-presence 
of  extension  and  color  in  the  visual  field.  It  is 
not  even  necessary  that  time  should  enter  into 
such  calculations  at  all;  as  is  illustrated  by  the 
interdependence  of  spacial  magnitudes  as  for- 
mulated by  geometry.  'Reciprocity,'  then,  may 
be  taken  to  mean  the  mutual  determination  of 
values  of  variables  under  the  law,  where  the 
factor  of  time-direction  is  not  essential." 

11.  Now  the  very  reason  substances  have 
had  their  little  day  and  cease  to  be  in  enlight- 
ened science  is  just  because  the  pursuit  of  re- 
lations to  their  lair  has  shown  not  only  that 
they  are  neither  mental  nor  physical,  but  also 
that  they  are  the  very  tissue  of  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  cosmos.  It  is  these  which  cement 
the  elements  of  things  together,  and  are  not 
substantial  in  any  sense  in  which  that  old  pair 
of  disreputable  cronies.  Matter  and  Mind,  were 
59 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
latterly  regarded.  The  significant  differences 
in  the  universe  are  relational,  not  substantial, 
and  not  "mental,"  either,  in  the  sense  of  being 
generated,  altered  and  dominated  by  thinking. 
Relations  are  indeed  the  hardest  data  of  the 
cosmos,  and  inasmuch  as  they  are  the  core  of 
every  fact,  must  be  treated  with  something 
else  than  other-worldly-mindedness  if  one  is  to 
treat  with  them  at  all  fairly.  I  promised  in  the 
last  chapter  to  show  why  materialism  is  too 
theological  a  doctrine  for  scientific  purposes. 
This  is  the  pat  place  for  doing  so.  The  "logic 
of  relations,"  into  which  we  have  entered  here 
at  some  length,  would  serve  in  physics  to  show 
that  there  are  some  things  which  are  not  phys- 
ical or  material  even  in  that  science,  and  that 
those  things  (relations)  are  quite  more  import- 
ant to  the  universe  than  the  miscroscopic  and 
Oh  so  hard!  brick-bats  which  the  old-line  ma- 
terialists claim  to  be  the  ultimate  stuffing  of 
the  cosmos.  Every  substance-theory  of  the  uni- 
verse is  theological.  The  absolute  idealist  and 
the  absolute  materialist  differ  only  in  the 
amount  of  personality  they  ascribe  to  the  prime 
substance  behind  everything.  Ego,  egg,  atom, 
ether-squirt,  ether-vortex,  hole-in-the-ether, — 
whichever  of  these  one  chooses,  it  is  only  a 
different  name  for  something  hidden  and  mys- 
60 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  ANALYSIS 
terious,— something  supposed  to  add  profundity 
to  the  faith  by  virtue  of  its  remoteness  and  awe- 
inspiring  character.  As  we  approach  nearer  to 
the  data  of  psychology,  also,  it  will  be  seen  that 
all  of  these  notions  must  be  discarded.  "Spirit- 
stuff"  is  as  relational  as  "matter,"  and  when 
one  analyses  even  "souls,"  one  finds  no  hidden, 
mysterious  thing  there  at  all.  At  this  the  stu- 
dent may  well  throw  up  his  hands,  wondering 
what  there  is,  if  matter  and  mind  are  equally 
to  be  pushed  aside. 

12.  It  is  now  time  to  sort  the  data  of  the 
conscious  cross-section.  By  consciousness  we 
shall  mean  every  object  within  range  of  the 
nervous  system, — whether  it  be  our  neighbor 
planet,  a  finger  nail,  a  mathematical  problem, 
or  a  call  from  starving  India;  as  well  as  every 
neural  process  going  on  entirely  within  the  epi- 
dermis,— such  as  the  gastric  and  other  splanch- 
nic functions,  spinal  perceptions,  or  cerebral 
functlonations;  in  addition  to  which  are  the  re- 
sponses from  body  to  object,  no  matter  how  far 
distant  or  how  abstract  it  is.  But  among  this 
host  of  objects  and  responses  only  a  few  are 
within  instant  report, — only  a  few  items  of  the 
possible  content  are  taken  up  and  dealt  with 
furtheringly  or  effectively.  Now,  bare  notice, 
without  naming  or  further  handling,  as  well 
61 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
as  such  items  barely  noticed,  we  shall  call 
awareness  or  sub-focal  consciousness.  Those 
we  fix  upon  and  deal  with  furtheringly,  we  shall 
call  focal  or  attentive  consciousness,  as  well  as 
so  denominate  the  processes  involved.  Those 
contents  and  processes  which  are  the  next  less 
clear  than  awareness  or  sub-focal  consciousness, 
we  shall  call  the  co-conscious;  while  those  proc- 
esses only  (not  contents,  for  the  contents  cease 
with  co-consciousness),  which  serve  especially 
to  others  than  ourselves  to  elucidate  the  status 
of  these  first  three  elements,  we  shall  call  the 
sub-conscious;  meaning  also  by  the  term  that 
they  are  evermore  present  as  physiological 
processes  defying  any  kind  of  elevation  to  fo- 
cality.  While  the  term  un-conscious  shall  be 
used  to  indicate  those  physiological  processes 
which  have  less  and  less  specific  and  directly 
traceable  influences  upon  the  more  focal  di- 
visions of  consciousness.  Language  normally 
functions  for  but  the  first  three  divisions  enum- 
erated above.  Abnormally,  however,  it  func- 
tions for  the  fourth,  but  never  for  the  fifth. 
This,  I  take  it,  is  the  logical  division  of  the 
conscious  cross-section  into  its  grand  divisions; 
and  it  must  be  noted  that  it  makes  no  more 
provision  for  genetic  psychology  than  a  gen- 
eral treatise  owes  to  such  a  subject. 
62 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  ANALYSIS 

13.  The  above  analysis  may  be  briefly 
termed  focal  distribution.  What  become  focal 
are,  in  the  main,  three  items, — sensation,  per- 
ception and  emotional  complexes.  Now  sensa- 
tions illustrate  the  attribute-thing  relationship, 
perceptions  illustrate  the  part-whole  type  of 
organization,  while  the  emotional  complexes  il- 
lustrate a  special  type  of  attribute-thing-func- 
tion. Furthermore,  sensation  is  found  in  the 
sub-focal,  focal  and  co-conscious  divisions,  per- 
ception is  found  in  these  also  with  the  sub-con- 
scious added,  while  the  emotional  complexes 
are  chiefly  concerned  with  the  sub-,  co-,  and 
focal  consciousnesses.  The  causal  sequence  of 
these  will  be  shown  in  the  special  chapters 
treating  of  them,  as  well  as  the  succession  of 
the  various  focalities  of  consciousness  owing 
to  qualitative  and  quantitative  elements  in  the 
sensations,  perceptions  and  emotional  com- 
plexes to  be  presented. 

14.  From  this  it  can  well  be  seen  that  one 
starts  with  nothing  "simple"  in  psychology.  In 
the  next  chapter  sensations  will  be  analysed 
into  more  than  a  dozen  elements.  Perceptions 
will  turn  out  to  be  sensations  organized  into 
structures  which  have  meaning  when  there  is 
motor  readiness  to  act  somehow  in  regard  to 
them.     Again,  in  the  emotional  complex  it  will 

63 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
always  be  a  situation  to  which  we  shall  refer, 
and  not  to  a  conscious  atom  to  explain  the 
"mental"  aspect  of  the  items  discussed.  Every 
bit  of  our  living  and  moving  is  immensely  com- 
plicated. But  this  does  not  make  it  impossible 
for  psychological  "simples"  to  be  found.  They 
will  not,  however,  be  stated  by  the  use  of  nouns, 
but  of  verbs,  adjectives  and  adverbs.  It  is  the 
manner  of  the  response  to  the  environment 
which  defines  psychology, — not  the  things  re- 
sponded to.  Also  remember  this:  that  the  en- 
vironment referred  to  in  various  situations 
means  neither  "that  mysterious  'external'  world 
beyond  the  limits  of  our  skin,"  nor  does  it  mean 
the  same  in  each  mentioned  case.  Often  the 
environment  is  within  the  body.  When  we  say 
we  have  a  toothache,  it  certainly  means  that 
the  vocal  organs  are  functioning  the  response 
of  the  general  somatic  condition  to  a  special 
environment  centered  in  the  tooth.  Individual 
environments  also  frequently  occur.  From  a 
large  group  of  things  we  select  only  specially 
interesting  features  as  material  for  speech  and 
memory.  For  example,  the  brute  mass  of  a 
football  field  and  the  players  is  first  grossly 
cross-cut  by  the  two  sympathetic  teams  of 
"rooters"  opposed  to  each  other  in  the  grand- 
stand; and  again  curiously  cross-cut  by  any  in- 
64 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  ANALYSIS 

dividual  witness  whose  special  interests  center 
in  one  or  more  of  the  padded  giants  in  the  turf. 
An  account  of  the  football  game,  if  complete, 
would  then  be  the  sum-total  of  all  spoken  or 
unspoken  judgments,  emotional  or  otherwise, 
that  those  preparing  for  it,  witnessing  it,  and 
remembering  it  would  make.  However  com- 
plex the  physical  situation  there  might  be,  the 
psychological  aspect  would  outdo  it  ten  to  one. 
To  ask  which  of  the  football  games  as  reported 
is  the  real  one,  has  no  meaning  for  psychology. 
It  is  the  task  of  our  analysis  to  determine  the 
order  in  which  things  get  known,  as  well  as 
the  succession  of  impulses  which  determine  the 
selection  for  speech  and  recall  of  several  items 
out  of  a  possible  multitude. 

15.  It  is  clear  that  in  the  realm  of  psychol- 
ogy more  newness  continually  develops  than  in 
any  other  field.  As  we  develop  from  childhood 
to  age  we  get  a  personality,  a  bias,  a  way  of  em- 
ploying the  material  of  the  cosmos  in  such  a 
manner  that  there  arise  from  our  own  nervous 
organization  certain  dependent  sets  of  functions 
which  point  our  doings  in  ways  that  are  "new" 
with  regard  to  the  material  they  respond  to. 
Within  our  own  bodies,  also,  there  are  colonies 
of  nerve  fibres  which  act  upon  and  are  reacted 
to  by  other  colonies,  in  such  a  way  that  rcfer- 
65 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
ence  cannot  be  made  solely  to  the  common,  un- 
critical names  for  one's  environment  to  explain 
why  our  actions  are  thus  and  so.  This  also 
must  be  kept  clear:  that  if  the  responses  to  their 
objects  by  one  nerve  colony  is  of  one  kind,  and 
the  responses  by  another  nerve  colony  is  of 
another,  that  the  responses  of  the  first  colony, 
say, — to  its  objects, — may  be  so  modified  by 
the  intercolonial  responses  that  the  result  will 
be  "new"  and  unpredictable  from  the  mere 
knowledge  of  the  way  in  which  either  colony 
alone  would  have  reacted  to  the  situation.  It 
is  the  task  of  analysis,  again,  to  label  correctly 
all  the  "new"  responses, — those  primes  in  the 
series  of  psychological  events. 

16.  Much  perplexity  often  arises  over  the 
question  of  the  position  of  things  in  mind. 
"Where  is  a  tooth  ache,  especially  its  disagree- 
ability?"  "Where  is  the  pleasure  of  a  good 
meal?"  are  typical  of  the  questions  sometimes 
asked.  This  question  ultimately  concerns  the 
nature  of  series,  and  I  submit  this  as  an  answer. 
Some  series  are  in  time  and  space,  while  some 
otiiers  are  not.  Those  in  time  have  position 
in  time  and  those  in  space  have  position  in 
space,  while  those  in  both  have  two  positions. 
But  when  one  asks  where  the  discomfort  of  a 
toothache  is  located,  or  where  hope,  fear  and 
66 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  ANALYSIS 
joy  may  be  found  during  their  office  hours,  the 
answer  is  that  there  is  at  least  one  more  order 
than  the  temporal  or  spacial  order  in  psychol- 
ogy, and  that  is  the  order  of  knowledge.  ("For 
space  and  time  are  continuous,  while  knowledge 
is  not")  Only  this  order  is  not  independent,  as 
are  the  orders  of  time  and  space,  but  dependent 
partly  on  them  and  partly  also  upon  the  logical, 
deductive  orders  of  things,  which  are  neither 
temporal  nor  spacial.  For  example,  the  vir- 
tuous kings  of  England,  if  named  in  the  order 
of  their  virtue,  would  not  perhaps  come  in  the 
same  succession  as  they  did  chronologically  to 
the  seat  of  the  Confessor.  The  order  of  their 
virtue  could  not  be  deduced  from  this  other 
order  any  more  than  the  order  of  their  sen- 
iority upon  ascending  the  throne.  The  orders, 
or  cross-sections,  of  these  British  monarchs 
would  show  no  ordinal  correlation.  And  when 
any  other  order  than  the  spacial  or  temporal 
order  is  involved,  "position"  cannot  mean 
something  geographical,  any  more  than  the 
phrase  "in  my  mind"  needs  to  refer  to  the  head 
or  the  bone-bound  mass  of  wrinkled  gray  mat- 
ter within  it.  Now,  the  toothache  is  not  in  the 
front  sidewalk,  to  be  sure,  nor  is  the  pleasure 
of  gourmandizing  in  the  handle  of  the  knife 
that  carves  the  truffied  grouse.  In  both  of  these 
67 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
cases  we  have  series  to  consider,  and  if  the 
toothache  or  the  dinner-delight  is  anywhere,  it 
is  in  that  manifold  which  is  defined  either  by 
the  terms  of  tooth,  nerves  and  rest  of  body;  or 
grouse,  unobtrusive  waiter  and  the  other  fine 
business  of  eating.  Its  position  in  these  com- 
plexes somewhat  compares  to  the  meaning  of 
"never"  in  contrast  to  "now." 

17.  There  is  but  one  more  thing  to  which  I 
wish  to  call  attention  before  we  pass  on  to  the 
next  chapter.  It  is  the  use  and  meaning  of 
"and"  in  psychology.  We  shall  find  that  a  sen- 
sation as  well  as  a  perception,  a  sentiment,  a 
will-act,  a  soul,  is  a  complex, — a  number  of 
things  more  or  less  organized  together.  They 
bear  to  one  another  in  psychology  among  oth- 
er things,  the  "and"  relation.  Now  this  "and" 
is  one  of  the  psychological  simples  mentioned 
before, — one  of  the  things  which  is  psycholog- 
ical and  nothing  else.  It  is  the  first  one  men- 
tioned, and  it  is  to  be  expressly  noted  and  filed 
away  for  reference  that  it  is  not  a  "noun,"  but 
a  "conjunction."  We  shall  get  the  verbs  and 
adverbs  by  and  by.  Here  we  may  see  one  of 
the  points  at  which  logic,  psychology  and  gram- 
mar coincide, — namely  the  letters  making  the 
word  "and."  But  spelling  here  serves  a  func- 
tion that  analysis  must  undo.  The  grammat- 
68 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  ANALYSIS 
ical  "and"  is  of  course  a  special  form  of  the 
logico-psychological  "and,"  being  exclusively 
neither  nor  all  of  both;  it  is  something  ele- 
mentally linguistic."  The  grammatical  "and" 
is  sometimes  expressed  by  a  comma.  This 
again  means  a  pause  in  the  voice,  or,  logically, 
an  enumeration  without  inference.  Grammar- 
ians call  this  repetition, — as  for  example,  "Hun- 
dreds and  thousands  of  dead  and  wounded." 
Variation  or  dijRference  with  insinuations  is  an- 
other meaning;  as  "there  are  lawyers  and  law- 
yers." Or,  the  attributive  relation  may  be 
poetically  expressed,  "thy  fair  and  outward 
character,"  i.  e.,  outwardly  fair  character."  Se- 
quence is  inferred,  or  causation, — "I  say  'go,' 
and  he  goeth."  It  sometimes  means  "or,"  as  in 
the  expression,  "taxable  for  state  and  county 
purposes."  In  the  expression,  "I  shall  try  and 
learn,"  it  means  "in  order  to."  In  symbolic 
logic  the  same  sign  is  used  for  both  "or"  and 
"and";  the  interpretation  and  reading  of  the 
sign  being  dependent  upon  its  place  in  the  sub- 
ject or  predicate.  Now  the  use  of  "and"  in 
psychology  may,  possibly,  be  any  one  of  the 
above  uses  at  times,  but  the  peculiarly  original 
psychological  use  of  the  conjunction  "and"  is 
as  follows:  Consciousness  is  both  a  content  and 
a    process,   and   the    contents,   which    are    all 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
analysable  into  non-mental  material  as  well  as 
are  the  processes,  exist  together  and  arouse  im- 
pulses in  a  way  that  is  not  found  elsewhere. 
The  combination,  the  organization  of  these  con- 
tents and  processes  we  shall  call,  for  brevity, 
an  exhibition  of  the  "with-for"  relation.  And 
let  us  add  that  it  is  not  mysterious.  If  a  realis- 
tic psychology  needs  any  justification,  it  will  be 
found  in  the  development  of  this  principle 
throughout  this  book. 

Bibliography. 

Perry,  R.  B.,  "A  Realistic  Theory  of  Inde- 
pendence," in  "The  New  Realism,"  by  E.  B. 
Holt  and  others. 

Spaulding,  E.  G.,  "A  Defense  of  Analysis," 
in  "The  New  Realism." 

Holt,  E.  B.,  "The  Concept  of  Consciousness," 
especially  Chapter  X,  "The  Empirical  Proper- 
ties of  Consciousness." 


70 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE   SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE   ORGANS 

1.  ".  .  .  there  are  not  sensations  and 
perceptions  and  their  objects.  There  are  ob- 
jects, and  when  these  are  included  in  the  mani- 
fold called  consciousness  they  are  called  sen- 
sations and  perceptions."  .  .  .  "In  sensation 
the  neutral  qualities,  the  so-called  'secondary 
qualities,'  come  and  go  as  more  or  less  unre- 
lated elements:  while  in  perception  they  enter 
and  depart  in  groups — smaller  or  larger.  Doubt- 
less few,  if  any,  qualities  (sensations)  enter 
consciousness  absolutely  single:  they  too  seem 
to  come  and  go  in  larger  or  smaller  masses. 
But  .  .  .  the  term  sensation  is  usually  ap- 
plied to  them  so  long  as  the  mass  of  qualities 
that  enter  together  has  within  itself  little  or  no 
logical  structure  or  unity,  no  internal  relation- 
ship :  while  in  perception  the  groups  have  some 
logical  coherence."  This  again  from  Holt  with 
many  thanks. 

2.  Why  do  we  habitually  say,  "I  have  a  sen- 
sation OF  color"?  Or  why,  again,  do  we  as- 
sert our  recollections  OF  people,  our  feelings 
OF  sadness,  our  consciousness  OF  this  or  that? 
Is  it  because  we  feel  a  gulf  deeply  fixed  be- 

71 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
tween  ourselves  and  this  world  of  ours  which 
so  constantly  stays  with  us?  Or  is  it  a  defect 
of  language,  and  has  a  little  wall-eyed  preposi- 
tion the  power  of  dropping  a  veil  over  our  eyes, 
thus  making  us  like  unto  the  Turkish  ladies 
who  are  calamitously  and  at  all  times  cut  off 
from  the  bright  realities? 

3.  Two  possible  explanations  are  open  and 
we  shall  consider  them  both,  (a)  The  Lin- 
guistic approach.  Usually  such  expressions  can 
be  avoided  by  the  use  of  other  words.  "I  have 
a  sensation  of  blue,"  means  something  diif  erent, 
does  it  or  not,  from  the  expression,  "I  sense  the 
blue  object"?  "I  recall  him,"  means  what  dif- 
ferent from,  "I  have  a  recollection  of  him"? 
"1  feel  sad,"  is  or  is  not  the  same  as  to  say,  "I 
have  a  feeling  of  sadness"?  Or  when  the  psy- 
chologist says,  "It  is  in  my  consciousness,"  does 
he  not  mean  that  he  is  conscious  of  it?  These 
all  seem  to  be  the  same  thing  in  a  different 
form,  allopathic  or  homeopathic,  just  as  you 
wish.  But  if  language  can  be  twisted  in  such 
a  manner,  then  not  in  language  itself  can  be 
found  the  solution.  The  OF-ness  has  as  much 
right  to  be  primary  as  does  the  more  direct  ex- 
pression. The  problem  is  still  unsolved, — it 
remains  a  dilemma.  Let  us  see  whether  this 
antique  dilemma  hath  not  a  third,  rudimentary 
72 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
horn,  the  grasping  of  which  will  lead  us  per- 
manently out  of  the  pinch. 

4.  (b)  That  the  thing  may  be  a  relayed 
form  of  consciousness  does  not  solve  the  dif- 
ficulty. All  consciousness  might  turn  out  to  be 
rp-presentative,  rather  than  immediate,  the  re- 
layings differing  only  in  complexity.  We  shall 
then  appeal  to  logic  as  our  old  standby.  The 
names  of  things  are  not  the  things,  which  every 
one  will  gladly  admit,  for  the  traveler  lost  in 
the  desert  cannot  slake  his  thirst  by  the  repeti- 
tion of  the  word  "water."  If  it  had  been  so, 
the  problem  of  the  relief  of  the  poor  could  never 
have  been  a  university  subject  for  which  the 
student  gets  full  credit.  But  to  use  the  word 
"water"  is  not  necessarily  indicative  that  it  is  in 
the  mouth  of  the  user  at  the  time.  "Water"  is 
the  conventional  English  symbol  for  a  liquid 
which,  in  some  countries,  is  used  to  slake  the 
thirst, — a  word  to  which  sensorial  wetness  per- 
taineth  not.  And  the  "meaning"  of  the  word 
"water"  is  dependent  in  such  a  case  upon  what 
others  will  do  when  it  is  uttered.  "Meaning," 
in  psychology,  at  least,  lies  in  what  will  be  done 
in  a  situation  involving  the  name  of  the  thing 
meant.  Meaning  is  therefore  motor;  it  refers 
to  functional  sequences,  and  is  an  example  of 
the  "with-for"  relation.  Now,  if  words  are  re- 
73 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 

lational,  just  as  consciousness  is  relational,  in 
that  it  is  generated  out  of  responses  to  an  en- 
vironment by  a  nervous  system,  then  the  old 
bugaboo  of  re-presentation  need  no  longer  be 
of  any  trouble  to  us.  Every  idea  consists  of 
positionless  parts  or  properties  of  a  thing.  The 
use  of  the  preposition  in  such  expressions  as 
"feeling  o/,"  "consciousness  of,"  etc.,  simply  in- 
dicates,— barring  the  linguistic  fallacy, — that 
the  thing  so  mentioned  is  one  of  the  elements 
making  up  the  conscious  manifold,  and  nothing 
else.  Otherwise,  the  expressions  "unclear,"  "a 
minor  element,"  or  "sub-focal"  provide  for  all 
cases  in  which  it  is  ever  properly  used.  The 
logic  of  relations  thus  accounts  for  certain  ele- 
ments in  genetic  psychology, — only  the  psy- 
chological aspect  in  language  frequently  swal- 
lows up  the  logical  one.  For  when  the  logical 
orders  get  distorted  by  the  introspective  con- 
sciousness, and  are  reinterpreted  by  way  of  it, 
they  suffer  the  lapse  of  their  scientific  validity. 
The  introspective  order  is  not  the  logical  one, 
and  the  introspective  consciousness  is  not  in  any 
sense  the  primary,  immediate  fact  of  conscious- 
ness. It  is  belated  consciousness,  and  when  too 
often  referred  to  is  indicative  of  an  incipient 
division  in  personality. 

5.     The  reason,  then,  for  attaching  validity 
74 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
to  the  expression,  "consciousness  o/,"  is  one  of 
"informal"  logic.  But  this  does  not  apply  to 
those  relational  states  in  which,  as  Professor 
Perry  says,  we  "surround  and  surmount  our 
past,  incomplete  experience."  To  say  "I  judge 
that  I  was  wrong,"  is  certainly  a  case  of  "con- 
sciousness of";  but  the  point  to  be  made  is  that 
the  "o/"-ness"  in  such  an  expression  ipso  facto 
defines  its  own  non-immediacy  or  non-focality 
in  consciousness.  Furthermore,  the  point  is  to 
be  made  that  one  cannot  have  this  o/"-relation 
occurring  twice  in  succession.  There  is  no  "of- 
consciousness-o/""  anything,  if  by  the  expression 
we  mean  to  link  co-ordinate  states  of  conscious- 
ness together.  /  may  recall  "that"  my  uncle 
mortgaged  his  house  "when"  7  was  a  mere  child, 
but  the  Vs  and  the  my  are  very  different  things 
each  time,  bearing  in  psychology  a  subordinate 
relation  to  each  other,  and  a  non-reciprocal  re- 
lation as  well.  Bluntly  spoken,  naively  taken, 
these  expressions  have  nothing  dangerous  in 
them,  but  the  naive  is  not  the  systematic  except 
by  a  coup  de  Dieu.  The  logic  of  introspection 
is  informal  logic:  as  Matthew  Arnold  would 
say,  it  "is  eloquent,  is  well, — but  is  not  true!" 

6.     We  have  been  using  the  term  conscious- 
ness as  something  already  built  up  and  guar- 
anteed by  responses,  but  not  as  something  not 
75 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
yet  functioned  for  or  organized  out  of  nature. 
Introspection  is  not  the  primary,  immediate 
fact  of  consciousness  because  it  is  found  only 
in  a  consciousness  set  a-brewing,  and  in  this 
brew  we  find  ourselves  long  before  we  first 
make  wise  inquiry  after  the  nature  of  our  being. 
For  the  "introspectional  feltness"  of  a  thing  is 
no  more  sufficient  to  explain  the  origin  or  per- 
sistence of  a  thing,  than  the  condition  of  being 
a  debtor,  will  ipso  facto  satisfy  one's  creditors. 
Now,  having  cleared  the  logical  grounds  of 
all  expected  difficulties,  we  are  ready  to  begin 
a  systematic  analysis  of  consciousness.  We 
shall  first  treat  of  sensations  and  perceptions, 
and  then  of  responses  and  meanings,  including 
speech.  Next  we  shall  see  what  emotions  and 
feelings  are,  following  this  with  an  explanation 
of  interest,  purpose  and  the  creative  faculties. 
Finally,  there  will  be  a  brief  but  wide  study  of 
the  ramifications  of  psychology  throughout  our 
practical,  daily  life.  For  psychological  things 
are  what  we  have  to  live  with,  if  we  live  at  all; 
indeed,  other  than  by  a  perspicuous  use  of  psy- 
chology, there  is  no  escape  from  certain  an- 
noyances but  by  death,  and  this  latter  business 
is  often  a  great  inconvenience  to  our  relatives. 
For  them  psychology  remains  the  proh'em,  sur- 
viving even  if  we  do  not. 
76 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
7.  This  is  the  program:  First  to  analyse 
objects  from  the  standpoint  of  their  being 
sensed,  and  then  to  analyse  the  physiological 
sensing  process.  By  this  means  we  shall  answer 
all  three  of  the  questions  regarding  conscious- 
ness,— what,  how,  and  why.  From  the  first 
standpoint  it  will  be  seen  that  there  are  two 
kinds  of  properties  or  attributes  which  give  the 
sensation  its  thinghood:  essential  and  inessen- 
tial. These  will  be  dealt  with  in  the  above  order. 
Every  one  of  the  essential  properties  at  least 
will  be  furthermore  seen  to  be  a  series,  and  the 
sensation  to  be  a  cross-section  of  those  terms 
of  each  such  series  which,  while  the  sensing 
process  is  going  on,  are  contingent  in  time  and 
space.  But  corresponding  terms  in  each  series 
need  not  be  present  at  the  same  time.  For  ex- 
ample, shapes,  colors  and  distances  are  all 
series,  but  the  moon  which  is  at  a  certain  point 
on  the  linear  space  series  distant  from  the  ob- 
server may  be  at  no  comparable  point  in  the 
shape  or  color  series,  nor  yet  in  the  bigness 
series.  Even  some  of  these  series  are  prime  to 
each  other.  Furthermore,  while  the  terms  of 
these  series  making  the  sensation  are  contin- 
gent, they  need  have  none  but  the  loosest  func- 
tional interdependence,  not  yet  having  the 
structure  requisite  for  the  formation  of  per- 
77 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
ceptions.  It  is  thence  that  some  of  the  in- 
formal logic  of  certain  kinds  of  consciousness 
is  derived.  It  is  not  here,  however,  that  one 
finds  any  original  "consciousness  stuff";  for 
these  various  series  are  not  generated  by  the 
consciousness  relation,  even  if  one  should  bol- 
ster up  his  argument  by  saying  that  continued 
fixation  of  a  color  appears  to  reduce  its  bright- 
ness. 

8.  Thus  sensations  have  no  substance, — 
they  are  not  the  ultimate  brickbats  of  existence. 
But,  added  to  this,  two  warnings.  This  does  not 
mean  that  we,  as  human  beings,  are  possessed 
of  a  special  stability  or  specific  gravity  which, 
by  comparison,  makes  the  rest  of  the  world  in- 
constant, filmy  and  tottering;  nor  that  when  I 
rap  on  the  table  before  me  and  say:  "This  is 
one  of  my  realities,"  that  I  deny  that  the  table 
is  hard.  Absolutely  the  contrary,  beyond  cavil 
and  argument !  A  series  can  well  be  a  series  of 
hardnesses  as  well  as  one  of  preferences  or  di- 
vorces, and  with  this  statement  the  philos- 
ophical program  of  this  book  must  close. 

9.  Consciousness  was  defined  for  us  as  both 
a  content  and  a  process;  some  of  its  elements 
are  likewise  of  this  twofold  character,  and  sen- 
sations are  such  elements.  For  instance,  if 
someone  holds  up  a  patch  of  red  in  front  of  me 

78 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
and  I  see  it,  the  red  color  is  my  content  of  con- 
sciousness, while  the  action  of  the  retinal  nerves 
guarantees  the  continuance  of  the  sensing  proc- 
ess. The  retinal  nerves  do  not  become  red,  nor 
is  it  a  reddish  neural  process  w^hich  is  going  on, 
— it  is  a  red-sensing  process.  However  ,on  the 
content  side,  we  have  a  red  sensation,  for  while 
there  is  a  functional  relation  between  the  neural 
action  and  the  patch  of  color,  there  is  an  iden- 
tical one  between  the  object  and  the  content  of 
consciousness.  In  our  discussion  of  visual  sen- 
sations further  on,  it  will  be  seen  why,  in  the 
case  of  the  color-blind  person,  the  content  is 
always,  regardless  of  optical  defects,  to  be  as- 
serted of  the  object.  For  psychology,  an  object 
is  something  that  can  stimulate,  just  as  a  rubber 
ball  is  something  that  will  bounce,  but  the  com- 
mon name  of  the  object  is  by  no  means  a  suf- 
ficient catalogue  of  its  functional  possibilities. 
If  one  were  to  enumerate  all  the  things  a  certain 
object  would  do,  he  would  then,  but  not  before 
then,  have  a  respectable  estimate  of  what  a 
sensation  is.  To  completely  exhaust  it  would 
require  that  it  be,  first  exhibited;  second, 
enumerated  as  to  its  properties;  and  lastly,  de- 
fined as  to  its  reaction  possibilities  in  all  situa- 
tions where  its  effects  made  a  difference  to  the 
outcome. 

79 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 

10.  But  no  dismay  need  accompany  the 
reading  of  this  last  statement.  The  cases  where 
it  does  make  a  difference  are  limited  and 
known;  at  least  if  not  fully  known,  known  as 
to  inveterate  trend.  The  series  has  been  plotted 
to  its  bounds,  and  whatever  we  lack  is  a  term 
or  two  within  the  known  range,  if,  indeed,  we 
lack  anything.  Eighteen  such  terms,  or  attrib- 
utes of  sensation  exist;  seven  of  these  are  es- 
sential, while  the  remaining  eleven  are  inessen- 
tial. The  whole  eighteen  never  exist  at  the 
same  time,  it  being  a  temporal  impossibility, 
but  whatever  of  them  do  exist  at  any  instant 
or  pulse  of  time,  define  the  sensation  for  us, 
and  at  the  same  time  exhaust  it.  Some  of  them 
are  temporal,  others  spacial  attributes;  some 
are  neither  spacial  nor  temporal,  but  quantita- 
tive or  qualitative  instead:  while  all  of  them 
refer  either  to  the  content  or  the  functional  side 
of  consciousness.  Membership  in  one  of  these 
classes  does  not  exclude  the  possibility  of  mem- 
bership in  another,  but  no  single  attribute  is 
found  in  all  six  classes. 

11.  The  Essential  Attributes  of  Sensation. 
(1)     Modality.  This  is  a  functional  attribute, 

referring  to  the  sense  field  operating.     There 

are  no  nameless    sensations;    every    object    is 

functioned  for  by   some   specialized   group   of 

80 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
cells, — the  organ  and  the  intra-neural  connec- 
tions; sight  is  one  modality,  sound  is  another, 
pain  is  another,  and  so  on.  There  is,  further- 
more, no  transition  possible  from  one  sense 
field  to  another;  a  prime  relation  exists  between 
them.  And  while  modality  is  functional,  it  is 
not  quantitative,  but  qualitative.  Ether  waves, 
which  produce  lights,  may  be  just  another  kind 
or  degree  of  vibrations  from  those  producing 
sounds,  but  they  are  even  thus  multifarious 
enough  in  their  quantitative  or  formal  relations 
to  be  called  qualitatively  different.  Modality 
is  not  spacial  or  temporal  either, — it  is  qualita- 
tively functional,  and  that  alone. 

(2)  Quality.  This  attribute  refers  to  such 
things  as  colors,  tastes,  smells,  tones,  and  the 
like,  for  every  sensation  is  not  only  taken  up 
by  some  sense  organ,  but  within  each  modal 
range  are  various  qualities;  in  some  cases,  such 
as  tastes,  very  few,  while  in  the  case  of  colors, 
exceedingly  many.  Qualities  are  intra-modal, 
and  as  such,  exhibit  transition  in  some  cases, 
but  not  in  others.  Thus  a  saline  solution  may, 
if  the  quantity  of  the  solvent  be  increased,  be- 
come a  burning  sensation,  but  never  sugary  or 
sour.  Likewise,  with  the  decrease  in  the  pro- 
portion of  the  solvent,  no  other  taste  will  be 
induced  when  the  salty  one  ceases  to  be  ef- 
81 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
fectual.  Nevertheless,  pure  distilled  water 
tastes  slightly  sweet.  Quality  is  of  course  a 
non-spacial  and  non-temporal  affair;  it  is  a 
physical  and  meta-physical  question  as  to 
whether  it  is  ultimately  quantitative.  Ulti- 
mately for  psychology,  however,  it  is  not. 

(3)  Intensity.  This  word  refers  both  to 
content  and  function  in  sensation.  Every  sen- 
sation has  its  own  specific  intensity, — it  is  some- 
where in  the  qualitatively  intensive  series.  This 
series  is  non-temporal  and  non-spacial.  Inten- 
sities cannot  be  added  together  arithmetically  to 
produce  a  sum,  just  as  no  number  of  undersea- 
soned  dishes  at  a  dinner  will  give  the  requisite 
flavor  to  it,  no  more  than  will  the  addition  of 
pinks  give  a  crimson.  Intensity  is  always 
unique.  We  may  not  be  able  to  tell  how  bright 
a  color  is,  nor  how  intense  the  toothache,  but 
the  naive  speech  reaction  is  pragmatic  and  not 
specific,  nor  are  all  conscious  contents  open  to 
steady  inspection.  As  a  functional  affair,  the 
intensity  of  sensation  refers  to  the  vigor  of  the 
transmission  of  the  nervous  impulse, — we  are 
stunned  by  the  detonation  of  the  ordnance,  or 
shocked  by  the  electric  current.  Or,  again,  at 
the  rose-carnival  our  own  entries  were  not  so 
red  as  those  of  another,  though  we  once  thought 
them  superlatively  so.  Here,  intensity  is  quan- 
82 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
titative;  in  many  cases  measurable  by  galvano- 
metric  methods.     But  it  is  not  spacial,  and  not 
in  point  of  rise  and  fall,  temporal. 

(4)  Latent-period.  This  term  is  functional, 
and  means  the  time  elapsing  between  the  ap- 
plication of  the  stimulus  and  the  reaction  upon 
it  by  the  sensing  organism.  It  is,  therefore, 
solely  a  temporal  phenomenon.  There  are  also 
two  kinds  of  latency, — focally  conscious  and 
sub-conscious,  as  follows:  Rain  falling  on  a 
sleeping  soldier's  upturned  face  on  the  battle- 
field might  cause  him  to  cover  it  without  awak- 
ening,— without  his  being  brought  to  the  notic- 
ing or  naming  consciousness.  This  would  be,  of 
course,  reflex  action  occurring  after  a  sub-con- 
scious latent  period.  If  the  soldier  awoke, 
knowing  and  naming  the  rain,  to  defend  him- 
self from  the  elements,  he  would  be  said  to  be 
focally  conscious  of  the  affair  after  a  latency 
ending  in  focal  consciousness  of  the  situation. 
In  both  of  these  cases,  the  latency  would  be  de- 
fined in  temporal  terms, — i.  e.,  as  a  time  be- 
tween the  mechanical  or  chemical  onset,  and 
the  movements  of  defense  or  speech,  or  both. 
Latency  has  much  to  do  with  intensity  of  the 
functional  kind:  it  is,  caeteris  paribus,  in  de- 
fined situations,  inversely  proportional    to    it. 

83 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
But  the  intensities  must  be  incremental  to  sliow 
this. 

(5)  Another  derivative  of  intensity  is  the 
Threshold.  Threshold  is  the  functional  ter- 
minus ad  quern  of  the  latent  period.  If,  in  the 
above  case,  the  sleeper  had  moved  to  cover  his 
face  from  the  rain,  some  threshold  of  arousal 
would  have  been  reached,  the  stimulation  would 
have  proved  effective,  and  the  with-for  relation 
become  operative.  While  being  at  the  end  of  a 
temporal  series,  it  is  not  itself  a  temporal  mat- 
ter, but  rather  a  prime  in  that  series.  Thres- 
holds are,  indeed,  measurable,  but  not  usually 
by  means  of  definite  terms  in  the  number  series. 
Sometimes  they  are  defined,  as  by  Titchener,  as 
those  points  on  the  intensive  scale  (mechanical 
measurements)  where  the  sensation  is  aroused 
(noticeably,  self-consciously)  50%  of  the  time. 
This,  however,  is  the  better  way  to  define  them, 
— as  having  membership  in  a  class  of  positions 
in  the  intensive  series  between  those  points 
where  the  sensation  is  noticeably  aroused  and 
those  where  it  is  not  noticeably  aroused;  a  de- 
cent illustration  of  which  would  be  the  area 
between  two  intersecting  parabolas  in  the  same 
plane.  It  is  not  a  point,  but  an  area,  not  such 
a  quantity  as  8,  but  rather  8  as  any  place  be- 
tween 7  and  9:  the  threshold  is  thus  shown  to 
84 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
be  a  quantitative  tendency.  Of  thresholds  there 
are  two  kinds,  the  upper  and  the  lower.  They 
are  at  opposite  ends  of  the  intensive  series,  and 
usually  exist  for  both  focal-  and  sub-conscious- 
ness in  every  modality.  But  the  operation  of 
the  with-for  relation  certainly  largely  depends 
upon  the  focally-conscious  aspect  of  the  thres- 
hold, or  limen,  as  it  is  often  called. 

(6)  Duration  is  the  chief  temporal  attrib- 
ute of  sensation.  It  can  be  applied  to  the 
period  of  time  between  the  onset  of  the  stim- 
ulus and  its  withdrawal,  to  the  temporal  extent 
of  sub-consciousness,  or  to  the  focal-conscious- 
ness of  the  sensation.  It  is  also  functionally 
important  for  the  intensity,  considered  as  a 
functional  attribute.  We  likewise  speak  cor- 
rectly of  the  duration  of  the  latent  period. 
Peculiarly  psychological  is  the  report  of  the 
duration  of  a  state  of  consciousness,  in  contrast, 
but  not  contradiction,  to  the  amount  of  time  in- 
volved in  the  physical  presence  of  the  excitant. 

(7)  The  chief  spacial  attribute  is  Extensity. 
As  an  elemental  attribute  of  sensation  this  cor- 
responds very  much  to  qualitative  intensity.  A 
pin  prick  is  "smaller"  in  extensity  than  is  the 
touch  of  a  blunt  pencil  point;  a  toothache  is 
also  usually  "smaller"  than  a  sensation  of  nau- 
sea.    It    is    not    alone    the    functioning  organ 

85 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
which  makes  this  difference, — not  alone  the 
knowledge  of  the  size  of  stimulus  or  organ,  but 
an  original  and  irreducible  attribute  of  the  sen- 
sation itself.  Now,  the  extensive  magnitudes 
are  not  absolute,  but  relative;  they  are  a  series, 
a  scale,  and  we  always  make  the  estimation 
by  employing  terms  of  comparison.  We  can- 
not tell  how  big  a  sensation  is,  nor  how  much 
bigger  it  is  than  another  one,  but  the  psychol- 
ogical number  system  is  of  this  kind,  and  one 
must  be  forewarned  of  it.  It  may  well  be,  also, 
that  the  space  of  psychology  is  not  Euclidian 
space,  but  a  space  very  like  that  of  a  fourth  or 
even  an  nth  dimension.  That  it  exists  cozily 
along  with  Euclidian  space,  however,  is  scarce- 
ly to  be  denied. 

12.  To  resume  and  further  elaborate  these 
seven  essential  attributes  of  sensation.  One  of 
them  is  spacial,  extensity;  two,  temporal, — 
latency  and  duration;  the  rest  are  neither  spa- 
cial nor  temporal,— modality,  quality,  intensity, 
and  threshold.  As  regards  content,  we  have 
quality,  intensity  and  extensity;  as  regards 
function,  we  have  modality,  intensity,  latency, 
threshold,  and  duration.  Intensity  was  also 
shown  to  be  related  to  both  content  and  func- 
tion, while  the  functional  character  of  other 
things,  such  as  duration  and  latent-period,  may 
86 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
frequently  tend  to  induce  qualitative  diii'erences 
in  the  content.  As  attributes  of  sensation,  these 
seven  terms  illustrate  the  attribute-thing  rela- 
tion, mentioned  and  discussed  in  the  preceding 
chapter.  Duration,  linked  with  intensity,  func- 
tionally construed,  as  well  as  latency,  refers  to 
the  causal  relation,  including  as  both  do  the 
temporal  aspect.  Now,  while  objects  are  ma- 
terial, none  of  these  attributes  are  material,  and 
yet  an  object  sensed  is  often  a  material  object. 
But  just  as  physical  and  chemical  analysis  finds 
no  brickbat-matter  in  the  universe,  neither  does 
psychology:  which,  however,  does  not  preclude 
that  matter  may  not  be  the  coagulation  of  non- 
material  things.  I  fling  the  material  stone  at 
the  material  cat,  but  on  the  levels  of  physical 
and  psychological  analysis,  qualities  only  tend 
to  displace  each  other  in  the  above  act.  The 
practical  cat  dies,  let  us  admit;  but  the  cat  of 
analysis  is  merely  redistributed :  the  stone  is  his 
passport  to  non-Euclidian  space. 

13.  We  now  pass  to  a  consideration  of  the 
inessential  attributes  of  sensation.  The  rubric, 
inessential,  does  not  mean  that  when  they  are 
present,  they  do  not  contribute  emphatically  to 
the  then  status  of  the  sensation.  They  do,  and 
as  attributes  they  are  constitutive  in  no  small 
degree  of  the  with-for  relationship  of  the  item 
87 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
of  consciousness  called  sensation.  A  harmless 
analogy  is  the  following:  A  household  may 
consist  of  from  two  to  n  members,  only  two  of 
which  are  essential;  but  the  children,  relatives, 
visitors  and  spungers  all  contribute  to  it,  even 
if  by  hunger  and  fracas  alone.  In  the  follow- 
ing sections  we  shall  take  up  the  nature  of  these 
attributes  from  the  standpoint  of  content,  func- 
tion, temporal  and  spacial  significance,  as  well 
as  relate  them  to  the  essential  attributes  just 
considered. 

(1)  Summation  is  the  term  used  to  indi- 
cate a  number  of  applications  of  a  stimulus  be- 
fore an  arousal  occurs.  It  is  a  temporal  ele- 
ment, and  functional.  The  heartless  fly  bites 
the  sleeper's  nose  a  dozen  times  before  he 
awakens.  Each  stimulus,  as  a  mechanical  or 
chemical  unit,  is  in  itself  insufficient  to  provoke 
the  arousal,  but  as  the  result  of  repetitions  near 
enough  together  so  that  the  organ  does  not  re- 
cover between  times,  summation  is  produced, 
the  threshold  is  passed  and  the  with-for  rela- 
tion firmly  established  in  the  defense.  Bare 
intensity  refers  to  one  application  of  the  stim- 
ulus; summation,  on  the  other  hand,  means 
many  (usually  identical)  applications.  Sum- 
mation plays  a  large  part  in  quotidian  affairs; 
"till  seven  times"  is  an  expression  based 
88 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
upon  it,  as  well  as  the  fact  that  a  basehall  team 
loses  heart  after  the  fifth  or  sixth  scccessive  de- 
feat of  the  season,  though  their  playing  all 
along  may  have  been  equally  poor.  The  sleep- 
meter  that  jangles  us  back  into  life  in  the  morn- 
ing, the  final  yielding  of  the  maiden  sister  to 
the  fatality  of  spinsterhood, — ^these  are  both 
summation.  To  some  persons  there  seems  to 
be  a  qualitative  aspect  to  summation  differing 
from  that  of  an  equable,  supra-liminal  sensa- 
tion. It  is  more  extensive,  they  say,  and  of  a 
texture  more  subtle  and  more  elusive;  if  so,  it 
would  be  another  case  of  psychological  new- 
ness.    As  such,  this  "element"  is  adjectival. 

(2)  The  after-image  is  that  part  of  the 
object  which  survives  the  temporal  extent  of 
its  application  to  the  sense  organ.  The  phy- 
sicist witnesses  summation  in  the  number  of 
shots  a  piece  of  ordnance  will  stand;  he  would 
likewise  find  positive  after-images  in  echoes, 
at  least  in  so  far  as  acoustical  effects  are  con- 
cerned. The  "kick"  of  a  gun  might  also  be  a 
sort  of  negative  after-effect.  Both  of  these  are 
illustrated  in  psychological  material,  for  there 
are  two  kinds  of  sensorial  after-images,  positive 
and  negative.  If  we  look  fixedly  at  the  yellow 
sun,  upon  turning  away,  greenish-blue  blobs 
pepper  the  landscape.  But  if  we  gaze  less  long 
89 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
at  an  illumination  of  a  milder  intensity,  the 
original  colors  are  usually  more  faithfully  pre- 
served in  the  neural  momentum.  The  after- 
image is  qualitative  and  quantitative,  depend- 
ing upon  many  things,  namely:  intensity,  qual- 
ity, duration,  extensity  of  the  stimulus,  and  in 
pathological  cases  upon  emotionality,  intricacy 
of  the  situation,  and  even  upon  habitual  lying 
or  truth-telling.  The  after-image  is  not  an  il- 
lusion, but  consists,  in  vision,  at  least,  of  but 
the  shape  and  color  of  the  object  sensed,  which, 
by  the  way,  have  no  position,  and  may  be  any- 
where. 

(3)  No  sense  organ  functions  without 
chemical  changes  within  it,  and  when  they  be- 
come such  as  to  impede  the  transmission  of  the 
impulses  throughout  the  system.  Exhaustion 
takes  place.  This  is  not  the  same  as  fatigue, 
which  will  be  discussed  under  emotion.  Ex- 
haustion is  a  function  of  intensity,  duration, 
extensity  and  certain  plain  qualities,  specially 
smells.  Curiously  enough,  also,  the  sense-or- 
gans are  attuned  to  the  reception  of  just  so 
much  stimulation,  teleologically  or  not,  just  as 
either  disputant  avers.  Leaving  before  the  sym- 
phony is  finished,  drowsing  through  the  mis- 
sionary sermon,  sleep,  death,  quitting  college 
before  the  degree  is  conferred, — such  cases 
90 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
usually  exist  by  virtue  of  a  complex  in  which 
it  is  more  or  less  nuclear.     We  shall  discuss  its 
physiological  side  in  a  few  moments. 

(4)  Adaptation  appears  to  be  a  kind  of 
partial  exhaustion,  and  as  such  is  a  derivative 
of  intensity;  it  is  temporal,  and  in  its  different 
aspects,  qualitative.  In  exhaustion  the  fuse  is 
burned  out;  in  adaptation  there  is  a  shunting  of 
the  current  to  a  transmission  circuit  of  exceed- 
ingly low  potential.  I  call  adaptation  those 
cases  of  partial  exhaustion  where  the  sensation 
can  be  restored  through  attending  to  it  or  ex- 
pecting it;  exhaustion  exhibits  no  such  resurg- 
ences. The  wearing  of  clothes,  glasses,  and  the 
like,  marriage,  accepting  life  or  death  in  the 
trenches,  failing  to  notice  how  bad  mannered 
we  are,  are  cases  of  adaptation.  Perhaps  the 
"ship  that  found  herself"  illustrates  it,  as  well 
as  the  fact  that  machinery  runs  better  after  a 
few  hundred  pulses  than  it  did  at  first.  But 
here  the  analogies  run  rather  to  seed  and  so 
we  shall  migrate  to  the  next  topic. 

(5)  Inhibition  is  a  case  where,  for  example, 
but  one  of  two  or  more  possible  objects  of  a 
group  gets  functioned.  It  may  follow  exhaus- 
tion or  adaptation,  and  appears  to  be  a  deriva- 
tive of  intensity.  While  intent  upon  our  tele- 
phone conversation  we  do  not  notice  that  the 

91 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
fire-engine  has  clanged  noisily  down  the  street, 
though  the  sound  it  makes  is  physically  in- 
tenser  than  the  voice  over  the  wire.  Again,  dis- 
agreeable table  companions  keep  us  from  en- 
joying an  otherwise  satisfactory  meal;  or  the 
fear  of  an  impending  final  examination  abol- 
ishes the  memory  of  things  we  were  positive  we 
had  at  instant  recall.  Inhibition  is  a  temporal 
and  quantitative  affair,  and  in  psychology  plays 
a  considerable  role.  Indeed,  one  author, 
Muensterberg,  regards  it  as  the  central  fact  of 
psychology. 

(6)  When  two  or  more  sensations  blend  so 
that  each  to  a  certain  extent  loses  its  independ- 
ent character,  the  resultant  is  called  a  Fusion. 
This  is  a  case  of  both  psychological  and  logical 
newness.  Fusion  is  both  a  process  and  a  con- 
tent. On  the  side  of  extensity  it  is  sometimes 
easily  comparable  and  again  curiously  incom- 
parable to  the  elements  from  which  it  was  de- 
rived. The  discussion  of  the  various  sense 
fields  will  illustrate  this.  Fusion  is  partial,  mu- 
tual inhibition;  wherever  it  occurs,  it  is  very 
likely  to  become  adapted,  and  often  seems  to 
be  a  sop  thrown  to  exhaustion.  It  will  be  seen 
later  on  to  be  one  of  the  integral  parts  of  per- 
ception. Language  itself  is  a  case  of  fusion. 
We  do  not  think  of  the  separate  letters  of  words, 
92 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
but  of  the  words  as  a  whole;  again,  orange  is 
obtainable  by  mixing  red  and  yellow  pigments, 
but  it  goes  by  a  simple  name  and  usually  passes 
by  unanalysed;  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity  was 
a  theological  fusion.  Fusion  and  confusion  are 
interesting  to  compare, — they  seem  to  have 
many  common  parts.  The  latter  term,  how- 
ever, refers  to  the  meaning-side  of  the  situa- 
tion,— the  degree  of  confusion  implying  the 
amount  of  labor  it  would  take  to  make  order 
grow  where  chaos  did  before. 

(7)  When,  again,  sensations  appear  to- 
gether and  neither  inhibit  each  other  nor  fuse, 
we  have  a  case  of  Contrast.  This  is  a  qualita- 
tive and  sometimes  a  spacial  attribute;  it  is  like- 
wise often  a  derivative  of  intensity.  The  chef 
applies  chemical  fusion  to  the  making  of  the 
salad,  while  the  hors  d'oeuvre  which  preceded 
was  concocted  for  the  sake  of  contrast  to  it. 
The  uses  to  which  contrast  effects  are  put  are 
apparently  unlimited,  and  yet  quite  closely  re- 
lated to  certain  definite  principles  of  order.  It 
would  be  more  "stunning"  to  wear  two  gloves 
each  of  a  different  color,  but  we  prefer  in  such 
a  case  bilateral  chromatic  symmetry;  in  fash- 
ions again,  suits  all  of  a  piece  are  not  disdained 
in  favor  of  polychromatic  clothing  whether  or 
no.  Besides  this,  we  may  be  passionately  fond  of 
93 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
change  in  many  directions,  and  yet  always  eat 
the  same  breakfast,  or  walk  to  business  down 
the  same  street.  But  where  contrast  effects  are 
produced,  each  of  the  components  more  or  less 
emphasizes  the  elfect  of  the  other.  It  is  thus 
a  case  of  the  opposite  of  fusion  in  its  two  prin- 
cipal aspects.  It  is  curious  to  note  in  what 
special  ways  it  differs  from  inhibition. 

(8)  Clearness  is  predicated  of  the  content 
side  of  a  sensation  when,  in  the  midst  of  other 
sensations,  it  defines  them  in  terms  of  itself. 
Thus  it  takes  a  relational  aspect  to  provide  the 
existence  of  this  attribute.  As  we  never  get 
but  one  sensation  in  consciousness,  there  is  al- 
ways more  or  less  clearness  in  the  cross-section. 
Clearness  and  inhibition  are  closely  related  in 
this  way, — the  inhibiting  sensation  may  be 
clear,  the  clear  sensation  always  inhibits.  To 
accomplish  this,  the  clearness  takes  on  the  tem- 
poral aspect  of  duration,  and  through  duration 
the  inhibition  gets  functioned.  In  point  of  de- 
fining the  context  in  terms  of  itself,  this  at- 
tribute has  important  bearings  on  perception. 
If  it  leads  to  inhibition,  it  relates  itself  to  in- 
tensity; while,  as  it  frequently  appears  to  come 
from  emotional  backgrounds,  it  often  loses  its 
purely  original  qualitative  and  content  aspect 
on  this  account. 

94 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 

(9)  Vividness  is  a  compound  of  clearness 
and  inhibition  simultaneously  occurring.  Clear- 
ness defines  the  background  in  terms  of  itself, 
— in  vividness  we  have  a  lost  background,  and 
an  increase  of  intensity  due  not  to  the  inhibit- 
ory crowding-out  of  the  other  contents,  but  of 
the  sudden  wilting  of  the  conflicting  functions. 
Crudely,  it  could  be  compared  with  a  land- 
slide to  a  certain  political  candidate  by  virtue 
(or  vice?)  of  the  withdrawal  of  his  opponents, 
rather  than  to  his  own  efforts  in  spite  of  them. 
This  latter  would  rather  be  a  case  of  inhibi- 
tion. Physicists  are  acquainted  with  a  half- 
brother  to  this  attribute  in  some  of  the  phenom- 
ena of  refraction.  In  psychology,  I  am  con- 
vinced, the  index  of  refraction  in  the  case  of 
vividness  is  frequently  emotional. 

(10)  The  attributes  of  sensation  may  have 
no  position  alone,  but  the  cross-section  of  their 
series  takes  position  with  reference  to  the  ob- 
ject and  the  sensing  organ:  we  call  this  the 
Local-sign  (or  Local-signature).  I  am  touched 
with  a  pencil  point  upon  variously  functioning 
organs,  and  the  name  of  the  sense  field  comes 
with  the  touch  (or  other)  sensations.  We  al- 
ways report  things  as  being  somewhere, — not 
only  in  the  case  of  sensations  which  arouse  a 
unique  quality  upon  various  skin  areas, — but  so 

95 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 

inveterately  do  we  apply  perspective  to  the 
contents  of  consciousness,  that  all  things  seem 
to  have  a  place.  And,  in  one  sense,  they  do; 
dreams  are  in  dreamland  just  as  fairies  are  in 
fairyland.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  just  as  the 
non-spatial  attributes  of  sensation  are  position- 
less,  so  are  many  of  their  combinations  into 
things  or  wholes;  especially  is  this  true  of  the 
part-whole  masses,  of  which  dreams  and  fairies 
as  well  as  logarithmic  functions  are  examples. 
(11)  Some  sensations  are  pleasant  or  un- 
pleasant, and  these  terms  signify  Feeling-tone. 
This  is  an  originally  qualitative  aspect,  and 
nothing  more ;  but  there  are  grades  of  it,  loosely 
called,  for  want  of  a  better  name,  intensities. 
The  nature  of  feeling  is  not  as  obscure  as  the 
dissertations  upon  it, — it  is  a  function  of  cer- 
tain equilibria, — neural,  muscular,  sensorial, 
and  the  like, — several  variables,  whose  ex- 
pected quotient  is  found  to  shrink  in  a  sur- 
prising manner.  For  without  the  proper  regard 
for  the  psychological  plus,  only  nonsense  arises 
from  the  addition  of  certain  elements  in  the 
conscious  cross-section.  Psychology  furnishes 
the  basis  for  the  empirical  status  of  the  irra- 
tional numbers  in  the  above  case,  just  as  in 
fusions  we  find  that  to  add  is  to  subtract.  In 
these,  as  in  other  cases  to  be  met  with,  nascitiir 
96 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
ridiciiliis  mus  is  the  authorized  shipman's  card. 
We  are  sometimes  found  furthering  or  hinder- 
ing those  sensation  masses  including  pleasant 
or  unpleasant  feeling-tones  respectively,  but 
not  always,  for  usually  displeasure  is  more 
heavily  socially  subsidized  than  is  pleasure,  as 
is  the  case  with  error  and  untruth.  These  two 
feeling-tones  are  not  incompatible  psychological 
opposites,  and  when  found  together,  they  need 
neither  fuse  with  nor  inhibit  each  other,  which 
is  a  curiosity.  We  have  discussed  the  "posi- 
tion" of  pleasure  in  a  previous  paragraph,  and 
those  authors  who  interpret  feeling  as  indicative 
of  the  fact  that  the  sensation  to  which  it  per- 
tains is  referred  to  the  body  rather  than  to  the 
"external"  world,  are  in  error.  What  a  dis- 
mal time  others  than  ourselves  must  be  hav- 
ing, according  to  this  bit  of  wisdom ! 

14.  The  table  on  the  following  page  will 
illustrate  the  relations  of  both  the  essential  and 
inessential  attributes  to  one  another. 


97 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 


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98 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
15.  These  eighteen  attributes  are  the  stuff 
of  which  sensation  is  made.  They  are  attrib- 
utes, rather  than  parts,  and  illustrate  the  attrib- 
ute-thing relationship  mentioned  and  defined  in 
the  previous  chapter.  As  such,  they  make  up 
sensation,  for  sensation,  apart  from  their  con- 
stituting, contributing  relationship,  does  not  oc- 
cur. Thus  it  is  incorrect  to  say  that  "a  sensa- 
tion varies,"  for  these  attributes  are  all  series, 
and  as  such  alter  in  their  changing  the  nature 
of  the  sensation  they  constitute  instead  of  being 
altered  by  it.  Sensational  consciousness  varies 
with  its  object,  but,  by  virtue  of  our  function- 
ing a  larger  environment  than  that  of  the  bare 
object  of  sense,  reports  upon  its  variation  are 
obtained.  From  this  it  is  likewise  perceived  that 
what  the  physicist  means  by  "object"  and  what 
the  psychologist  means  by  it  are  apparently  dif- 
ferent things.  In  psychology,  however,  we  use 
the  word  stimulus  to  indicate  the  physicist's 
"object."  Sensation  is  more  than  stimulus. 
Sensation  is  the  object,  and  what  it  will  do;  or, 
in  other  words,  the  psychologist's  "object"  is 
the  content  and  functions  of  a  consciousness 
when  within  receptive  range  of  the  physicist's 
"object"  or  stimulus.  For  neither  can  all  of 
these  attributes  occur  at  the  same  instant  of 
time,  nor  does  the  identity  of  the  sensation  with 
99 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
the  object  exhaust  it.  Surely  the  stimulus,  as 
a  physical  datum,  will  affect  other  physical 
data  in  a  way  that  differs  from  its  directly  af- 
fecting a  nervous  system;  or  it  may  have  chem- 
ical properties,  or  a  geological  system  to  sup- 
port. But  in  either  case,  the  sensation  is  iden- 
tical with  whatever  of  the  object  is  material  for 
psychology.  Series  and  properties  only  delimit 
the  fields  of  the  various  sciences. 
Questions  on  the  foregoing: 

1.  Enumerate  three  common  cases  of 
adaptation  and  three  of  exhaustion  not  men- 
tioned in  the  text.  To  what  sort  of  stimuli  are 
they  referred?  Tell  in  each  case  why  you  think 
the  one  attribute  appears  instead  of  the  other. 

2.  "Quality"  is  under  the  heading  "qualita- 
tive" in  the  above  table.  Can  you  suggest  a 
better  term  than  the  latter  in  order  that  the 
same  word  need  not  be  used  in  two  senses? 

16.  I  propose  now  to  indicate  what  the 
nervous  system  has  to  do  with  sensation.  Let 
me  first  lay  down  the  principle  that  neural  ac- 
tion is  concerned  more  with  the  functions  of 
consciousness  than  with  its  content.  To  be  sure, 
we  should  never  see  yellow  without  a  physiolog- 
ical eye,  nor  taste  lemon  without  a  tongue, 
but  physiological  psychology  is  the  science  of 
the  functional  maintenance  of  the  content  of 
100 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
consciousness  rather  than  something  concerned 
with  the  question  of  why  we  see  yellow  instead 
of  red  or  taste  lemon  rather  than  lemonade. 
For  the  qualities  of  the  content  are  implicit  in 
any  neural  action  at  all,  while  the  functional  and 
quantitative  series  do  not  follow  such  an  un- 
eventful history.  This  may  sound  far  from 
obvious,  to  say  the  least  of  it,  and  yet  the  whole 
history  of  psychology  is  befuddled  with  bulle- 
tins from  Paddock,  aggravating  in  their  gloomy 
references  to  that  moist  bundle  of  strands  with- 
in our  bodies  known  as  the  nervous  system,  in 
which  sensation,  perception,  emotion  and  rea- 
son were  said  to  keep  a  heirarchy  of  thrones 
whose  exact  location  was  a  perpetual  discom- 
fiture to  the  invading  investigator.  To  be  spe- 
cific, there  are,  for  example,  but  four  simple 
taste  qualities,  while  there  are  nine  functional 
attributes  of  each  of  them.  Now  responses  to 
the  chemical  stimuli  known  as  tastes  are  re- 
stricted to  these  four  qualities,  but  not  in  any 
way  so  attached  to  the  functionally  quantitative 
series  of  sensational  attributes.  Response,  be- 
ing a  process,  is  therefore  superlatively  con- 
cerned with  functional  attributes:  and  to  this 
we  shall  direct  our  attention. 

17.     A  schematic  representation  of  the  nerv- 
ous system  would  incline  toward  the  shape  of  a 
101 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
funnel,  the  large  end  of  which  is  located  in  the 
skull.  Thence,  thinning  down,  to  the  base  of 
the  spine,  it  ends  as  a  notable,  separate  struc- 
ture. It  is,  therefore,  almost  entirely  posterior 
to  the  countenance.  Just  as  visually  we  walk 
about  headless,  so  we  are  never  aware  of  the 
nerves  as  such.  But  from  this  central,  funnel- 
like nervous  system,  there  are  prolonged  in- 
numerable and  immensely  complicated  bundles 
of  fibres,  ramifying  to  all  parts  of  the  body, 
and  varying  from  a  fraction  of  an  inch  to  five 
or  six  feet  in  length.  Functionally,  the  mass 
of  the  nervous  system  does  not  assist  us  in  un- 
derstanding it.  It  is  best  regarded  as  a  sys- 
tematic set  of  strands,  called  cells.  Let  us  be 
emphatic  here,  however,  and  take  notice  that 
the  word  "cell"  does  not  mean  a  little,  roundish 
affair.  The  cells  of  the  nervous  system  are 
long,  tiny  strands,  contrasting  in  shape  with 
bone  and  other  cells  in  the  same  way  that  a  tall 
flag-pole  contrasts  with  a  chopping  block.  The 
functional  construction  goes  farther.  The 
physiological  unit  of  response  is  not  a  single 
cell,  but  a  set  of  at  least  three  such  long  fibres, 
articulating  in  such  a  way  that  a  stimulation, 
say,  from  the  surface  of  the  body  will  be  car- 
ried as  an  impulse  along  all  three  of  them  in 
linear  succession,  and  arouse  at  the  end  the 
102 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
release  of  energy  required  to  make  the  stimulus 
effective.  Such  a  linear  series  of  nerve  cells 
or  fibres  is  called  a  reflex  arc,  and  consists  of 
three  parts  (the  three  cells)  as  follows:  recept- 
or, conductor  and  effector.  The  receptor  starts 
with  or  in  the  sense  organ,  and  extends  to  some 
part  of  the  central  nervous  system, — brain  or 
spinal  cord, — where  it  ends  as  a  fibre.  But 
functionally  it  continues  in  the  conductor,  which 
interlaces  it  with  the  effector,  whose  further  end 
is  attached  to  a  muscle  by  means  of  a  little  pad 
or  end-plate.  The  action  of  this  response 
mechanism  is  usually  more  useful  to  study  than 
are  pictorial  representations  of  it,  since  they 
are  all  idealized.  The  best  way  to  understand 
the  scheme  is  to  procure  some  nice  animal,  kill 
it,  and  trace  out  some  special  set  of  nerve  fibres; 
for  by  this  means  alone  the  curious,  angular 
character  of  the  nerve-path  can  be  appreci- 
ated. 

18.  The  cell  is  primarily  a  white  fibre. 
Somewhere  along  the  fibre  will  be  found  a  cell- 
body,  colored  gray;  the  term  "gray  matter"  in- 
dicates that  the  cell-bodies  are  on  the  surface 
of  the  brains  while  below  the  surface  in  the 
spinal  cord.  There  are  about  eleven  thousand 
million  of  these  nerve  cells  in  the  human  body, 
each  of  which  derives  its  nourishment  from  its 
103 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
own  gray  cell-body.  They  thus  communicate 
impulses,  but  not  food.  The  nerve  strand  has 
two  sheaths,  an  inner  or  myelin  sheath,  and  an 
outer,  called  the  neurilemma.  The  function  of 
these  concern  electro-physiology,  however, 
rather  than  our  own  science.  Special  psycho- 
logical interest  attaches  to  the  appearance  and 
function  of  the  physical  termination  of  the 
nerve  strands,  one  of  which  is  the  end-brush,  the 
other,  the  dendrites.  It  will  be  noticed  that  the 
names  are  similes,  and  as  such  explain  nothing 
functional.  The  end-brush  of  one  fibre  meets 
the  dendrites  of  another,  or  aborizes  with  it; 
and  right  at  this  juncture  psychology  finds  its 
chief  interest  in  the  nervous  system.  This  is 
not  to  say  that  latency,  for  example,  is  uncon- 
nected with  the  rate  of  the  nervous  impulse, 
which  makes  it  impossible  for  the  "speed  of 
thought"  to  be  more  than  one  or  two  hundred 
metres  per  second.  Nor  is  it  unimportant  that 
the  nervous  action  is  chemical  rather  than  elec- 
trical, even  though  the  action  of  the  cell  is  ac- 
companied by  electrical  phenomena  detectable 
by  a  galvanometer,  and  that  there  is  chemical 
substance  freed  by  the  nervous  action  of  re- 
sponse. Important  as  these  are,  they  concern 
not  intimately  the  conscious  cross-section.  But 
the  fact  that  the  change  of  the  direction  of  the 
104 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
current  through  this  neural  arc  is  irreversible, 
and  that  it  proceeds  from  sense  organ  down 
the  receptor  fibre,  through  the  dendrites  of  that 
fibre  across  to  the  end-brush  of  the  conducting 
fibre,  and  so  on  to  the  end-plate  of  a  muscle 
ready  to  be  aroused  into  changes  of  form,  elas- 
ticity and  the  like, — this  point  is  so  important 
for  psychology  that  we  shall  take  it  up  in  con- 
siderable detail.  It  is,  indeed,  the  backbone 
of  our  knowing  and  doing. 

19.  Reflex  action  is  the  occupation  of  the 
reflex  arcs.  "When  one  touches  oft"  a  charged 
Leyden  jar,  incalculably  more  energy  is  dis- 
charged from  the  jar  than  was  contained  in  the 
mechanical  connecting  of  the  two  poles  by  the 
discharging  wire.  The  release  of  energy  in  ex- 
ploding dynamite  far  overtops  the  mechanical 
blow  from  the  percussion  cap.  These  are  help- 
ful analogies  in  considering  reflexes.  Reflex 
action  means  that  more  energy  is  discharged 
from  the  arc  than  was  imparted  to  the  organ- 
ism by  the  stimulus.  It  also  means  that  the 
"end  effect  is  mediated  by  a  conductor,  itself  in- 
capable of  mediating  that  particular  end  effect." 
Furthermore,  in  all  animals  having  a  compli- 
cated nervous  system,  we  find  the  reflexes  de- 
fining the  environment  in  point  of  being  specifi- 
cally and  selectively  excitable.  Some  respond 
105 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
but  to  grades  of  temperature,  others  to  lights, 
still  others  to  sounds,  or  to  mechanical,  chem- 
ical, electrical  and  other  eiffects;  and  thus  by 
their  cross-sectioning  the  environment,  unite  in 
forming  that  which  we  call  consciousness. 
There  are,  of  course,  other  responses,  such  as, 
for  example,  those  which  calls  from  starving  In- 
dia would  provoke,  but  these  are  not  simple 
reflexes.  According  to  recent  investigators,  the 
difference  between  the  higher  and  the  lower 
animals,  insofar  as  neural  action  is  concerned, 
lies  in  the  fact  that  the  unicellular  organisms 
take  but  two  chapters  in  physiology  to  exhaust 
them, — one  on  surface,  and  the  other  on  internal 
phenomena, — while  multicellular  organisms 
supply  a  third  chapter  on  intercellular  physiol- 
ogy by  virtue  of  intercellular  deposits.  Now 
when  these  deposits  are  solid  (e.  g.,  bone)  we 
have  mechanical  or  lever  operations  to  con- 
sider; when  they  are  liquid,  we  have  chemical; 
and  when,  lastly,  the  intercellular  connections 
are  by  virtue  of  real,  living  protoplasmic  masses, 
whose  business  it  is  to  connect,  intercommunica- 
tion becomes  possible  by  reflex  action.  Now 
we  can  see  why  the  foregiven  analogies  of  the 
Leyden  jar  and  the  dynamite  are  going  to  prove 
psychologically  inadequate.     And  yet  mechan- 


106 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
ics  has  a  finger  in  reflex  action  as  will  forth- 
with appear. 

20.  In  the  succeeding  paragraphs,  until  we 
come  to  the  detailed  relating  of  the  attributes 
of  sensation  to  the  action  of  the  nervous  sys- 
tem, I  shall  draw  largely  upon  the  work  of  C. 
S.  Sherrington  and  others,  as  given  in  his  "In- 
tegrative Action  of  the  Nervous  System,"  in 
which,  by  the  way,  is  recorded  the  most  signif- 
icant information  upon  physiological  psychol- 
ogy that  has  appeared  for  many  centuries.  The 
student  will  profit  largely  by  studying  some 
parts  of  this  book  in  detail  in  connection  with 
this  present  chapter.  "A  sense  organ  is  a  recep- 
tive surface."  From  whatever  parts  of  the  body 
a  reflex  can  be  elicited,  nerve  fibres  run  to  the 
conductor  involved  in  the  response,  and  those 
parts  are  the  sense  organ  for  that  reflex.  "The 
eye  is  a  glorified  heat  spot,  the  ear  a  glorified 
touch  spot."  The  long  and  eventful  history  of 
evolution  traces  the  contraction  of  those  sense 
fields  receptive  to  ether  and  air  vibrations  to 
certain  restricted  areas,  furthermore  formed 
into  organs  which  lie  half  embedded  under 
apertures  in  the  skin,  neither  strictly  within  nor 
on  the  surface  of  the  body.  Of  stimuli  that 
will  excite  the  reflex  chain  implicit  with  the 
presence  of  a  sensory  surface  there  are  four 
107 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
kinds.     The  first  and  largest  class  are  the  ef- 
fective stimuli,  by  which  is  meant  all  means, 
mechanical,   thermal,   chemical,   etc.,   that  will 
start  neural  action  along  the  arc.     Of  these  ef- 
fective stimuli,  however,  some  are  adequate,  or 
those  to  which  the  organ  is  normally  attuned, 
such  as  sight  to  the  eye,  sound  to  the  ear,  and 
so  on;  while  others  are  inadequate  (let  us  say 
for  true  perceptions)  such  as  a  blow  on  the  eye, 
or  a  foreign  substance  in  the  ear.     All  other 
stimuli  are  ineffective,  that  is,  cause  no  arousal 
whatever,  such  as  a  beam  of  moonlight  stream- 
ing into  the  ear.     Considered  from  the  stand- 
point of  modality,  the  sensory  reflexes  define  a 
modality  of  adequate  stimuli  only,  the  blow  on 
the  eye  being  a  mechanical  jar,  transmitted  to 
the  optic  nerve  not  by  the  retina  but  by  a  se- 
quence of  concussions  through  the  coats  and 
liquids  of  the  eye-ball.     The  sensory  surfaces 
are  thus  selective.     Sherrington  reports  that  the 
plantar  reflex  of  the  brainless  dog  and  the  pinna 
reflex  in  the  cat  can  be  elicited  by  only  mechan- 
ical stimuli.     Electrical  are  wholly  ineffective. 
As  a  last  general  word  on  the  receptive  sur- 
faces, it  is  found  that  if  we  consider  such  field 
as  that  whole  collection  of  points  on  the  skin 
from  which  an  identical  reflex  may  be  elicited, 
that  a  weak  stimulus  in  the  center  of  the  field 
108 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
has  about  as  much  of  an  effect  as  a  strong  one 
on  the  periphery,     A  schematic  representation 
of  a  reflex  field  would  have  to  include  the  item 
of  varying  penetrability. 

21.  Some  reflex  fields  overlap.  Especially 
is  this  true  of  the  so-called  proprio-ceptive  and 
the  extero-ceptive  reflex  fields,  the  former  be- 
ing the  sub-cutaneous  receptors  for  organic 
stimulation,  while  the  latter  are  on  the  skin 
surface,  or  superficial.  The  dermal  senses  ex- 
hibit this  overlapping  all  the  while,  and  in  ex- 
perimenting on  touch,  one  finds  that  most  in- 
vestigation is  meaningless  without  taking  ac- 
count of  this  fact.  Thus  for  the  modalities 
known  as  touch,  warmth,  cold,  and  pain,  there 
is  a  rather  illy  defined  set  of  dependable  re- 
flexes for  functioning  them.  Sometimes,  also, 
there  is  interaction  between  overlapping  sense 
fields,  setting  up  a  new  condition  in  their  re- 
lation, known  as  the  "reinforcing  of  reflexes  by 
each  other,"  This  has  bearings  upon  intensity, 
both  qualitative  and  quantitative.  Sometimes 
reflexes  widely  apart  (dermographically)  com- 
bine and  interact,  as  in  synaesthesia,  by  which 
is  meant  the  co-presence  of  the  qualities  of  one 
object  (the  stimulus)  with  the  presence  of  those 
of  another  object  of  a  normally  unrelated  mo- 
dality. This  is  especially  instanced  by  the 
109 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
musician  who  has  his  "white"  and  "blue"  minor 
tonalities. 

22.  Reflexes  also  are  set  off  in  certain  se- 
quences. The  sight  of  a  fly  causes  a  hungry 
frog  (doubtless  visually  more  alert  through 
hunger)  to  dart  out  its  tongue,  the  movement 
of  the  tongue  arousing  salivation,  which  again 
leads  to  the  business  of  swallowing.  The  stim- 
uli to  such  reflexes  usually  overlap  each  other 
in  time,  and  the  threshold  of  excitability  of 
each  succeeding  one  is  lowered  by  the  excita- 
tion just  in  advance  of  its  own.  It  is  almost 
needless  to  say  that  most  of  our  learned  habits 
are  of  such  a  sequential  reflex  character,  called 
con-sequential  when  the  with-for  relation  is 
present.  As  a  rule,  furthermore,  the  series  is 
intransitive,  which  is  exactly  what  irreversibil- 
ity of  the  transmission  of  impulses  along  the 
neural  arc  must  be  understood  to  mean. 

23.  Curious  among  the  reflexes  are  those 
whose  response  functions  pain.  The  pain  sense 
organs  are  "anelective,"  that  is,  their  modality 
includes  exceedingly  heterogeneous  objects. 
Very  many  kinds  of  stimuli  are  painful.  And 
if  the  stimuli  are  normally  inadequate,  when 
danger  to  the  whole  organism  is  threatened, 
they  become  adequate, — that  is,  the  threshold 
is  then  very  low.  Especially  js  an  exposed 
110 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 

nerve  susceptible  to  low  intensities  of  noxious 
stimuli,  and  as  such  represents  the  imperative- 
ly protective  character  of  the  pain  reflex.  The 
pain  reflex  exhibits  another  curiosity  in  point 
of  being  aroused,  for  example,  by  a  harmful 
touch  on  a  certain  spot  of  the  skin,  where  a 
harmless  touch  would  be  insufficient.  The  re- 
sulting actions,  likewise,  from  these  two  char- 
acters of  stimulus  are  diametrically  unlike. 

24.  Our  fund  of  health  is  guaranteed  by 
an  immense  number  of  tonic  and  other  reflexes. 
The  vegetative  functions,  cardiac,  respiratory 
and  other  valiant  reactions  against  an  environ- 
ment we  propitiate  by  metabolism,  guarantee  a 
certain  vital  momentum, — on  the  basis  of  which 
we  are  free  to  function  extero-ceptively, — and 
depend  for  their  integrity  upon  retaining  their 
receptive  surfaces,  modalities  and  thresholds 
intact.  In  a  way,  we  might  be  said  to  thrive 
principally  upon  the  funded  increment  of  the 
unconscious,  for  only  by  means  of  the  warn- 
ings of  pathological  symptoms  do  we  recognize 
the  stabilizing  character  of  these  background 
reflexes  of  our  organism. 

25.  All  the  reflexes  may  be  said  to  be  pur- 
posive. That  is  to  say,  they  maintain  the  ani- 
mal against  some,  maybe  not  the  choicest,  por- 
tion of  his  environment.     For  those  parts  which, 

111 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
in  a  case  of  danger,  cannot  withdraw,  evoke  by 
mediation  of  pain  reflexes  those  which  can  ef- 
fect a  withdrawal.  Sherrington  also  points  out 
that  the  scratching  by  a  dog  of  his  own  bitten 
skin  grooms  the  skin  so  as  to  protect  the  sen- 
sory surface  against  becoming  of  too  high  a 
threshold  value  for  the  inevitable  noxious 
stimulus. 

26.  After  this  brief  account  of  reflexes  in 
general,  we  turn  to  the  specific  relation  of  the 
reflex  arc  to  sensation  and  its  constitutive  at- 
tributes. It  will  be  remembered  that  the  three 
strands  in  the  nerve  path  were  the  receptor, 
the  conductor  and  the  effector,  each  of  which 
has  a  different  function.  As  may  be  already 
in  mind,  the  function  of  the  receptor  is  implicit 
in  an  adequate  description  of  a  receptive  sur- 
face. But  to  go  farther,  the  function  of  the 
receptor  (fibre  and  sense  organ  together)  is  "to 
lower  the  threshold  of  excitability  of  an  arc  for 
one  kind  of  stimulus,  and  to  heighten  it  for 
all  the  others."  In  our  own  terms, — to  specify 
more  and  more  the  limits  of  the  modality.  For 
example,  there  are  no  electrical  receptors:  na- 
ture excludjgs  volts  and  amperes  from  the  list 
of  adequate  stimuli, — from  modalities.  But 
the  selective  excitability  of  the  receptor  not 
only  limits  the  number  of  stimuli  within  the  mo- 
112 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
dality,  but  provides  increasing  responsiveness 
to  them,  and  heightens  it  superlatively  for  a 
special  few.  As  far  as  the  efllector  is  concerned, 
it  is  connected  with  the  muscle  on  its  end-plate, 
and  the  end-plate  is  indefatigable.  No  amount 
of  stimulation  exhausts  it, — it  has  no  threshold. 

27.  But  when  one  asks  what  happens  in 
the  conductor,  the  array  of  facts  and  functions 
is  not  so  abbreviated  as  in  the  above  cases. 
Now  if,  instead  of  stimulating  the  sensory  sur- 
face of  a  reflex,  we  dissect  in  under  the  skin 
to  the  nerve  trunk,  and,  leaving  the  receiving 
organ  out  of  the  experiment,  stimulate  a  con- 
duction path,  the  results  will  differ  from  those 
derived  from  intact  reflex  arc  conduction  in 
the  following  ways : 

"Conduction  in  reflex  arc  exhibits,  (1)  slow- 
er speed  as  measured  by  the  latent  period  be- 
tween application  of  stimulus  and  appearance 
of  end-eff"ect,  this  diff'erence  being  greater  for 
weak  stimuli  than  for  strong; 

(2)  Less  close  correspondence  between  the 
moment  of  cessation  of  stimulus  and  the  mo- 
ment of  cessation  of  end-eff'ect,  z.  e.,  there  is  a 
marked  "after-discharge"  ; 

(3)  Less  close  correspondence  between  the 
rhythm  of  stimulus  and  rhythm  of  end-eff'ect; 

(4)  Less  close  correspondence  between  the 

113 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
grading  of  intensity  of  the  stimulus   and   the 
grading  of  intensity  of  the  end-effect; 

(5)  Considerable  resistance  to  passage  of 
a  single  nerve  impulse,  but  a  resistance  easily 
forced  by  a  succession  of  impulses  (temporal 
summation) ; 

(6)  Irreversibility  of  direction,  instead  of 
comparative  unfatigability  of  nerve  trunks; 

(7)  Fatigability  in  contrast  with  the  com- 
parative unfatigability  of  nerve  trunks; 

(8)  Much  greater  variability  of  the  thres- 
hold value  of  stimulus  than  in  nerve  trunks; 

(9)  Refractory  period,  inhibition,  and 
shock,  in  degrees  unknown  for  nerve  trunks; 

(10)  Much  greater  dependence  on  blood 
circulation,  oxygen;  and 

(11)  Much  greater  susceptibility  to  various 
drugs — anaesthetics." 

I  have  italicised  several  words  in  this  quo- 
tation for  the  purpose  of  showing  the  trend  of 
my  interpretation  of  the  nervous  system;  and 
it  will  be  noticed  also  that  these  eleven  points 
of  difference  sum  for  us  into  a  general  concept 
of  something  like  a  blockade.  And  the  place 
where  these  blockades  occur  has  been  quite 
clearly  indicated  to  be  not  in  the  nerve  cell 
bodies,  nor  the  sustaining  tissue  between  nerve 
fibres,  but  in  the  surfaces  of  separation  be- 
114 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
tween  the  end-brush  and  the  dendrites,  called 
the  synapse.  Now  a  surface  of  separation  is 
physically  a  membrane, — the  nerves  do  not  con- 
join any  more  than  the  fleshy  surfaces  of  the 
hands  touch  when  one  clasps  his  gloved  hands. 
Correlated  with  the  irreciprocal  permeability 
of  the  synaptic  membrane  is  the  irreversibility 
of  the  nervous  current, — a  phenomenon  well 
known  as  a  phase  of  osmosis.  Now  the  nervous 
conduction  is  not  preeminently  chemical,  as  is 
witnessed  by  the  facts  of  its  speed,  freedom 
from  the  effects  of  temperature  changes,  and  its 
facile  excitation  by  mechanical  means.  Right 
here,  then,  is  where  mechanics  and  physics  come 
in  for  their  own  in  psychology.  In  order  that 
a  transverse  membrane  become  a  conductor, 
it  must  be  modified  by  doing  the  conducting, 
and  such  we  find  to  be  the  case  with  reflex 
conduction  as  differing  from  nerve  trunk  con- 
duction. This  feature  defines  many  of  the 
phenomena  of  physiological  psychology  as 
types  of  auto-catalysed  neural  activity,  and  has 
no  end  of  bearings  on  personality. 

28.  We  are  now  ready  to  indicate  the  re- 
lation between  the  attributes  of  sensation  and 
neural  activity.  Of  the  first  two  essential  at- 
tributes, modality  and  quality,  we  have  suf- 
ficiently spoken.  The  next  in  order  is  inten- 
115 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
sity.  The  first  point  to  make  is  that  the  in- 
tensity of  effect  is  less  well  graded  with  the 
mechanically  measurable  stimulus  in  the  case 
of  the  intact  reflex  arc  than  in  the  nerve  trunks. 
In  the  latter  it  is  almost  a  one-to-one  correla- 
tion, while  in  the  former  it  looks  like  all  or 
nothing.  So  that  internal  neurological  condi- 
tions play  a  greater  role  than  do  external  ones 
in  reflex  conductions  as  compared  with  those  in 
nerve  trunk  conductions.  Especially  is  this  to 
be  noted, in  the  different  grading  of  effects  in 
various  reiiexes.  The  series  are  not  ordinally 
correlated  either.  And  yet  intensities  in  these 
cases  are  connected  with  the  number  of  ele- 
ments coexcited,  acting  by  irradiation.  How- 
ever this  may  be,  the  reaction,  as  it  irradiates, 
treats  the  motor  element,  the  effector  and  its 
connections,  as  a  unit.  For  the  whole  motor 
center  functionally  belongs  to  each  and  all  of 
the  groups  of  receptors  proper  to  the  reflex. 
Much  light  is  thrown  by  this  knowledge  of  the 
working  of  reflexes  upon  both  the  qualitative 
and  quantitative  aspects  of  intensity.  Unless 
we  are  merely  sparring  for  time,  the  unique- 
ness of  qualitative  intensity  means  in  connec- 
tion with  reflexes,  that  the  "all  or  nothing" 
principle  implies  too  sudden  an  inlet  and  out- 
go of  energy'  for  any  intercolonial  responses  to 
116 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
furnish  an  equilibrating  neural  background  at 
the  time  of  the  release  of  reflex  energy;  while 
the  quantitative  and  functional  aspect  of  in- 
tensity lies  unconcealed  in  the  two  principles 
of  irradiation  and  difterences  of  grading  in  the 
various  reflexes.  This  grading  is  found  to  be 
a  constant  function,  but  its  mathematical  ex- 
pression is  far  from  being  reducible  to  a  sim- 
ple linear  equation:  its  formulation  includes  at 
least  two  dimensions. 

29.  In  connection  with  the  next  attributes 
of  sensation  to  be  disposed  of,  it  is  requisite 
that  we  consider  briefly  certain  characteristics 
of  the  release  of  neural  energy  in  the  effector 
nerves.  Sensory  surfaces,  as  we  have  just  seen, 
may  be  very  large  or  very  small,  but  in  either 
case  the  sensory  (receptor)  fibres  leading  from 
them  pass  toward  some  part  of  the  central 
nervous  system,  there  to  be  gathered  together 
in  a  bundle  to  guarantee  that  the  response  me- 
chanism shall  not  be  at  all  hit  or  miss,  but 
rather  specifically  differentiated  from  that 
mechanism  fed  by  the  sensory  fibres  from  an- 
other sense  field.  Now,  however,  several  sense 
fields  frequently  are  connected  by  receptor 
fibres  to  the  same  effector  mechanism,  so  that 
the  stimulation  that  gets  there  first  will  close 
the  "valve"  against  the  later  arrival  and  crowd 
117 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
it  out  of  action.  The  simultaneous  or  even 
successive  debouching  of  nervous  energies  upon 
the  same  undischarged  effector  does  not  behave 
always  in  the  above  manner,  but  whenever  any 
effector  amenable  to  neural  discharge  from  sev- 
eral sense  fields  functions  in  this  way  it  is 
called  a  "final  common  path."  Before  the  final 
common  path  is  reached,  however,  at  least  one 
synapse  has  to  be  passed,  and  the  condition  of 
passage  at  this  surface  of  separation  is  of  such 
a  character  that  sensory  selectivity  is  very  sim- 
ple and  easy  to  comprehend  in  contrast  to  the 
eccentric  character  of  the  release  readiness  at 
the  entrance  to  this  final  common  path.  The 
motor  cells  do  not  conjoin.  Only  a  functional 
union  knits  them  together,  and  here  in  connec- 
tion with  this  neuronic  threshold  of  release  we 
may  freely  mention  all  but  a  few  of  the  re- 
maining attributes  of  sensation, — not  only  men- 
tion them,  in  fact,  but  at  the  end  propound  a 
very  searching  and  insistent  question. 

30.  Intensity  has  been  shown  to  concern 
the  release  of  energy  all  along  the  neural  arc. 
"The  entrant  path  tends  to  run  in  certain  di- 
rections or  not  at  all,"  for  other  paths  may  lead 
to  the  same  conductor  and  the  two  sets  of  forces 
may  conflict.  Then,  either  irradiation  or  sum- 
mation of  stimuli  must  overcome  the  neuronic 
118 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
threshold,  "and  irradiation  extends  per  saltum 
rather  than  ad  gradatim."  The  strongest  stim- 
ulated afferent  arc  is  the  most  likely  to  capture 
the  final  common  path, — strong  and  weak  re- 
ferring not  only  to  mechanical  or  other  stimuli 
as  such,  but  also  to  the  relation  they  bear  to 
the  focus  and  fringe  of  the  receptive  field.  Typ- 
ical of  the  sort  of  data  the  psychologist  must 
not  haggle  over,  is  the  fact  that  the  threshold 
of  excitability  in  the  reflex  mechanism  is  more 
variable  than  in  the  nerve  trunks.  Stimulation 
in  the  undissected  animal  is,  pro  tanto,  destined 
to  be  more  eventful  than  that  in  the  mutilated 
specimen.  There  is  in  James'  "Psychology, 
Briefer  Course,"  (pp.  92-101),  an  account  of  the 
behavior  both  of  a  mutilated  frog  and  of  a 
pigeon,  in  which  the  diff'erences  between  them 
and  their  whole  fellow  creatures  is  taken  up 
in  considerable  detail,  just  in  point  of  what 
the  neural  connections  contribute  to  conscious- 
ness, as  we  are  doing  here,  with  a  conclusion 
that  I  am  certain  is  in  serious  error.  I  shall 
quote  just  enough  of  this  chapter  both  to  be 
fair  to  its  author  and  to  make  my  point: 
".  .  .  the  main  difference  between  the  hem- 
isphereless  animal  and  the  whole  one  may  be 
concisely  expressed  by  saying  that  the  one  obeys 
absent,  the  other  only  present,  objects."  Again, 
119 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
"Within  the  psychic  life  due  to  the  cerebrum 
itself  the  same  general  distinction  obtains,  be- 
tween considerations  of  the  more  immediate 
and  considerations  of  the  more  remote.  In  all 
ages  the  man  whose  determinations  are  swayed 
by  reference  to  the  most  distant  ends  has  been 
held  to  possess  the  highest  intelligence."  I 
cite  this  nmch  quoted  expression  right  here, 
even  at  the  risk  of  losing  my  reader's  memory 
of  the  issue  I  have  started  to  make  pertinent  for 
him,  for  the  exact  purpose  of  showing  just  what 
inadequacy  has  characterized  many  a  psy- 
chologist's treatment  of  neural  connections.  For 
not  only  are  there  innumerable  present  objects 
and  immediate  considerations  which  even  the 
whole,  undissected  animal  cannot  obey  or  re- 
spond to, — on  account  of  the  selective  excitabil- 
ity of  the  neural  arc  and  the  neuronic  thres- 
hold,— but  there  are  also  recent  investigations 
upon  dogs,  by  Goltz,  Pavlow  and  Rothmann, 
showing  that  new  tricks,  habits  and  memories 
may  become  the  possession  of  animals  with 
spines  transected  and  brains  dissected  out.  Let 
any  one  make  out  of  this  whatever  he  pleases, 
remembering  also  the  nudge  we  gave  in  a  pre- 
vious paragraph  regarding  the  heirarchy  of 
dark  thrones  in  the  wilderness  of  the  central 
nervous  system, 

120 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
31.  Due  to  the  energy  required  to  overpass 
the  neuronic  threshold,  not  immediately  upon 
the  application  of  the  stimulus  does  the  release 
occur.  But  the  latent  period  (refractory  phase) 
in  the  nerve  trunks  is  only  about  one  sigma  (one- 
thousandth  of  a  second),  while  in  the  case  of 
the  reflex  arc  the  pause  is  considerably  longer 
and  more  variable.  Besides,  in  the  latter  case 
it  often  "misses  a  stitch," — the  eft'ect  of  the  stim- 
uli thereafter  being  poorly  graded  with  the 
amount  of  mechanical  or  electrical  stimulation. 
Something  is  happening,  nevertheless,  in  the 
refractory  phase,  which  is  only  "that  state  dur- 
ing which,  apart  from  fatigue,  the  mechanism 
shows  less  than  its  full  efl'ect  of  excitability." 
The  summation  of  stimuli  also  "produce  a  con- 
dition at  the  synapse  similar  to  that  normally 
present  in  the  nerve  trunk.'  Lhis  phenomenon 
is  not  due  to  the  muscle,  but  is  wholly  a  reflex 
arc  affair.  Very  feeble  electric  shocks  will 
summate,  and  one  weak  stimulus  followed  by 
another  one  as  far  apart  as  1400  sigma  (1.4  sec.) 
may  summate  with  it.  This  phenomenon 
lurther  means  that  "the  nearer  together  two 
points  are  in  the  receptive  field  which  get  stim- 
ulated, the  greater  coalition  there  is  between 
the  reflexes  elicited."  For  "where  conduction 
lines  run  together,  there  is  a  reduction  in  re- 
121 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
sistance,"  and  this  is  primarily  what  summation 
means.  At  this  point  we  may  also  speak  of 
vividness  and  clearness.  When  an  "initial  re- 
flex is  followed  by  an  incremental  one,  the  lat- 
ency of  the  latter  is  shorter  than  that  of  the 
former."  The  synapse  was  "set,"  and  the  qual- 
itatively different,  but  modally-prepared-for 
stimulus  got  functioned  on  the  background  of 
this  neural  readiness. 

32.  The  final  common  path  being  captured, 
adaptation  may  set  in;  in  which  case  less  en- 
ergy from  the  stimulus  will  be  then  needed  to 
produce  a  release  equal  to  the  original  reaction. 
The  bridge  is  built,  and  merchandize  may  be 
shipped  across  it  ad  libitum.  "The  length  of 
latency  being  inversely  proportional  to  the  re- 
flex intensity,"  before  the  synapse  is  "set,"  there 
follows  in  cases  of  adaptation  the  maintenance 
of  a  transmission  circuit  at  the  expense  of  very 
little  energy  from  the  stimulus.  In  conduct  we 
call  this  feature  "poise."  The  final  common 
path  is  a  common  conductor  for  many  impulses, 
arising  from  many  sources  of  reception.  When 
impulses  producing  allied  rather  than  opposed 
effects  play  upon  it,  we  have  a  case  of  fusion, 
which  is  summation  minus  the  time  element, 
considered  from  the  standpoint  of  reflex  readi- 
ness, though  the  qualitative  character  of  the 
122 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
fused   elements   is  apparently   a   derivative   of 
time  itself. 

33.  Linked  with  the  amount  of  receptive 
surface  stimulated  is  the  attribute  of  extensity. 
It  appears  now  why  this  and  other  attributes 
are  referred  to  content  rather  than  to  function. 
For  if  fusion  exhibits  the  fact  that  in  psychol- 
ogy to  add  is  to  subtract,  extensity  of  receptive 
field  or  surface  needs  not  go  hand  in  hand  with 
summation  of  releases  or  end-effects.  This 
very  item  indicates  the  different  dimensionality 
of  quantities  and  qualities.  Yellow,  for  exam- 
ple, is  not  just  a  certain  number  of  vibrations. 
It  is  also  yellow, — ^the  physics  of  color  defines 
not  that  other  dimension  into  which  the  concept 
of  color  is  embedded.  So  with  extensity:  we 
might  even  add  contrast  to  the  list,  for  the  items 
of  sensation  in  regard  to  which  we  have  to  be 
exceedingly  perspicuous  and  rigidly  empirical 
began  as  far  back  as  the  paragraph  on  the 
neuronic  threshold.  Contrast  is  represented,  or 
better  shared  in  neural-arc  releases  by  an  en- 
largement of  the  concept  of  the  neurology  of 
fusion:  I  mean  the  simultaneous  and  balanced 
use  of  final  common  paths  for  allied  effects 
even  within  different  modalities. 

34.  The  receptive  surface  of  a  reflex  has 
bounds,  and  functionally  thins  off  in  a  manner 

123 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
specified  before.  The  local-sign  of  an  object 
stimulating  it  will  then  more  accurately  cor- 
respond to  its  position  in  space,  the  more  ortho- 
gonally it  impinges  upon  that  field,  functionally 
considered.  For  an  erroneous  judgment  in 
terms  of  local  sign  means  only  a  certain  obliq- 
uity of  stimulus  in  relation  to  the  field  as  a  re- 
ceiving apparatus.  This  concept  will  be  elab- 
orated in  the  paragraphs  on  illusions. 

35.  The  attributes  of  duration  and  after- 
image are  best  treated  of  together  in  connection 
with  neural  action.  We  saw  that  the  latent 
period  included  the  element  of  time.  These  do 
also,  but  in  the  following  special  manner:  Sen- 
sations, qualitatively  construed,  may  endure  as 
long  as,  not  as  long  as,  or  longer  than  the  ap- 
plication of  the  stimulus.  Indeed,  the  latent- 
period  implies  that  the  effector  fibre  shall  re- 
lease its  energy  later  than  the  receptor;  after- 
images merely  require  the  concept  of  more  slug- 
gish time  without  necessary  diminution  of  ef- 
fect to  explain  them.  For,  as  formerly  asserted, 
time  in  psychology  is  not  solar  time,  and  for 
the  differences  no  one  on  an  empirical  mission 
needs  to  make  any  apology.  We  find  that  the 
after-discharge  of  reflexes  may  be  very  incal- 
culable. It  may  be,  for  example,  the  same  fot 
nine  stimulations  as  it  is  for  three  stimula- 
124 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
tions,  each  of  which  is  mechanically  thrice  the 
quantity  of  the  one  used  nine  times.  Or,  again, 
after  a  number  of  subliminal  stimuli  there  may 
be  a  pause  without  discharge,  but  during  which 
the  stimuli  are  summing,  followed  by  a  vigor- 
ous discharge,  then  another  pause,  then  an 
after-discharge, — a  thing  not  so  different  after 
all  from  one's  experience  with  induction  coils 
and  Leyden  jars. 

36.  Exhaustion  is  a  function  of  time  and 
intensity.  As  a  reflex  tires  from  excessive  stim- 
ulation, it  not  only  declines  in  the  amount  of 
release  of  motor  energy,  but  becomes  also  more 
and  more  markedly  tremulous.  Opposed  to 
this  effect  is  that  of  an  adapted  reflex,  as  noted 
above.  Exhaustion  is  also  a  function  of  po- 
sition or  direction.  Some  reflexes  which  tire 
when  aroused  from  one  spot  in  the  sensory 
surface,  can  be  aroused  again  to  full  activity 
by  stimulating  another  spot  some  little  distance 
away.  With  judicious  use,  the  reflexes  are  rel- 
atively indefatigable;  for  by  the  shifting  of 
briefly  lasting  stimuli  from  point  to  point  in 
the  field,  one  can  produce  a  longer  lasting  re- 
action than  when  the  same  stimuli  come  at 
equal  intervals  at  the  same  point.  Now  in  spite 
of  the  fact  that  reference  to  the  sensory  sur- 
face is  a  great  factor  in  exhaustion,  the  phe- 
125 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
nomenon  is  not  sensory,  but  directly  referable 
to  the  conduction  fibres  within  the  central  nerv- 
ous system.  But  here  we  have  to  include  the 
fact  that  "only  when"  the  sensory  surface  is 
treated  thus  and  so  does  the  internal  conduc- 
tivity become  involved  in  the  manner  so  far 
shown. 

37.  Inhibition  is  manifested  in  the  reflex 
arc  action  in  many  ways,  some  of  which  are 
quite  curious.  We  have  spoken  of  the  incre- 
mental reflex, — ^where  the  second,  say,  of  two 
stimulations  being  suddenly  intensified,  arouses 
sudden  intensification  of  the  motor  result.  In 
such  a  case,  whenever  there  is  a  latent  period 
other  than  one  might  expect  for  such  a  change 
in  intensity,  it  means  the  checking,  or  inhibi- 
tion of  spreads  of  discharge  to  other  centres 
than  the  one  concerned  with  the  discharge  into 
the  final  common  path  then  in  operation. 
Again,  the  after-discharge  may  be  prevented  by 
stimulating  another  reflex  which  uses  the  same 
final  common  path  for  an  eff"ect  contrary  to  the 
first  one.  What  else,  also,  is  the  latent  time 
itself  than  a  period  of  inhibition?  But  we 
usually  speak  of  this  phenomenon  as  occurring 
after  the  inception  of  some  other  fully  opened 
discharge  mechanism.  Now  come  the  curios- 
ities. Reflexes  of  a  simultaneous  double  sign 
126 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
(that  is,  where  the  motor  nerve  of  the  extensor 
muscle  of  a  limb  and  that  of  the  flexor  muscle 
have  opposed  end  effects)  are  neither  exclusive- 
ly excitatory  nor  exclusively  inhibitory.  Be- 
sides, certain  other  reflexes  are  purely  inhibi- 
tory, (that  is,  they  are  nihilistic  in  character, — 
dogs  in  a  manger).  They  check  all  end  eff"ects 
possible,  producing  none  but  those  of  their  own 
release.  Inhibitions  usually  also  leave  the 
nervous  tissue  better  fitted  for  more  extensive 
functioning  after  their  occurrence,  though  some 
are  neutral,  leaving  the  tissue  neither  exhausted 
nor  surcharged  as  to  energy. 

38.  There  is  but  one  more  attribute  of  sen- 
sation to  be  considered  in  this  wise.  This  is 
feeling-tone.  It  was  suggested  previously  that 
not  quite  all  the  data  of  sensation  could  be 
harnessed  to  neural  action,  and  this  intricate 
and  mooted  point  of  the  neural  nature  of  feel- 
ing now  confronts  us.  These  other  seventeen 
attributes  are  all  accounted  for  by  intra-neural 
categories;  feeling-tone  must  be  accounted  for 
by  means  of  inter-neural  relationships.  But 
the  problem  is  not  acute:  in  case  of  the  readi- 
ness of  an  arc  to  respond,  or  in  case  of  the  readi- 
ness of  transfer  of  energy  from  one  arc  to  an- 
other, or  in  case  of  a  readiness  to  inhibit, — 
such  items  as  these  sum  up  most  of  the  neurol- 
127 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
ogy  of  feeling-tones.  Whatever  other  empirical 
conditions  may  be  found  to  be  the  bases  of  feel- 
ing will,  of  course,  but  plot  other  points  in  the 
same  series.  We  like  not  only  to  be  doing,  but 
also  at  times  to  keep  ourselves  and  others  from 
doing,  as  well  as  we  like  changes  and  novelties. 
That  these  are  implicit  in  the  general  neurology 
of  sensation  is  evident  from  a  careful  perusal 
of  the  above  explanatory  and  analytic  para- 
graphs. 

39.  But  now  there  comes  an  insistent  ques- 
tion with  regard  to  all  the  foregoing.  Is  what 
the  nerves  are  doing,  sensation?  And  are  the 
attributes  of  sensation  which  are  carefully  and 
completely  welded  to  neural  releases  to  be 
taken  to  imply  that  the  sensation  is  in  the  nerv- 
ous system?  Is  the  fluent  speaker  after  all 
only  emptying  his  spine  and  cranium  upon  his 
hearers?  For  it  is  exactly  at  this  point  in 
most  treatises  upon  things  mental,  where  psy- 
chology meets  its  unpremeditated  Golgotha. 
And  here  a  large  two-horned  dilemma  pokes  its 
nose  over  the  horizon,  for  there  seem  to  be  but 
two  alternatives  from  which  to  choose  in  this 
and  every  other  similar  case.  One  of  which 
dilemmas  I  have  elsewhere  in  this  book  called 
the  gospel  of  dendrites;  and  the  other  of  which 
I  shall  have  no  trouble  in  allying  to  the  theory 
128 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
of  soft  souls.  The  gospel  of  dendrites  asserts 
that  sensations  are  in  and  of  the  nervous  sys- 
tem exclusively.  My  preceding  paragraphs, 
with  the  exception  of  a  few  phrases  about 
series,  (odious  and  sour  to  the  hide-bound 
physiologist),  are  welcomed  no  doubt  by  the 
upholders  of  this  doctrine,  and  they  point  with 
triumph  to  the  harnessing  of  every  last  attrib- 
ute of  sensation  to  the  internal  workings  of  the 
body.  '''There  the  sensation  is,"  they  say,  "it 
is  just  what  the  nerves  are  doing."  The  other 
party,  breezing  forth  the  doctrine  of  a  soft  soul, 
retaliates  vigorously  upon  the  preceding  by  as- 
serting that  the  neural  action  heretofore  de- 
scribed has  nothing  to  do  with  sensation  as  ex- 
perienced. "It  doesn't  feel  that  way  to  look  at 
yellow,  nor  to  taste  lemonade,  nor  yet  to  be 
pricked  with  a  pin.  The  experiencing  of 
things  is  unique,  and  all  your  nervous  action 
and  conceptual  series  are  preposterous  and  ar- 
tificial." 

40.  But  both  of  these  objections  come  about 
through  a  clear  case  of  total  misapprehension. 
It  was  not  a  dilemma  that  appeared  above  the 
horizon,  but  merely  a  unicorn,  which  only  to  the 
strabismic  showed  a  bifurcated  frontal  excres- 
cence. And  I  shall  treat  of  these  two  doctrines 
in  exactly  the  inverse  proportion  to  their  pop- 
129 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
ularity.  In  the  first  place,  the  gospel  of  den- 
drites gives  no  sufficient  account  of  the  object 
stimulating  the  arcs.  In  the  second  place,  the 
theory  of  the  soft  and  elusive  soul  spurns  all 
identity  between  that  which  sensations  can  be 
analysed  into  (attributes)  and  the  character- 
istics of  neural  action  as  shown  by  investigators 
who,  by  the  way,  do  not  thus  cavil  at  what 
they  find  to  be  the  case.  For  to  speak  intro- 
spectively  about  sensations  in  any  manner  ex- 
cept simply  to  blurt  their  names  and  their  im- 
mediate effects,  is  to  use  memory  and  judgment, 
which  are  not  sensations.  But  then,  the  hope- 
lessness of  persuading  the  soft-soul  theorist 
against  his  assumptions  is  worth  nothing  in 
comparison  to  keeping  others  from  becoming  so 
unregenerate  as  he.  Of  course  the  object  is 
not  the  neural  action.  When  we  ask,  as  Holt 
asks  in  regard  to  reflex  activities,  ''What  is  this 
organism  doing"  in  the  presence  of  the  fateful 
stimulus?  the  answer,  if  complete,  can  neither 
be  in  terms  of  the  neural  release  alone  as  tested 
on  laboratory  specimens,  nor  yet  in  terms  of  the 
object  we  care  to  assert  is  the  only  possible 
potent  object  within  range  of  the  nervous  sys- 
tem; but  our  answer  must  rather  be,  that  "the 
organism  proceeds  to  do  something,  of  which 
the  strict  scientific  description  can  only  be  that 
130 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
it  is  a  constant  function  of  some  feature  of  the 
environment;  and  this  latter  [the  environment] 
is  by  no  means  necessarily  the  stimulus  itself." 
("Response  and  Cognition,"  by  E.  B.  Holt,  Jour. 
Phil.,  Psych,  and  Sci.  Methods.     July  8,  1915.) 

41.  The  physiologist  cannot,  with  a  mere 
wave  of  the  hand,  banish  all  other  objects  than 
the  one  he  is  especially  interested  in  testing 
upon  the  organism.  Neither  is  the  soft-soul 
theorist  putting  away  nonsensical  things  in  as- 
serting that  the  object  sensed  is  not  the  object 
as  described;  for  when  he  says  "sensation,"  he 
means  "object  in  an  environment  colored  by 
the  environment."  Of  course  he  cannot  under- 
stand why  you  are  talking  about  one  thing  when 
he  is  thinking  about  fifty.  So  that  it  is  neither 
neural  action  that  is  the  sensation,  nor  yet  the 
"experience"  which  no  one  can  mention,  but 
the  sensation  is  the  object  and  what  it  will  do 
in  that  environment  to  accomplish  the  release 
of  energy  in  the  nervous  system.  And  these  two 
things,  what  it  is  and  what  it  does,  while  un- 
separated  in  that  which  the  soft-soul  theorist 
calls  his  "experience,"  have  just  been  separated 
in  this  treatment  of  sensation.  This  point  ex- 
hibits an  explicit  case  of  the  with-for  relation; 
things  and  doings  are  blended  in  unanalysed 
consciousness, — blended  to  make  consciousness, 
131 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
— and  it  is  upon  the  basis  and  according  to  the 
character  of  these  blends  that  we  ever  thought 
of  using  the  pronoun  I. 

42.  But  lest  1  be  misunderstood  at  this  junc- 
ture, let  me  say  that,  insofar  as  the  neural  ac- 
tion is  concerned  with  the  sensation,  it  is  iden- 
tical with  whatever  of  the  sensation  can  be  de- 
fined by  reference  to  the  attributes  constitut- 
ing it.  Some  of  these  attributes  are  also  identi- 
cal with  the  object,  the  stimulus.  In  adaptation 
the  nerves  are  becoming  adapted  to  the  con- 
tinued release  of  their  energy;  in  summation, 
they  sum  their  efiects,  and  so  on  throughout  the 
list.  Sensation,  however,  is  made  by  an  object 
within  an  environment  upon  nervous  arcs  with- 
in the  eleven  thousand  million  cells  of  the  sys- 
tem. The  object  is  not  cleft  from  its  environ- 
ment nor  are  the  specialized  arcs  separated 
from  their  gray  and  white  bedding.  For  the  at- 
tributes that  refer  to  content  are  of  the  object 
as  well  as  exhibited  in  the  response,  and  partial 
naming  of  them  with  reference  exclusively  to 
one  or  the  other  is  fallacious.  Mind  and  body 
are  the  same  thing,  and  of  the  attribute-thing 
character;  only  the  possible  attributes  are  not 
ever  all  together  in  time  or  space,  since  the 
orders  to  which  they  belong  forbid  such  a  con- 
dition. 

132 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 

THE  SPECIAL  SENSES 

/.     Internal 

43.  Typical  of  the  internal  sensations  and 
doubtless  of  prime  importance  to  the  reader  is 
the  sensation  of  hunger.  This  sensation  is  to 
be  cleft  from  appetite,  for  the  desserts  we  eat 
are  not  taken  to  satisfy  hunger,  but  merely  to 
please  us.  Furthermore,  hunger  often  forces 
people  to  take  food  when  it  is  both  distasteful 
and  nauseating.  It  is  specifically  characterized 
by  "a  dull  ache  or  gnawing  localized  at  the  low- 
er mid-chest  region  and  the  epigastrium,  be- 
coming more  local  the  intenser  it  becomes." 
This  dull  ache  is  also  accompanied  by  lassitude, 
drowsiness,  faintness,  headache,  irritability  and 
restlessness  at  times,  these  being  the  inessential 
concomitants  of  the  sensation.  It  is  not  a  gen- 
eral somatic  condition,  nor  is  it  due  to  nerve 
cells  "suffering  from  a  shortage  of  provisions," 
for  after  the  first  few  days  of  a  fast,  hunger 
wholly  disappears.  The  absence  of  hunger  in 
fever,  that  there  is  no  evidence  for  the  sudden 
changes  in  the  blood  corresponding  to  the  sud- 
den and  intermittent  onsets  of  the  pangs,  and 
the  fact  that  hunger  is  gone  too  soon  after  eat- 
ing for  the  replenishments  it  provides  to  become 
effective,  together  with  the  illustration  that  to 
eat  moss  and  clay,  indigestibles  that  they  are, 
133 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
allays  the  pangs, — these  point  to  a  special  loca- 
tion for  the  stimulus.  Neither  is  it  due  to 
emptiness  of  the  stomach  alone,  nor  to  the  tur- 
gescence  of  the  gastric  glands,  for  after  one 
swallows  indigestibles,  causing  no  secretions  of 
gastric  juice  whatever,  hunger  is  assuaged. 

44.  Hunger  is  rather  the  "result  of  contrac- 
tions of  the  muscle  fibres  of  a  wholly  empty 
stomach"  (in  health),  and  "such  contractions 
may  be  even  stronger  than  during  digestion." 
This  has  been  shown  by  means  of  detecting 
manometric  contractions  caused  by  rubber 
baloons  connected  with  tubing  temporarily 
swallowed  and  allowed  to  be  inflated  so  as  to 
receive  the  impacts  of  the  stomach  wall.  The 
fact  that  hunger  is  often  felt  higher  up  than  at 
the  stomach  is  accounted  for  by  the  similar 
finding  of  synchronous  contractions  in  the  low- 
er oesophagus.  The  cause  for  these  contrac- 
tions is  not  known,  but  writers  incline  to  the 
view  that  habit  rather  than  specific  bodily  need 
causes  them.  The  expression  "too  tired  to  eat" 
means  that  fatigue  poisons  in  the  blood  relay 
their  effects  to  accomplish  a  fatigue  in  the 
rhythmic  contractions  of  the  digestive  organs 
involved.  Professor  W.  B.  Cannon  writes: 
"Hunger,  in  other  words,  is  normally  the  signal 
that  the  stomach  is  contracted  for  action;  the 
134 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
unpleasantness  of  hunger  leads  to  eating;  eat- 
ing starts  gastric  secretion,  distends  the  con- 
tracted organ,  initiates  the  movements  of  gastric 
digestion,  and  abolishes  the  sensation."  Now 
the  curious  thing  to  note  in  this  sensation  is 
that  the  stimulus  is  not  the  stomach,  nor  the 
empty  stomach,  but  the  qualitative  and  quan- 
titative character  of  the  movements  of  that  or- 
gan. If  the  introspector  says  that  hunger  is 
nonsense  when  reduced  to  movements,  (just  as 
he  would  say  ether  vibrations  are  a  silly  sub- 
stitute for  yellow),  the  reply  is  that  the  sensa- 
tion hunger  is  the  object  and  what  it  will  do, 
just  as  with  every  other  sensation  in  the  con- 
scious cross-section.  Only  the  experience  of 
hunger  is  just  another  qualitative  attribute  of 
just  such  movements  and  nothing  else;  for  the 
physiologist  from  whom  I  have  just  quoted 
would  likewise  be  the  last  man  to  say  that  when 
the  stomach  contracts  all  one  has  in  mind  are 
the  graphical  results  of  the  manometric  meas- 
urements. 

45.  The  other  internal  sensations  we  shall 
not  consider  in  detail.  Except  in  diseased  con- 
ditions the  intestinal  organs  can  be  burned, 
pricked,  cut  or  pinched  without  any  result  for 
focal  consciousness.  The  peritoneum  and 
diaphram,  on  the  other  hand,  as  far  as  experi- 
135 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
ment  has  gone,  show  extreme  responsiveness; 
yet  the  various  attributes  of  sensation  have  not 
been  systematically  studied  in  them.  Thirst 
and  nausea  are  usually  localized  in  the  mouth 
and  throat.  As  a  usual  thing  we  are  not  con- 
scious of  the  action  of  the  heart  and  lungs,  any 
more  than  we  are  of  the  other  viscera,  and,  in- 
deed, only  by  those  feelings  known  as  aches 
and  pains  do  we  become  at  all  aware  of  the 
unconscious  backgrounds  of  focal  conscious- 
ness. And  these  aches  and  pains  are  frequent- 
ly intensities,  summations,  extensities,  durations 
and  the  like  of  coenaesthetic  disturbances,  con- 
stituting the  with-for  relation  of  general  and 
specific  defense  against  disease  and  thwarting. 
The  psychology  of  these  things,  when  thorough- 
ly investigated,  will  prove  of  interest  to  all 
hands,  but  their  special  study  is  for  the  pathol- 
ogist rather  than  for  the  student  of  general  psy- 
chology. 

2.  Cutaneous  Senses 
46.  The  next  group  of  sensations  we  shall 
consider  are  those  functioned  for  by  organs  in 
the  epidermis.  These  are  commonly  called 
touch,  pain,  warmth,  cold,  the  pilomotor  reflex, 
tickle,  roughness,  smoothness,  and  the  like, — 
some  of  which  are  fusions  and  summations  of 
other  sensations.  The  area  known  as  the  "sur- 
136 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
face  of  the  b«rdy"  is  defined  as  extending  as  far 
within  the  apertures  of  the  body  as  the  nor- 
mally "skin-senses"  can  be  aroused.  In  con- 
nection with  all  these  dermal  senses  two  things 
must  be  diligently  kept  in  focus:  first,  the  char- 
acter of  the  mechanical  or  other  stimulus  used, 
and  second,  the  various  layers  of  organs  of 
sensibility  beneath  the  skin  surface.  As  said 
before,  sensations  are  objects,  and  there  are  not 
sensations  of  these  objects;  so  that  later  on, 
when  we  come  to  the  possibility  of  arousing  a 
sensation  of  warmth  by  a  cold  file  the  student 
will  have  no  need  of  invoking  the  artifacts  to 
help  him  over  the  seeming  difficulty.  In  this 
connection  it  will  be  seen  just  how  important 
the  nature  of  series  becomes  in  the  science  of 
the  conscious  cross-section. 

47.  The  organs  for  the  cutaneous  senses  are 
in  general  bulb-like.  In  and  about  every  hair 
follicle  fine  nerve  fibres  wind,  thus  making  the 
organs  for  superficial  touch, — that  is,  the  char- 
acteristic sensation  aroused  by  a  pin-head  or 
a  medium-sized  bristle  moderately  applied. 
The  formation  of  the  touch-bulb  is  not  unlike 
a  rather  amateurish  piece  of  splicing.  Cold  is 
functioned  for  by  other  end-bulbs,  of  a  round- 
ish appearance,  while  warmth  is  transmitted 
by  a  cylindrical  organ,  deeper  in  the  layers  of 
137 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
the  skin  than  that  for  cold.  Other  disc-like  or- 
gans have  been  located  in  the  deeper  tissues, 
whose  function  is  not  as  exactly  definable  as 
that  of  the  others.  Pain  is  connected  with  the 
sensorial  functioning  of  the  free  nerve  endings, 
and  has  no  specialized  organ,  insofar  as  evolu- 
tionary shaping  is  concerned.  The  skin  does 
not  respond  to  thermal,  mechanical  and  elec- 
trical stimuli  homogeneously,  but  is  a  mosaic 
of  tiny  areas,  some  of  which  respond  to  touches, 
others  to  temperatures,  and  still  others  to  punc- 
tures and  the  like.  But  the  interesting  thing 
about  the  integumental  sense  field  is  that  the 
same  areas  or  spots  remain  constantly  of  the 
same  character,  so  that  we  can  factually  say: 
"Once  a  touch  spot  always  a  touch  spot,"  and 
so  on.  Of  these  spots,  those  responding  pain- 
fully are  the  most  numerous,  cold  and  touch 
spots  come  next,  while  the  warmth  spots  are 
the  fewest.  Punsters  might  infer  from  this 
condition  both  that  "man  was  made  to  mourn," 
and  also  that  nature  had  some  hand  in  the  size 
of  the  coal  bill.  Exploration  of  the  entire  in- 
tegument has  also  shown  that  these  spots  are 
unequally  distributed,  in  general  the  most  sen- 
sitive parts  being  over  the  joints  and  upon  those 
areas  uncovered  by  clothing.  Special  articles 
on  these  points  will  have  to  be  referred  to  by 
138 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
the  student  for  further  and  exacter  informa- 
tion. 

48.  As  a  signal  example  of  clean  and  sig- 
nificant experimentation  upon  the  skin  surface, 
is  to  be  mentioned  the  work  of  Drs.  Rivers  and 
Head,  as  recorded  in  "Brain,"  Nov.,  1908,  in 
an  article  called  "A  Human  Experiment  in 
Nerve  Division."  1  cite  this  article  also  for  the 
purpose  of  showing  that  naive  experiments  per- 
formed in  laboratories  result  in  findings  con- 
trary to  those  which  appear  in  text-books,  be- 
cause of  lack  of  definition  in  the  materials  used 
and  the  method  employed.  Dr.  Head  found 
three  separate  sets  of  organs  located  in  the 
dermal  layers,  each  of  which  behaved  quite 
differently  upon  the  application  of  the  same 
stimuli.  And  in  this  case,  as  before,  one  must 
be  ready  to  resign  his  old  idea  of  the  nature  of 
sensation,  and  distinguish  between  the  p  ijsical 
nature  of  the  stimulus,  the  functional  nature  of 
the  neural  release,  and  the  nature  of  ivhal  the 
organism  is  doing  in  the  presence  of  the  en- 
vironment. For  while  we  get  yellow  when  look- 
ing at  the  sun  as  a  conscious  content,  we  get 
touches,  colds,  warmths  and  pains  when  the 
same  shaped  stimulus  in  diiferent  physical 
series  is  applied  to  the  skin.  Only  persons  who 
are  eye-minded  think  of  needles  when  their 
139 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
skin  is  punctured.  The  thing  known  as  pain  is 
not  the  essence  of  needledom;  for  the  abstract- 
ing of  a  hair  from  the  skin  will  also  cause  pain, 
just  as  the  tapping  of  a  cold  spot  often  arouses 
the  sensation  called  cold.  We  shall  speak  of 
the  identity  of  series  in  these  various  contents 
and  processes  after  the  following  brief  sum- 
mary of  this  article  cited  above. 

49.  There  is  an  area  of  deep  sensibility,  in- 
dependent of  cutaneous  nerves,  which  functions 
as  follows.  Tactile  (pin-head)  pressure  is  pres- 
ent in  it,  which  even  deep  freezing  by  ethyl 
chloride  does  not  abolish;  but  the  application 
of  cotton  wool  and  the  pulling  of  hairs  outwards 
produces  no  focality  in  consciousness.  Sudden 
jars  and  slight  gradual  pressures,  however,  are 
each  differently  responded  to,  thus  indicating 
that  the  content  of  consciousness  subtends  re- 
spectively the  different  kinds  of  intensity  in- 
volved. Roughness  is  well  functioned  for  by 
this  deep-lying  system  of  nerves.  Pressure, 
which  to  a  normal  hand  would  be  painful,  is 
present  in  consciousness  as  an  ache,  while  needle 
pricking  and  electric  pain  arouse  nothing  there 
at  all.  Local  sign  is  curiously  prominent,  even 
after  freezing,  but  two  compass  points  as  far 
apart  as  6  cm.  laid  longitudinally  to  the  axis  of 
the  arm  are  not  distinguished.  Yet  upon  the 
140 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
application  of  the  points  successively  no  such 
results  are  obtained.  Temperature  is  wholly 
absent,  only  numbness  being  reported  after  the 
application  of  cold  silver  tubes  and  freezing 
solutions.  The  point  to  be  finally  made  is  that 
in  the  above  experiment,  "the  peculiar  aptitude 
possessed  by  a  part  innervated  solely  by  the 
atierent  receptor  fibres  of  a  muscular  nerve,  is 
the  appreciation  of  all  stimuli  which  produce 
deformation  of  structure." 

50.  Some  time  after  such  an  operation,  pro- 
topathic  sensibility  is  present,  or  the  sensibility 
appearing  in  the  first  stages  of  a  lesion.  In  this 
condition,  pain  is  distinctly  felt,  but  "any  ther- 
mal sensation  produced  by  an  adequate  stim- 
ulus to  a  protopathic  area  tends  to  be  widely 
diffused  and  to  be  referred  into  remote  parts. 
In  the  attempt  to  estimate  the  relative  intensity 
of  two  stimuli,  a  less  cold  object  covering  a 
larger  area  of  the  skin  may  evoke  a  more  vivid 
sensation  than  one  of  smaller  size  but  of  lower 
temperature."  In  this  stage,  also,  the  hair  is 
insensitive  to  all  stimulation.  (As  long  after 
the  operation  as  86  days.)  The  hairs  do  not 
respond  with  the  characteristic  "touch"  sensa- 
tion, but  bring  about  a  tingling  and  diffused 
one,  which  "tends  to  be  referred  to  parts  remote 
from  the  point  stimulated.  Moreover,  the  re- 
141 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
turn  of  this  form  of  sensibility    (protopathic) 
does  not  bring  to  the  skin  after  shaving  any 
power  of  reacting  to  stimulation  with  cotton 
wool." 

51.  In  the  later  stages  of  a  lesion,  epicritic 
sensibility  is  manifest.  Tactual  sensations 
abound  in  almost  the  normal  amount;  localiza- 
tion is  good,  as  are  pointedness  and  relative 
sizes;  and  while  thermal  sensitivity  is  acute,  the 
compass  points  are  responded  to  with  much 
irregularity.  The  touch  of  cotton  wool  on  a 
shaven  area  is  clearly  appreciated,  and  the  hair 
clad  parts  react  both  to  pulls  and  pushes.  The 
irregularity  of  the  compass  tests,  however,  does 
not  include  the  item  of  eccentric  reference,  and 
Head  believes  that  spacial  discrimination  is 
primarily  a  function  of  the  epicritic  sensibility. 

52.  The  pilomotor  reflex,  commonly  known 
as  "goose-skin,"  is  principally  a  function  of  the 
protopathic  sensibility.  "The  exact  date  of  the 
return  of  this  reflex  was  not  noted;  but  we 
gradually  became  aware  that  pricking  the  skin, 
pulling  the  hairs,  or  the  application  of  the  cold 
tube  would  occasionally  give  rise  to  a  condi- 
tion of  "goose-skin"  within  the  area  we  were 
testing. 

"As   protopathic   sensibility   increased,    this 
reflex  could  be  evoked  more  easily  from   the 
142 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
affected  area  than  from  the  normal  skin.     ,    .    . 
Even  brushing  the  hairs  with  cotton  wool  in 
this  stage  of  recovery  would  start  a  pilomotor 
reflex. 

"With  the  gradual  return  of  epicritic  sen- 
sibility to  the  forearm,  this  increased  response 
died  away     .     .     . 

"Whilst  engaged  on  these  experiments,  we 
discovered  that  the  'thrill'  called  forth  by 
aesthetic  pleasure  is  accompanied  by  erection 
of  the  hairs  ...  He  [the  subject]  could 
evoke  the  reflex  by  reading  aloud  some  favorite 
poem."     (Head,  op.  cit.) 

53.  As  to  the  differences  between  these  sys- 
tems of  cutaneous  sensibility  in  adapting  to 
warm  and  cold,  it  is  reported  that, 

"Over  normal  parts,  the  neutral  point  of 
thermal  sensibility  shifts  according  as  the  hand 
is  adapted  to  heat  or  to  cold. 

"Over  protopathic  parts,  no  such  change  oc- 
curs   .     .     . 

"It  follows  that  some  innervation  other  than 
protopathic  must  exist  in  the  normal  skin 
.  .  .  and  that  this  mechanism  is  capable  of 
adaptation  within  a  wide  range. 

".     .     .     protopathic  parts  are  incapable  of 
adaptation  to  any  material  extent,"  but  "parts 
in  a  condition  of  defective  sensibility"  are  "ren- 
143 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
dered  apparently  more  sensitive  to  the  specific 
stimulus  of  cold."     (op.  cit.) 

54.  "Accurate  tactile  localization  is  possible 
even  M^hen  the  part  is  supplied  with  deep  sen- 
sibility only,  provided  the  pressure  is  sufficient 
to  stimulate  the  deep  afferent  system. 

".  .  .  the  recognition  of  two  compass 
points  applied  simultaneously  to  the  skin,  is  im- 
possible in  the  absence  of  epicritic  sensibility, 
except  at  distances  enormously  in  excess  of  the 
normal. 

"The  existence  of  epicritic  impulses  inhibits 
the  tendency  to  refer  into  remote  parts. 

"Localization  is  in  all  probability  the  sum 
of  two  sets  of  sensations,  one  of  which  arises 
from  deep,  the  other  from  cutaneous  stimula- 
tion." 

55.  The  attribute  of  intensity  is  found  to 
have  the  following  bearings  upon  the  case: 

"Parts  in  a  condition  of  protopathic  sensi- 
bility respond  more  vividly  than  the  normal 
skin  to  all  stimuli  capable  of  evoking  a  sensa- 
tion."    [I  should  rather  say  "content."] 

"This  ...  is  usually  more  intense  and 
always  of  much  greater  extent  than  over  normal 
parts. 

"For  all  effective  stimuli,   the   threshold  is 


144 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
high  in  a  protopathic  area,  and     ...     is  one 
of  defective  sensibility. 

"An  effective  protopathic  stimulus  of  low  in- 
tensity, but  covering  a  larger  area,  may  produce 
a  sensation  of  greater  apparent  intensity  than 
a  more  restricted  stimulation  of  greater 
strength. 

"The  usual  psychological  view  that  an  in- 
creased sensory  reaction  corresponds  to  a  low- 
ered threshold  must  be  readjusted.  It  is  true 
in  the  strict  sense  only  of  epicritic  and  deep 
sensibility."  (The  italics  in  the  above  are 
mine.) 

56.  As  to  punctuate  sensibility,  Head  furth- 
er reports: 

"The  skin  is  supplied  by  two  anatomically 
distinct  systems  which  .  .  .  regenerate  at 
different  periods  after  complete  nerve  division. 
Moreover,  a  part  of  the  skin  may  be  supplied 
by  one  of  these  systems  only. 

"Protopathic  sensibility  depends  upon  spe- 
cific end-organs  gathered  together  within  the 
skin  to  form  sensory  spots;  the  spaces  between 
are  insensitive  to  cutaneous  stimuli,  if  the  part 
is   endowed   with   protopathic  sensibility   only. 

"Owing  to  the  sparseness  of  the  heat  spots, 
their  characteristics  can  be  easily  demonstrated; 
cold  spots  are  more  numerous  and  correspond- 
145 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
ingly  difficult  to  investigate.  The  pain  spots 
are  so  closely  distributed  throughout  the  skin 
that  it  is  impossible  to  study  them  with  the 
[same]  accuracy  [as  in  the  case]  of  the  heat 
heat  and  cold  spots;  but  the  character  of  their 
response,  and  the  period  at  which  they  regen- 
erate, show  that  they  belong  to  the  same  order. 

"Whenever  the  skin  is  supplied  with  proto- 
pathic  end  organs  only,  any  sensation  evoked 
radiates  widely  and  tends  to  be  referred  to  re- 
mote parts.  These  are  the  same,  whichever 
kind  of  spot  be  stimulated,  so  long  as  it  lies 
within  the  same  area  of  the  skin. 

"Radiation  and  reference  are  abolished  as 
soon  as  the  part  becomes  sensitive  to  cutaneous 
tactile  stimuli  and  to  intermediate  degrees  of 
temperature. 

"All  protopathic  sense  organs  have  a  high 
threshold.  All  epicritic  organs  have  a  low  thres- 
hold. .  .  .  When  the  normal  skin  is  stim- 
ulated, the  defects  of  protopathic  sensibility  are 
corrected  and  compensated  by  the  simultaneous 
activity  of  the  low-threshold  epicritic  system. 
.  .  .  The  epicritic  mechanism  is  highly  adapt- 
able. The  threshold  for  painful  sensations  is 
the  same  over  normal  and  over  highly  proto- 
pathic parts,  but  on  the  normal  skin  the  ap- 
proach of  pain  is  preceded  by  the  sensation  of 
146 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
contact  with  a  pointed  object.  This  is  absent 
over  protopathic  parts.  The  power  of  recogniz- 
ing the  pointed  nature  of  the  stimulating  ob- 
ject .  .  .  belongs  to  that  group  of  sensations 
by  which  we  estimate  relative  size." 

57.  It  can  thus  be  seen  that  "touch"  instead 
of  being  one  sense,  as  handed  down  in  popular 
mythology,  is  more  exactly  ten  or  eleven  senses, 
shared  among  three  sets  of  nerve  fibres.  For 
example,  we  can  "physically"  touch  the  skin 
with  wool,  sandpaper,  pin  points  and  heads,  or 
with  wooden  skewers  that  deeply  deform  it, — 
all  touchings,  if  you  will,  and  yet  the  conscious 
content  is  qualitatively  different  each  time. 
Quantitative  equality  in  these  cases  is  something 
that  does  not  exist  for  psychology, — the  intensity 
is  in  each  case  prime;  and  these  quantitative  se- 
ries in  psychology  possess  severally  but  one 
term,  the  term  of  specific  qualitative  intensity. 
However,  in  their  relations  to  other  series,  an 
other  than  the  prime  relation  exists  in  those  se- 
ries constituting  the  separate  dermal  sensations. 
The  case  of  paradox-cold  is  one  to  which  too 
great  emphasis  cannot  be  drawn,  for  it  means 
that  some  of  the  series  making  up  sensation  in- 
tersect, just  as  two  lines  intersect.  To  be  able 
to  arouse  a  cold  sensation  with  the  use  of  a  hot 
rod  means  precisely  that  as  much  of  the  cold 
147 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
sensation  as  is  thus  aroused  is  identical  with  the 
as  yet  unnamed  complex  of  heat-touch-nerve- 
touch-organ,  called  by  virtue  of  surprise,  the 
paradox-cold  sensation.  It  is  something  more 
than  this;  for  in  these  two  above-named  com- 
plexes, there  exists  a  common  part.  Further- 
more, this  concept  of  the  common  part  is  ex- 
hibited in  the  case  of  arousing  tickle  with  cot- 
ton wool  and  with  a  fine  bristle  attached  to  the 
tine  of  a  tuning  fork  vibrating  against  the  skin. 
The  eccentric  reference  of  sensation  by  the  pro- 
topathic  system  to  which  Head  refers  is  also 
but  a  case  of  common  parts  in  the  two  series 
of  stimulus-organ-response  complexes.  It  also 
means  for  the  student  of  physiology  that  the 
response  was  inhibited  along  one,  its  accus- 
tomed, final  common  path,  and  found  its  way 
out  by  another  less  blockaded. 

58.  It  is  almost  needless  to  say,  that  the  pro- 
hibition we  declared  against  the  use  of  popular 
terminology  in  the  first  chapter  is  more  than 
justified  by  this  rather  exhaustive  account  of 
the  nature  of  touchings  and  other  dealings  with 
the  skin.  Impacts,  which  have  been  the  glory 
of  physics  to  reduce  to  formulae,  have  almost 
no  meaning  in  psychology.  For  impacts  branch 
and  flower  at  the  gateway  of  the  nervous  system 
in  such  a  surprising  manner,  that  a  new  con- 
148 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
ception  of  their  significance  must  react  even 
on  the  study  of  physics.  For  physics  should 
be  that  area  of  study  in  which  sensations  are 
exhaustively  analysed.  Again,  in  the  tempera- 
ture senses,  what  we  call  warmth,  heat  and  cold, 
are  all  within  a  very  small  range  of  the  possible 
and  actual  temperatures.  The  series  is  short 
in  psychology,  bordered  by  the  series  of  numb- 
nesses below  the  lower  threshold  of  cold,  and 
by  burnings  above  the  upper  threshold  for  heat. 
Ice  is  way  beyond  our  limit  of  cold  imagina- 
tions, and  the  fusion  point  of  even  lead  bank- 
rupts our  sense-imagery.  But,  having  lived  so 
long  under  the  dominion  of  hyperbole  and  ex- 
clamation points,  we  flatter  ourselves  that  the 
range  of  the  imagination  is  unlimited.  We  for- 
get that  we  substitute  sensation  thresholds  for 
what  lies  beyond,  and  thus  in  the  dust  of  the 
wheel  utter  many  statements  whose  meaning 
corresponds  exactly  to  that  of  flapdoodle  and 
galoozalum. 

59.  Nevertheless  here  is  a  point  where 
something  other  than  sensational  consciousness 
enters  in.  The  thermometer,  by  which  we 
measure  temperatures  accurately,  and  trans- 
cend our  sensible  appreciation  of  cold  and  heat, 
is  in  fact  just  a  detachable  organ,  whose  busi- 
ness is  temperature  affectiveness,  but  whose 
149 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
efferent  (sensory)  nerve  is  not  in  the  skin,  but 
in  the  eye.  That  is,  we  do  not  sense  trans-sen- 
sational thermometric  temperatures,  but  per- 
ceive them.  And  at  this  point  we  shall  leave 
the  attribute-thing  complex  called  sensation 
and  go  to  the  part-whole  complex  called  per- 
ception, at  least,  as  far  as  dermal  sensitivity 
allows  us. 

60.  When  a  single  compass  point  is  placed 
on  the  skin,  and  we  merely  react  with  "there," 
indicating  that  a  touch  of  some  kind  was  re- 
ceived, it  is  called  sensation.  When,  again,  the 
two  compass  points  are  placed  on  the  skin,  and 
we,  with  eyes  closed  as  before,  say  "there,"  we 
have  again  merely  sensational  content.  But  if 
we  are  asked  to  tell  whether  in  the  second  case 
there  are  two  points  rather  than  one  touching 
us,  and  the  twoness  is  manifest,  we  are  on  the 
road  to  perception.  Especially  is  this  true  if 
we  notice,  by  instruction,  whether  the  points 
are  placed  in  a  certain  dermographic  relation 
to  each  other.  Then,  if  we  so  locate  them,  or, 
if  we  discriminate  the  single  point  as  having 
position  relative  to  a  certain  other  point  or  a 
part  of  the  hand,  we  are  perceiving  along  with 
our  sensing, — ^they  both  getting  simultaneously 
into  the  language  reaction  (common  part). 
This  is  perception:  sensations  having  structure, 
150 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
sensations   organized  into   some   relationships 
and  mentioned  by  the  use  of  nothing  necessarily 
more  than  prepositions  and  conjunctions.  Drag 
a  point  along  the  skin,  likewise,  and  if  the  re- 
port includes  terms  in  relation,  the  conscious- 
ness is  perceptual.     Bear  in   mind,   also,   that 
these   relations   are   not   "material."     Now   the 
perception  of  cold  or  heat  beyond  the  thresholds 
of  these  senses  is  vicariously  accomplished  by 
the  observation  of  another  set  of  changes  than 
those  of  temperature  proceeding  side  by  side 
with   the   sensational    alterations.     Before    the 
threshold  of  cold  or  heat  is  passed,  several  sets 
of  changes  are  simultaneously  present,  one  in 
the  modality  specified  above,  and  the  other  in 
another  modality,  say  that  of  sight.     The  first 
modality  may  be  in  focal,  the  second  in  co-con- 
sciousness.      Then,     when     the     threshold     of 
the     first     modality     is     passed,     the     second 
modality     comes     into     focality,     and     func- 
tions    for     both     of     them     without     apparent 
loss     to     fused     consciousness      of     the     mo- 
dality which  has  actually  ceased  to  be  present. 
For  in  such  a  case,  our  own  responses  keep 
marking  time  while  the  physical  changes  keep 
mounting  their  series,— the  result  being  that  the 
very  condition  of  duration  in  one  sense  field 
coupled  with   alterations  in   another  produces 
151 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
the  fusion  or  summation  effect  of  the  sense  im- 
agery adequate  to  the  vicarious  functioning  of 
the  trans-liminal  series. 

61.  Thus  perception  is,  so  far,  not  a  "mental 
act"  by  which  we  grasp  the  data  obvious  to  us. 
It  is,  so  far  as  dermal  things  are  concerned, 
based  entirely  upon  local  sign,  duration,  exten- 
sity,  intensity,  fusion,  contrast  and  after-image. 
For  by  the  use  of  these  alone,  plus  the  responses 
of  the  neural  organisation  to  relations,  percep- 
tion is  made  clear  and  unmysterious.  And  if 
one  asks  here,  as  is  inevitable,  "how  do  we  re- 
spond to  relations?"  the  answer  is  that  all  neural 
functioning  is,  ipso  facto,  a  series  of  effects  and 
as  such  is  a  set  of  terms  in  relation. 
And  these  relations  correspond  with  the 
relations  between  the  objects  they  function. 
Furthermore,  two  compass  points  are,  when 
not  fused  in  touch,  psychologically  present  as 
(1)  "there,"  (2)  "there,"  and  (3)  "something  re- 
lating the  two  theres"  as  content.  It  is  like- 
wise with  all  other  relations  and  terms.  Fur- 
thermore, when  the  content  is  loosely  knit,  they 
stand  more  clearly  manifest  the  longer  it  en- 
dures; while  when  the  content  is  welded  and 
blent  together,  it  has  to  be  of  longer  duration 
to  allow  the  relations  to  be  perceived,  and  even 
then  the  various  familiar  parts  must  be  allied 
152 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
and  compared  with  other  things.     This  also  is 
the  door-step  to  logical-mindedness,  as  a  little 
reflection  will  show. 

62.  It  remains  to  speak  somewhat  in  de- 
tail of  certain  attributes  of  dermal  sensation. 
Of  qualities  there  are  only  a  few  as  compared 
with  auditory  and  visual  contents.  In  touch, 
there  are  light  touch,  superficial  touch,  granular 
touch,  and  the  contents  characteristic  of  moving 
objects  on  the  skin.  Intensity  has  been  suf- 
ficiently treated  in  the  quotations  from  Head. 
The  latent  period  of  touch  is  relatively  long, 
varying  from  1/6  to  1/4  sec,  depending  some- 
what upon  the  rate  of  impact  employed.  The 
threshold  of  touch  is  determined  by  the  amount 
of  pressure  required  to  arouse  the  organs,  and 
varies  somewhat  for  different  spots.  The  dura- 
tion of  the  touch  sensation  is  connected  with 
the  matter  of  after-image,  exhaustion,  adapta- 
tion, and  one  or  two  other  attributes,  as  follows. 
If  the  impact  is  forcible,  say  a  dab  with  a  pen- 
cil eraser  on  the  forehead,  suddenly  withdrawn, 
there  is  very  little  longer  duration  to  the  main 
sensation  than  to  the  maintenance  of  the  stim- 
ulus. But  immediately  afterwards,  rings  of 
throbbing  or  resurgence  will  arise  from  the 
smitten  area  as  a  center  and  pass  off  centri- 
fugally.  These  are  after-images,  and  may  ex- 
153 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
ceed  five  in  number  as  well  as  exceed  the  in- 
tensity of  the  original  impact  as  felt.  They  will 
be  also  more  extensive  than  the  original  "sen- 
sation." Again,  subliminal  pressures  will  sum 
up  into  an  effective  stimulation,  whose  quality 
is  often  itchy  or  even  painful  and  diffuse. 
Furthermore,  the  persistent  stimulation  of  a  live 
touch  spot  by  supra-liminal  pressures  may  ex- 
haust it,  so  that  not  even  by  looking  at  it  and 
suggesting  to  oneself  that  it  "ought"  to  feel 
touched,  can  we  reaffirm  the  content  above  the 
threshold.  Nevertheless,  in  the  case  of  adapta- 
tion, the  relating  of  the  subconscious  or  co-con- 
scious elements  of  the  sensation  with  other  fo- 
cal contents  will  suffice  to  reinstate  it  among 
the  series  of  appreciable  intensities.  Fusions 
in  touch  we  have  already  illustrated  by  refer- 
ence to  the  compass  points;  curious  simultane- 
ous and  successive  contrasts  are  often  obtained 
by  the  use  of  compass  points  along  with  an  in- 
strument giving  single  touches.  Even  when  the 
compass  points  are  beyond  or  within  the  two- 
point  threshold,  they  may  be  felt  as  one  or  two 
as  contrasted  with  single  touches.  Clearness  is 
well  illustrated  in  the  above  case  as  well  as  in 
that  of  diffuseness  and  pointedness  being  pres- 
ent at  the  same  time;  while  lightly  brushing  a 
hair-clad  surface  will  show  that  "intensity"  (as 
154 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
an  impact  phenomenon)  is  not  required  for  fo- 
cal vividness.  Feeling-tones  in  touch  are  beau- 
tifully illustrated  with  the  aid  of  various  text- 
ures, though  touch  blends  operate  here  rather 
than  single  sensations. 

63.  As  a  last  word  on  touch,  I  wish  to  cite 
an  experiment  upon  the  difference  between  the 
relative  percentages  of  after-images  derived 
from  various  modes  of  stimulating  the  skin,  as 
reported  in  the  "Psychological  Monograph"  for 
September,  1912,  by  M.  H.  S.  Hayes  in  a  thesis 
on  "Cutaneous  After-Sensations."  The  quota- 
tion I  shall  make  will  also  serve  to  show  the 
nature  of  the  after-image  series  for  dermal  sen- 
sitivity. The  general  percentage  of  after-sen- 
sations, both  those  outlasting  the  application  of 
the  stimulus,  and  those  reappearing  after  a  sub- 
conscious interval  is  as  follows: 

"Areal  Cold   94.8% 

Punctiform  Pain 93.5% 

Areal  Heat   89.3% 

N.  B.    Areal  Pressure 88.4% 

Punctiform  Cold 84.7% 

N.  B.    Punctiform  Pressure   79.3% 

Punctiform  Heat 79.3% 

Radiant   Heat    74.5% 

Radiant  Cold  67.9% 

Electric  Cold   59.3% 

155 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 

Electric  Heat   58.3%" 

As  to  latent  intervals,  they  are  found  most 
frequently  with  pressure,  and  less  and  less  so 
with  pain,  heat  and  cold.  Punctiform  stimuli 
function  them  better  than  areal;  whereas  the 
briefer  latent  intervals  are  connected  with  heat, 
while  longer  ones  are  evident  in  touch  and  cold. 
The  author  concludes  the  article  by  saying,  fur- 
thermore, that  "cutaneous  after-sensations  are 
real  phenomena,  and  not  explainable  by  imagi- 
nation, oscillating  attention,  or  the  presence  of 
skin  and  muscle  [  ?]  sensations  ordinarily  pass- 
ing unnoticed." 

64.  In  connection  with  heat  and  cold,  or 
better,  warmth  and  cold,— for  heat  is  a  curious 
blend  of  cold  and  warmth,  with  slight  admix- 
tures of  pain  at  times, — one  needs  to  notice  that 
the  range  of  temperatures  which  the  skin  right- 
ly appreciates  is  very  limited.  We  shall  speak 
of  this  range  as  those  temperatures  functionally 
effective  for  focal  consciousness.  But  just  as 
"physically"  there  is  only  "colder"  and  "warm- 
er," rather  than  true  "cold"  and  "warm"  or 
"hot," — thus  offering  no  objection  to  the  notion 
that  temperature  series  in  psychology  overlap 
and  possess  common  parts, — so  in  psychology, 
the  sensational  value  of  a  thermal  stimulus  is 
dependent  upon  its  temperature  relative  to 
156 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
that  of  the  human  body.  Notice  this,  further- 
more,— that  we  say  we  feel  comfortable,  that 
is,  neither  warm  nor  cold,  when  we  mean  that 
there  are  no  noticeable  thermal  sensations, 
while  yet  the  temperatures  of  mouth,  nose,  and 
ear,  for  example,  are  quite  a  few  degrees  dif- 
ferent from  each  other.  To  this  contrast  con- 
dition, there  is  only  unconscious  response.  As 
a  "warm"  background  for  sensations,  the  skin 
behaves  curiously:  for  we  feel  a  cold  stimulus 
as  cold,  even  while  the  temperature  of  the  skin 
affected  is  rising, — something  the  physicist 
would  scarcely  expect.  Other  curious  phenom- 
ena of  temperature  are  the  paradox-cold  and 
paradox-heat  sensations,  while  even  tapping  a 
temperature  spot  sometimes  arouses  the  tem- 
perature sensation.  A  similar  curiosity  is  dis- 
covered in  touch,  where  the  diffuse  sensation 
of  light  wool  can  be  inhibited  by  touching  with 
a  pencil  point  the  center  of  the  responding  area. 
But  all  these  phenomena,  and  many  others  of  a 
like  character,  merely  show  that  the  dermal 
senses  are  to  be  best  thought  of  schematically, 
but  schematically  only  as  comparable  to  a  net- 
work of  intersecting  lines  and  planes,  which 
cannot,  however,  be  reduced  to  the  ordinary 
tri-dimensionality  of  Euclidian  space. 

65.     Pain  is  not  the  same  as  unpleasantness, 
157 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
for  aches  and  pains  can  at  times  possess  a  curi- 
ous agreeability.  Pain  and  pleasure,  which 
common  sense  makes  antithetical,  have  no  such 
opposition  in  psychology:  for  pain  is  a  sensa- 
tion, while  pleasure  is  an  attribute  of  any  sen- 
sation. It  is  to  be  noted,  in  regard  to  pain,  that 
it  has  an  unusually  long  latent-period.  The 
child  whose  cries  do  not  come  immediately 
after  its  being  hurt,  can  thus  be  whisked  out 
of  the  pain  series  if  another  class  of  sensations 
be  properly  presented  to  it.  Extremes  of  tem- 
perature are  called  painful,  but  they  do  not  be- 
come pains  any  more  than  a  red  becomes  yel- 
low; the  common  part  of  both  series  is  the  basis 
for  this  apparent  change  in  the  conscious  con- 
tent. Furthermore,  pain-producing  spots, 
though  the  most  numerous  of  dermal  organs, 
normally  function  less  often  than  do  the  others, 
as  result  of  both  long  latent-periods  and  habits 
of  avoiding  the  adequate  stimulus  for  this  sen- 
sation. 

66.  If  tickle  can  be  aroused  by  stimulating 
a  hair-clad  surface  with  wool  or  by  drawing  a 
pencil  lightly  across  it,  this  sensory  content  is  a 
blend  of  subliminal  touches.  Tickle  can  also 
be  aroused  on  hairless  surfaces,  where  touch 
organs  thickly  abound,  and  in  some  cases  seems 
to  be  interpenetrated  with  slight,  unpleasant 
158 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
pain.  Other  touch  blends  will  be  taken  up  un- 
der Kinaesthetic  Sensations.  The  point  I  wish 
to  keep  in  mind  here  is  that  if  a  rapidly  vibrat- 
ing bristle  and  other  things  will  arouse  tickle, 
psychologically  a  spacial  numerousness  over  a 
large  area  is  the  same  as  a  temporal  numerous- 
ness over  a  smaller  one.  For  psychology,  then, 
numerousness  or  periodicity  is  a  prior  category 
to  space  or  time.  And  numerousness  is  a  prop- 
erty of  the  cardinal  number  system,  and  not  a 
"mental"  or  "physical"  object. 

Questions   on   the  Dermal  Senses. 

1.  Describe  fully  both  the  physical  and 
psychological  events  in  producing  some  form 
of  touch  sensation.  Make  a  list  of  the  attributes 
exhibited  and  relate  them  one  at  a  time,  as  ac- 
curately as  you  can,  to  the  physical  stimulus 
operating. 

2.  Slowly  immerse  the  hand  in  cold  water, 
and  notice  that  the  more  surface  that  becomes 
stimulated  by  the  liquid,  the  colder  the  con- 
sciousness becomes.  Do  the  same  with  hot 
water  and  mark  the  corresponding  effect.  Then 
completely  cover  the  hand  with  dry  sand;  or 
better,  slowly  immerse  it  in  mercury  and  no- 
tice carefully  that  something  else  happens  than 
in  the  case  of  the  other  two  liquids.  Enumerate 
all  the  attributes  of  sensation  involved  in  the 

159 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
three  parts  of  this  experiment,  and  state  psy- 
chologically the  different  effects  obtained. 
Kinaesthetic  Sensations. 

67.  We  have  seen  that  a  point  moving  over 
the  skin  can  be  sensorially  appreciated.  This 
phenomenon  includes,  however,  the  items  of  in- 
termittence  and  resistence,  which  are  also  pres- 
ent when  we  move  the  skin  over  a  fixed  stim- 
ulus; and  these  two  situations  are  identical  in 
their  cutaneous  effects.  Now,  movement  is  not 
a  function  of  the  touch  organs,  and  neither  is 
it  dependent  upon  the  muscular  condition,  for 
there  are  no  muscular  sensations,  heavy  and 
deep  pressures  being  functioned  by  the  cutane- 
ous system  of  deep  sensibility,  and  by  organs 
located  in  the  joints  and  tendons. 

68.  The  quality  known  as  strain  which  we 
find  as  content  in  pushing,  pulling,  long  stand- 
ing and  the  like  is  derived  from  an  environment 
upon  which  the  tendinous  sense  is  contrasted. 
The  spindles  of  Golgi  furnish  the  specific  organs 
for  this  response.  It  will  be  noted  here,  also, 
that  strains  as  sensations  are  identical  with 
strains  in  physics.  Content  and  function  here 
coincide.  The  strain  sensation  has  common 
parts  with  certain  members  of  the  pain  and 
warmth  series  in  overexercise,  while  in  buoyant 
health  the  "springy"  step  we  experience  is  due 

160 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
to  the  presence  of  the  attributes  of  clearness 
and  vividness,  quite  independent  of  the  thres- 
hold. Strain  has  an  obviously  precise  local  sign 
in  some  cases,  while  in  others  eccentric  refer- 
ence allies  it  to  the  protopathic  system  in  touch. 

69.  Joint  sensations  have  much  the  same 
quality  as  certain  touches,  especially  the  deep- 
er ones.  To  the  functions  of  the  end-organs  of 
articular  cartilages  are  due  these  joint  or  artic- 
ular sensations.  If,  before  we  push  a  heavy 
object,  we  "set"  the  joint,  the  subsequent  sen- 
sations are  largely  tendinous.  Now  the  state- 
ments in  regard  to  movement  are  almost  never 
indicative  of  sensations,  but  rather  of  percep- 
tions. To  report  that  a  limb  has  moved, — just 
moved, — is  of  course  a  sense  report,  but  to  say 
that  its  relation  to  the  rest  of  the  body  or  to  an- 
other limb  is  altered,  is  no  longer  a  matter  of 
sensation,  but  of  perception.  This  can  be  built 
up  out  of  after-images  of  former  position,  united 
with  the  present  sensory  datum,  or  can  be  di- 
rectly related, — but  in  either  case,  we  more 
properly  speak  of  perceptions  of  movement, 
since  the  situation  contains  parts,  rather  than 
bare  attributes. 

70.  When  one  feels  a  rough  or  smooth  sur- 
face, not  only  is  touch  present,  but  a  certain 
amount  of  intermittence    and    resistence    also. 

161 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
The  reason  we  do  not  ordinarily  call  these  con- 
tents perceptions,  is  because,  if  the  eyes  are 
closed,  we  are  uncertain  as  to  the  physical  na- 
ture of  the  stimulus,  and  the  loose  organization 
of  parts  is  scarcely  sufficient  to  avoid  misnaming 
the  stimulus.  So  we  call  them  touch-blends  in- 
stead. They  are,  more  exactly,  cases  of  inter- 
sensational  fusion  and  summation,  and  as  such 
have  many  common  parts  with  each  other  as 
we  shall  presently  see.  For  with  all  move- 
ments, or  with  all  situations  in  which  the  ten- 
dinous and  articular  senses  are  involved,  in- 
sufficient orientation  with  the  rest  of  the  con- 
scious cross-section  produces  a  condition,  the 
type  of  which  the  following  illustration  will 
render  clear.  In  the  first  place,  we  never  know 
our  nerves,  and  never  have  any  focal  conscious- 
ness of  the  release  of  energy  into  the  effector 
organs.  It  is  impossible  to  think  of  the  move- 
ments we  go  through  in  terms  of  specific  excita- 
tion of  the  moving  member, — arm,  leg,  eye, 
tongue,  etc.  We  know  only  late  in  the  game 
that  they  have  moved  beyond  the  place  that  is 
in  focal  consciousness.  Former  theorists  on  the 
nature  of  the  will  have  turned  over  in  their 
graves  several  times  since  this  was  made  evi- 
dent, but  it  has  so  far  done  little  good.  Active 
and  passive  movements  alike  are  unaccom- 
162 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
panied  by  this  experience  of  energy  in  the  con- 
sciousness they  produce.  Furthermore,  foot- 
rules  are  not  part  of  the  furniture  of  the  nervous 
system;  and  our  blind  estimation  of  how  far, 
or  how  much  further  we  have  moved  a  member 
this  time  in  comparison  to  the  last  is  very  in- 
accurate. It  takes  a  whole  orgy  of  sensations 
to  make  a  satisfactory  perception  of  movement, 
and  even  then  the  part-whole  complex  they  con- 
struct is  often  top-heavy  with  eccentric  refer- 
ence of  one  of  the  elements.  For  with  all  the 
senses  active, — movement,  sight,  hearing,  touch, 
and  the  like, — one  expects  that  his  body  will  be- 
come an  efficient  geometer.  But  in  psychology, 
there  are  no  unequivocal  calibrations.  The 
quadrants,  sextants,  slide-rules,  meter  sticks,  and 
so  forth,  which  we  make  and  use,  are  again  ad- 
justable touch,  movement,  and  sight  organs,  de- 
rived from  countless  comparisons  with  and  con- 
tradictions of  data  obtained  by  the  naive  sense 
organs,  as  well  as  made  under  conditions  in 
which  the  natural  forces  themselves  inscribe 
their  periodicities  upon  receiving  surfaces.  In 
comparison  to  the  accuracy  of  these  records, 
almost  all  naive  perceptions  might  be  termed 
blends,  for  as  true  perceptions  they  are  serious- 
ly unstable. 

71.     I  shall  quote  E.  B.  Titchener's  account 
163 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
of  touch  blends,  as  found  on  pages  171-2  of  his 
"A  Text  Book  of  Psychology,"  since  it  seems 
both  thorough  and  quite  in  line  with  the  view 
of  sensation  as  propounded  in  this  book.  "The 
difference  between  hard  and  soft,  for  instance, 
is  mainly  a  difference  in  degree  of  resistance 
offered  to  the  hand;  and  this  means  a  difference 
in  the  degree  of  pressure  exerted  by  the  one 
articular  surface  upon  the  other.  The  distinc- 
tion thus  belongs  to  the  joints  rather  than  to  the 
skin.  Again,  the  difference  between  smooth 
and  rough  is  a  difference,  first,  between  con- 
tinuous and  interrupted  movement,  and  sec- 
ondly between  uniform  and  variable  stimula- 
tion of  the  pressure  spots  of  the  skin.  The  dis- 
tinction thus  belongs  to  joints  and  skin  to- 
gether." 

"Sharp  and  blunt  differ,  primarily,  as  pain 
and  pressure:  a  thing  is  sharp  if  it  pricks  or 
cuts,  blunt  if  it  sets  up  diffuse  pressure  sensa- 
tions." .  .  .  "Wetness  is  a  complex  of  pres- 
sure and  temperature.  It  is  possible,  under  ex- 
perimental conditions,  to  evoke  .  .  .  wet- 
ness from  perfectly  dry  things, — flour,  lycopo- 
dium  powder,  cotton  wool,  discs  of  metal;  and 
it  is  possible,  on  the  other  hand,  to  wet  the 
skin  with  water  and  to  evoke  the  perception  [  ?] 

of  a  dry  pressure  or  a  dry  temperature.     Not 
164 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
the  moistening  of  the  skin,  but  the  fitting  dis- 
tribution of  pressure  and  temperature  sensa- 
tions, gives  rise  to  the  perception  [?]  of  wet- 
ness. Other  modes  of  distribution  of  the  same 
sensations  produce  the  perception  [?]  of  dry- 
ness. 

"Clamminess  is  a  mixture  of  soft  and  cold: 
the  cold  sensations  and  the  pressure  elements 
in  the  softness  must  be  so  distributed  as  to  give 
the  perception  [?]  of  moisture.  The  clammy 
feel  of  a  wet  cloth  may  be  got  by  laying  the 
finger  on  a  loosely  stretched  rubber  membrane, 
and  sending  a  puff  of  cold  air  over  it  at  the 
moment  of  contact.  Oiliness  is  probably  due  to 
a  certain  combination  of  smoothness  and  re- 
sistance; movement  seems  to  be  necessary  to 
its  perception  [?].  Clinging,  sticky  feels  may 
be  obtained  from  dry  cotton  wool." 

If,  then,  an  identical  conscious  content  can  be 
provoked  by  two  or  more  differing  mechanical 
means,  we  can  but  say  that  they  have  common 
parts:  they  coincide  in  the  effects  they  produce. 
We  have  noticed  this  item  in  connection  with 
the  phenomenon  of  a  "touch"  becoming  "pain- 
ful," and  have  dealt  with  the  error  involved 
in  such  a  statement.  Further  illustrations  of 
the  same  thing  will  occur  profusely  in,  for  ex- 
ample, the  sense  of  sight,  but  we  only  need 
165 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
prophesy   here    that  no   "red"   ever  became   a 
"yellow,"  as  will  turn  out  after  the  whole  band- 
age has  been  removed. 

Taste  and  Smell. 
72.  These  two  senses  are  very  intimately 
connected  in  the  conscious  cross-section  by  vir- 
tue of  the  fact  that  they  blend  together  so  in- 
veterately.  But  psychological  analysis  separ- 
ates them  with  ease,  and  their  definite  connec- 
tion with  chemicals  is  quite  complete.  The  taste 
organs  are  taste  buds,  which  are  calyx-like 
structures  in  the  papillae  of  the  tongue,  parts  of 
the  soft  palate,  the  larynx,  and  a  few  other 
places.  There  are  taste  buds  also  in  children 
on  the  inside  of  the  cheeks,  and  in  the  center  of 
the  tongue,  which,  in  adults  lacks  responsive- 
ness to  taste.  There  are  but  four  primary  qual- 
ities of  taste, — sweet,  salt,  bitter,  and  sour, — all 
others  being  smell-taste  mixtures,  or  compensa- 
tions and  rivalries  either  in  one  sense  or  the 
other,  or  between  them  both.  Oscillations  are 
also  frequent  between  tastes  of  a  high  intensity. 
In  general,  the  adequate  stimulus  is  a  solution, 
which  is  part  of  the  function  of  the  salivary  re- 
flex. Besides,  chemical  salts  taste  salty,  sugars 
taste  sweet,  alkaloids  bitter,  and  the  acids  sour. 
However,  there  are  some  chemical  salts  that 
taste  sweet,  others  bitter,  while  quite  a  few  are 
166 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
tasteless.  Too,  some  few  acids  taste  sweet, 
some  are  tasteless,  while  one,  hydrocyanic  acid, 
gives  bitter.  Very  salty  solutions  slightly  burn, 
and  very  sour  things  become  astringent  or  pain- 
ful. Likewise,  sweets  in  saturated  solutions 
prickle  or  burn  the  tongue,  while  bitters  often 
have  a  fatty  as  well  as  a  burning  quality.  Only 
solutions  taste,  whether  the  solvent  be  solid, 
liquid  or  gaseous,  but  just  as  there  are  salts 
which  do  not  taste  salty,  so  there  are  some  solu- 
tions which  are  tasteless. 

73.  Taste  is  easily  localizable,  being  un- 
equivocally in  that  complex  of  solution- 
tongue.  But  in  taste,  one  must  carefully  dis- 
tinguish between  the  quality  of  the  taste  and 
the  quality  or  intensity  of  the  solution  as  well 
as  other  things.  An  apple,  let  us  say,  tastes 
either  sweet  or  sour;  but  as  something  eaten,  as 
something  in  the  mouth,  there  is  much  more 
to  be  considered  than  the  bare  taste  quality. 
There  are,  for  instance,  the  elements  of  pres- 
sure, movement,  and  duration,  any  or  all  of 
which  give  us  the  characteristic  perception  of 
eating  this  or  that  thing.  It  is  known  that  a 
jaded  palate  is  more  often  appeased  by  altera- 
tions in  duration  and  pressure  concerned  in  "re- 
ducing the  contrary  material  to  submission" 
than  by  alterations  of  the  specific  taste  ele- 
167 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
ments  themselves.  The  most  interesting  attri- 
butes of  taste  are  fusion,  adaptation,  inhibition, 
and  contrast,  especially  as  they  occur  in  cook- 
ing. Lemonade  is  both  sour  and  sweet,  and 
also  a  partial  fusion  of  these  two  qualities. 
Sweets  taste  "smooth"  and  acids  "rough,"  and 
thus  lemonade  is  a  complex  of  five,  if  not  of  six 
separable  things.  We  sweeten  bitter  coffee  and 
tea, — nature  not  having  consulted  with  us  in 
planning  the  woodside  order  of  these  bever- 
ages. Salads  are  another  case  of  the  "search 
for  happiness"  (?),  in  which  concoctions  sugar 
offsets  the  salt,  while  both  either  inhibit  or  en- 
hance the  oil  and  vinegar  to  a  slight  degree.  A 
strong  sweet  and  a  salt  make  an  insipid  com- 
bination, but  neutralize  each  other  into  a  vapid 
blend,  if  weak.  And  so  on.  The  contrast  ef- 
fects of  tastes  may  be  either  simultaneous  or 
successive,  and  subliminal  sweets  often  sum  up 
into  something  focal,  which,  if  based  on  bare 
quantity,  plots  an  unexpected  series  of  relations 
between  the  two  thresholds  thus  obtained.  The 
latent  period  of  taste,  from  long  to  short,  runs 
as  follows :  bitter,  sour,  sweet,  and  salt.  But  in 
taste  mixtures,  this  order  does  not  follow  the 
combinations  made  on  a  quantitative  basis. 
For  while  the  neutralizations  (inhibition)  are 
best  in  the  order:  sweet-bitter,  sour-salt,  salt- 
168 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
bitter,  sweet-sour,— following  slightly  the  laws 
of  color  mixture,— yet  new  series  are  developed 
in  the  mixing  which  have  their  bases  in  some- 
thing other  than  chemistry    or    physics.     Even 
the  time  relations  of  tastes  would  suffice  to  de- 
velop "newness"  in  the  gustatory  cross-section. 
Contrast  in  taste  is  more  marked  than  adapta- 
tion, and  adaptation  to  one  sort  of  solution  al- 
ways leaves  the  other    three    intact.     Liminal 
sour  on  one  side  of  the  tongue  applied  at  the 
same  time  as  a  subliminal  sweet  on  the  other, 
may  bring  the  latter  to  some  sort  of  focality; 
while  subliminal  bitter,  when  applied  with  an- 
other taste,  is  usually  present  as  sweet,  if  at  all. 
74.     Taste  is  a  difficult  sense  to  study,  as  one 
can  easily  imagine.     The  mouth  must  be  bul- 
warked with  cotton,  and  the  tongue  wiped  dry 
incessantly,  while  the  experimenter,  with  a  fine 
camel's  hair  brush  stimulates  the  various  pa- 
pillae.    But  by  dint  of  patience,  the  following 
general  facts  are  well  established:  the  back  of 
the  tongue  senses  bitter,  the  edges  sour,  the  tip 
sweet,  while  salt  is  sensed  by  nearly  every  part 
of  it.     Some  of  the  individual  taste  buds  re- 
spond to  all  stimuli,  while  others  to  but  one  or 
two;  continued  touching  of  the  papillae  also  ex- 
hausts their  functioning  power.     The  threshold, 
as  might  be  expected,  varies  with  the  amount 
169 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
of  the  liquid  taken,  but  for  equal  quantities  of 
solution,  a  0.27(  solution  of  sulphuric  acid,  a 
0.4%  solution  of  salt  and  a  1.2%  solution  of 
sugar  is  sufficient  to  effect  a  focality  of  taste. 
Curiously  enough,  also  the  electric  current 
tastes, — doubtless  due  to  ionization, — while  with 
the  ears  full  of  warm  water  in  which  electrodes 
are  bathed,  a  sour  taste  in  the  mouth  results. 
However,  inasmuch  as  the  nerve  supply  of  the 
tongue  is  functioned  by  the  vagus,  lingual  and 
chorda  tympani,  such  a  phenomenon  is  not  al- 
together anomalous. 

75.  The  curious  common  parts  in  the  der- 
mal senses  have  already  been  intimated.  Chem- 
ically, there  is  apparent  evidence  for  allying 
the  various  tastes  more  effectively  than  there  is 
physically  for  allying  the  senses  of  warmth  and 
cold.  The  so-called  III,  IV,  and  V  groups  of 
chemical  series  are  generally  sweet-tasting, 
while  the  "inorganic,  bitter-tasting  substances 
are  derived  from  positive  ionization  of  the  I  and 
II  groups,  and  from  the  negative  elements  of 
the  VI  and  VII  groups."  On  this  basis  the 
sweet-generating  molecule  is  also  potentially  a 
generator  of  bitter.  But  much  clean  experi- 
mentation is  yet  to  be  done  upon  this  sense 
field. 

76.  Smell,  like  taste,  is  a  chemical  sense, 

170 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
but  smell  is  peculiarly  a  land  and  ground  sense, 
used  by  man  only  for  its  nutritive  and  protec- 
tive value,  and  not  for  such  purposes  as  are  em- 
ployed by  those  animals  in  whom  it  is  best  de- 
veloped. We  find  our  food  by  appointment  and 
not  by  odor.  The  organ  for  this  sense  is  not 
the  total  nose,  but  is  a  very  small,  brown  patch 
of  mucous  membrane  high  up  in  the  whorls  of 
the  anterior  part  of  the  head  cavity,  ciliated 
and  bathed  in  liquid.  The  cilia  waft  forward, 
also,  thus  driving  those  odors  ordinarily  un- 
noticed in  eating,  which  rise  through  the  pos- 
terior nares,  out  toward  the  forward  apertures, 
and  in  this  way  function  a  sort  of  extra  sentry- 
duty  upon  our  food.  The  cells  in  this  patch  of 
mucous  are  similar  to  the  taste  cells,  and  the 
olfactory  nerve,  which  supplies  them,  is  the 
shortest  in  the  body.  Part  of  the  region  con- 
cerned is  also  supplied  by  the  trigeminous 
nerve,  and  there  is  unusual  sensitivity  to  cold, 
heat  and  pain  in  that  area  of  the  body.  It  is 
thus  doubtful  whether  one  should  call  the  organ 
of  smell  and  its  environs  inside  or  on  the  sur- 
face of  the  skin. 

77.     Contact  is  essential  for  smell,  and  either 

vapors  or  particles    can    stimulate.     The  local 

sign  of  an  object  of  smell  is  given  by  virtue  of 

its  position  in  the  cone-shaped  area  defined  by 

171 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
the  apertures  of  the  nose  downwards.  In  gen- 
eral, those  substances  which  whirl  while  dis- 
solving in  a  liquid  can  be  smelled,  but  not  quite 
all  whirling  substances  are  odorous,  nor  do  all 
smellable  things  whirl  in  solution.  Again,  some 
substances  must  be  applied  in  solution  to  the 
brown  patch  directly,  in  order  to  be  sensed  by 
this  organ.  Furthermore,  the  brown  patch  is 
not  on  the  main  line  of  conduction  from  the 
front  to  the  back  of  the  nasal  passage,  but  the 
odors  drift  and  are  wafted  thither  by  the  cilia 
instead.  In  spite  of  this  fact,  the  threshold  is 
very  low,  being  given  as  one  millionth  of  a  milli- 
gram of  mercapton  dissolved  in  a  cubic  deci- 
meter of  washed  air.  There  has  been  some  at- 
tempt to  relate  the  chemistry  of  smell  to  the 
psychology  of  it,  but  no  one  has  plotted  the 
series  very  far  or  very  assuredly,  since  smell  is 
even  a  more  diflicult  thing  to  test  than  taste  on 
account  of  sudden  exhaustion  and  adaptation. 
78.  While  there  are  but  four  original  tastes, 
there  are  several  hundred  smells,  sometimes  ar- 
rangea  in  classes,  but  without  well  determined 
bounds.  Aromatic  odors  certainly  differ  from 
the  vapors  of  dried  fish,  but  in  psychology,  there 
is  frequently  as  much  "difference"  between  the 
near  together  as  between  the  far  apart.  This 
may  be  politely  analogous  to  the  status  of  rela- 
172 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
tives  and  strangers.     Some    smells    also    taste 
sweet,  others  bitter,  while  some  are  instantly 
painful    withal.     Some    arouse    tingling,    some 
tears,  and  not  a  few  nauseate.     The  inessential 
attributes  of  smell  largely  constitute  the  sensa- 
tion, since  adaptations,  fusions  and  inhibitions 
are  especially  frequent  and  potent.     The  curve 
of  qualitative    intensity    falls    with    exceeding 
rapidity  during  the  first  few  seconds,  as  every 
boudoir  enthusiast  knows.     But  smell  mixtures 
are  possible  in  smell  in  a  way  not  quite  known 
in  taste.     There  are  two  brown  patches,  one  in 
each  nose,  and  the  nasal  passages  do  not  unite 
that  far  forward  in  the  head;  thus  one  smell 
can  be  led  to  one  nostril  and  another  to  the 
other,  so  that  there  can  be  an  effect  produced 
for  consciousness   not  referable   to   the   single, 
separable    organs    alone.     The    "position"    of 
smells,  therefore,  is  not  necessarily  in  the  space 
of  our  forefathers.     Smells  will  also  mix  in  the 
same  nostril,  just  as  tastes  on  neighboring  pa- 
pillae.    But  smell  mixtures  are  less  stable  than 
color  mixtures,  and  there  is  also  no  clear  cut 
antagonism   in   this  field   as   there   is   in   sight. 
Smell  is  lacking  in  the  negative  after-images  we 
find  in  the  temperature  senses  and  in  taste,  a 
phenomenon  that  allies  it  likewise  with  the  do- 
main of  sound.     Peculiarly  special  in  this  sense 
173 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
field  also  is  the  case  of  the  elevation  of  the 
threshold  for  discrimination  after  partial  adap- 
tation, thus  making  contrast  here  a  derivative  of 
one  of  the  temporal  attributes  of  neural  release. 
Hearing. 
79.  In  connection  with  this  modality,  it  will 
be  requisite  that  the  student  have  access  both 
to  enlarged  models  of  the  ear  and  to  charts 
showing  the  various  dimensions  in  outline,  for  a 
verbal  account  of  so  intricate  an  organ  is  usual- 
ly misleading  and  often  fails  to  flatter  the  de- 
scriptive powers  of  an  author.  We  shall  speak, 
then,  of  the  functions  of  the  various  parts,  pre- 
suming some  slight  anatomical  knowledge  of 
the  terms  employed.  Every  one  of  the  attrib- 
utes of  sensation  is  clearly  illustrated  in  connec- 
tion with  audition,  and  the  importance  of  this 
sense  field  being  so  obvious,  it  will  be  advan- 
tageous to  keep  in  mind  the  schematization  of 
sensation  given  in  the  introductry  paragraphs 
of  this  chapter,  as  well  as  to  note  carefully  the 
differences  between  the  aural  functions  and  con- 
tent, and  those  of  the  previously  discussed  sen- 
sory fields. 

80.     To   begin   with,   there   are   three   main 

groups  of  auditory  qualities:  tones,  noises  and 

voices.     The  adequate  stimulus  for  audition  is 

air  or  other  vibrations  which  reach   the   ear. 

174 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
Sound  is  not  all  due  to  air  vibrations,  for  the 
sound  of  a  tuning  fork  placed  on  the  crown  of 
the  head  or  on  the  teeth  will  be  conducted  to 
the  receptive  surface  by  means  of  bony  bridges; 
but  vibrations  of  some  sort  must  set  the  ap- 
paratus in  motion  for  there  to  be  a  functioning 
in  sound.     It  must  be  observed  that  an  air  or 
bone  vibration  is  not  a  blank  flutter.     Cases  of 
vibration  are  cases  also  of  the  frequency  of  the 
impacts,  the  amplitude  of  the  wave  motion  and 
the  form  or  regularity  of  the  disturbance  of  the 
particles  of  the  transferring  medium.     Each  of 
these  has  an  important  finger  in  the  auditory 
pie.     For  while  the  number  of  the  vibrations 
means  pitch,  high  or  low,  while  the  amplitude  of 
the  vibrations  means  loudness,  and  while  wave 
form  is  a  specifically    differentiating    element 
in  tones,  noises  and  timbres;  yet  all  high  tones 
are  intrinsically  loud,  and  low  tones  intrinsical- 
ly weak.     Also,  by  a  figure,  we  call  the  former 
bright  or  thin  and  the  latter  dull  and  broad  by 
virtue  of  the  fact  that  we  habitually  see  the 
means  of  their  production.     Again,  while   the 
wave  form  is  what  we  mean  physically  when 
we  speak  of  clarionets  and  French  horns,  we 
also  have  the  expression  "tone  color,"  by  which 
is  meant  the  pitch,  "size"  and  intensity  of  a  cer- 
tain given  tone.     Within  these  three  groups,— 
175 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
tones,  noises  and  voices, — there  are  exceeding- 
ly many  separate  qualities,  clear  from  the  lower 
limit  of  audibility  (pitch)  to  the  highest  tone 
which  can  become  focal  in  consciousness. 
These  two  extremes  are  called,  respectively,  the 
lower  and  upper  thresholds  of  pitch.  The  au- 
dible range  extends  from  about  12  to  40,000 
vibrations  per  second,  but  the  recognized  musi- 
cal scale  is  between  40  and  8,000  vibrations 
only.  The  letter  "s,"  which  occurs  so  frequent- 
ly in  language,  is  almost  at  the  upper  limit  of 
hearing,  as  can  be  made  manifest  by  compari- 
son with  notes  on  a  Gallon  whistle.  There  is 
also  another  very  important  threshold  in  sound, 
and  that  is  the  duration  threshold.  Any  note, 
to  be  heard  distinctly  in  its  physical  pitch,  must 
be  represented  by  at  least  two  vibrations  before 
it  has  value  in  the  diatonic  scale.  Otherwise  it 
will  not  set  into  operation  the  mechanism  of 
the  ear  sufficiently  to  arouse  a  tone  sensation 
rather  than  one  of  noise.  For  noises  are  crowds 
of  still-born  tones. 

81.  The  function  of  hearing  is  partly  ac- 
complished by  a  mechanical  apparatus  of  the 
following  kind.  The  outer  ear,  or  concha  and 
external  meatus,  are  together  a  funnel  for  re- 
receiving  sound.  They  together  form  an  unob- 
structed opening  into  the  head,  the  external 
176 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
meatus  ending  at  the  tympanum,  or  drum.  This 
drum  is  a  tough  membrane  of  fibres  radiating 
from  the  center,  and  performs  an  adaptive 
function  as  well  as  its  function  in  hearing.  It  is 
likewise  protective,  especially  in  its  collabora- 
tion with  the  action  of  the  Eustachian  tube,  for 
we  prevent  rupture  of  the  ear  drum  by  keeping 
our  mouth  open  in  the  presence  of  sharp  explo- 
sions, thus  equalizing  the  pressure  of  the  air 
on  both  sides  of  the  drum.  By  means  of  at- 
taching a  very  small  convex  mirror  to  the  tym- 
panum and  observing  the  play  of  reflected  beams 
of  light  cast  on  the  surface  of  the  mirror,  ob- 
servers have  been  able  to  detect  with  sureness 
just  what  part  the  tympanum  plays  in  the  hear- 
ing of  certain  sounds.  The  tensor  tympani, — 
a  small  muscle  attached  to  the  hammer  bone, 
which  acts  torsionally  upon  the  tympanum, — 
is  observed  to  contract  with  the  increasing  in- 
tensity of  the  tone.  This  function  does  not  op- 
erate in  connection  with  pitch,  except  insofar 
as  the  highest  tones  are  intrinsically  intense, 
as  noted  above.  At  a  sharp  sound  there  is  in- 
stant contraction  of  the  membrane,  barring  of 
course  the  latency  required  for  such  adjust- 
ment. After  the  drum  is  "set"  for  a  certain 
intensity,  it  vibrates  as  a  whole  sympathetical- 
ly to  the  number  of  vibrations  in  the  generating 
177 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
body,  and  even  vibrates  in  partials  when  the 
overtones  of  the  stimulus  note  are  relatively 
strong.  We  speak  here  particularly  of  notes  in 
the  middle  register  of  the  musical  scale.  Not 
only  does  the  drum  vibrate  pro  tanto  with  the 
stimulus,  but  the  small  bones  in  the  ear  do  like- 
wise; for  clear  to  the  oval  window  the  separate 
vibrations  can  be  traced  along  the  bony  chain, 
which  has  been  especially  studied  in  the  vibra- 
tions of  the  stapes  when  the  tympanum  is  en- 
tirely absent.  The  general  function  of  the  or- 
gans of  the  middle  ear  is  to  vibrate  freely  as  a 
whole  to  moderately  low  and  mildly  intense 
sounds.  But  the  higher  in  pitch  and  the  greater 
in  intensity  the  sounds  become,  the  tighter  be- 
come all  the  loose  parts  in  the  external  and 
middle  ears.  Thus  the  function  of  hearing 
some  things  is  partly  accomplished  without  ref- 
erence to  anything  but  a  mechanical  apparatus, 
insofar  as  the  transfer  of  sound  vibrations  half- 
way into  the  organ  is  concerned.  Nevertheless, 
the  one-to-one  correlation  above  indicated  is 
but  brief  in  the  series  of  sounds,  and  the  disor- 
ganization of  our  expectancy  begins  even  at  the 
tympanum.  For  here  vibrations  of  a  relative- 
ly great  amplitude  and  slight  strength  are 
turned  into  ones  of  smaller  amplitude  and 
greater  strength.  Furthermore,  the  tympanum, 
178 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
when  stretched,  becomes  a  functioner  of  entire 
energy  rather  than  pitch,  for  the  amplitude  of 
its  vibrations  in  this  case  is  very  much  de- 
creased; while  if  the  tensor  tympani  is  cut,  the 
vibrations  of  the  hammer  head  are  considerably 
increased.  These  two  additional  items  must 
also  be  noted :  first,  that  if  a  sound  is  led  to  but 
one  ear,  the  other  ear  functions  it  by  conduction 
through  the  bones  of  the  head  and  the  Eustach- 
ian tubes,  and  second,  that  persons  who  lack 
the  ossicles,  still  hear  very  high  and  very  low 
tones. 

82.  Before  taking  up  the  interesting  mass  of 
material  in  audition  which  better  concerns  the 
psychologist  than  most  of  the  discussions  about 
what  becomes  of  the  vibrations  after  they  are 
prodded  into  the  oval  window  by  the  foot  of 
the  stapes,  we  had  better  outline  in  brief  the 
general  nature  of  neural  functions  in  regard  to 
periodicities  in  general.  For  the  concept  of 
periodicity  includes  not  only  such  things  as  air- 
vibrations,  but  also  such  things  as  roughness, 
smoothness  and  a  few  other  phenomena  in  the 
dermal  modalities.  We  saw  in  connection  with 
the  senses  hitherto  considered,  that  if  one  be- 
came frightened  as  to  how  in  the  world  the 
qualities  of  sensation  managed  to  get  into  con- 
sciousness, there  was  nothing  to  do  but  to  in- 
179 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
voke  the  general  mysteries  of  nature,  or  necro- 
mantically  squeeze  the  nervous  system  until 
something  like  a  reality  oozed  out.  With  hear- 
ing, as  in  the  other  senses,  we  shall  not  have 
any  need  to  waste  wonder  over  how  the  vibra- 
tions get  heard:  vibrations  do  not  get  heard, — 
they  get  counted.  Vibrations  are  not  all  there 
is  to  tones,  noises  or  voices:  the  vibrations  are 
the  part  of  these  phenomena  which  are  open 
to  the  investigations  of  physics.  The  part  not 
specifically  physical,  but  specifically  psycholog- 
ical—(and  call  it  psychological  and  nothing  else, 
if  the  grumbling  spirit  moves  you) — consists  of 
things  we  call  tones  or  other  qualitative  audi- 
tory phenomena,  which,  insofar  as  they  are  cor- 
related by  the  physicist,  are  said  to  be  dependent 
upon  vibrations;  but  which,  as  apprehended  by 
the  psychologist,  are  something  else  than  this. 
Besides,  it  is  not  up  to  the  psychologist  to  tell 
how  he  hears,  but  literally  only  what  he  hears. 
As  for  the  physiologist,  he  may  clip  his  tensor  if 
he  wishes,  but  if  he  does,  it  is  no  gauntlet 
thrown  down  to  the  physicist  or  the  psycholog- 
ist: it  is  his  own  boomerang.  The  central  fact 
of  psychological  data  is  the  principle  of  order, 
— what  I  have  elsewhere  called  series, — and  it 
has  been  shown  that  the  attributes  of  sensation 
are  series  for  the  most  part  of  no  temporal  or 
180 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
spacial  character.  The  name  in  physics  for 
these  series  or  orders  is  periodicity  of  vibra- 
tions, while  the  physiological  name  for  them 
is  electro-chemical  waves  of  neural  discharge  or 
release.  However  this  does  not  make  the  nar- 
row strip  of  territory  between  physics  and 
physiology  called  Psychology  a  petty  and  in- 
digent principality  doing  homage  forever  to  its 
aggrandizing  neighbor  kingdoms.  For  only  a 
few  even  of  the  mathematical  sciences  can 
claim  to  be  based  upon  series  which  have  a  full 
quota  of  members.  In  physics,  in  chemistry, 
in  physiology  as  well  as  in  psychology,  there  are 
many  series  which  cannot  muster  all  the  terms 
inferred  from  their  point  of  origin  and  their 
subsequent  development.  Nevertheless,  in  this 
connection  the  point  to  be  made  is  that  not  all 
things  are  physical  nor  chemical,  nor  yet  "men- 
tal," but  whatever  partial  orders  there  are  in 
these  and  the  other  sciences,  they  frequently 
exhibit  the  phenomena  of  the  common  part. 
Here  it  is  that  many  curious  things  often  hap- 
pen in  science  on  account  of  the  hasty  desire 
of  theorists  to  rigidly  apply  throughout  a 
science  a  principle  that  is  exhibited  only  a  little 
ways  in  the  data  they  have  honestly  observed. 
83.  Thus  the  only  reputable  theories  of 
hearing,  of  sight,  of  emotion  and  any  other  phe- 
181 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
nomena  are  bare  enumerations  of  the  facts  ar- 
ranged according  to  whatever  principles  of  or- 
der are  manifest.  As  is  the  case  with  other 
sciences,  the  data  of  psychology  define  their 
own  dimension,  and  as  observed  before,  neces- 
sitate the  use  of  a  system  of  terms  in  need  of 
no  apology  in  the  presence  of  the  other  sciences. 
If,  then,  one  asks  how  hearing  is  functioned, 
the  answer  is  that  the  orders  or  series  of  audible 
things  are  partly  correlated  with  physical  vibra- 
tions, partly  with  neural  periodicities,  which 
are  not  vibrations  of  the  nerves  at  all,  but  waves 
of  neural  release  corresponding  to  the  period- 
icity of  the  impacts  of  the  stimulus.  The  con- 
nection is  functional;  whether  there  be  identity 
now  and  then  is  neither  a  case  for  exultation 
nor  alarm.  Within  the  ear,  then,  we  have  seen 
that  the  organs  in  the  air-filled  spaces  of  it  have 
a  definite  functional  as  well  as  mechanical  re- 
lation to  the  sounding  stimulus;  but  in  the 
liquid  chambers  of  that  organ,  the  case  has  not 
been  altogether  facetiously  called  "a  watery  cor- 
relation between  hearing  and  hammering";  for 
the  action  of  the  basilar  membrance  with  its 
"harp  of  a  thousand  strings"  is  itself  the  definer 
of  a  new  order  of  relations  between  stimulus 
and  content.  For  this  membrane,  directly  an 
element  in  the  neural  tissue,  translates  the  phys- 
182 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
ical  impacts  into  neural  releases  of  such  a  char- 
acter that  the  content  of  consciousness  is  iden- 
tical with  the  qualitative  character  of  the 
sounding  and  vibrating  stimulus.  The  sound 
may  be  in  the  head,  by  virtue  of  bone  or  even 
air  and  nerve  conduction,  but  it  does  not  origin- 
ate in  the  head,  nor  is  it  hurled  from  the  brain 
as  a  sort  of  by-product.  The  sound  may  be  in 
the  head,  in  the  ear,— in  fact  anywhere  you 
please,— but  it  is  IN  whatever  is  stimulus  as  well 
as  content  of  consciousness.  For  the  conscious 
cross-section  includes  the  knowledges  of  every- 
thing, whether  it  be  the  introspection  upon  our 
poor  relations,  or  our  observations  of  and  in- 
cluding the  librations  of  the  moon. 

84.  To  give  exactly  the  relation  between 
tones,  noises  and  vowels  (voices),  I  shall  cite 
the  unusually  significant  and  clean  experimen- 
tation of  Jaensch.  He  placed  a  selenium  cell 
in  the  circuit  of  a  telephone  which  was  illum- 
inated by  an  arc  lamp  whose  light  was  varied  in 
its  continuity  and  steadiness  by  the  revolutions 
of  an  obstructing  disc.  This  disc,  moreover, 
was  so  cut  about  its  edge  that  the  variations  in 
the  length  of  its  radius  corresponded  with  the 
variations  in  height  of  any  sound  form-curve. 
By  means  of  this  apparatus  he  demonstrated 
that  (a)  a  constant  rate  of  vibration  produces 
183 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
a  tone  (e.  g.  mean  variation  of  zero),  (b)  the 
same  average  rate  of  vibration  produces  a  vow- 
el-like sound  if  the  mean  variation  from  the 
average  is  still  small,  but  (c)  with  the  further 
increase  of  the  mean  variation  the  sound,  after 
passing  into  the  vowel  character,  passes  again 
out  of  it,  until,  with  the  mean  variation  being 
very  great,  nothing  but  noise  is  produced.  Thus 
he  showed  that  the  average  rates  of  vibration  of 
the  letter  sounds,  m,  ii,  o,  a,  e,  i,  s  and  ch  are 
very  nearly  octaves  of  each  other  in  an  ascending 
series.  But  this  octave  connection  is  not  in- 
clusive of  the  fact  that  the  vowels  are  neces- 
sarily to  be  identified  with  certain  tones,  even 
if  the  prolongation  of  a  vowel  at  a  steady  pitch 
always  necessitates  its  being  based  upon  some 
note  in  the  musical  scale.  Thus  vowels  are 
something  of  tones  and  something  of  noises, 
though  no  octave  connection  exists  between 
noises.  Noises  can  be  produced  with  striking 
resemblance  to  the  musical  scale,  by  the  drop- 
ping of  sticks  of  uneven  length  upon  a  flat  sur- 
face. Orchestra  players  know  very  well  that 
the  "attack"  required  in  sforzando  passages  is 
an  actual  noise.  The  relation  between  these 
three  sorts  of  auditory  qualities  can  be  further 
elaborated  by  saying  that  with  the  increase  of 
variation  in  the  number  of  vibrations  per  sec- 
184 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
ond,  there  is  a  corresponding  decrease  in  the 
definiteness  of  the  pitch.  But  this  scheme  is 
best  at  about  1000  vibrations  per  second,  for  it 
waxes  as  one  ascends  or  descends  the  pitch 
series,  ceasing  altogether  at  both  32  and  32,000 
vibrations. 

85.  The  physical  analysis  of  sound  waves 
shows  two  main  patterns  of  vibration:  periodic 
and  non-periodic.  A  periodic  wave  is  one  in 
which  the  same  movements  are  repeated,  how- 
ever complex,  during  equal  periods  of  time, 
however  long.  A  non-periodic  wave  is  wholly 
devoid  of  regularity.  The  periodic  waves  are 
subdivided  into  two  lesser  classes,  pendular  and 
non-pendular,  these  terms  referring  to  the  sim- 
plicity of  their  form.  Thus  the  pendular  waves 
represent  pure  tones,  such  as  are  produced  by 
bottles  and  tuning  forks,  the  form  of  the  wave 
being  a  sine  curve;  while  the  non-pendular 
represent  such  tones  as  are  produced  on  musical 
instruments,  being  accompanied  by  a  series  of 
overtones  or  partials.  Voices  and  noises  thus 
are  composed  of  non-periodic  sound  waves,  dif- 
fering in  their  percentage  of  regular  interrup- 
tions as  indicated  previously. 

86.  Every  contained  volume  of  air  as  well 
as  every  more  or  less  regularly  (or  orderly) 
shaped  physical  object,  whether  solid  or  hol- 

185 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
low,  has  its  own  specific  rate  of  vibration, 
which  can  be  aroused  not  only  by  mechanical 
impacts,  but  by  the  surrounding  air  being 
thrown  into  suitable  vibration.  The  vibrations 
which  act  thus  as  a  stimulus,  however,  need  not 
be  the  same  in  number  as  that  of  the  sounding 
body  of  air  or  wood,  for  example,  but  must  be 
related  to  it  according  to  the  laws  of  overtones 
with  whose  series  it  has  a  common  part.  We 
shall  illustrate  this  in  the  following  manner. 
When  the  low  C  string  of  a  Cello  is  vigorously 
struck,  not  only  is  that  particular  tone  sound- 
ing, but  a  great  number  of  harmonic  tones,  gen- 
erated by  its  automatic  division  into  halves, 
thirds,  fourths,  fifths,  sixths,  etc.,  in  which  case 
the  tone  of  the  string  may  be  compared  to  the 
base  of  a  veritable  pyramid  of  sound,  the  har- 
monics being  fainter  the  higher  they  are  in 
pitch.  They  all  appear  simultaneously,  of 
course,  their  number  and  intensity  being  part- 
ly dependent  upon  the  intensity  with  which  the 
ground-tone  is  struck,  though  a  few  of  them  are 
implicit  in  the  fact  of  their  being  any  ground- 
tone  at  all.  If  the  low  tone  be  C,  its  first  over- 
tone, being  generated  by  the  string  vibrating 
in  halves,  will  be  a  note  of  the  same  name,  but 
its  pitch  will  be  an  octave  above  the  generating 
tone;  the  second  one  will  be  G,  one  fifth  above 
186 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
the  first,  being  generated  by  the  string  vibrating 
in  thirds,  and  so,  as  in  the  table  following: 


Amount    of    string 

Tones  and  Over- 

Name  of  Note 

vibrating  to 

tones 

produce  it 

Ground    tone 

c 

Entire  string 

First   overtone 

c 

half 

Second 

g 

third 

Third 

c 

fourth 

Fourth 

e' 

fifth 

Fifth 

s' 

etc. 

Sixth 

b'  flat* 

Seventh 

c" 

Eighth 

d" 

Ninth 

e" 

Tenth 

t" sharp* 

Eleventh 

S" 

Twelfth 

a'"* 

Thirteenth 

b'"  flat* 

Fourteenth 

b"  "  natural 

Fifteenth 

c 

Now  mark  well  this  sign  (*)  in  the  above 
scheme.  For  where  it  occurs  it  means  that  the 
notes  so  designated  are  all  too  flat  to  be  used 
in  the  diatonic  scale,  even  though  they  were 
generated  out  of  "pure  nature"  and  represent 
the  natural  development  of  overtones  from  a 
low,  generating  string.  Even  a  Stradivarius  or 
Guarnerius  Cello  will  fail  to  produce  anything 
more  available  for  music  than  these,  which  sim- 
ply means  that  the  "natural"  order  of  tones  as 
above  developed  is  but  one  of  the  tone-orders, 
coincident  at  some  points  with  the  order  of 
presentable  music,  but  diverging  from  it  at 
many  others.  In  other  words,  we  use  only  cer- 
tain special  tones  of  the  "natural"  note  series 
in  the  chromatic  scale,  discarding  those  which 
would  clash  with  some  of  the  harmonic  tones 
generated  from  certain  other  ground-tones. 
187 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
For  when  we  want  an  f-sharp  that  will  give 
keenness  to  the  tonality  G, — as  the  note  b-nat- 
ural  does  to  the  tonality  C, — we  do  not  select 
nature's  f-sharp  as  derived  from  C,  (as  in  the 
above  scheme),  but  we  derive  it  from  a  ground- 
tone  D,  in  which  case  it  will  be  generated  as 
the  fourth  overtone  of  that  series.  And  not 
only  is  the  whole  keyboard  scale  of  the  piano 
made  in  this  careful,  searching  manner,  but 
even  then,  the  various  scales  are  tempered  to 
each  other,  so  that  transitions  from  one  key  to 
another  will  be  possible  enharmonically. 
That  is  we  employ  the  note  midway  between  G 
and  A,  for  instance,  as  either  G-sharp  or  A-flat, 
depending  upon  the  tonality  about  to  be  en- 
tered or  passed  through.  This  account  may 
briefly  suffice  to  give  a  hint  as  to  the  intricate 
nature  of  the  series  of  tones,  whether  due  to 
pendular  or  non-pendular  vibrations.  The 
point  to  be  made  in  passing  is,  that  just  as  the 
lowest  string  of  the  Cello  arouses  its  popula- 
tion of  overtones,  so  will  any  sounding  body 
tend  to  throw  into  vibrations  any  other  body 
within  effective  range,  whose  natural  rate  of 
vibration  is  the  same  as  its  fundamental  or  the 
same  as  one  of  its  partials.  But  we  shall  meet 
with  a  corollary  to  this  law  in  connection  with 
difference  tones, 

188 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
85.  Strictly  psychological  is  the  matter  of 
tonal  intensity.  Two  notes,  equally  intense, 
when  played  together,  will  not  produce  a  re- 
sultant of  double  the  intensity.  If  one  asks 
whether  it  is  3/4,  4/5,  or  any  other  fraction  of 
it,  no  answer  can  be  given.  It  is  not  less,  to  be 
sure,  nor  is  it  twice  as  much,  but  as  hinted  at 
before,  the  intensity  series  rarely  consists  of 
anything  but  primes.  We  met  with  much  the 
same  situation  in  connection  with  the  dermal 
senses.  The  eccentric  reference  of  a  local- 
sign  as  exhibited  there  is  paralleled  in  one  of 
our  responses  to  notes  which  are  near  the  low- 
er limit  of  audible  pitch.  If  the  note  30  vibra- 
tions be  produced  on  the  Ebbinghaus  acoustical 
apparatus,  and  carefully  attended  to,  it  will  ap- 
pear to  have  a  recognizable  pitch,  and  be  heard 
in  its  proper  place  in  the  series.  Now  let  the 
note  of  60  vibrations  be  sounded,  noticed,  and 
followed  by  the  previous  lower  tone,  and  the 
observer  will  detect  that  the  lower  note  was 
formerly  heard  too  high,  thus  indicating  that 
the  straight,  linear  series  of  tones  in  physics, 
became  curved  at  its  end  to  the  unaided  ear,  so 
that  almost  any  note  between  25  and  32  vibra- 
tions per  second  would  have  appeared  of  the 
same  pitch.  Here  then  would  be  a  case  of  un- 
changing sensory  content  with  changing  stimuli, 
189 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
a  thing  not  so  very  different,  so  far  as  series 
are  concerned,  from  the  phenomenon  of  various 
means  producing  the   tickle   sensation,   or  the 
sense  of  pain. 

86.  We  have  mentioned  so  far  three  thres- 
holds of  pitch.  There  is  now  a  fourth  to  be 
considered  in  connection  with  the  phenomena 
of  fusion,  summation,  contrast  and  the  like. 
This  is  the  threshold  of  pitch  difference,  and 
it  has  been  just  treated  in  one  of  its  aspects  in 
the  previous  paragraph.  Pitch  differences  are 
determinable  both  by  a  simultaneous  and  a 
successive  presentation  of  the  sources  of  sound. 
In  physics,  they  are  settled  by  recourse  to 
graphic  and  other  methods,  but  in  psychology 
they  are  referred  to  the  ears,  for  it  is  by  them 
alone  that  we  gain  criteria  for  the  use  of  tones 
in  the  realm  of  art.  To  come  closer  to  the 
point,  a  pedantic  physicist  would  hold  up  his 
hands  in  horror  at  the  use  of  certain  tonal  arid 
harmonic  effects  in  an  orchestral  symphony. 
Nevertheless,  the  physics  of  sound  does  not 
include  the  element  of  the  esthetically  satisfac- 
tory character  of  the  resolution  of  a  dissonance. 
However,  the  series  of  objects  which  have 
standing  in  psychology  are  just  as  empirical 
as  those  in  any  other  science,  as  the  reader  who 
has  followed  me  is  well  assured.  An  orchestra 
190 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
or  chorus  frequently  inhibits  many  a   serious 
tonal  error  by  the  dynamic  qualities  produced 
by  its  ensemble. 

87.  The  physicist  is  acquainted  with  inhibi- 
tions in  the  action  of  interference  tubes.  An- 
other kind  of  inhibition  is  found  in  the  phe- 
nomenon of  beats.  Beats  are  a  function  of 
the  difference  in  the  vibration  rates  of  tones 
simultaneously  sounding.  If  we  have  two 
sources  of  sound,  one  of  which  vibrates  100 
and  the  other  102  times  per  second,  there  will 
be  2  beats  per  second.  Which  is  to  say  that 
twice  each  second  the  two  wave  systems  will 
coincide  and  produce  a  maximum  sound  (mu- 
tual reinforcement),  and  twice  they  w^ll  be 
half  a  wave  length  apart,  and  then  the  sound 
will  all  but  disappear.  Now  physically,  we 
might  expect  there  would  be  as  many  audible 
beats  of  the  same  character  as  the  numerical 
difference  between  the  vibration  rates  of  the 
notes  simultaneously  sounding  to  produce  them. 
However,  a  significant  divergence  at  once  ap- 
pears in  the  qualitative  aspect  of  the  increasing 
difference  between  the  generating  tones.  For 
there  are  four  well-marked  qualitative  stages 
in  beats,  which  are  a  psychological  series  rather 
than  a  physical  one,  whereby  it  is  again  seen 
that  various  kinds  of  quantities  and  intensities 
191 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
may  be  co-present  in  any  conscious  content. 
Between  two  notes  from  one  to  six  or  seven 
vibrations  apart,  the  beats  have  a  well-marked 
"swell";  when  the  vibration  difference  is  be- 
tween eight  and  twenty,  a  "sudden  rise,  pointed- 
ness  or  thrust"  is  manifest;  at  a  difference  of 
twenty  to  thirty,  a  rattling  effect  is  produced; 
while  the  roughness  that  characterizes  a  dif- 
ference of  about  forty  vibrations  disappears 
entirely  at  some  fifty  vibrations  per  second 
between  them.  What  then  appears  is  con- 
sonance, rather  than  dissonance,  and  we  have 
fusion  in  the  result  as  opposed  to  the  previous 
effect.  Again,  if  we  keep  increasing  the  dis- 
tance between  the  two  tones,  some  roughness 
constantly  appears  until  another  musical  in- 
terval is  reached,  and  so  on,  as  far  up  the  scale 
within  an  octave  as  we  care  to  go.  Thus  the 
musical  intervals  might  be  considered  in  one 
aspect  as  primes  in  the  beat-series,  for  no 
graphical  record  of  them  would  give  a  hint 
as  to  the  places  where  fusions  of  consonance 
pop  up  as  it  proceeds.  Of  psychological  inter- 
est, again,  is  the  differing  qualitative  and  quan- 
titative character  of  the  fusion  value  of  the 
various  intervals  generated  by  the  beat  series. 
This  is  evidenced  by  the  fact  that  the  musical 
intervals  which  in  linear  series  are  the  unison, 
192 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
second,  third,  fourth,  fifth,  and  so  on  are  not 
better  and  better  fusions  in  this  order,  but  in 
another  one  entirely, — this  again  not  deducible 
from  the  physical  aspect  of  tones.  Let  me  indi- 
cate in  a  table  the  relations  between  the  two 
series. 

I.  Order  of  appearance  II.  Order    of   fusion    of 
of    intervals    in    the         the  same  intervals: 
beat  series: 


Minor  second 
Major  second 
Minor  third 
Major  third 
Fourth 

Augmented  fourth 
Fifth 

Minor  sixth 
Augmented  fifth 
Major  sixth 
Natural  seventh 
Major  seventh 
Octave 


Octave 
Fifth 
Fourth 
Major  third 
Major  sixth 
Natural  Seventh 
Minor  third 
Minor  sixth 
Augmented  Fourth 
Augmented  fifth 
Major  seventh 
Major  second 
Minor  second 


The  second  column  above  is  a  trifle  individual, 
but  even  then  it  represents  the  matter  fairly. 
The  series  of  fusions  thus  given  appears  once 
more  to  form  quite  an  independent  series,  a 
series  which  may  be  exactly  termed  the  second 
derivative  of  beats,  but  which  again  in  a  strik- 
193 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
ing  manner  harks  back  to  physics  in  this  way, 
— that  these  intervals  are  the  same  as  those 
derived  from  the  harmonic  notes  of  the  "nat- 
m-al"  vibrations  of  strings.  The  simpler  the 
ratios  of  the  above  intervals,  furthermore,  the 
sooner  they  appear  in  the  natm-al  system  of 
overtones. 

88.  But  yet  another  set  of  empirical  data 
is  to  be  presented.  Beats  produced  between 
two  very  high  notes,  say  about  1,000  vibrations 
per  second,  show  only  one  stage  of  the  above 
four  qualities:  they  chirp  rather  than  rattle  or 
roughen.  Again,  the  two  lowest  strings  of  the 
Cello  when  sounded  together  in  the  seemingly 
consonant  interval  of  the  fifth,  produce  beats; 
just  as  any  two  low  notes,  no  matter  how  con- 
sonant, (barring  the  octave  and  unison),  lack 
the  smooth  character  of  the  same  intervals  in 
the  middle  register  of  the  scale.  Beats  can  also 
be  produced  by  two  dissonant  tones  when  each 
is  led  through  a  tube  to  either  ear,  even  when 
the  separate  tones  are  inaudible.  This  phe- 
nomenon is  due  to  the  action  of  the  bony  ap- 
paratus of  the  middle  ear,  and  is  termed  "bi- 
naural beats".  Substantially  the  same  phe- 
nomenon is  met  with  in  many  other  modalities 
besides  sound,  but  oftener  as  a  fusion-resultant 
than  as  a  case  of  inhibition.  There  is  at  pres- 
194 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 

ent  some  inclination  among  students  of  tone 
to  consider  pitch  as  equivalent  to  local-sign, 
and  to  regard  the  musical  intervals  in  the  same 
way  as  the  fusion  of  two  touches  or  colds  upon 
the  skin  surface.  Accordingly,  if  only  a  few 
beats  per  second  were  present,  there  would  be 
an  intermediate  locus  for  the  beat-tone  of  three 
or  four  vibrations  per  second,  but  insofar  as 
the  musical  scale  is  concerned,  its  "position" 
would  be  assimilated  by  one  of  the  generating 
notes.  Following  this,  the  concept  of  tones  as 
a  linear  series  would  have  to  include  the  attrib- 
ute of  bi-dimensionality.  Hints  as  to  the  prob- 
able correctness  of  this  view  will  appear  in 
the  general  treatment  of  the  psychological 
nature  of  the  scale,  soon  to  follow.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  beats  are  heard  as  "fluctuations  of  a 
single  tone,  whose  pitch  is  indistinguishable 
from  that  of  the  generators".  Upon  increasing 
the  difference  between  them,  the  number  of 
beats  actually  functions  a  tone  quality,  recog- 
nized as  an  intermediate  tone,  "which  at  first 
lies  near  the  lower  generator,  and  gradually 
rises  in  pitch  until  it  approaches  the  upper", 
granting  the  ever-widening  distance  between 
the  two  generators.  At  the  point  where  the 
beats  become  rough,  however,  the  tonality  of 


195 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
the   intermediate   tone   which   carries   them  is 
lost,  and  we  hear  only  its  noisy  aspect. 

89.  Another  singular  datum  is  the  differ- 
ence-tone. When  two  notes  in  the  medium  or 
upper  register  thirty  or  more  vibrations  apart 
are  sounding  together,  there  will  be  heard  an 
entirely  new  tone,  very  deep  in  pitch,  of  as 
many  vibrations  as  the  arithmetical  difference 
between  those  of  the  generators.  This  might 
well  be  called  the  undertone,  in  distinction  to 
the  overtones  previously  described.  Under  fa- 
vorable conditions,  also,  as  many  as  four  or 
five  of  these  undertones  can  be  produced,  whose 
pitches  coincide  with  the  following  scheme. 

Let  a  be  the  vibration  rate  of  the  upper 
generating  tone,  and  /  be  the  vibration  rate  of 
the  lower,  and  Dl,  D2,  D3,  D4,  D5  be  the  sym- 
bols for  the  various  undertones,  then  Dl=  u  —I, 
D2  =  2/  —  u,  D3  =  3/—  2u,  D4  =  4/  —  3li,  and 
D5  =  4iz,  —  5/,  etc. 

The  final  important  tonal  phenomenon  to  be 
mentioned  is  the  interruption  tone,  which  has 
strong  alliances  with  the  item  of  beats.  The 
number  of  times  a  tone  is  interrupted,  as  espe- 
cially evidenced  on  the  siren, — but  not  the  siren 
that  deceived  Ulysses, — becomes  the  vibration 
rate  of  a  new  tone,  whose  difference  from  noise 
is  significantly  correlated  with  the  periodicity 
196 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
of  the  interruptions.  The  tone  interrupted  may 
also  combine  with  the  interruption  tone  in  two 
ways;  either  as  a  summation  efitect,  evidenced 
by  a  note  of  the  combined  pitches,  or  by  making 
a  difference  tone,  in  the  manner  Jillustrated 
above.  In  the  case  of  both  difference  tones  and 
sunmiation  tones,  it  is  to  be  kept  in  mind  that 
they  are  often  generated  within  the  ear,  and 
localized  furthermore  within  the  head,  at  a 
point  midway  between  the  two  tympani.  This 
corresponds  to  the  eccentric  reference  men- 
tioned in  connection  with  the  protopathic  sys- 
tem of  the  touch  organs.  By  the  use  of  resona- 
tors, however,  some  of  them  can  be  made  the 
subject  matter  of  physics  as  well  as  of  psy- 
chology. 

90.  The  musical  scale  presents  an  impor- 
tant problem  in  psychology,  independent  of 
the  mechanical  system  which  produces  it.  Two 
tones  in  unison  and  two  tones  an  octave  apart 
are  more  fused  than  any  of  the  intermediate 
intervals  of  the  scale.  It  has  been  previously 
shown  that  both  beats  and  musical  intervals 
are  produced  by  steadily  increasing  the  differ- 
ence between  two  generating  tones;  but  what 
the  nature  of  the  scale,  as  a  case  of  order  with- 
out exclusive  regard  for  physics  is,  has  not  been 

settled.     The  intervals  of  the  scale,  as  fusions, 
197 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
are  not  in  the  same  series  as  they  are  in  the 
series  of  increasing  pitch  differences,  for  the 
interval  of  the  fifth,  for  example,  which  is  mid- 
way in  this  latter  series,  occupies  the  second 
place  in  the  fusion  series,  and  the  second  and 
seventh,  as  musical  intervals,  both  lie  at  the 
upper  end  of  the  series  of  fusions.     The  other 
intervals,  likewise,  are  dispersed  in  the  transi- 
tion from  physics  to  psychology.     They  are  of 
course,  both  in  the  conscious  cross-section,  in- 
asmuch as  we  know  their  separate  character- 
istics, indeed,  almost  better  than  we  can  speak 
it  out.     But  physical  instruments  of  measure- 
ment, in  addition  to  being  detachable  sense  or- 
gans, respond  usually  by  means  of  the  efferent 
nerve  of  a   different  sense  than  the  one  they 
were  constructed  to  be  an   adjunct  to.     Espe- 
cially is  this  so  in   the  case  of  sound,  where 
the  best  we  can  get  from  physics  is  a  graphical 
record  and  not  an  improved  psychological  ear. 
So  that  when  one  asks  what  the  scale  and  the 
fusion  intervals  constitute  as  an  organized  sys- 
tem for  psychology,  he  must  consider  all  the 
data  investigated,  and  find  his  ultimate  order 
in  what  we  are  as  psychologists  often  led  to 
call    our   favorite   interpretations   of   the    facts. 
At  the  same   time  in  strict  logic  we   discover 
that  they  are  often  those  principles  from  which 
198 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
all  the  data  originate,  whether  they  be  the  stuft" 
of  physics  or  of  any  other  realm  of  investiga- 
tion. Let  us  then  consider  the  grounds  for 
regarding  the  scale  as  something  other  than  a 
simple,  linear  series  in  but  one  dimension.  The 
pitch  rises,  to  be  sure,  and  as  it  does  so,  the 
scale  ascends  to  the  octave  of  the  original  note. 
Yet  in  so  doing,  it  ends,  from  the  standpoint  of 
fusion,  where  it  began,  or  at  least  nearer  to 
that  position  than  at  any  other  in  the  physical 
order.  Schematically,  then,  it  loops  back  to  a 
point  on  the  perpendicular  erected  upon  the 
starting  point,  but  in  the  transition,  it  extends 
farther  from  the  perpendicular  at  the  interval 
of  the  second  and  seventh,  than  it  does  at  the 
fourth  and  fifth,  making  also  other  curious 
twists  and  returns  before  the  whole  gamut  is 
passed  through. 

91.  It  is  not  my  intention  to  state  any  solu- 
tion for  this  intricate  problem,  but  only  to  show 
why  it  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  serious  one. 
There  are  other  orders  than  the  rational,  other 
dimensions  than  those  handed  down  as  a  leg- 
acy from  Euclid,  and  the  fusion  order  of  the 
musical  intervals  does  not  perplex  any  one  who 
understands  the  havoc  time  plays  with  deduc- 
tion, as  already  illustrated  at  every  place  where 
opportunity  afforded.  Some  problems  are 
199 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
solved  by  sheer  brute  force,  others  by  the  appli- 
cation of  analogies,  and  still  others  by  being 
dropped.  Expectancy  is  not  the  cue  to  the  cor- 
rectness of  an  answer,  and  in  regard  to  this 
question  of  the  "rationality"  of  the  fusion  in- 
tervals of  the  scale,  it  can  be  readily  shown  why 
the  order  of  preferences  takes  precedence  over 
the  order  of  vibration  ratios  and  their  geometri- 
cal relations  to  each  other.  This  is  the  evidence : 

(1)  To  determine  the  fusion  values  of  the 
various  intervals,  one  must  ask  for  preferential 
judgments  from  musical  subjects. 

(2)  Likewise,  one  must  ask  unmusical  sub- 
jects whether  they  hear  one  or  two  notes  in  the 
interval,  and  how  clearly  they  hear  them:  fu- 
sion being  a  case  of  partial  inhibition. 

(3)  Judgments  of  the  amount  of  fusion  are 
within  the  realm  of  "psychological  quantity", 
— a  series,  by  the  way,  which  is  as  likely  to 
contain  all  primes  as  it  is  to  contain  other 
integers  of  an  ordinal  relationship. 

(4)  While  the  intervals  of  the  octave,  fifth, 
fourth,  third,  and  the  like  are  correlated  with 
the  mathematical  ratios  of  1/2,  2/3,  3/4,  4/5, 
3/5,  5/6,  5/8,  and  so  on,  and  while  the  geomet- 
rical ratios  between  them  may  be  exactly 
specified,  the  simplicity  of  these  ratios  does  not 
compare  with   the  simplicity  of  the  conscious 

200 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
content  produced  by  them.  Besides,  no  constant 
geometrical  ratio  exists  between  the  ratios  of 
these  intervals,  unless  they  are  arranged  in  a 
series  conflicting  with  them  as  a  series  of  pref- 
erences. Even  then  it  is  poor.  1/2  is  3/4  of  2/3, 
2/3  is  8/9  of  3/4,  3/4  is  15/16  of  4/5,— so  far  very 
well;  but  nothing  whatever  can  be  done  with 
such  ratios  except  to  lay  hold  of  their  simplicity 
as  an  evidence  that  fusion  has  evident  mathe- 
matical correlates.  But  this  is  saying  nothing 
more  than  that  correlative  simplicities  are 
found  between  physics  and  psychology.  This 
is  good  news,  to  be  sure,  yet  it  requires  nothing 
beyond  psychology  to  tell  us  that  a  fusion  is  a 
psychological  simplicity.  Search  for  all  other 
information  is  quite  unnecessary,  and  the  in- 
sistence that  physics  and  psychology  should  co- 
incide at  every  point  is  but  a  symptom  of 
fatuous  hankering  after  causes.  The  fusion 
series  is,  whatever  else  it  may  be,  psychological, 
and  as  such  exhibits  the  independent  status  of 
some  of  the  data  of  psychology.  That  it  is  em- 
pirical, and  open  to  any  investigator  who  cares 
to  inspect  it,  goes  without  saying.  For  be  it 
well  remembered  that  nothing  was  ever  taken 
out  of  the  public  universe  by  its  being  called 
"mental",  the  mental  for  all  practical  purposes 
being  only  the  "not  yet  mentioned".  And  some- 
201 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
thing  specific  has  been  said  on  a  previous  page 
in   regard   to   unformulated   statements,   which 
does  not  need  repetition  here. 

92.  It  will  be  sufficient,  in  the  brief  space 
yet  to  be  devoted  to  sound,  to  indicate  only  a 
few  cases  in  which  the  attributes  of  sensation 
particularly  apply  to  this  modality  in  a  way 
not  evidenced  in  the  other  sense  fields.  The 
strictly  qualitive  character  of  intensity  has  been 
shown  in  connection  with  intervals,  and  it  as 
well  applies  to  chords  of  three  or  more  notes. 
The  latency  of  sound  is  very  short,  muscular 
reactions  to  auditory  stimuli  being  the  quickest 
of  the  sensori-motor  releases.  Sounds  made  on 
musical  instruments  with  many  and  strong 
overtones  have  a  roominess  (extensity)  greater 
than  that  of  the  sounds  produced  by  such  in- 
struments as  the  flute,  which  is  weak  in  over- 
tones. Duration  and  after-image  concern  us 
in  the  question  of  the  discrimination  of  pitch 
differences.  If  two  tones  are  successively  given 
to  us  to  distinguish  as  to  pitch,  the  interval  be- 
tween their  presentation,  the  length  of  presenta- 
tion, and  the  character  of  the  after-image  will 
all  determine  whether  by  a  good  ear  they  shall 
be  judged  to  be  the  same  or  different.  Ordi- 
narily, 64.0  vibrations  is  in  this  way  just  dis- 
tinguishable from  64.15  vibrations  per  second; 
202 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
and  2048.0  from  2048.36  vibrations.     In  an  ex- 
periment performed  by  Dr.  H.  T.  Moore  in  The 
Harvard  Psychological  Laboratory  on  Conson- 
ance and  Dissonance,  it  was  shown  that  after 
listening   to    the    prolongation    of   two    tones   a 
dissonant   interval   apart,   the    two    generating 
tones  became  inaudible  after  four  or  five  min- 
utes,— nothing    being    heard    thereafter    except 
the  rattling  of  the  intertone  localized  within  the 
ears.     This  illustrates  the  attribute  of  exhaus- 
tion.   Adaptation  is  too  well  known,  as  in  cases 
of  the   street  cars  and    city    clocks,    to    need 
further  comment.     In  symphonic  music  is  ex- 
hibited  to   a   striking   degree   many   phases   of 
the   phenomena   of  fusion,  contrast  and  clear- 
ness.    Vividness  is  well  illustrated  in  the  case 
of    the    exceedingly    low    degree    of    intensity 
required  to  elevate   the   bel  canto  passages  of 
music  into  focality.     Fusions  furnish  a  hint  as 
to  one  function  of  consciousness  underlying  the 
feeling-tone  of  sounds,  while  the  pleasantness 
or  unpleasantness  of  human  voices  are  directly 
referable  to  the  status  of  their  owners  in  the 
social  self.    Local  sign  will  be  especially  treated 
in   the   sections   on   space   perception.      In    this 
connection,   also,   the   vestibular  organs   of   the 
ear  will  be  functionally  related  to  the  responses 
of  orientation. 

203 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
Questions  on  Audition. 

1.  State  briefly,  and  in  the  order  of  their 
importance,  the  significant  diff"erences  between 
the  physics  and  the  psychology  of  sound. 

2.  Which  of  the  attributes  of  sensation 
appear  first  in  a  melody  (succession  of  single 
notes),  as  contrasted  with  those  appearing  in 
a  harmonized  melody  (two — ,  three — ,  or  four- 
part  combination  of  tones)  ? 

Vision. 
93.  The  gross  structure  of  the  eye  can  easily 
be  demonstrated  by  means  of  models,  charts, 
and  by  the  dissecting  of  a  specimen.  Structure 
need  concern  us  only  in  its  connection  wdth 
function,  to  which  we  at  once  turn.  It  will  be 
sufficient  at  the  start  to  indicate  merely  the 
course  of  a  beam  of  light  upon  entering  the 
eye  and  its  various  effects  upon  that  organ. 
The  cornea  is  of  interest  chiefly  in  cases  where 
it  is  misshapen, — in  astigmatism, — that  has  to 
be  corrected  by  the  use  of  eyeglasses  which, 
according  to  the  laws  of  optics,  make  up  for 
its  lack  of  regularity.  Behind  the  cornea  is 
the  aqueous  humour,  and  behind  that  is  the 
iris,  which  acts  as  an  accommodation  apparatus, 
functioning  the  intensity  of  light.  It  thus  en- 
larges or  reduces  the  size  of  its  aperture  accord- 
ing to  the  diminution  or  increase  of  intensity, 
204 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
unless  inhibited  from  doing  so  by  drugs.  Its 
latency  is  long,  as  everyone  has  experienced 
when  going  suddenly  from  a  sunny  room  to  a 
dark  one,  and  vice  versa.  The  lens,  which  lies 
behind  the  iris,  possesses  a  unique  accommoda- 
tion apparatus,  likewise,  and  functions  the 
distance  of  the  stimulus.  Muscles  at  its  edge 
pull  it  flat  or  push  it  into  a  thickened  form, 
with  somewhat  less  latency  than  occurs  in  the 
iris  reflex.  However,  loss  of  the  lens  through 
an  operation  for  cataract  does  not  preclude 
the  possibility  of  vision,  for  a  certain  correctly- 
made  artificial  eye-glass  lens  will  restore  the 
visual  function  nearly  to  its  normal.  In  the 
case  of  wearing  such  an  adjustable  sense  organ 
in  front  of  the  eye,  it  is  ditficult  to  draw  the 
line  between  the  physiological  and  the  physical, 
functionally  construed.  Similarly,  in  the  use 
of  tele-,  micro-,  stereo-,  and  pseudo-scopes,  the 
eye  does  not  end  at  the  cornea,  inasmuch  as 
the  conscious  content  we  obtain  by  the  use  of 
these  instruments  is  functioned  for  by  the  com- 
plex of  eye-instrument,  and  not  by  the  use  of 
the  eye  alone.  The  function  of  the  lens  of  the 
eye  is  the  same  as  that  of  any  bi-convex  lens, 
and  by  means  of  it  the  rays  of  light  entering 
the  eye  are  projected  toward  the  retina.  If  the 
eye-ball  is  too  long,  and  the  incoming  rays  of 
205 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 

light  do  not  reach  the  retina,  a  concave  lens  is 
used  in  eye-glasses  to  remedy  this  defect,  known 
as  near-sightedness;  if  the  eye-ball  is  too  short, 
as  in  far-sightedness,  the  rays  focus  behind  the 
retina,  and  a  convex  lens  is  used  instead.  In 
either  case,  as  before,  the  functioning  eye  is 
constituted  out  of  all  that  goes  to  make  up  the 
vision  apparatus  in  or  about  the  head. 

94.  According  to  the  laws  of  physiological 
optics,  the  stimulus  for  vision  is  the  image  of 
the  object  on  the  retina.  But  this  is  not  a  fair 
statement  of  the  case  in  psychology.  The  stim- 
ulus for  vision  is  the  object  which  one  sees, 
whether  it  be  something  one  can  also  touch,  or 
whether  it  be  some  impalpable  object  in  a 
dream  or  an  hallucination.  Of  these  stimuli 
for  vision,  there  are  two:  colors  and  shapes, 
which,  as  has  been  mentioned  before,  may  be 
anywhere.  By  color  I  mean  anything  one  sees 
which  is  not  a  shape,  thus  including  those  con- 
tents called  grays,  whites  and  blacks,  as  well 
as  the  usual  spectrum  effects.  Insofar  as  the 
image  on  the  retina  is  concerned,  it  is  in  and 
of  the  object,  just  as  is  the  wave-length  of  solar 
light:  just  as  we  hear  tones  rather  than  vibra- 
tions, so  we  see  colors  rather  than  the  numeri- 
cal status  of  their  wave  lengths.  In  the  same 
manner  we  smell  smells,  which  may  be  mem- 
206 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
bers  of  the  III,  IV,  and  V  groups  in  chemistry 
as  well,  and  we  feel  cold  and  warmth  without 
first    determining    their    position    on    the    ther- 
mometer scale.    In  pain,  the  distinction  between 
stimulus  and  content  is  even  more  strikingly 
made.     The   history   of   experimentation    upon 
vision  is  murky  with  the    conclusions    which 
have  been  drawn  from  half-baked  tests  upon 
the  action  of  the  eye, — cases  of  the  experimenter 
knowing  everything  that  was  going  on,  and  of 
the   subject  being  interpreted   as   having  only 
that  knowledge  which  the  experimenter  chose 
to   favor  him   with.     Bishop   George   Berkeley 
showed  that  we  never  see  depth,  but  this  was 
only  another  case  of  the  "unthinkable  having 
been   carefully   thought   out".     By    flashing    a 
pencil  of  light  into  the  eye  at  an  oblique  angle, 
Purkinje  showed  that  one  could  see  his  own 
optical   blood   vessels   out  in   space,   for  what 
reason  and  with  what  conclusions  heaven  only 
knows;  while  a  certain  Le  Cat  demonstrated, 
by  means  of  a  card  and  a  pin  held  up  before 
the  eye  inside  of  the  focal  distance  that  every- 
thing we  see  is  upside  down!     From  all  these 
and  similar  tricks  of  opticians  one  needs  to  be 
emphatically  warned.     We  may  not  see  depth, 
but  we  perceive  that  some  things  are  nearer  or 
farther  than  are  others;  and  groans  need  never 
207 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
arise  from  the  fact  that  the  retinal  image  is 
inverted.  The  retinal  image  is  not  a  datum  in 
the  psychology  of  vision,  nor  do  we  ever  see 
or  feel  it.  Furthermore,  objects  are  seen  right 
side  up,  indeed  just  as  they  are,  for  the  psy- 
chological status  of  the  retina  is  one  of  func- 
tional dependence,  and  psysiological  optics 
holds  mortgages  on  nothing  in  the  eye  except 
the  bare  physical  aspect  of  the  watery  media, 
the  cornea,  and  the  lens.  We  saw,  in  connec- 
tion with  sound,  that  certain  series  had  com- 
mon parts  in  physics  and  psychology,  while 
certain  others  did  not  at  all.  In  vision,  how- 
ever, we  shall  see  that  color  sensations  are  even 
less  tangential  to  the  series  of  physical  de- 
terminations than  was  true  in  the  case  of 
auditory  qualities.  What  else  can  it  be  than  a 
downright  subtraction  from  fact  to  palm  off  on 
science  a  single  insignificant  phenomenon  for 
the  whole  cross-section  of  vision,  and  to  insist 
that  the  parts  which  make  up  a  whole  in  physics 
are  the  only  kind  of  parts  with  which  men  of 
empirical  minds  can  have  anything  to  do? 

95.  To  cite  another  as  well  as  a  last  case 
of  artifact  in  vision,  the  images  of  objects  fall- 
ing upon  the  retina  are  said  by  some  to  proceed 
to  the  brain,  thence  to  be  "projected"  outward 
into  the  air  into  or  on  top  of  the  object  of  sen- 
208 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
sation  in  order  that  vision  may  be  accomplished. 
This  is  not  only  absurd,  but  more  than  that,  it 
is  a  contravention  of  the  entire  data  involved. 
In  the  first  place,  the  "image"  never  gets  into 
the  brain,  no  more  than  does  the  object  which 
functions  by  it:  the  very  last  place  where  ob- 
jects  sequester  is   the   clammy   inside    of    the 
skull.     The  "image",  solely  an  optical  datum, 
is  scarcely  more  than  a  datum  for  the  uncon- 
scious retinal  mechanism;  it  is  not  a  content 
of  visual  consciousness, — it  is  solely  a  content 
of  inferred   consciousness  for  the   student    of 
physiological  optics.    Nothing  gets  into  the  brain 
at  all  in  vision:  the  stimulus,  or  object,  sends 
light  into  the  eye,  and  this  light  acts  adequately 
upon   the   sensitive   membrane   known   as    the 
retina,    thereby    releasing    the    neural    energy 
along     the     neural     connections     to     whatever 
cerebral  localities  the  function  of  vision  may 
have  specific  reference.     Objects  outside  of  the 
head;  releases  within  the  head, — nothing  more: 
the  periodicity  of  light  waves  and  the  periodi- 
city of  neural  releases  being  functionally  re- 
lated and  that  is  all.    The  actual  numerousness 
of  the  ether  vibrations  maij,    indeed,    be    the 
actual   numerousness   of   the   pulses   along   the 
optic  nerve,  but  that  would  never  necessarily 

209 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
make   the  optic  nerve  yellow    or    blue    while 
functioning  for  those  particular  colors. 

96.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  there  are 
two  axes  of  the  eye.  Where  the  optic  nerve 
enters  on  the  nasal  side  in  either  eye  is  the 
point  which  defines  the  origin  of  the  optical 
axis.  This  does  not  coincide,  however,  with 
the  visual  axis,  which  is  determined  by  project- 
ing a  diameter  through  the  center  of  the  cornea 
and  the  center  of  the  lens,  thereby  making  it 
strike  the  retina  farther  from  the  nasal  side 
than  the  optic  nerve  lies  in  its  circumference. 
Both  of  these  axes  are  important:  the  optical, 
for  it  defines  the  blind  spot  where  there  is  no 
functioning  for  vision;  the  visual,  for  it  defines 
the  spot  of  clearest  color  vision,  known  as 
the  fovea.  Now  the  optic  nerve,  upon  entering 
the  eye-ball,  spreads  out  in  all  directions, 
covering  the  inner  surface  of  it,  and  is 
further  formed  into  minute  terminal  organs, 
known  by  a  simile  as  the  rods  and  cones,  which 
point  not  toward  the  light,  but  directly  away 
from  it.  At  the  fovea  there  are  only  cones,  and 
at  some  distance  outwards  they  cease  entirely; 
beginning  at  the  periphery  there  are  only  rods, 
which  decrease  in  number  significantly  toward 
the  fovea,  and  ending  at  that  point.  The  cones 
function  for  color  and  the  rods  for  whites, 
210 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
blacks  and  grays,  as  well  as  for  the  shapes  of 
visible  objects.  Nocturnal  animals  have  only 
rods,  while  diurnal  animals  usually  have  both: 
it  is  thought  that  birds  and  fowls  in  general 
have  only  cones.  Nevertheless,  these  animals 
do  not  appear  to  distinguish  what  we  specifically 
sense  as  spectrum  colors.  In  human  beings, 
it  is  to  be  remembered,  there  is  a  larger  area 
covered  by  both  rods  and  cones  than  the  retinal 
space  covered  by  either  alone. 

97.  The  following  list  of  visual  sensations 
are  to  be  considered:  (a)  the  chromatic,  or 
spectrum  color  sensations,  which  are  developed 
best  by  beams  of  light  passing  through  prisms; 
(b)  the  white-black-gray  series,  or  achromatic 
sensations,  whose  relation  to  the  former  are 
yet  to  be  in  all  points  determined;  (c)  the  color 
sensations  derived  by  mixing  the  chromatic  and 
achromatic  together;  (d)  the  sensations  derived 
from  textures  such  as  pigments  produce  in  so- 
lution or  spread  out  on  surfaces;  and  (e)  the 
shape  sensations  of  objects  stimulating  the 
retina.  One  significant  thing  to  be  noted  in 
connection  with  chromatic  and  achromatic  sen- 
sations is  the  paucity  of  names  for  the  various 
reds,  greens,  and  grays  that  are  constantly 
sensed.  Another  quirk  in  terminology  comes 
with  the  determination  of  the  elements  one  can 
211 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
name  m  every  color  as  distinguishable  from 
each  other.  As  a  usual  thing,  hue  is  the  term 
which  means  the  point  in  the  spectrum  series 
we  are  referring  to  in  our  naming;  tint  or 
brightness  applies  to  the  likeness  of  the  spec- 
trum color  to  pure  white  light;  while  chroma 
is  taken  to  mean  such  things  as  "the  blueness 
of  the  blue",  and  refers  to  the  amount  of  gray 
or  black  not  at  the  time  stimulating  the  reiina. 
98.  Physicists  have  offered  correlations  for 
these  three  factors  in  color  vision.  Correlated 
with  hue  is  the  wave  length  of  the  ether  vibra- 
tions. The  longest  wave  lengths  are  at  the  red 
end  of  the  spectrum,  while  the  shortest  are  at 
the  violet  end,  the  wave  lengths  decreasing  with 
ordinal  steadiness  from  red  to  violet.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  changes  from  color  to  color  are 
not  so  steady.  For  instance,  there  is  much 
more  red  than  yellow  in  the  spectrum,  and  much 
more  violet  than  green,  as  any  casual  observer 
of  the  rainbow  must  have  remarked.  Again, 
there  are  many  more  distinguishable  yellows 
and  blue-greens  packed  into  a  small  linear 
space  than  there  are  hues  of  any  other  color. 
This  applies  for  a  constant  and  equal  spectrum 
intensity  only,  of  course,  but  the  independence 
of  the  physical  and  the  psychological  series  here 
is  nevertheless  well  marked.  Again,  even  apart 
212 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
from  the  fact  that  wave  length  is  sometimes 
correlated  with  a  difference  in  chroma,  (as 
evidenced  by  the  fact  that  the  most  naturally 
saturated  colors  are  red  and  blue,  and  the  least 
yellow  and  blue-green, — chroma  thus  being  a 
correlate  of  wave  length  as  well  as  of  wave 
form),  the  wave  length  as  it  changes  also  brings 
a  change  of  tint,  or  brightness,  yellow  being 
the  lightest  and  violet  the  darkest  color  of  the 
whole  spectrum.  According  to  a  strict  depend- 
ence upon  physics,  the  correlation  of  energy 
should  indicate  red,  rather  than  yellow  as  the 
lightest  spectrum  color,  and  blue  should  be 
much  darker  than  is  the  case.  As  a  last  case 
of  negative  correlation,  any  sufficiently  intensi- 
fied color  is  seen  as  white,  and  the  minimum 
visibile,  or  the  smallest  area  of  stimulus  pos- 
sible, is  always  seen  in  the  achromatic  series. 
Contrariwise,  any  sufficiently  enfeebled  color 
intensity  is  functioned  as  colorless, — on  the  dark 
side  of  the  white-black  series.  This  phenome- 
non applies  for  diminution  of  intensity,  also, 
as  well  as  for  the  extent  of  the  chromatic 
surface. 

99.     If  one  fixates  a  spot  of  white  on  a  gray 

background,   while   a   disc    of    some    color    is 

brought  in  from  the  periphery  to  the  center  of 

the  visual  field,  certain  changes  in  the  appear- 

213 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
ance  of  the  stimulus  will  be  noted.    It  will  first 
appear  doubtless  as  an  amorphous  gray,  then 
as  a  disc  of  some  color  allied  to  the  actual  hue, 
and  finally  as  a  clear  steady  chromatic  sensa- 
tion.    For  different  colors,  the  results  will  be 
different;  some  of  the  hues  will  be  sensed  truly 
at  first  focal  functioning,  while  others  may  pass 
through  several  curious  stages.    The  upshot  of 
such  experimentation  is  to  ally  the  extent  of 
cone-covered  retina  with  the  functioning  of  the 
colors  by  the  retinal  apparatus  in  a  very  definite 
manner.    The  retina  has  zones  of  unequal  sen- 
sitivity to  the  various  hues :  the  inner  zone  func- 
tions for  red  and  green,  the  next  outward  for 
yellow  and  blue,  while  the  farthest  zone,  toward 
the  periphery,  sees  everything  as  a   series   of 
light  and   dark    grays.     The    spectrum,    when 
thrown   upon   this   outermost  zone   is  likewise 
devoid  of  chromatic  character.    But  these  zones 
are  not  as  distinguishable  in  function   as  the 
above  statement  might  imply.    They  are  weak, 
rather  than  blind  to  the  colors  they  imperfectly 
function,  because  sufficient  extent  and  intensity 
of  a  stimulus  in  the  periphery  can  bring  out 
the  known   hue  perfectly  well.     In   moving  a 
patch  of  color  from  the  fovea  to  the  periphery 
of  the  field,  it  is  found  that  it  will  keep  its  color 
longer  than  when  the  stimulation  moves  in  the 
214 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
opposite  direction.  High  degrees  of  energy  and 
brief  periods  of  stimulation  are  more  effective 
than  those  of  low  energy  and  long  duration, 
which  is  a  principle  we  found  illustrated  in 
certain  phenomena  of  dermal  sensitivity  as  well. 
But  this  correlation  of  intensity  with  threshold 
of  clear  color  vision  does  not  necessarily  mean 
intensity  as  the  physicist  construes  it,  for  the 
intensities  one  meets  with  in  psychology  were 
seen  earlier  in  the  discussion  of  sensation  to 
be  other  than  of  a  numerical  status, — the  in- 
tensity as  well  as  the  extensity  of  sensation 
being  in  a  prime  series.  Vision  offers  full  sup- 
port to  such  a  scheme  of  empirical  classification. 

100.  Among  the  numerous  thresholds  met 
with  in  vision,  the  following  will  suffice  as  a 
sample  of  their  nature.  The  minimum  visibile 
is  a  threshold,  just  as  is  the  maximum  visibile, 
or  the  largest  patch  of  color  or  visual  stimulus 
which  can  be  seen  at  one  time.  These  two 
thresholds  would  define  one  sort  of  series, — the 
bi-dimensional  space  series.  Another  threshold 
is  the  color  zone  threshold  for  each  and  all  of 
the  colors.  The  threshold  of  color  identity,  of 
identity  in  tint  between  any  number  of  chro- 
matic or  achromatic  sensations,  of  the  greatest 
differences  in  saturation,  or  the  least;  the 
threshold  of  shape  discrimination  in  the  peri- 
215 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
phery  of  the  eye,  and  similar  phenomena  are 
samples  of  the  extent  to  which  this  attribute 
can  be  applied.  Any  terminus  ad  qiiem,  how- 
ever defined,  could  without  fancy  be  called  by 
the  same  term  name, 

101.  Now  while  the  spectrum  appears  as  a 
straight  band  of  hues,  psychologically  it  cannot 
be  regarded  as  such,  since  various  properties 
of  color  forbid  such  a  looseness  in  terminology. 
In  the  first  place,  for  every  spectrum  color,  or 
hue,  there  is  another  spectrum  color,  which,  if 
mixed  with  it,  will  produce  an  achromatic  sen- 
sation. Thus  red  and  blue-green,  yellow  and 
blue,  and  the  like,  when  mixed  together,  neutral- 
ize each  other.  But  hue,  or  spectral  series 
reference  is  lacking  in  the  resulting  conscious 
content.  Schematically,  therefore,  we  shall  have 
to  regard  the  spectrum  as  some  sort  of  a  closed 
series,  possibly  ovoid  rather  than  circular.  The 
trans-sensational  infra-red  and  ultra-violet  se- 
ries need  not  be  as  "long"  series  as  that  of  the 
visible  hues,  for  since  the  spectrum  is  a  dis- 
persion phenomenon,  apparent  distances  in  the 
spread  of  the  dispersed  light  may  be  but  one 
of  the  natural  series,  and  not  by  any  means 
the  fundamental  one.  There  is  no  need,  on  the 
other  hand,  of  insisting  that  the  logic  of  color, 
—the  principle  of  color  clarification, — be  lim- 
216 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
ited  to  the  ordinary  concept  of  two  or  three 
dimensions.  The  properties  of  color  mixture, 
color  contrast,  after-images,  and  the  like  point 
not  to  a  fundamental  principle  which  maintains 
the  naive  naming  of  colors  as  the  ultimate  basis 
of  their  existence. 

102.  Before  stating  that  principle  as  it 
should  be  formulated,  let  us  examine  the  phe- 
nomena which  make  it  both  necessary  and  in 
line  with  induction.  As  to  color  mixture,  not 
only  will  certain  pairs  of  spectrum  colors  pro- 
duce a  gray,  but  two  colors  out  of  such  gray- 
producing  position  in  the  spectrum  series  will 
produce  a  hue  dependent  upon  the  relative 
amounts  and  intensities  of  the  two  colors,  with 
a  variation  in  saturation  or  chroma  from  the 
originals  due  to  their  nearness  or  remoteness 
in  the  color  series.  Here  one  must  keep  in  mind 
the  facts  of  intrinsic  intensity  and  saturation 
of  the  spectrum  colors  as  outlined  previously. 
Again,  the  double  mixing  of  pairs  of  colors  fol- 
lows the  same  laws.  Two  gray-producing  colors 
will,  if  mixed  with  two  other  gray-producing 
colors,  produce  a  third  gray  whose  tint  is  usually 
the  arithmetical  mean  of  the  two  combinations. 
In  the  same  manner,  red  and  yellow,  which  give 
or  are  that  hue  we  call  orange,  will,  if  mixed 
with  a  green-violet  blend  giving  a  blue  of  low 
217 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
saturation,  produce  a  purplish  gray.  The  formu- 
lation of  the  laws  of  color  mixture  is  easy  within 
certain  limits.     For  example,  the  first  law  can 

be  stated:  C= ,  in  which  gray(G)  is  derived 

c 

from  any  two  complimentary  colors,  repre- 
sented by  C  and  c  respectively, — complimentary 
referring  to  position  in  the  spectrum  series.  The 
second  law  can  be  stated  in  a  formula  as  fol- 
lows: 

w.l.Ci  +  W.I.C2  (  Ci 


C.C,= 


2 

which  reads:  the  mixture  of  any  two  non-com- 
plimentary colors  (Cj.Co)  will  give  a  third  color 
whose  wave  length  (w.  1.)  is  intermediate  be- 
tween the  first  two;  in  which  combination, 
furthermore,  the  hue  of  one  color  (C^)  will 
predominate  over  that  of  the  other  (C,)  in 
proportion  as  its  intensity  and  quantity  (i,  q) 
are  greater.  The  third  law  of  color  mixture 
may  be  symbolically  stated  by  the  use  of  the 
expression, 

103.  Now,  so  far  as  psychology  is  concerned, 
identical  contents,  such  as  result  from  fusion 
(color  mixture),   are   expressed   in    the    same 


218 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
terms, — that  is,  by  expressions  of  identity.  Many 
stimuli  are  painful,  and  many  combinations 
give  gray.  And  while  psychological  simplicity 
is  never  to  be  confused  with  logical  simplicity, 
yet  the  "new"  things  in  psychology  are  just  as 
much  terms  in  science  as  are  the  physical  terms 
of  the  stimulus.  For  we  saw  that  the  fusion 
intervals  in  music  were  a  series,  just  as  were 
the  vibration  differences  which  produced  them. 
Psychological  simplicity,  or  naivete,  must  be 
sharply  distinguished  from  the  perception  of 
prime  relations  between  non-physical  proper- 
ties; all  we  urge  is  that  the  chronogenetic  order 
be  not  taken  for  the  logical  one  without  suffi- 
cient warrant.  As  it  is,  the  two  may  sometimes 
coincide,  but  the  point  is  that  their  coincidence 
has  importance  only  after  inspection  rather  than 
before  it. 

104.  Color  mixing  is  not  only  possible  with 
lights,  but  with  the  use  of  rotating  discs,  con- 
taining various  sizes  of  sectors  of  pigment  colors 
spread  out  on  various  textures.  If  such  a  disc 
is  fixated,  while  revolving,  various  phenomena 
will  be  observed.  Suppose  the  disc  to  be  equally 
divided  between  two  colors,  say  yellow  and 
blue,  to  the  right  and  left  of  the  vertical  respec- 
tively. One  vertical  half  of  the  retina  will  then 
be  blue-stimulated,  the  other  half  will  be  yel- 
219 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
low-stimulated.  Upon  rotation  of  the  disc,  that 
half  of  the  retina  formerly  stimulated  hy  the 
blue  will  first  be  gradually  and  then  completely 
stimulated  by  the  yellow  half  of  the  disc,  and 
so  on, — the  alternations  of  stimulation  compar- 
ing with  the  spacial  relations  of  the  two  rotat- 
ing colors.  The  colors  are  thus  retinally  mixed. 
However,  a  certain  rate  of  rotation  is  required 
before  complete  fusion  occurs.  At  a  low  speed 
only  a  flickering  impression  will  be  produced, 
which  phenomenon  is  actually  not  one  of  hue 
as  such,  but  of  tint  or  brightness, — the  speed 
required  to  abolish  flicker  being  greater  with 
the  brighter  colors.  The  "likeness  to  white" 
of  the  rotating  colors  is  thus  actually  seen  as 
a  partially  isolated  element.  When  fusion  is 
finally  accomplished  by  the  above  means,  it  is 
due  to  the  fact  of  positive  retinal  after-images, 
for  if  the  blue  sensation  had  lasted  no  longer 
than  the  blue  stimulation,  a  gray  resultant 
would  never  have  been  produced.  Part  of  the 
stimulus  lags  behind  the  temporal  duration  of 
visual  presentation,  thus  making  one  of  the 
terms  in  color  mixture  which  is  independent 
of  the  physical  nature  of  the  stimulus.  In  mov- 
ing pictures  and  fireworks  the  same  phenome- 
non of  after-images  is  to  be  observed.  The  fol- 
lowing special  aspect  of  flicker  is  also  note- 
220 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
worthy.  Before  the  threshold  of  fusion  is 
reached,  two  kinds  of  flicker  are  observable, 
— coarse  and  fine;  and  the  brightness  of  the 
coarse  flicker  is  even  greater  than  that  of  the 
resulting,  fused  sensation.  Besides,  upon  let- 
ting the  impression  of  the  rotating  disc  fall  upon 
the  periphery  of  the  eye  instead  of  directly  upon 
the  fovea,  the  number  of  rotations  of  the  disc 
per  second  required  to  abolish  the  flicker  is 
considerably  greater.  The  function  of  the  rods 
of  the  retina  has  been  previously  shown  to 
account  for  this.  If,  now,  one  compares  color 
fusions  with  tonal  fusions,  he  will  see  a  differ- 
ence between  them  on  the  side  of  physical 
quantity.  For  upon  steadily  increasing  the  dis- 
tance between  two  tones,  after  fusion  is  ob- 
tained, the  consonance  is  at  once  exchanged 
for  dissonance,  after  which,  consonance  once 
more  appears,  then  dissonance,  and  so  on  in 
alternation.  Whereas,  after  color  fusion  is  ob- 
tained on  a  color  wheel,  no  increase  in  the 
rotation  rate  will  make  any  alteration  in  the 
character  of  the  fusion  so  produced.  Indeed 
most  analogies  of  physical  quantity  have  but 
slight  value  in  psychology. 

105.     Fixation  of  a  color  does  not  always 
result  similarly.    We  never  adapt  to  the  noon- 
day sun,  on  account  of  its  intensity,  but  are 
221 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
always  exhausted  by  it.  Besides,  such  fixation 
results  in  the  provocation  of  negative  after- 
images of  long  duration,  the  number  of  them 
which  simultaneously  occur  being  dependent 
upon  eye  movements  which  partially  rest  one 
part  of  the  retina,  only  to  be  followed  by  the 
reappearance  of  the  partially  inhibited  sensa- 
tion through  irradiation  and  sympathetic  induc- 
tion from  neighboring,  over-stimulated  areas. 
For  the  retina  is  so  sensitive  that  such  a  strong 
stimulation  as  naked  sunlight  becomes  almost 
an  inadequate  stimulus,  as  is  evidenced  by  the 
inability  to  make  out  the  sun's  form  directly 
after  the  first  instant  of  fixation  upon  it.  The 
combination  of  intensity  and  extensity  here 
passes  one  of  the  upper  thresholds  of  visual 
sensation.  Fixation  of  milder  colors  than  the 
most  intense,  causes  adaptation,  by  which  we 
mean  that  every  color  in  the  middle  range  tends 
toward  neutrality, — that  is,  grayness.  But  the 
color  does  not  become  grayer,  any  more  than 
red  ever  becomes  yellow:  for  all  colors  are  a 
combination  of  hue,  tint  and  chroma,  and  "fad- 
ing out"  or  "becoming  yellow"  is  the  naive  name 
for  the  fact  that  either  the  total  sensation  is 
altered  by  exchanges  of  identity,  or  that  some 
physical  essential  property  got  called  by  the 
name  of  a  psychological  inessential.  Never- 
222 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
theless,  through  adaptation,  the  color  of  blue 
or  brown  spectacles  becomes  less  than  focally 
conscious,  and  wall  paper  not  faded  by  the  sun 
looks  less  bright  or  colorful  after  a  while  than 
it  did  at  first.  The  fixation  of  a  colored  field 
until  it  fades  (incorrect  expression!)  followed 
by  the  fixation  of  a  gray  field,  is  accompanied 
by  the  negative  after-image.  But  this  is  no 
enigma,  as  we  shall  presently  see. 

106.  For  when  the  eye  fixates  a  colored 
field,  and  the  after-image  replaces  the  stimulus, 
both  conscious  contents  are  identical  in  some 
constituent  element.  The  hues  interchange,  it 
is  true,  but  the  brightness  or  saturation  remains 
constant.  Color  sensations  thus  oscillate  about 
some  identity  in  their  component  parts  or  at- 
tributes. The  color  blind  person,  who  asserts 
that  my  red  books  are  of  the  same  color  as  my 
green  ones,  asserts  for  tint,  perhaps,  what  I 
assert  for  that  complex  known  as  hue-tint,  or 
even  hue-tint-chroma.  We  saw  that  the  laws 
of  color  mixture  indicated  the  gray  relation  be- 
tween complimentary  colors,  and  that  the  tint 
and  chroma  of  colors  are  stated  in  terms  of  the 
gray-white-black  series  of  sensations,  which 
terms  strictly  apply  to  the  fusion  of  colors  into 
their  neutral  components.  Similarly  the  laws 
of  the  mixture  of  non-complimentary  colors 
223 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
laid  their  main  emphasis  upon  hue  as  modified 
by  tint  and  chroma,  specifying  the  intrinsically 
intense  effect  of  the  contributing  elements.  Now, 
whatever  color  may  be,  the  hues  as  qualities 
refer  also  to  positions  in  the  spectrum  series; 
which,  as  evidenced  by  its  various  phenomena, 
is  neither  linear,  nor  spacial,  nor  anchored  irre- 
vocably to  quantity.  Mixing  non-complimentary 
colors  toward  the  red  end  of  the  spectrum  series 
showed  a  numerical  resultant  that  was  half  of 
that  of  the  other  two  colors;  while  the  mixing 
of  red  and  black,  for  example,  does  not  give 
a  wave  length  one  can  find  in  physics  in  the 
same  way.  Bare  numerical  values  give  small 
aid  here.  The  colors,  called  by  simple  names, 
— "experienced"  if  you  please  as  undefinable 
states  of  consciousness, — hold  an  altogether  dif- 
ferent relation  to  each  other  than  either  the 
physicist  or  the  introspective  psychologist  have 
yet  been  able  to  discover.  I  propose  to  give 
that  relationship  as  well  as  possible,  in  the 
brevity  of  space  here  available. 

107.  The  intensity,  or  brightness  of  a  color 
is  its  one  essential  attribute.  Hue  is  incidental. 
This  intensity  is  its  psychological  intensity, 
(correlated  with  its  wave  length  or  amplitude, 
outside  of  the  realm  of  psychology  as  far  as  one 
pleases),  and  moreover  not  predicated  of  it 
224 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
before  we  see  the  color,  but  afterwards.  It  is 
a  variable  corrolary  and  not  axiomatic.  The 
yellow  and  blue  which  give  gray,  give  the  gray 
w^hich  results  on  account  of  the  fact  that  inhibi- 
tory conditions  between  the  hues  abolish  them, 
leaving  the  intensities  to  be  algebraically  sum- 
med into  the  resultant.  Fundamentally,  then, 
the  spectrum  is  a  logico-psychological  artifact: 
its  linear  extent  is  in  no  wise  indicative  of  the 

essential  nature  of  color.     The  formula  C= 

c 

points  to  the  systematization  of  the  various 
colors  as  schematically  represented  by  a  right 
triangle,  whose  hypothenuse  is  analogical  with 
the  result  of  mixtures.  Schematically  only, 
however,  for  there  is  nothing  linear  about  color, 
nor  spacial  either,  except  as  the  shape  series 
and  the  color  series  have  compatible  relations 
in  tri-dimensional  space.  With  eyes  closed,  we 
see  a  mean  gray  which  is  distinguished  only  in 
point  of  brightness, — the  fundamental  color 
attribute.  Now  that  gray  which  we  thus  see 
may  be  equalled  by  any  two  complimentary 
colors,  just  as  it  may  be  equalled  by  a  mixture 
of  white  and  black.  The  hues  are  positions  in 
the  spectrum  series,  it  is  true,  but  their  posi- 
tions are  of  no  importance  to  the  visual  situa- 
tion. The  correlating  of  wave  length,  wave 
225 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 

amplitude,  and  wave  form  with  the  properties 
of  color  is  always  done  with  more  or  less 
apology,  and  we  may  regard  the  physical  vibra- 
tions and  forms  as  quite  incidental:  the  various 
series  coincide  only  with  the  mathematics 
strapped  for  consistency.  Certainly  a  rather 
tottering  basis  for  color,  this  numerical  fiction; 
and  it  is  not  for  psychology  to  put  on  a  straight- 
jacket  to  mollify  this  incompatibility.  Let  the 
two  series  be  as  incompatible  as  they  will: 
apparent  homogeneousness  is  the  basis  for 
naivete, — not  for  logical  treatments  of  data.  And 
yet  the  question  will  doubtless  be  asked,  "are 
not  the  four  so-called  psychologically  simple 
colors,  red,  yellow,  green,  and  blue,  more  funda- 
mental than  the  attribute  of  intensity"?  These 
four  colors  look  to  be  unanalysable,  while,  or- 
ange, violet  and  the  like,  are  certainly  com- 
pounds, or  at  least  can  be  compounded  out  of 
the  others,  whereas  no  such  thing  is  possible 
with  these  four.  But,  if  compounding  is  to  be 
made  the  criterion,  all  compounding  ends  with 
the  gray  series, — gray  being  the  terminus  ad 
quern  of  intensity,  adaptation,  mixture  and 
other  color  phenomena.  Why  stop  with  com- 
pounding at  an  irrational  point?  To  the  painter, 
the  primary  colors  are  red,  yellow,  and  blue, 
pigments  relegating  green  to  a  basis  of  mixture. 
226 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
To  the  physicist,  the  primary  colors  are  red, 
green,  and  blue-violet,  yellow  being  a  resultant 
of  admixing  the  others.    While  for  the  physio- 
logist,  the   primary   colors   are   whatever   few 
colors  can  act  as  equilibrants  upon  the  retinal 
apparatus,  insofar  as  the  color  zones  of  the  eye 
are  concerned.     Surely  that  cannot  be  unlim- 
itedly  primary  which  in  this  and  that  field  of 
fact  changes  its  status  so  readily.     Sciences  are 
fields  of  functions  as  well  as  fields  of  interests, 
and  if  a  fact  is  public  property,  it  cannot  vanish 
into    subsidiary    importance    upon    being    ap- 
proached merely  from  a  different  angle.     Now 
red,  or  one  of  the  reds  of  the  spectrum  and 
"something  bluish",   are    the   only   two   colors 
that  retain  their  primacy  throughout  the  above 
lists  of  simple  colors;  but  the  basis  for  this  is 
choice    among    a    multitude    rather    than    an 
attempt  to  get  behind  the  spectrum  as  an  ulti- 
mate series.    That  only  a  few  of  the  colors  are 
requisite  for  mixings  by  which  the  others  may 
be  obtained,  is  doubtless  exactly  the  case;  but 
here  again  psychological  simplicity  has  gotten 
the   upper  hand.     Red   and   green   equilibrate 
about  gray,   and   yellow   and  blue   equilibrate 
about  gray  also,  while  all  the  other  selections 
of  primary  hues  have  been  made  for  the  sake 
of  finding  the  fewest  spectrum  positions  which 
227 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
will  in  summation  satisfy  all  the  requirements 
of  color.  Gray  being  that  about  which  all  these 
terms  of  color  oscillate,  the  logical  primacy  of 
this  intensity  is  in  need  of  no  more  defending 
at  present. 

108.  Color  contrast  exhibits  certain  inter- 
esting derivatives  of  the  fundamental  attribute 
of  intensity.  There  are  also  two  kinds  of  color 
contrast, — simultaneous  and  successive, — in 
which  the  temporal  and  spacial  elements  per- 
form their  usual  unique  functions.  When  a 
complimentary  color  is  induced  during  steady 
fixation,  we  have  a  case  of  simultaneous  con- 
trast. When,  again,  the  after-effect  is  con- 
nected with  the  fixation  of  a  brighter  or  darker 
surface  than  the  surface  of  fixation,  the  induced 
or  equilibrating  color  will  depend  for  its  inten- 
sity upon  the  elements  of  the  background.  Often 
simultaneous  induction  occurs, — that  is,  the  re- 
turn of  the  original  brightness  and  hue  during 
fixation.  Successive  contrast  is  shown  in  cases 
of  fixation  followed  by  eye  movements,  in  which 
case  the  complimentary  hue  and  brightness  is 
induced  in  the  after-image.  Contrast  is  due  to 
the  mutual  interaction  of  neighboring  retinal 
areas  and  is  a  differentiating  process.  Adapta- 
tion, on  the  other  hand,  is  a  function  of  dura- 
tion and  acts  as  a  leveling  process.  The  gen- 
228 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
eral  laws  of  color  contrast  are  as  follows :  Con- 
trast varies  with  the  degree  of  antagonism,  and 
with  the  nearness  of  the  juxtaposed  colored  sur- 
faces or  lights;  it  is  enhanced  hy  the  elimina- 
tion of  contours  or  boundary  lines,  is  greater 
when  there  is  no  simultaneous  light  contrast, 
and  increases  not  only  with  the  saturation  of 
the  inducing  colors,  but  also  with  equal  tex- 
tures, as  well  as  with  very  simple  patterns. 
However,  prolonged  experimentation  and  use  of 
large  fields  of  comparison,  both  reduce  the  con- 
trast eiiects.  There  is  therefore  both  a  time 
and  a  space  threshold  in  the  phenomenon.  This 
is  new  in  psychology,  and  is  something  like  the 
newness  of  fusion.  For  colors  that  are  con- 
trasted as  well  as  fused  produce  an  effect  not 
deducible  from  either  naive  acquaintance  and 
expectation,  nor  yet  from  a  study  of  color  effects 
not  involving  contrasts  and  memories  of  them. 

109.  Another  function  of  intensity  is  the 
Purkinje  phenomenon.  If  we  increase  the 
amplitude  of  the  light  waves  in  the  spectrum, 
gradually  the  yellow  and  the  blue,  with  a  light 
gray  between  them,  will  be  the  only  hues  vis- 
ible, while  the  orange  and  red  will  appear  yel- 
lower and  yellower,  and  the  blue  and  violet 
become  indistinguishable  from  a  bluish  green. 
But  the  whole  spectrum  shortens,  both  ends 
229 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
losing  their  stimulating  character.  On  the  other 
hand,  upon  decreasing  the  light  energy  of  the 
spectrum  we  get  another  series  of  effects.  This 
time  orange  and  yellow  drop  out  entirely,  the 
red  gets  very  dark,  while  blue  and  violet  fuse 
into  a  bluish-violet,  with  only  the  green  retain- 
ing its  place  and  hue.  Furthermore,  all  that 
now  appears  is  of  dark  tint  and  low  chroma. 
The  amount  of  physical  change  in  intensity 
necessary  to  produce  either  one  of  this  pair  of 
phenomena  is  called  the  photochromatic  in- 
terval. Besides,  it  occurs  only  to  a  dark-adapted 
eye,  that  is,  one  that  has  been  accommodated 
to  the  dark  room  in  which  the  Purkinje  phe- 
nomenon is  being  exhibited.  Neither  will  it 
appear  when  thrown  into  the  eye  on  that  col- 
ony of  cones  known  as  the  fovea.  There  being 
no  rods  at  the  fovea,  the  evidence  points  to  this 
phenomenon  as  being  functioned  by  those 
organs.  It  might  be  added  that  the  Purkinje 
phenomenon  has  the  smallest  photochromatic 
interval  at  the  extremes  of  the  periphery, — the 
permanently  dark-adapted  or  nyctalopic  part  of 
the  eye.  The  rest  of  the  retina  is  hemeralopic, 
or  normally  day-adapted, — that  is,  suited  for 
hue  and  mean  degrees  of  brightness.  Daylight 
and  twilight  vision  are  in  evidence  when  we 
come  suddenly  from  light  to  dark  rooms,  just 
230 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
as  adaptation  is  noticed  in  coming  from  the 
yellow  lighted  theatre  after  a  matinee  into  the 
sunlight,  where,  by  contrast,  everything  looks 
bluish  until  the  equilibrating  functions  of  the 
retina  have  readjusted  the  field.  The  colors  in 
hangings  and  carpets  are  often  selected  for  their 
day  and  night  effects,  and  modern  cloth  shops 
sell  by  artificial  light  such  goods  as  are  to  be 
worn   under  similar  conditions. 

110.  Evidences  point  to  the  rods  as  the 
functioners  of  daylight  and  nightlight  vision. 
And  the  specific  sine  qua  non  of  this  function- 
ing is  a  substance  in  the  rods  known  as  the 
visual  purple,  or  rhodopsis.  It  is  a  reddish 
substance,  reacting  to  intensities  of  light.  Under 
a  bright  illumination  it  becomes  first  red,  and 
then  white.  Immediately  a  pigment  in  the  rods 
creeps  up  and  covers  the  rhodopsis,  thus  throw- 
ing them  out  of  action.  When  the  light  is  dim- 
med, the  pigment  cells  retract  and  the  visual 
purple  first  yellows,  and  then  whitens.  In  the 
owl,  this  photochemical  substance  is  covered 
by  day,  while  in  the  night  it  is  uncovered.  The 
owl  having  only  rods,  his  day-blindness  is  thus 
accounted  for.  If  one  eye  be  kept  closed  while 
the  other  is  receiving  stimulations  which  affect 
its  rhodopsis,  the  same  effects  will  be  produced 
in  both  eyes  by  sympathetic  induction, — so  uni- 
231 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
fied  are  the  functions  of  both  retinae.  Inasmuch 
as  the  bleaching  is  most  quickly  accomplished 
by  green,  and  most  slowly  by  red  light,  its  con- 
nection with  the  functioning  for  intensities,  and 
especially  night  and  day  vision,  is  indisputable. 
111.  Flicker  and  rivalry  (oscillating  inhibi- 
tion) may  also  be  obtained  binocularly.  One 
eye  may  get  a  negative  after-image  of  an  object 
given  only  to  the  other.  A  black  patch  and  a 
white  patch,  binocularly  combined  in  the  stereo- 
scope frequently  produce  a  silvery  lustre,  in 
which  case  not  only  the  white  and  black,  but 
the  textures  of  the  surfaces  bearing  them  have 
to  be  considered.  Something  like  this  we  have 
previously  met  with  in  connection  with  the 
Purkinje  phenomenon, — I  mean  the  silvery  gray 
in  the  green  section  of  the  spectrum  series.  Bin- 
ocular sensation  in  this  case  is  combined  from 
right  and  left  eye  sensory  contents  separately 
brought  to  focality,  and  thus  binocular  lustre  is 
a  prime  in  this  series  of  eif  ects.  When  .flicker 
is  present  by  virtue  of  separate  stimulations 
to  the  two  eyes,  it  can  be  reduced  by  giving 
the  same  speed  in  the  revolutions  of  the  stimuli 
to  both  eyes  separately  as  would  be  required 
with  one  eye  directly.  Two  combinations  of 
flicker  separately  given  to  the  eyes  take  the 
same  speed  to  reduce  as  is  required  for  both 
232 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
eyes  together.  But  when  one  eye  gets  a  flicker 
effect,  while  the  other  eye  gets  none,  the  flicker- 
ing efiect  is  considerably  dampened  in  the  total, 
semi-fused  content  resulting  from  inter-ocular 
functioning,  even  despite  a  considerable  range 
of  brightnesses  in  the  flickerless  half  of  the 
visual  field.  Another  binocular  phenomenon  is 
found  when,  by  giving  two  difli'erent  bright- 
nesses in  the  visual  field  to  the  eyes  separately, 
a  brightness  slightly  above  the  mean  of  the 
single  sensations  is  produced.  This  ceases,  how- 
ever, when  the  original  differences  are  very 
great,  but  rises  significantly  with  dark  adapta- 
tion. It  is  absent,  again,  when  a  dark  field  is 
presented  first,  and  when  the  dark  area  is  very 
small. 

Question  on  Vision. 

1.  Arrange  the  colors  of  the  normal  spec- 
trum according  to  greatest-to-least  intensity, 
and  then  according  to  greatest-to-least  satura- 
tion. Compare  these  two  series,  singly  and  to- 
gether, with  the  "natural"  succession  of  hues 
from  red  to  violet.  How  many  points  of  iden- 
tity do  you  find  in  these  three  series?  How 
many  similar  tendencies  do  you  find?  Discuss 
fully  the  psychology  of  color  from  the  above 
standpoint. 


233 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
Perceptions,  Meanings,  and  Speech. 
112.  Perception  differs  from  sensation  in 
point  of  structure.  Sensations,  as  representing 
the  attribute-thing  relationship,  were  seen  to 
be  cross-sections  of  series  whose  terms  were 
to  a  large  degree  prime  to  each  other.  One 
might  well  have  wondered  what  could  be  de- 
duced from  their  relationships,  for  so  fre- 
quently were  they  isolated,  that  bare  enumera- 
tion seemed  the  only  introduction  and  farewell 
they  permitted.  Nevertheless,  simple  exhibi- 
tion is  all  the  scientist  owes  to  elemental  prop- 
erties, and  to  treat  as  blunt  matters  of  fact 
things  which  exist  solely  as  neutral  elements, 
is  the  only  fair  course  to  pursue  with  them. 
The  elements  of  sensation  are  not  mental,  for 
one  must  go  to  them  without  presuppositions. 
And  after  one  has  deduced  from  them  what 
seems  to  be  their  terminus  ad  quern,  he  must 
again  frankly  apply  himself  to  the  facts  in  order 
to  eliminate  the  cavalier  element  from,  his  con- 
jecturing. On  the  other  hand,  perceptions  are 
examples  of  the  part-whole  relationship,  sub- 
sisting in  a  complex  of  simultaneously  or  suc- 
cessively existing  sensations  which  have  a  defin- 
able logical  structure  or  unity.  It  now  being 
necessary  to  distinguish  between  attributes  and 
parts,  we  shall  first  say  that  for  psychology  there 
234 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
are  more  specific  properties  of  a  whole  consti- 
tuted out  of  parts,  than  there  are  specific  prop- 
erties of  a  thing  made  of  attributes.  There  is, 
indeed,  a  geometrical  increase  of  such  proper- 
tics  for  wholes  over  what  it  is  for  things.  Again, 
sensations  refer  principally  to  sensory  recep- 
tiveness  or  sensory  acuity;  while  perceptions 
refer  more  to  the  motor  element  in  conscious- 
ness,— the  multiplicity  of  possible  responses  to 
the  same  stimulus  embedded  in  different  con- 
texts. 

113.  Now  the  parts  in  a  perception  are  both 
sensations  and  relations  between  sensations.  A 
patch  of  red  is  held  up  before  my  eyes,  and 
along  with  other  reactions,  I  respond  to  the 
duration  of  the  stimulus,  whether  by  adapta- 
tion, exhaustion  or  what  not.  But  if  a  patch 
of  blue  replaces  it  and  gets  noticed  as  blue,  and 
if  my  consciousness  becomes  verbally  expressed 
by,  "  'red  and  blue'  supervenes  the  conscious- 
ness 'red' ",  with  any  additional  relational  con- 
scious content  such  as,  "two  after  one",  "one 
more",  or  "formerly  one,  now  two",  I  am  per- 
ceiving rather  than  sensing.  Or,  to  take  a  more 
familiar  example,  "that  black  thing",  or  an 
object  whose  color  quality  alone  is  being  func- 
tioned, would  be  a  sensation,  in  contrast  to 
"that  black  thing"  as  "my  black  silk  hat",  which 
235 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
would  be  a  perception.  It  is  not  a  case  of  the 
intensity  of  stimulus  that  makes  the  diflerence, 
but  of  the  relations  between  the  sensations,  and 
in  this  particular  case,  what  I  am  going  to  do 
about  the  object  stimulating  my  retinae.  It  is 
on  the  basis  of  the  "with-for"  relation  that  per- 
ceptions obtain  a  rank  as  focal,  forwarding 
elements  in  consciousness, — a  thing  sensations 
never  get.  In  sensation  the  time  element  is 
reducible  to  now,  the  space  element  to  here; 
while  in  perception  the  time  and  space  elements 
are  never  more  simply  expressed  than  by  the 
compound  expression  "here  and  now",  their 
relation  of  togetherness  being  for  perception, 
at  least,  indissoluble.  Not  that  the  attributes 
of  duration  or  extensity  in  sensation  have  to 
change  clothes  in  order  to  be  valid  in  percep- 
tion, but  only  when  duration  is  present  as  some- 
thing partly  focal  and  partly  fading  out  of 
focality,  has  the  lower  threshold  of  perception 
been  passed.  Similarly,  the  spacial  element, 
expressed  by  the  word  "here"  means  a  sensa- 
tional element,  if  everything  is  equally  "here." 
It  becomes  of  a  perceptual  status,  however,  if, 
at  the  same  time  there  is  a  "here,"  there  is  also 
another  portion  of  the  content  better  expressed 
by  the  contrasting  term  "there."  Considerable 
warning  needs  to  be  assimilated  at  this  point. 
236 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 

There  may  be  in  logic,  but  there  is  not  in  psy- 
chology' any  necessary  distinction  between 
"here"  and  "there"  when  these  terms  are  used 
isolatedly.  Do  not  say  that  consciousness  is  the 
same  as  speech,  for  it  is  not;  neither  fall  into  the 
egregious  blunder  of  verbalizing  the  item  re- 
ferred to  by  verbal  symbols.  There  is  a  logical 
consciousness,  and  there  is  also  a  verbal  or 
speaking  consciousness;  just  as  there  is  func- 
tional consciousness,  and  a  conscious  content 
logically  separable  from  it.  Sensations  are  the 
warp  and  woof  of  perceptions,  and  perceptions 
are  the  stuff  out  of  which  logic  is  made,  but 
that  does  not  allow  one  to  say  that  the  series  is 
symmetrical.  Furthermore,  the  logical  dis- 
tinctions cannot  be  applied  to  the  sensational 
sources  of  consciousness  as  focal  elements  re- 
siding oginally  in  them,  for  the  finished  pro- 
duct is  never  the  cause  of  the  materials.  Thus 
"here"  and  "now"  as  elements  in  sensation 
need  have  no  relational  status  to  what  is  not 
here  or  now.  For  "then"  and  "there"  might  never 
occur,  and  indeed,  never  do  occur,  to  one  not 
engaged  in  logical  considerations,  sensation 
being  merely  the  present,  immediate  qualitative 
and  quantitative  consciousness,  and  as  such  out 
of  relation  to  other  and  more  complicated  forms 
of  consciousness. 

237 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
114.  Space  and  time  have  had  but  slight 
consideration  up  to  this  point.  Their  relation 
to  sensation  and  perception  is  rarely  treated 
with  candor.  "How  do  we  experience  space?" 
and  "What  is  the  psychology  of  time?"  are 
questions  over  which  much  obscurity  has  been 
indulged  in.  It  is  said,  and  with  truth,  that 
the  retinal  image  of  a  square  table-top  viewed 
obliquely  is  by  no  means  square.  It  is,  in  fact, 
a  spherical  surface,  with  four  spherical  angles, 
whose  sum  is  greater  than  that  of  the  four  right 
angles  of  the  table-top  as  a  geometrical  surface. 
In  this  case,  we  are  told,  memory  is  invoked, 
and  expectation  as  well,  and  many  a  fatuous 
explanation  as  to  how  the  table-top  is  perceived 
as  square  ensues.  Likewise  in  the  case  of  time. 
A  half  hour  in  the  captivating  theatre,  as  the 
classic  example,  is  shorter  psychologically 
than  the  half  hour  spent  in  listening  to  a  ser- 
mon; and  then  we  are  slyly  asked  just  how  we 
gain  an  experience  of  time,  with  nothing  more 
to  depend  on  than  such  psychological  data. 
Now  let  us  frankly  admit  all  these  facts  as  well 
as  many  more.  A  person  blind  from  early  in- 
fancy, who,  in  later  life,  has  his  sight  restored, 
cannot  tell  the  difference  between  a  cube  and  a 
sphere  if  he  has  nothing  more  than  his  retinae 
with  which  to  function  the  object.  Also,  a 
238 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
blindfolded  subject  wlio  is  asked  to  tap  contin- 
ously  an  interval  given  only  once  or  twice  by 
auditory   stimulations,    will,   in    the   course   of 
the   tapping,  enlarge  some  intervals  and  con- 
tract some  others,  remaining  steady  and  accu- 
rate only  when  the  "indifference"  period  exists 
between  the  stimuli.     But  when  all  our  senses 
are  active,  there  is  a  geometrical  increase  of  ac- 
curacy in  space   and  time  judgments,   and  so 
when  the  question  of  dermal,  visual  or  auditory 
space  and  time  perceptions  is  up  for  discussion, 
we  always  have  to  remember  that  a  whole  has 
properties  not  implicit  in  the  properties  of  the 
parts;  and  also  that  while  visual  space, — audi- 
tory space, — and  dermal  space-perception,  when 
occuring  singly,  are  all  poor,  yet,  that  a  summa- 
tion of  space  perceptions  as  given  by  all  these 
means  together  is  far  more  accurate  than  their 
combined  effects  would  arithmetically  indicate. 
Similarly,  in  the  case  of  time.     Besides,  as  spe- 
cifically mentioned  before,  we  have  some  other 
means  whereby  to  determine  spaces  and  times 
than  by  our  naive  sense  organs,  either  singly 
or  in  combination.     Our  physical  instruments 
of    precision, — mathematically    true    eyes    and 
ears  that  they  are,— not  only  function  to  correct 
the  errors  of  naive  perceptions,  but  even  to  cor- 
rect their  own   errors  as  well.     Therefore,   to 
239 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
speak  of  space  and  time  perceptions  as  being 
dependent    solely    upon    the    unmathematical 
sense  organs  is  an  example  of  deliberate  self 
abasement  and  self  delusion. 

115.  But  let  us  nevertheless  exhibit  just  the 
extent  to  which  naive  space  and  time  are  in 
need  of  correction.  Let  us  also  examine  the 
data  by  which  we  ever  got  the  hint  for  the  de- 
velopment of  self  correcting  devices  in  the  at- 
tempt to  infinitessimalize  space  and  time.  In 
every  science,  the  taking  of  a  set  of  measure- 
ments involves  the  determination  of  the  result- 
ing value.  "Only  when"  is  the  scientists'  goal 
in  an  experiment,  and  not  the  goal  determined 
by  his  expectation.  Otherwise,  Paddock  calls, 
and  careful  analysis  of  the  results  always  show 
a  "trace"  of  faking.  Control  of  the  conditions 
without  hindering  the  freedom  of  the  function 
to  be  investigated,  is  all  the  experimenter  can 
ask,  though  frequently  some  slight  bonus  for 
doing  so  is  smuggled  into  the  final  reckoning. 
But  whenever  we  wish  to  find  some  such  datum 
as  a  threshold,  let  us  say,  we  take  not  one,  but 
many  measurements.  These  measurements  are 
not  identical,  to  be  sure,  but  they  always  group 
themselves  about  a  common  terminus  ad  quern, 
— about  a  standard,  average,  or  mean,  which 
may  or  may  not  be  one  of  the  recorded  measure- 
240 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 

ments.  Now  this  grouping  about  an  average 
is  significant,  in  that  it  usually  defines  what  is 
known  as  a  curve  of  probability,  or  a  Gauss 
curve.  Such  a  curve  represents  a  tendency  of, 
rather  than  an  identity  between,  the  measure- 
ments,— just  as  we  spoke  of  the  threshold  being 
a  quantitative  tendency.  It  is  not  something 
peculiar  to  psychological  measurements,  but  is 
met  with  in  every  set  of  scientific  determina- 
tions. Not  only  is  this  central  tendency  im- 
portant, however,  but  also  is  the  percentage  of 
deviations  from  it,  as  well  as  their  amount  pro 
rata;  for  often  two  averages,  derived  from  two 
independent  sets  of  measurements  will  be  the 
same,  while  the  deviations  from  these  averages 
will  be  the  only  thing  significantly  describing 
their  differences.  It  then  becomes  necessary 
to  pause  and  see  just  what  numbers  mean  in 
such  a  situation.  The  rougher  or  finer  the  work 
is  done,  the  greater  or  less  general  deviation 
from  the  central  tendency  will  usually  occur; 
but  in  any  case,  the  result  sought  for  will  have 
to  be  admitted  to  be  not  some  such  unvarying 
quantity,  such  as  8,  but  only  a  quantity  greater 
than  7  and  less  than  9.  And  if  any  one  be  dis- 
appointed at  this,  his  disappointment  of  course 
comes  about  through  the  fact  that  to  infinites- 
simalize  space  and  time,  whether  or  no,  involves 
241 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
the  fallacy  of  regarding  continuity  of  measuring 
as  necessarily  bound  up  with  the  discreteness 
of  recorded  measurements.  Curved  lines  are 
not  a  succession  of  tiny  straight  ones,  and  the 
mean,  or  average  of  a  set  of  determinations  is 
quite  useless  without  their  average  deviation 
from  that  average.  This  is  also  why  we  speak 
of  the  diameter  of  a  circle  as  its  most  accurate 
dimension,  since  the  circumference,  which  is 
in  the  prime  relation  of  "tt"  to  it,  is  incommen- 
surable. 

116.  Of  the  many  methods  possible  in  ex- 
perimentation, I  shall  outline  but  three.  The 
method  of  mean  error  consists  in  having  the 
subject  himself  reproduce  the  quantity  of  the 
standard  measurement  as  closely  as  he  can. 
Given  a  vertical  line  on  a  card,  whose  length  he 
is  to  reproduce  in  a  horizontal  line,  for  example, 
the  time  intervals  between  the  exhibition  of 
standards,  and  both  the  accuracy  and  time  taken 
to  reproduce  the  line  are  recorded.  Exceed- 
ingly great  variability  appears  in  the  results  of 
such  a  method,  as  one  might  expect.  The  other 
two  methods,  the  limiting  and  the  constant,  are 
more  fruitful, — all  the  conditions  being  pre- 
scribed by  the  experimenter.  The  limiting 
method  consists  of  presenting  graded  variables 
to  the  subject,  who  judges  them  in  terms  of  each 
242 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
other,  giving  such  answers  as  "greater,"  "less," 
"equal,"  and  the  like.  Now,  in  such  a  case,  not 
only  do  simultaneity  and  succession  play  a  big 
part,  but  such  things  as  the  Tightness  or  leftness 
of  the  standard  from  the  variable.  The  num- 
ber of  measurements  often  taken  in  such  a  case 
is  enormous,  in  order  to  cover  all  the  possible 
permutations  and  combinations.  Furthermore, 
the  threshold  may  be  obtained  in  four  ways: 

(1)  by  taking  a  variable  greater  than  the  stand- 
ard and  decreasing  the  amount  between  it  and 
the  standard  until  no  difference  is  observable; 

(2)  to  start  with  two  equal  stimuli  and  increase 
their  difference  until  one  is  much  greater  than 
the  standard;  (3)  to  start  again  with  two  equal 
stimuli  and  decrease  one  below  the  value  of 
the  standard;  and  (4)  to  start  with  one  variable 
way  below  the  standard  and  approach  it,  as 
in  the  first  case  above,  (1).  The  constant  meth- 
od consists  of  an  irregular  presentation  of  vari- 
ables along  with  the  standard,  with  no  regular 
series  of  differences  between  the  pairs  as  pre- 
sented. One  reason  why  these  various  methods 
are  all  employed  is  that  with  different  material 
different  methods  are  desirable,  so  as  not  to 
interrupt  the  function  to  be  investigated.  Be- 
sides, too  slight  differences  between  the  pairs 
of  stimuli  are  deadly  to  the  selective  attention 

243 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
of  the  subject,  anaesthetizing  him  against  the 
ability  to  discriminate.     For  when  only  contra- 
dictions and  negations  result,   they   are  taken 
to  mean  that  one  is  on  the  wrong  tack. 

117.  This  will  give  an  indication,  not  only 
of  the  method  employed  to  find  thresholds  and 
the  like  in  sensation,  but  of  the  method  to  de- 
termine naive  space  and  time  estimation  as 
well.  If  we  wish  to  know  what  "similarity"  in 
psychology  means,  we  take  stimuli  in  which 
there  is  something  identical,  as  determined  by 
all  possible  means,  and  present  them  to  a  sub- 
ject who  has  not  yet  made  such  a  determina- 
tion. Whatever  he  takes  or  mistakes  (no  dis- 
tinction here)  for  identity,  is  made  the  basis  of 
similarity.  Without  any  slur  on  his  intelli- 
gence, the  subject  in  an  experimentation  has 
only  to  keep  even-minded  and  naive, — it  being 
the  business  of  the  experimenter  to  plan  un- 
expectancies  and  keep  from  coaxing  results. 
That  is  to  say,  the  experimenter  regards  the 
data  of  the  experiment  as  lying  in  several  series, 
but  the  subject's  responses  are  narrowed  to  the 
one  series  about  which  certain  information  is 
desired.  They  both  know  equally  what  is  go- 
ing on,  except  that  the  subject  is  not  prepared 
for  the  exact  order  of  the  presentations. 

118.  Psychological  things  have  as  much  be- 

244 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
ing  as  have  any  other  things.  Strictly  speak- 
ing, there  are  no  illusions.  The  psychological 
order  is  not  the  only  order  into  which  things 
get,  and  by  virtue  of  the  world  not  being  a 
charming  and  fragrant  unity,  we  have  contrasts, 
contradictions  and  incompatibilities.  Thus  the 
bent  stick  in  water  is  both  a  bent  and  a  straight 
stick,  the  refractive  power  of  water  being  a 
perfectly  empirical  fact.  The  psychological 
(naive  ocular)  stick,  and  the  physical  stick  ex- 
ist cozily  together;  the  one  that  is  bent  being 
made  both  of  wood  and  of  the  index  of  refrac- 
tion for  water,  and  of  certain  properties  of  the 
eye,  while  the  straight  stick  is  made  of  wood 
only.  If  one  be  asked  whether  the  stick  is  bent 
or  not,  the  answer  cannot  be  wrong,  no  matter 
how  stated;  for  the  question  is  put  in  ambiguous 
language,  not  specifying  which  stick  is  meant. 
Every  so-called  illusion  is  either  due  to  a  tricky 
question,  or  to  the  fact  that  but  one  sense  is 
operative  where  normally  all  the  senses  giving 
data  germane  to  the  stimulus  contribute  to  the 
perceptive  consciousness.  Naive  space  and 
time  determinations  are  not  therefore  illusions, 
but  merely  and  frankly  terms  of  series  exist- 
ing with,  while  being  more  or  less  opposed  to, 
those  determinations  made  with  that  set  of  de- 


245 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
tachable  sense  organs  known  as  instruments  of 
physical  precision. 

119.     If  the  subject  closes  his  eyes,  and  a 
pencil  be  drawn  over  the  skin  of  his  hand,  and 
he  be  asked  how  long  a  line  it  traced,  his  an- 
swer will  be  naive  and  erroneous.     Our  skin  is 
not  pock-marked  with  calibrations,  and  hence 
we  do  not  know  such  things  as  dermal  inches 
or  millimetres.     Yet  here  naive  dermal  space 
and  time  are  clearly  exhibited.     If  a  bristle  be 
attached  to  the  tine  of  a  tuning  fork  and  the 
fork  is  struck  and  laid  on  the  skin,  we  cannot 
count  the  vibrations,  though  they  may  be  sep- 
arately felt.     This  is  the  dermal  perception  of 
number.     If  the   subject's  arm  is  placed  in   a 
tilting  frame  and  gently  moved,  the  extent  of 
the  movement  will  be  stated  in  terms  on  the 
basis  of  which  no  accurately  calibrated  scale 
could  ever  be  made.     A  single  point  placed  di- 
rectly in  the  visual  axis  of  the  eye  and  moved 
forward  or  back  with  reference  to  the  subject, 
cannot  be  seen  to  have  changed  its  position.     If 
the  eyes  are  closed  and  a  clicking  stimulus  is 
sounded  at  various  positions  with  regard  to  the 
head,  those  back  and  front  will  be  interchanged 
in  the  report  almost  haphazardly,  while  those 
from  side  to  side  will  get  into  series  compatible 
with  what  the  experimenter  knows,  and  what 
246 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
the  subject  would  too,  if  he  did  but  open  his 
eyes.  With  the  James  Artificial  Waterfall  one 
can  get  negative  after-images  of  movement, 
and  of  course  one  asks  whether  the  ribbed  belt 
is  actually  reversing.  The  answer  is  that  the 
physical  belt  as  a  whole  is  stationary,  but  that 
certain  parts  of  it  which  have  no  position,  (hav- 
ing any  position  whatever),  need  not  be  still. 
That  much  of  our  sea-faring  friends  as  is  func- 
tioned by  our  timidity,  dies  in  every  storm 
which  sets  us  in  a  fear,  while  the  ship  bearing 
them  may  at  the  same  time  be  making  twenty 
knots  in  good,  calm  weather.  As  with  sensa- 
tion, so  with  perception;  an  object  is  something 
that  will  stimulate,  and  naive  perception  is  not 
one  of  the  functions  of  the  organism  with  ref- 
erence to  the  stimulus  within  the  encasing  en- 
vironment which  can  be  summarily  pushed 
aside. 

120.  Naive  time  perception  is  a  function 
of  several  diiferent  things.  Owing  to  the  na- 
ture of  the  sense  organs,  stimulation  produces 
consciousness  which  continually  alters  as  to  its 
focus,  unless  reinforcements  arc  forthcoming 
from  other  means  than  the  stimulus  itself.  I 
mean  the  environment  within  and  without  the 
body.  The  fading  of  a  sensation  out  of  focality 
is  accompanied  by  the  relational  consciousness 
247 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
of  the  change.  It  may  not  he  called  hy  any 
suitable  name,  but  is  signalized  hy  a  difference 
in  focality,  a  wilting,  and  is  accompanied  hy  a 
corresponding  condition  of  consciousness  name- 
able  either  as  "hefore-now-after,"  "less-more," 
or  "more-less,"  or  some  such  non-mental  ex- 
pression. Again,  the  wave  of  neural  discharge 
rises  and  falls,  while,  for  example,  the  pulse 
is  beating,  or  the  breath  being  drawn  or  re- 
leased. These  general  organic  rises  and  falls 
are  the  physiological  basis  of  naive  time  per- 
ception, and  the  word  "now"  means  any  neural 
continuity  or  equilibrium  which  is  homogene- 
ously focal  in  consciousness.  However,  "now" 
or  "the  present"  may  be  regarded  as  just  as 
long  as  the  uninterrupted  neural  discharge. 
When  a  writer  says,  "Let  us  now  consider,  etc.," 
he  means  that  he  wishes  his  readers  to  have  a 
focal  consciousness  whose  content  is  his  ideas 
for  just  as  long  a  time  as  it  takes  to  peruse  his 
statements.  If  the  backgrounds  of  conscious- 
ness are  steadily  maintained,  "now"  is  a  func- 
tion of  that  maintenance.  "Now"  and  "then" 
are  also  interchangeable:  any  reference  to 
events  in  time  past,  taken  as  a  whole,  means  a 
"then."  But  the  sensorial  "now,"  or  the  present 
time,  is  always  short,  while  the  perceptual  or 
logical  "now"  may  be  as  long  as  one  pleases. 
248 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
Tliat  is  to  say,  those  things  which  are  axiomatic 
and  always  dependable  are  timeless,  being  in- 
different to  any  special  time  or  situation. 

121.  Time  estimations  concern  such  things 
as  the  following:  the  number  of  objects  oper- 
ating in  the  sense  field;  the  strength  of  the  first 
impression, — or  the  strength  of  some  one  of  the 
impressions  as  contrasted  with  the  varying 
strength  of  the  succeeding  or  simultaneous  im- 
pressions; the  contrast  effects  of  the  sucession 
of  unequal  intervals  of  solar  time  in  a  series 
of  presentations;  the  alternation  of  sense  fields 
in  focality,  and  similar  phenomena.  Sometimes 
the  expressions  "filled"  and  "unfilled"  time  are 
spoken  of,  but  this  means  that  interest  domin- 
ates the  items  in  the  content,  and  not  that  the 
time  interval  is  quantitatively  altered.  One 
curious  fact  in  this  connection  is  the  "indiffer- 
ence period."  The  motor  repetition  of  certain 
time  intervals  will  be  erroneous  unless  the  in- 
terval is  some  multiple  of  about  0.7  seconds. 
This  particular  naive  "second"  is  remarkably 
accurate.  Again,  if  one  sits  in  a  chair  resting 
the  tendon  under  the  knee  upon  an  elevation 
too  high  to  allow  the  heel  to  be  comfortably 
held  on  the  floor,  and  starts  to  jerk  the  heel  up 
and  down,  the  ensuing  reflex  will  continue  in 
spite  of  all  volitions  to  the  contrary  while  re- 
249 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
maining  in  that  position,  and  the  regularity  of 
the  interval  thus  maintained  will  be  a  close  in- 
voluntary standard  of  time.  The  sub-  and  un- 
conscious always  function  more  dependably 
than  any  one  sense  field,  no  matter  how  focal 
it  is.  Rhythm  may  be  spoken  of  as  the  invol- 
untary grouping  of  regular  stimuli  into  pat- 
terns, the  basis  of  which  grouping  is  in  the  sub- 
conscious action  of  the  neural  arcs.  Multiple, 
rapidly  recurring  stimuli  are  not  responded  to 
separately,  but  they  sum  into  releases  as  has 
been  indicated  before.  The  initial  reflex  and 
the  after-discharge  are  veritable  elementary 
constituents  of  the  trochaic  foot  in  poetry.  And 
no  rhythm  whatever  has  been  successful  which 
demanded  grouping  contrary  to  the  elemental 
properties  of  the  discharge  mechanism  of  the 
neural  arcs.  As  certain  geometrical  figures  are 
to  lines,  so  rhythms  are  to  time  intervals;  the 
basis  for  spacial  grouping  being  extensity,  that 
of  temporal  grouping  being  intensity.  We 
shall  treat  of  the  other  features  of  time  in  con- 
nection with  space,  with  which  we  shall  have 
considerably  more  to  do. 

122.     The     following    psychological     space- 
givers  are  usually  enumerated: 

(1)   the  bi-dimensional  field  of  the  passive 
skin, 

250 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 

(2)  the    bi-diniensional    field    of    the    active 
skin, 

(3)  the  tri-dimensional  field  of  the  passive 
skin, 

(4)  the   tri-dimensional   field   of   the   active 
skin, 

(5)  the  bi-dimensional  field  of  the  passive, 
single  eye, 

(6)  the  bi-dimensional  field  of  the  passive, 
double  eye, 

(7)  the   tri-dimensional  field   of   the   single 
and  double  moving  eye  or  eyes, 

(8)  the  bi-dimensional  field  of  the  ear,  or 
ears. 

Smell  and  taste,  as  well  as  the  organic  sensa- 
tions, are  spaceless,  though  not  lacking  in  the 
attribute  of  extensity.  By  "spaceless"  is  here 
meant  that  they  cannot  be  developed  into  per- 
ceptions that  wall  square  with  the  readings  of 
detachable  sense  organs.  One  dimension  can 
be  gotten  easily  from  either  the  skin  moving 
over  a  point  or  a  point  moving  over  the  skin. 
But  a  square,  circle  or  triangle  outlined  upon 
the  skin  is  poorly  judged  to  be  a  closed  figure 
unless  the  stimulation  is  intense  enough  to  leave 
definite  after-sensations.  Otherwise  the  first 
impression  of  the  stimulus  will  give  an  eccen- 
tric spacial  reference.  A  temporal  threshold 
251 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
must  not  be  exceeded  here  either,  for  otherwise, 
the  after-sensation  will  be  excentrically  re- 
ferred. Local-sign,  duration,  after-image  and 
the  like,  thus  pass  over  into  perceptions.  A 
geometrical  figure  in  metal,  when  laid  on  the 
skin,  will  likewise  require  a  certain  intensity 
of  application  to  be  judged  correctly  as  to  its 
shape.  If  it  has  sharp  corners,  they  are  likely 
to  arouse  pain  before  its  sides  fully  arouse 
touch,  in  which  case  all  the  elements  in  the  per- 
ception of  its  size  will  be  derived  from  the  vari- 
ous systems  of  cutaneous  sensibility  rather  than 
from  superficial  (or  epicritic)  touch  alone.  A 
warmed  dollar  feels  larger  and  lighter  than  a 
cold  one,  if  both  are  laid  simultaneously  upon 
corresponding  parts  of  the  body,  this  being  due 
both  to  the  engorgement  of  the  capillaries 
through  heat,  and  to  the  numbing  of  the  skin 
through  cold,  thereby  making  the  skin  itself  a 
tactual  stimulus.  If  a  heavy,  blunt  point  moves 
across  the  skin  surface  at  the  same  rate  as  a 
lighter,  finer  one,  the  judgment  of  rate  of  mo- 
tion will  err  in  point  of  underestimating  the 
speed  of  the  second.  In  all  these  cases  of  der- 
mal perception,  there  must  be  considered  the 
matter  of  the  "pressure  gradient."  This  refers 
to  the  deformation  of  the  skin  by  the  stinmlus. 
The  hand  immersed  in  mercury  will  respond 
252 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
to  a  summation  of  touches  only  at  the  line  of 
emergence  from  the  liquid.  Below  that  point 
it  will  function  a  mutual  inhibition  of  them. 
This  is  due  to  the  exceedingly  unusual  pressure 
of  the  liquid  at  that  place  as  compared  with  the 
pressure  of  the  air  above  it.  Contrast  is  here 
the  deciding  factor.  In  cases  of  the  pressure 
gradient,  the  distribution  of  pressures  from  the 
point  of  application  becomes  such  that  irradia- 
tion occurs, — a  factor  which  accounts  for  some 
of  the  eccentricity  of  dermal  local-sign, — for 
some  of  the  outlying  areas  beyond  the  stimulus 
will  be  subliminally  excited,  and,  by  virtue  of 
the  lateral  pressure  of  the  deformed  skin,  the 
non-orthogonal  character  of  the  entire  stimu- 
lation will  be  functioned  erroneously  in  the 
judgment  given.  Pain,  in  its  quick  lancing 
down,  and  cold  in  its  contrasting  thrill,  are  bet- 
ter localized  than  those  other  sensations  which 
have  less  instant  contrast  effects,  regardless  of 
latency  or  intensity. 

123.  Dermal  perception  of  space  is  also  ob- 
tained by  the  moving  of  one  skin  area  over  an- 
other. All  three  dimensions  can  be  thus  exhib- 
ited,— the  vertical,  the  horizontal,  and  the  third 
dimension  called  depth.  But  this  almost  always 
involves  tendinous  and  articular  ingredients, 
and  while  the  threshold  of  bare  movement  is 
253 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
low,  judgments  of  the  extent  to  which  the  legs 
or  arms  have  moved,  whether  singly  or  in  pairs, 
are  usually  quite  inaccurate.  For  example,  a 
slow  movement  seems  longer  than  a  rapid  one 
of  the  same  extent,  while  the  judgment  of  a 
blindfolded  subject,  who  determines  his  two 
arms  to  pass  symmetrically  through  the  same 
distance,  errs.  The  movement  of  the  limb 
mentioned,  noticed  and  kept  in  focus  is  always 
overestimated,  though  the  extent  of  successive 
movements  is  better  judged  than  that  of  simul- 
taneous. Along  with  kinaesthetic  sensations, 
there  is  usually  present  either  coolness  or 
warmth  from  the  skin  due  to  the  fanning  of  the 
air  by  the  moving  member.  This,  however, 
often  gives  cues  as  to  spacial  differences  in  the 
resulting  perception.  Extents  of  movement, 
durations,  and  qualities, — that  is,  the  local  sign 
of  the  articular  elements  in  toe,  hip,  shoulder, 
wrist  and  the  like,  together  with  the  massive- 
ness  of  the  fusions  from  the  large  joints, — these 
are  determining  elements  in  all  cases  of  kinaes- 
thetic perceptions.  Curious  among  the  eccen- 
tricities of  naive  perceptions  is  the  familiar 
"size-weight"  illusion.  If  a  subject  is  presented 
with  two  objects  of  similar  shape,  but  of  ex- 
actly the  same  weight,  and  takes  them  both 
simultaneously  and  lifts  them,  the  smaller  of 
254 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
the  pair  will  appear  heavier  than  the  larger. 
Furthermore,  the  larger  is  not  only  "better  pre- 
pared for"  muscularly  than  is  the  smaller,  but 
it  gets  lifted  more  steadily  and,  due  to  the  mus- 
cular "surprise"  provoked  by  the  other  weight, 
gets  lifted  more  rapidly.  Other  things  being 
equal,  the  more  rapidly  a  lifted  object  ascends, 
the  lighter  it  seems.  The  experiment  is  usually 
set  to  deceive,  and  could  be  called  an  illusory 
phenomenon  only  in  point  of  the  verbal  report 
of  the  subject  upon  suffering  the  joke.  Other- 
wise, it  is  but  a  case  of  co-conscious  perception 
as  functioned  by  movement  on  the  basis  of  in- 
equality of  visual  responses  to  sizes.  For  the 
motor  setting  with  which  we  approach  such  un- 
equal objects  is  usually  derived  solely  from 
their  space  relations,  and  not  from  the  in- 
tended movements  giving  a  sub-focal,  strain 
pre-sensation.  There  is  such  a  thing  as  a  yellow 
consciousness,  an  angry  consciousness,  but  there 
is  no  such  thing  as  a  heavy  consciousness:  we 
function  for  weights  only  by  strains.  This  point 
of  pre-sensation,  pre-perception  and  motor  at- 
tunement  will  be  further  treated  of  in  the  sec- 
tions on  "meaning." 

124.     Before  elaborating  auditory  and  visual 
space  perceptions,  I  wish  to  outline  the  sensa- 
tional elements  in  all  perceptions.     Under  the 
255 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
concepts  of  the  attribute-thing  and  part-whole 
relationships,  sensations  and  perceptions  are 
differentiated  chiefly  by  the  complexity  and 
concatentation  of  their  elements.  Perceptions, 
being  linked  with  motor  responses  of  general 
orientation,  in  a  way  which  sensations  are  not, 
illustrate  the  "with-for"  relationship  in  its  most 
significant  aspect.  The  clearest  consciousness 
is  perceptual,  not  sensational  or  emotional,  and 
the  motor  acts  of  the  body  are  not  only  the  sur- 
est, most  maintaining,  and  least  fatiguing,  when 
the  perceptual  responses  are  dominant;  but  per- 
ceptions at  once  lead  to  organizations  of  activ- 
ity, judgments,  reasonings,  clear  conceptions  in 
a  manner  not  ever  approached  by  other  kinds  of 
responses.  Now,  those  attributes  of  sensation 
which  lead  directly  to  perception  are  the  fol- 
lowing: fusion,  duration,  intensity,  local-sign, 
contrast,  and  after-image.  I  shall  take  them 
up  separately. 

125.  Fusion  in  perception.  Every  whole 
has  properties  other  than  those  of  its  parts, 
taken  isolatedly.  There  may  also  be  more  prop- 
erties of  the  whole  than  the  addition  of  those 
of  the  parts  would  indicate  to  be  the  case.  Now 
insofar  as  fusion  typifies  wholeness,  a  fusion 
resultant  manifests  the  specific  properties  of  a 
whole.  A  fusion  resultant,  furthermore,  is  not 
256 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
the  same  as  a  simple  sensation;  for  a  fusion 
can  be  broken  up  into  several  sensations,  while 
a  simple  sensation  breaks  up  at  once  into  at- 
tributes: besides,  the  elements  of  a  fusion  still 
have  position  in  space  and  time,  while  the  at- 
tributes of  sensation  do  not.  It  is  possible,  also, 
for  the  "position"  of  the  fusion  resultant  not 
to  coincide  with  that  of  any  of  the  constituting 
sensations.  Nevertheless,  fusions  give  us  a 
clear  example  of  the  addition  of  one  and  one 
to  make  but  one, — as  is  evidenced  by  the  two 
compass  points  placed  on  the  skin  within  the 
dermal  threshold  for  twoness.  In  such  a  case 
of  fusion,  also,  we  have  exhibited  the  fact  of 
the  submergence  of  some  of  the  properties  of 
the  parts  under  the  new  quality  of  the  whole,  or 
resultant.  If,  again,  such  a  fusion  be  gradually 
consummated  and  then  gradually  broken  up, 
one  may  get  a  clear  perception  of  change  as 
well  as  of  rate  of  change, — two  factors  both  of 
which  facilitate  orientation  in  any  recurrent 
meeting  with  either  the  elements  in,  or  results 
of,  such  fusion.  Lastly,  identity  and  contrast 
may  be  obtained  along  with  fusion,  with  the 
probability  that  each  may  supplement  the  per- 
ceptual value  of  the  others.  For  instance,  if 
tickling  be  produced  first  by  light  wool  and 
later  by  a  vibrating  tuning-fork,  while  the  sub- 
257 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
ject  obtains  both  visual  and  dermal  contents 
from  the  stimulus,  he  will  dermally  sense  iden- 
tities but  visually  sense  and  perceive  difTer- 
ences.  This  will  automatically  evoke  contrast 
in  the  resulting  consciousness  and  all  of  the 
elements  here  involved  will  make  a  perceptual 
pattern  of  larger  dimensions  than  would  other- 
wise be  possible.  Such  an  account  will  fail  to 
satisfy  the  incurable  introspector, — for  he 
wants  to  know  in  all  such  cases  how  the  object 
is  re-presented  in  consciousness, — not  what  of 
the  object  is  first  of  all  just  plain  consciousness. 
But  this  is  asking  what  the  "mental"  status  of 
an  object  is,— an  item  we  have  long  ago  rele- 
gated to  the  vocabulary  of  metaphysical  pro- 
fanity. 

126.  Duration  in  perception.  The  fading 
out,  wilting,  or  sudden  onset  and  release  of  a 
stimulus,  accompanied  by  whatever  content  or 
process  is  functionally  related  to  such  things, 
brings  with  it,  or  has  as  part  of  it,  the  corre- 
sponding consciousness  in  point  of  duration  and 
its  relational  aspects.  The  duration  of  a  content 
or  process  means  also  the  passing  of  a  threshold 
of  the  perception  of  relations.  This  tem- 
poral attribute  of  sensations  welds  them  to- 
gether into  the  causal  or  symmetrical  relations 
of  perception.  It  is  a  primitive  and  ultimate  at- 
258 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
tribute,  and  is  to  be  correlated  directly  with  the 
rise  and  fall  of  the  neural  releases.  Duration, 
including  simultaneity  and  succession  of  im- 
pulses, is  a  bi-dimensional  field,  and  by  virtue 
of  temporal  duration  we  are  enabled  both  to 
sense  together,  and  sense  successively,  as  well 
as  perceptually  function  the  discrimination  be- 
tween pairs  of  intensities,  local-signs,  durations, 
and  so  on.  The  overlapping  of  neural  impulses 
is  the  physiological  element  operating  here. 

127,  Intensity  in  perception.  The  more  in- 
tensive stimulations  usually  capture  the  final 
common  path,  and  thus  get  soonest  organized 
into  perceptions.  If,  also,  there  be  differences 
of  intensity  in  the  conscious  manifold,  they  will 
be  functioned  as  a  series  of  intensities  in  addi- 
tion to  whatever  other  series  the  stimulations 
may  exhibit.  Were  it  not  for  differing  levels  of 
receptiveness,  most  objects  would  otherwise  be 
recorded  as  "Blob  No.  1,"  "Blob  No.  2,"  etc.  A 
series  of  psychological  intensities  in  one  mo- 
dality, however,  may  be  contrasted  with  data 
from  another  sense  field  operating  at  the  same 
time,  and  thus  better  balance  and  orientation 
may  result. 

128.  Local  sign  in  perception.  The  position 
of  every  sensory  stimulus  is  more  or  less  de- 
terminable, and  the  resulting  sensation  is  func- 

259 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
tioned  as  being  derived  from  some  part  of  the 
spacial  order;  however,  the  Euclidian  position 
and  the  reported  position  need  not  coincide. 
We  saw  in  the  case  of  touch,  that  when  two 
compass  points  were  placed  on  the  skin  within 
that  distance  known  as  the  dermal  threshold 
for  twoness,  that  the  local  sign  of  the  resulting 
sensation  was  either  absorbed  by  one  or  the 
other  of  the  points,  or  was  referred  to  something 
like  a  mean  position  between  them.  Likewise, 
when  only  the  deep  sensibility  is  left  after  nerve 
section,  successive,  and  not  simultaneous  double 
pressure  alone  remains.  Now,  whether  local- 
sign  be  a  quality  peculiar  to  every  direction  of 
stimulation  or  not,  there  is  soon  derived  with 
practice  an  increased  sensitivity  to  location,  and 
practice  also  improves  spacial  discrimination  on 
that  side  of  the  body  not  exercised.  In  all  cases 
of  location,  two  senses  are  better  than  one,  and 
differences  of  position  are  responded  to  better 
than  are  single  positions.  But,  as  said  before, 
we  are  not  calibrated  as  meter  sticks  are,  and 
questions  put  to  us  in  regard  to  the  sensorial 
position  of  things  have  no  right  to  be  couched 
in  terms  of  the  experimenter  to  the  disparage- 
ment of  the  subject.  Any  response  is  a  respect- 
able datum  in  psychology. 

129.     Contrast  in  perception.     Togetherness, 
260 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
whether  sinuiltaneous  or  successive,  is  accom- 
panied by  partially  balanced  neural  responses, 
and  this  balance  is  part  of  the  basis  for  the  per- 
ception of  the  pattern  of  stimulations  func- 
tioned in  consciousness.  We  sense  dififerences 
rather  than  absolute  magnitudes,  and  this  fact 
has  a  cash  value  in  perception.  Gradual  in- 
creases or  decreases  in  intensity  of  the  stimulus 
are  not  usually  accompanied  by  equal  slidings 
in  the  content  of  consciousness,  but  abrupt  in- 
creases or  decreases  are  the  rule.  The  steady 
"stream  of  thought"  is  something  which  the 
writer,  for  one,  knows  nothing  about.  Instead 
of  being  continuous,  consciousness  is  discon- 
tinuous,— arguments  for  continuity  on  the  basis 
of  anything  but  breath  or  pulse  being  incompre- 
hensible to  him.  In  this  connection,  it  is  logical 
to  distinguish  between  the  perception  of  con- 
trast and  the  sensations  that  are  contrasted  to- 
gether; nevertheless,  in  psychology  either  may 
be  now  primaiy,  and  again  derivative. 

130.  After-image  in  perception.  Structures 
are  also  revealed  by  duration  and  other  con- 
tinuing phenomena.  The  after-image  is  such  a 
functioner  of  structure.  Both  positive  and  neg- 
ative after-images,  insofar  as  perception  is  con- 
cerned, each  add  just  another  term  in  the  series 
of  possible  contents  derived  by  the  sense  or- 
261 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
gan.  Often  in  so  doing  they  give  common  parts 
with  the  effects  of  other  stimuli.  Thus  they 
relate  things  which  might  otherwise  go  unre- 
lated for  a  considerable  time,  and  by  lasting 
longer  than  the  stimulus  presentation,  they  af- 
ford contrast  effects,  whereby  further  bases  for 
perception  are  established. 

131.  There  is  thus  nothing  mythical  in  the 
sensational  contributions  to  the  elements  of  per- 
ception. We  have  specifically  dealt,  however, 
only  with  the  response  side;  but  inasmuch  as 
the  sensation  is  the  object  and  what  it  will  do, 
we  have  only  to  indicate  the  way  structure  is 
first  functioned, — for  it  is  always  the  object 
which  is  a  structural  experience  as  well  as 
structurally  experienced.  Indeed,  the  object 
sensed  and  the  object  perceived  differ  in  only 
two  respects, — namely,  the  structure  of  the 
neural  releases,  and  the  structure  of  the  en- 
vironment in  which  it  is  being  functioned.  All 
these  structural  relations  are  logical  and  em- 
pirical, and  have  none  of  the  odor  of  "mental- 
ity" upon  them. 

132.  Now  for  space  perception,  especially  as 
related  to  the  eye  and  the  ear.  Let  us  first  bear 
in  mind  the  fact  that  the  study  of  space  with 
reference  to  the  naive  ear  and  eye  is  not  a  study 
of  how  space  is  made,  space  never  having  gone 

262 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
through  any  mill  or  shop,  but  only  how  space 
and  spaciality  are  functioned.  For  the  study  of 
psychology  is  principally  an  analysis  of  what 
we  already  well  know,  as  well  as  how  things 
get  known;  and  it  determines  the  properties  of 
parts  in  a  whole  whose  parts  are  not  yet  fully 
determined  as  to  their  contributing  elements. 
Consider  the  following  list  of  sense-fields : 

Visceral  and  coenaesthetic  sensations. 

Taste, 

Smell, 

Touch, 

Kinaesthesis, 

Hearing, 

Vision. 

As  named  in  the  above  order,  they  represent 
not  only  that  order  in  which  they  are  the  worst- 
to-best  space  givers,  but  also  that  order  in  which 
they  have,  with  one  or  two  exceptions,  the  least- 
to-most  structure.  Not  only  this,  but  they  have 
in  this  order  an  increasing  number  of  qualities, 
and  therefore  exhibit  correspondingly  numer- 
ous instances  of  variation  in  the  combination  of 
attributes  leading  directly  to  perception. 

Ear  Space. 

133.     The  eyes  converge  and  focus,  but  the 
ears   do   not.     The    tensor    tympani    contracts 
upon  accomodation,  and   the   tympanum  func- 
263 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
tions  sudden  intensity  in  the  manner  previous- 
ly described.     But  ear  space  is  obtained  by  the 
relative  intensity  with  which  sounds  are  gotten 
by  the  two  ears,  barring  one  notable  exception, 
the  human  voice.     This  can  be  very  well  lo- 
calized front  and  back,  while  all  other  sounds 
are  in  need  of  being  placed  well  within  the  lat- 
eral field  of  sound  with  reference  to  the  coronal 
and  sagittal  planes  of  the  head.     The  shell  of 
the  ear  (concha)  also  acts  as  a  resonator,  and 
performs  a  localizing  function.     There  is  also 
a    widespread    and    clearly   manifest   tendency 
to  locate  a  relatively  loud  sound  in  front  of,  and 
a  relatively  weak  sound  behind,  the  head,  but 
just  what  the  zero    of    intensity    (loudness  or 
weakness)   is,  in  such  cases,  has  not  yet  been 
determined.     Furthermore,  the  straining  of  the 
eyes  to  right  or  left  causes  a  misplacement  of 
the  sound  in  that  direction,   and   every   reflex 
tendency  of  the  head  adds  an  element  in  the 
determination   of  space    while    the    eyes    are 
closed.     Sounds  full   of  overtones  are  naively 
localized  nearer  to  us  than  sounds  poor  in  over- 
tones, while  the  "flatter"  of  two  sounds  seems 
to  be  the  farther  away.     Fusion  in  sounds  offers 
an  interesting  analogue  to  fusion  in  touches.     If 
two  similar  sounds  be  produced  at  certain  dif- 
ferent positions  with  relation  to  the  head,  they 
264 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
will  invariably  be  heard  as  one,  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  the  subject  knows  there  are  two  of 
them.  The  position  of  the  fused  resultant  will 
be  either,  (a)  the  actual  position  of  one  of  the 
stimuli,  (b)  at  a  point  between  them,  or  (c) 
eccentrically  referred  to  an  indeterminate  po- 
sition. 

134.  Again,  if  an  auditory  stimulus  is  car- 
ried toward  the  head,  the  localization  of  it  will 
be  functioned  with  the  same  result  as  if,  with 
the  stimulus  fixed,  the  head  has  been  moved  in 
the  direction  of  the  source  of  sound.  It  is  the 
moving  things  of  nature  that  give  us  our  best 
cues  of  position,  and  ear  space  furnishes  a  field 
in  which  these  operate.  Within  the  internal  ear 
lie  the  semi-circular  canals,  as  well  as  two 
conjoined  organs  of  spherical  shape  known  as 
the  saccule  and  utricule.  The  canals  are  set 
in  the  three  geometrical  dimensions,  and  are 
full  of  a  liquid  that  gets  impacts  which  develop 
wave  forms  in  the  tiny  tubes  of  these  canals 
when  the  head  is  moved.  Extirpation  of  them 
impairs  our  perceptions  of  position;  but  one  of 
each  corresponding  pairs  of  canals  on  either 
side  may  be  removed  without  apparent  loss  of 
this  function.  Only  when  both  vertical,  or  both 
horizontal  canals,  for  example,  are  extirpated, 
will  such  perception  be  inhibited.  The  saccule 
265 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
and  utricule  have  on  their  internal  surfaces 
tiny  hairs  upon  which  lie  crystals,  whose  func- 
tion is  thought  to  be  to  exert  pressure  during 
sudden  movements  of  the  head  or  body,  and 
thus  to  arouse  stabilizing  reflexes.  Deaf  mutes 
very  frequently  have  defective  inner  organs  of 
the  ear,  and  the  common  inability  of  these  per- 
sons to  locate  themselves  in  under-water  swim- 
ming, as  to  the  surface  and  bottom  of  the  pool, 
is  correlated  with  this  fact.  Interesting  side- 
lights upon  dizziness  are  revealed  by  incidents 
in  connection  with  our  modern  conquest  of  the 
air.  One  of  the  important  things  that  has  been 
shown  is  to  how  great  an  extent  the  environ- 
ment of  the  aviator  may  be  rigidly  defined  by 
his  aeroplane,  with  but  little  reference  to  the 
surrounding  medium.  Spiral  somersaults  are 
soon  learned  without  any  feeling  of  dizziness. 
From  a  recent  magazine  comes  the  following 
quotation:  "A  naval  airman  when  flying  sea- 
ward entered  a  thick  white  cloud  and  wholly 
lost  his  sense  of  direction.  He  only  realized 
that  he  was  upside  down  on  finding  that  things 
were  falling  out  of  his  pockets.  ...  At 
length  he  emerged  from  the  cloud  and  saw  the 
sea  apparently  over  his  head,  but  was  able  to 
right  his  machine  and  continue  his  flight."  In 
rotating  the  body  rapidly,  we  produce  the  phe- 
266 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
noinenon  known  as  dizziness,  which  might  be 
classified  under  sensations  of  movement,  as  well 
as  under  perceptions  of  space.  It  is  accom- 
panied by  eye  movements,  nausea,  and  dis- 
placements of  the  viscera,  which, — being  less 
stable  than  the  bones, — alter  the  center  of  grav- 
ity of  the  body  when  they  are  disturbed.  In 
this  case  also  undoubtedly  the  kinaesthetic  or- 
gans of  the  internal  ear  function  importantly. 
Looking  in  a  mirror  whose  position  is  suddenly 
unsteadied  will  also  give  a  sense  of  dizziness. 
Toe-dancers  obviate  the  inevitable  dizziness  in- 
cident to  their  rapid  rotation  by  fixating  one 
object  after  another  before  they  arrive  directly 
in  front  of  it;  or  else,  with  eyes  closed  and  di- 
rected downwards,  they  attain  the  same  end. 
When  one  observes  the  eyes  of  a  person  who 
has  been  rapidly  rotated,  without  any  of  these 
precautions  being  taken,  he  sees  an  involun- 
tary rotary  movement  of  the  eyes,  called  nystag- 
mus. This  nystagmus  may  be  lateral,  (that  is, 
the  eyes  may  jerk  rapidly  from  side  to  side),  or 
rotary,  but  it  is  rarely  vertical.  During  rota- 
tion, there  is  a  tendency  to  fixate  any  stationary 
object,  but  it  soon  gets  left  behind,  and  we  look 
quickly  forward  to  fixate  another  stimulus. 
During  this  look  forward  there  is  no  vision. 
After  slowing  up,  a  contrary  effect  is  produced; 
267 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
the  eyes  of  the  subject  jerk  quickly  back  and 
slowly  forward,  the  general  effect  of  this  being 
being  to  function  the  surrounding  objects  as 
rotating  around  him  as  a  center.  Some  people 
lose  their  sense  of  orientation  while  watching  a 
waterfall,  as  this  is  a  form  of  flicker,  while  in- 
toxicants, and  strange  eye  glasses,  as  well  as 
disturbances  in  the  circulation  all  have  common 
parts  in  this  phenomenon  of  mis-orientation. 
Even  to  pass  a  galvanic  current  through  the 
ears  produces  dizziness,  and  one  may  have  sen- 
sations of  falling  toward  the  cathode  pole  in 
such  a  case.  But  neither  this  nor  the  oscilla- 
tions of  the  eyes  accompanying  it  occur  when 
the   labyrinths   are   removed. 

135.  In  all  these  cases  of  confusion,  there 
are  several  significant  things  to  be  noted.  In 
the  first  place,  the  organs  of  accomodation  and 
adjustment  act  with  longer  latent  periods  than 
allow  instantaneous  readjustment  to  an  envi- 
ronment whose  relative  positions  are  shattered; 
and  the  consciousness  generated  in  such  situa- 
tions is  the  situation  itself  pitted  against  the 
responses  to  that  other  environment  which  has 
no  especially  significant  name,  but  which  is 
mainly  functioned  by  the  tonic  reflexes  that 
react  against  all  such  disturbances.  Further- 
more, while  the  perception  of  confusion  may  be 
268 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
a  confused  perception,  all  of  our  responses  at 
any  one  time  need  not  be  confined  to  those  ele- 
ments which  are  focally  conscious.  A  confused 
environment  may  lie  within  an  unconfused  one, 
and  part  of  the  stabilizing  influences  may  come 
directly  from  the  responses  to  this  other  en- 
vironment. But  at  the  time,  these  responses 
are  not  focally  conscious,  and  need  not  have 
any  content;  they  may  be  treated  of  entirely  in 
terms  of  the  general  somatic  momentum,  which 
after  all  is  but  a  response  to  whatever  stability 
is  present.  For  human  beings  are  constant 
functions  of  their  environment,  whether  they 
be  manifesting  sensation,  perception,  volition, 
belief,  or  judgment.  And  if  any  one  wishes  to 
know  what  "mystery"  lies  behind  these  other 
stabilizing  environments,  the  only  reply  is  that 
the  non-mental  elements  which  make  up  both 
mind  and  matter  have  other  orders  than  those 
into  which  they  may  be  and  are  constantly  or- 
ganized as  sensory  data;  and  being  non-mental 
as  well  as  non-physical,  they  have  no  age  nor 
settled  occupation. 

136.  Of  all  the  modalities,  sight  is  the  one 
which  figures  principally  in  spacial  perceptions. 
Not  only  are  the  combinations  of  sight  and 
touch,  sight  and  sound,  sight  and  movement, 
better  space  givers  than  any  such  two-term  com- 
269 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
bination  not  including  sight,  but  also  our  in- 
struments of  precision  are  usually  adjustable 
sight  organs  rather  than  organs  co-functioning 
with  the  efferent  nerves  of  other  sense  fields. 
Telescopes,  transits,  sextants,  and  range-finders, 
for  example,  are  all  visual  apparatus,  and  even 
the  physical  measurements  employed  to  deter- 
mine time  and  intensities  are  calibrated  into 
scales  which  we  read  with  the  eye  rather  than 
perceive  by  the  use  of  the  other  receiving  or- 
gans of  sense.  The  domination  of  all  other 
spaces  by  sight  space  is  apparent,  and  we  even 
employ  in  more  than  a  figurative  sense  the  ex- 
pression "seeing  is  believing,"  when  we  are  in 
doubt  as  to  the  factual  status  of  the  something 
under  suspicion.  The  functional  dependence 
of  perception  upon  the  eye  is  not  difficult  to 
make  explicit.  No  other  single  organ  can  re- 
ceive so  many  impressions  and  group  them, 
while  at  the  same  time  it  adjusts  itself  to  their 
differences,  as  can  the  eye.  For  three  sets  of 
functions  are  implicit  in  its  action, — movement 
of  the  entire  organ  by  rotation  within  its  socket; 
accomodation  of  the  lens  by  the  ciliary  reflex; 
and  the  color  and  shape  responses  quite  inde- 
pendent of  these  two.  The  amount  of  space  re- 
sponded to  by  the  eye  so  far  exceeds  that  of  any 
other  sense  organ,  that,  if  by  the  expression 
270 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 

"higher  sense"  is  meant  the  possibility  of  or- 
ganized and  dependable  perception,  no  modal- 
ity is  in  any  way  superior  to  vision. 

137.  Convergence  and  accommodation  are 
two  motor  responses  of  the  eye  which  aid  sig- 
nificantly in  space  perceptions.  Convergence 
accompanies  accomodation,  and  any  intense 
stimulus  for  vision  will  set  going  automatic  ro- 
tation of  the  eyes  to  bring  the  object  directly 
in  line  with  the  visual  axis,  as  well  as  adjust- 
ment of  the  lens  to  the  focal  distance  required 
for  clear  vision.  The  two  eyes  converge  and 
accomodate  as  one,  and  by  means  of  producing 
convergences  and  accomodations  under  arti- 
ficial circumstances,  the  distances  of  objects 
thus  seen  will  be  functioned  by  the  extent  of 
the  automaticity  of  these  processes.  Exceed- 
ingly distant  objects  make  no  apparent  con- 
vergence in  the  eyes:  the  axes  are  practically 
parallel,  as  is  the  case  with  persons  asleep ;  and 
the  "far  away  look"  of  one  in  abstraction  or  in 
a  condition  of  surplus  eating  is  directly  refer- 
able to  the  non-fixation  of  any  sensory  stimulus. 
Objects  will  appear  then,  in  this  connection,  as 
far  away  as  the  sensations  of  reflexly  excited 
accommodation  and  convergence  function  them. 
But  we  must  also  take  into  account  the  matter 
of  visual  distance,  and  what  it  means.  When 
271 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
things  are  found  out  to  be  nearer  or  farther  than 
they  appeared,  it  cannot  be  called  a  visual  il- 
lusion. Depth  or  distance,  visually  speaking, 
is  as  great  as  it  appears  to  be;  but  depth  or  dis- 
tance in  terms  of  intended  movement  to  reach 
the  object,  is  as  great  as  it  is  found  out  to  be. 
Of  course,  in  eye-consciousness,  one  must  con- 
sider that  there  are  many  unequal  linear  ex- 
tents which  are  functioned  exactly  alike,— they 
have  common  parts,— and  these  visual  identities 
are  just  as  good  data  as  any  others.  Let  the 
cause  of  the  eye,  and  not  the  eye  itself  be  the 
emptor  qui  caveat.  What  we  were  set  to  do 
on  the  basis  of  regarding  these  common  parts  as 
in  one  series  only,  is  the  basis  for  error;  and 
this  is  a  case  of  contradiction  in  the  resulting 
movements,  not  an  error  of  the  visual  content. 
The  exact  basis  for  erroneously  calling  this  a 
"visual  illusion"  is  the  violation  of  the  part- 
whole  relation, — that  is,  the  making  of  the 
whole  consciousness  independent  of  its  contrib- 
uting parts  and  relations. 

138.  The  so-called  retinal  image,  or,  for  our 
purposes,  the  extent  of  retinal  stimulation,  has 
an  immediate  bearing  upon  the  functioning  for 
extents  and  depths.  According  to  physiological 
optics,  the  size  of  the  stimulated  retinal  area 
is  directly  proportional  to  the  size  of  the  ob- 
272 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
ject  stimulating  it;  and  thus  whatever  object 
can  be  made  to  stimulate  a  smaller  retinal  area 
than  it  normally  would  in  its  spacial  context,  is 
called  more  distant  than  normally.  The  clear- 
ness or  faintness  of  the  stimulated  retinal  area 
has  much  to  do  also  with  the  visual  estimation 
of  size  and  distance.  Irradiation  of  light  on 
neighboring  retinal  areas  brings  an  inevitable 
distance  effect,  as  well  as  does  the  stimulation 
of  the  retina  by  objects  in  a  fog.  But  here 
haziness  causes  us  to  function  the  objects  as 
much  nearer  for  vision  than  they  are  in  motor 
terms,  whereas  their  vagueness  of  outline  makes 
them  appear  farther  away  than  one  would  ex- 
pect. Moreover,  objects  nearer  than  the  fixa- 
tion point  seem  larger,  and  those  farther  away 
smaller;  while  if  there  are  two  objects  directly 
in  the  line  of  vision,  and  the  eye  first  fixates  the 
farther  and  then  the  nearer  of  them,  there  will 
be  apparent  a  doubling  of  the  object  not  fixated. 
Holding  a  meter  stick  directly  in  the  line  of 
sight,  and  looking  first  at  one  end,  then  the 
other,  and  then  at  the  middle,  will  cause  all  the 
blurring  which  any  mis-focussed  optical  appa- 
ratus is  heir  to  under  similar  circumstances. 

139.     Before  taking  up  this  phenomenon  of 
doubling  in  detail,  let  us  consider  one  differ- 
ence between  monocular  and  binocular  vision 
273 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
on  the  phenomenal  side.  If  a  ring  is  suspended 
before  one  with  its  diameter  in  the  median 
plane  of  the  head  while  one  eye  is  closed,  the 
task  of  thrusting  a  pencil  quickly  into  the  aper- 
ture of  the  ring  will  be  far  more  difficult  than 
when  both  eyes  are  open.  But  the  error  is  not 
so  much  one  of  direction  as  of  the  amount  of 
distance  at  which  the  ring  is  estimated  to  be. 
If  the  ring  moves,  and  any  co-ordination  be- 
tween vision  and  intended  movement  is  there- 
by obtained,  the  trials  will  result  in  far  greater 
accuracy  than  otherwise.  Nevertheless,  the  de- 
termination of  the  amount  of  movement  the 
ring  has  to  make  before  accuracy  of  thrust  is 
obtained,  is  of  slight  account;  for  there  would 
be  no  basis  on  which  accuracy  with  both  eyes 
open  without  movement  of  the  ring,  could  be 
equated  with  accuracy  with  but  one  eye  open 
while  the  ring  is  moving.  These  two  situations 
are  prime  to  each  other,  and  psychological 
primes  may  all  be  substituted  for  each  other  or 
not,  just  as  environmental  and  intentional  con- 
ditions determine.  But  so  much  does  movement 
enter  into  perceptions  of  depth,  that  the  eye 
must  be  regarded  primarily  as  a  motor  mechan- 
ism whenever  we  wish  to  refer  the  data  of 
space  getting  to  it.  For  if  we  produce  experi- 
mentally an  apparent  monocular  visual  im- 
274 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
passe, — unless  it  be  flashed  on  and  oft'  instan- 
taneously to  the  subject, — involuntary  accomo- 
dation and  re-accomodation  occur,  since  the 
eyes  are  almost  never  still,  even  though  we  in- 
trospectively  judge  them  to  be  so.  Again,  the 
two  retinae  do  not  function  singly,  however  in- 
dependently they  may  elaborate  their  stimula- 
tions antecedent  to  the  full  neural  discharge  ac- 
companying focality.  So  that  while  uniocular 
depth  may  be  obtained,  especially  with  move- 
ment, one  must  be  warned  against  assuming 
that  the  closure  of  one  eye  is  accompanied  by 
the  exclusion  of  unconscious  binocular,  accu- 
rate functioning  of  space. 

140.  As  a  matter  beyond  dispute,  however, 
depth  can  be  obtained  in  too  short  a  time  to  al- 
low for  any  eye  movements,  and  while  just  how 
great  a  depth  is  therein  apprehended  is  not  quite 
clear,  any  depth  at  all  would  be  sufficient  evi- 
dence of  the  fact  that  space  is  not  a  matter  of 
what  some  psychologists  incorrectly  term  ex- 
perience, for  spacial  content  is  one  thing,  while 
the  study  of  the  functions  whereby  we  get  that 
content  is  quite  another.  Furthermore,  to  find 
ourselves  accurately  and  prudentially  oriented 
among  our  surroundings  often  means  that  mo- 
tor habits  have  improved  upon  the  sensory 
content  of  vision  to  a  large  degree.  The  lowest 
275 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
levels  of  consciousness  are  devoid  of  content, 
but  they  are  not  on  that  account  lacking  in  those 
functions  out  of  which  accurate  judgments  may 
still  be  made.  To  treat  then  of  binocular  space, 
we  have  to  consider  first  the  fact  that  when  the 
eyes  are  focussed,  this  functioning  defines  the 
field  of  vision  in  terms  of  the  point  of  focus. 
Everything  beyond  and  nearer  than  that  point 
fails  to  arouse  the  same  sort  of  definite  stimu- 
lations from  the  eye  sockets;  as  well  as  it  fails 
to  open  such  co-ordinating  pathways  to  in- 
tended movements  as  does  the  fixation  reaction, 
to  which  all  others  are  subsidiary.  One  cannot 
converge  his  eyes  in  the  dark  correctly,  and 
exact  fixation  of  its  source  is  impossible  after  a 
light,  once  shown,  is  obscured.  If  we  turn  out 
the  electric  light  before  retiring,  not  only  will 
the  exact  position  of  the  lighting  fixture  be  lost 
to  consciousness,  but,  in  a  strange  room,  all 
movements  of  orientation  wall  be  suddenly 
swamped  out  of  the  motor  pattern  except  the 
vaguest  remnant  of  our  previous  intention. 
"Groping  in  the  dark"  is  just  another  way  of 
saying  that  intended  movements  guaranteed  in 
their  integrity  by  the  element  of  visual  fixation 
have  been  geometrically  decreased  by  the  bare 
arithmetical  loss  of  the  guiding  eye,  in  point 
both  of  accuracy  and  chain  continuity.  Now, 
276 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
as  a  usual  thing,  one  is  led  to  believe  that  the 
physiology  and  psychology  of  vision  have  made 
an  inseparable  contract.  The  notion  of  the  ex- 
act correspondence  between  the  amount  of  con- 
vergence of  the  eyes  and  the  apparent  distance 
of  the  object  from  the  observer  emanates  from 
the  very  bosom  of  physiological  optics,  as  well 
as  the  impossibility  of  single  vision  when  non- 
corresponding  points  are  being  stimulated. 
Previous  to  that  notion  there  was  much  support 
given  to  a  derivative  of  the  laws  of  optics 
known  as  the  projection  theory.  This  fell  out 
of  that  opaque  philosophical  era  in  which  the 
mind  was  considered  a  mirror  of  the  objects  of 
the  "external"  world.  And  yet  the  mind  was 
in  the  brain,  though  the  brain,  strange  to  say, 
was  also  external!  These  were  also  the  days 
when  the  mention  of  certain  unctious  words  was 
inevitably  followed  by  the  stupefaction  of  the 
non-elect.  Now  although  every  observation 
may  contribute  to  science,  and  while  the  search 
for  ordinal  correlations  is  symptomatic  of  one 
form  of  an  orderly  mind,  yet  any  one  who  ex- 
periments upon  vision  and  tries  to  ordinally 
correlate  every  visual  phenomenon  either  with 
one  of  the  laws  of  lenses  or  the  laws  of  phys- 
iological optics  exclusively,  will  find  that  in- 
stead of  obeying  the  laws  of  nature,  he  has  but 
277 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
obeyed  the  laws  of  the  logic  of  intention.  We 
do  find,  it  is  true,  that  objects  falling  on  non- 
corresponding  points  of  the  retinae, — that  is, 
upon  points  geometrically  non-identical, — pro- 
duce usually  double  vision  of  the  stimulus.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  however,  we  get  too  few  dou- 
ble images  for  the  theory  of  identical  points  to 
be  unlimitedly  applicable,  and  too  many  for  the 
notion  of  projection  to  be  entertained.  Im- 
portant work  is  being  done  at  present  upon  this 
very  item  of  binocular  vision,  and  the  general 
tendency  of  writers  is  to  be  catholic  in  the  use 
of  conclusions.  At  present,  also,  depth  or  solid- 
ity is  being  explained  by  saying  that  it  is  func- 
tioned by  retinal  conditions  which  exhibit  a 
half-way  state  between  single  and  double  vision. 
For  while  we  never  see  double  at  the  fovea, 
neither  does  the  marksman  see  two  targets,  nor 
the  microscopist  two  specimens,  though  both 
of  his  eyes  are  open.  To  say,  furthermore,  that 
the  eye  not  at  the  slit  of  the  gun  nor  at  the  eye 
piece  of  the  microscope  sees  nothing,  is  perjury 
to  the  facts. 

141.  For,  if  explanations  of  vision  are  to  be 
through  and  through  optical,  or  physiological, 
— in  order  to  satisfy  some  a-priori  theory  of 
mechanism, — then,  of  course,  at  inconvenient 
places  some  such  psychological  (!)  factor  as 
278 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
"habitual  neglect"  of  the  disturbing  fact  must 
be  solicited  in  the  final  reckoning.  For  even 
stereoscopic  cficcts  of  depth  persist  not  only 
when  the  eyes  are  converging,  but  even  when 
they  are  parallel,  and  when  they  are  diverging 
as  well;  and  distances  can  be  discriminated  as 
far  as  twenty  metres,  when  kinaesthetic  factors 
or  retinal  disparity  are  negligible.  "Neglect  of 
the  extraneous  elements," — by  which  is  usually 
meant  some  "mental"  hocus  which  is  invoked 
to  lubricate  the  irritating  fact, — will  not  serve 
as  an  explanation,  unless  it  be  allowed  to  serve 
whichever  side  such  a  factor  as  "habitual  ne- 
glect" or  "convenient  explanation"  may  prag- 
matically be  called  upon  to  support.  Other- 
wise, "experience"  and  "habit"  might  become 
terms  of  no  meaning!  "Neglect"  or  "experi- 
ence" have  nothing  to  do  with  the  laws  of  op- 
tics; but  so  hard  put  are  any  and  all  purveyors 
of  the  insurmountable  duality  of  stimulus  and 
content,  that  the  convenient  explanation  be- 
comes the  one  of  greatest  validity.  Now  the 
eye,  besides  being  the  functioner  of  vision,  is  a 
spherical  body,  whose  optical  effects  are  there- 
by often  translations  of  plane  surfaces  into 
sphericities.  Let  one  consider  along  with  this 
the  phenomenon  of  irradiation,  the  fact  of  much 
more  than  foveal  vision  being  functioned  nei- 
279 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
ther  as  infra-  or  ultra-foveal  perspective,  tlie  fact 
of  some  indisputable  monocular  depth,  of  some 
instantaneous  depth,  and  many  other  phenom- 
ena, and  he  will  be  factually  obliged  not  only  to 
infer,  but  imply  as  well  that  the  series  of  phys- 
ical phenomena,  the  series  of  physiologically- 
optical  phenomena,  and  the  series  of  psycholog- 
ical space  phenomena  are  three  series,  each  as 
empirical,  each  as  independent,  and  each  as 
likely  to  have  as  not  to  have  copious  common 
parts  with  the  others.  In  brief,  there  is  a  re- 
lation of  functional  dependence  rather  than  a 
numerically  causal  relation  existing  between 
all  these  terms;  and  only  the  barest,  and  one 
might  almost  say  inessential,  correlation  exists 
between  all  the  terms  of  any  one  series,  and  all 
the  terms  of  any  other.  But  here  is  the  main 
point,  that  incompatible  as  all  these  various 
series  may  be,  term  by  term,  their  summation 
in  all  functioning  for  space  may  become  self- 
corrective  of  any  discrepancies  in  the  partial 
explanation  which  any  one  of  them  may  aftord. 
Motor  adjustment,  on  the  basis  of  the  cumula- 
tive effects  of  re-fixation,  accompanied  either 
by  the  eye  itself  moving  or  the  stimulus  being 
moved  about,  has,  as  a  total  complex  in  the 
cross-section,  such  a  geometrically  greater  ef- 
fect than  the  simple  arithmetical  summation  of 
280 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
the  separable  data  iiiight  lead  one  to  expect, 
that  the  question  of  how  we  get  space  is  quite 
subsidiary  to  the  question  of  how  accurate  is 
the  space  so  gotten.  And  this  question  is  final- 
ly answerable  by  reference  those  ultra-ocular 
instruments  of  precision  mentioned  before, — I 
mean  by  reference  to  the  ability  of  two  con- 
structing engineers  to  make  their  separate  tun- 
nels meet  in  the  middle  of  a  mountain,  or  to  the 
ability  of  the  gunner  to  demolish  a  target  whose 
position  is  relayed  to  him  by  monoplane,  tele- 
phone, and  the  calculus. 

142.  The  insufficiency  of  such  an  account  of 
visual  space  may  perhaps  be  condoned  on  the 
strength  of  a  brief  mention  of  certain  geomet- 
rical figures  which  are  always  cited  as  evidence 
of  the  tattered  character  of  optical  impressions. 
I  mean  the  Mueller-Lyer,  the  Poggendorf,  the 
Zoellner  diagram,  and  others  of  their  kind. 
Likewise,  "Mach's  Book"  is  often  cited  as  espe- 
cially telling  evidence  against  the  stability  of 
space.  One  word  only  must  suffice  in  our  treat- 
ment of  this  and  all  similar  material.  The 
"illusory"  character  of  all  these  figures  consists 
in  the  questions  asked  of  the  subject  who  at- 
tends to  them.  For  example,  if  one  is  asked 
which  way  "Mach's  Book"  is  open, — toward  one 
or  away  from  one, — the  answer  is  that  it  is 
281 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
turned  in  either  direction,  just  as  it  appears  to 
be.  It  is  equally  either,  since  it  contains  the 
perspective  elements  of  both,— zY  is  all  common 
parts,  and  has  no  exclusive  relation  to  one 
aspect  or  the  other.  I'll  even  wager  that  it  was 
drawn  with  this  very  end  in  view.  The  Muell- 
er-Lyer  figure,  while  depending  largely  upon 
the  motor  element  in  vision  for  its  emphatic 
effect,  is  a  figure  about  which  only  tricky  ques- 
tions can  be  asked.  "Tell  which  line  is  the 
longer,"  as  a  sample  of  the  instructions  given 
to  the  subject,  should  be  replaced  by  "which 
figure  gives  the  more  contracted  effect?"  For 
the  threshold  of  this  contraction  can  be  easily 
found  by  the  rotation  of  the  movable  arrows 
about  their  axes,  and  the  whole  "illusion"  de- 
pends upon  the  absorption  of  one  set  of  local 
signs  by  another, — a  thing  we  found  in  connec- 
tion with  compass  points  and  intertones,  and 
which  we  are  as  likely  to  find  again  in  still  a 
different  set  of  phenomena  as  well. 

143.  This  ends  our  particular  treatment  of 
sensations  and  perceptions.  Be  it  known,  how- 
ever, that  some  of  the  attributes  we  found  in 
sensation  apply  also  to  perception.  For  in- 
stance, the  time  elapsing  between  the  presenta- 
tion of  such  an  object  as  a  marlinespike  and  the 
comprehension  of  it  as  a  splicing  instrument, 
282 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
would  be  called  the  latent-period  of  perception. 
The  latent-period  ending,  the  threshold  would 
be  reached.  Again,  perceptions  summate,  as 
for  example,  when  a  commander  surveys  the 
intricacies  of  a  general  engagement,  and  decides 
upon  the  particular  efficacy  of  bayonets  or  cav- 
alry sabres  to  turn  the  tide  of  affairs.  We  adapt 
to  perceptions  also.  Indeed,  one  of  the  clear- 
est ways  to  define  analytically  the  difference 
between  sensation  and  perception  is  to  enumer- 
ate the  attributes  which  both  exhibit,  and  to 
determine  why  not  all  of  them  are  carried  over 
into  the  structural  content  of  perception.  This 
is  hereby  submitted  as  a  question  for  the  stu- 
dent to  answer.  We  now  turn  to  motor  attune- 
ment  and  meaning. 

144.  It  will  be  recalled  that  the  motor  end 
of  the  neural  arc  was  mentioned  as  a  very  im- 
portant functioner  of  sensation.  Indeed,  unless 
the  whole  arc  is  active,  the  focalities  of  con- 
sciousness do  not  transpire.  Although  there  are 
several  ways  in  which  the  full  neural  release 
may  occur,  the  most  obvious  way  is  to  be  elab- 
orated in  the  case  of  the  instincts  and  the  emo- 
tions, where  the  reflex  excitation  is  practically 
total  for  the  whole  organism.  Another  form  of 
release  is  the  bare  maintenance  of  the  arc  in  a 
state  of  low  resistance  to  a  low  current,  as  in 
283 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
cases  of  adaptation,  when  no  obviously  visible 
change  in  the  motor  aspect  comes  with  con- 
tinued functioning.  Other  forms  of  the  motor 
aspect  of  release  are  convergence  and  accomo- 
dation. The  continued  maintenance  of  bodily 
positions  with  regard  to  the  stimulus  is,  like- 
wise, just  as  motor  as  was  the  initiation  of  such 
motor  relations;  and,  likewise,  just  as  motor  as 
is  the  inhibition  of  unequilibrating  tendencies 
from  other  motor  complexes  which  might  sup- 
plant them  upon  the  slightest  provocation.  But 
by  far  the  most  significant  sets  of  motor  re- 
sponses are  those,  which,  either  following  ac- 
comodation, following  convergence,  or  follow- 
ing the  inhibition  of  spreads  and  wiltings,  lead 
to  the  further  orientation  of  the  organism  in 
reference  to  its  surroundings.  It  follows  upon 
this  that  the  stimuli  are  functioned  in  a  pattern 
on  the  basis  of  which  we  may  deal  furtheringly 
with  the  pliable  part  of  the  environment.  In 
such  cases,  also,  the  more  closely  related  the 
exciting  stimulus  is  to  the  chief  furthering  ele- 
ment in  the  environment,  the  more  automatic- 
ally does  the  chain  of  reflexes  run  off',  and  the 
less  focal  does  anything  but  the  end  effect  to  be 
reached,  become.  Now  the  body  is  an  organ- 
ism, and  as  such  is  an  example  of  parts  func- 
tioning a  whole.  Likewise,  the  environment  is 
284 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
at  times  organized  into  a  definite  whole  leading 
to  some  general  effect  into  which  the  effects  of 
the  separate  parts,  for  a  time,  to  be  submerged. 
The  motor  adjustment  to  an  environment  then 
will  be  a  furthering  one,  just  to  the  extent  that 
the  cue-sensation  and  the  resultant  motor  re- 
sponse are  co-ordinated  with  the  possibilities 
of  the  developing  environment.  Otherwise,  less 
than  the  low  current  required  in  adaptation  and 
habit  will  be  developed  in  the  responsive  organ- 
ism. For  habit  is  first  based  on  the  ease  with 
which  a  response  is  shot  off,  and  second,  upon 
the  lack  of  focality  plus  the  gain  in  friction- 
less  orientation  which  the  completed  response 
entails.  With  mannerisms  and  unconsciously 
learned  responses  the  chapter  on  the  emotional 
complex  will  have  to  do.  From  the  internal 
sensations  as  well  as  from  the  general  tonic 
reflexes  of  the  body  we  gain  a  momentum  which 
is  indisputably  fundamental  for  the  superstruc- 
ture of  learned  habits,  perceptions  of  relation, 
and  the  more  special  extero-ceptive  sensibilities. 
The  motor  attunement  developed  as  we  ap- 
proach maturity  is  always  guaranteed,  though 
not  always  directed,  by  the  residual  environ- 
ment and  funded  responses  within  the  body. 
The  general  character  of  this  bodily  momentum 
is  not  introspectable, — it  is  physiological,  and 
285 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
unconscious.  The  environment  which  the  un- 
conscious responses  function,  being  largely  un- 
observable,  is  not  what  one  ordinarily  means 
by  his  special  environment,  for  this  latter  is 
usually  unsteady,  and  by  virtue  of  its  shifts  in 
and  out  of  focality,  has  sometimes  erroneously 
been  called  that  environment  in  reference  to 
which  one  is  free.  "1  can  look  or  not,"  "I  can 
close  my  ears  to  it,'  "I  can  take  it  or  leave  it," 
are  expressions  not  referred  to  the  vegetative 
system,  but  to  the  focally  sensorial  environment 
of  our  organism.  But  whatever  this  may  ulti- 
mately turn  out  to  mean,  one  can  never  say  that 
he  is  unresponsive  to  his  surroundings,  even 
though  the  sensorial  environment  is  often  made 
up  of  series  which  have  many  missing  members, 
— a  thing  which  partly  accounts  for  the  notion 
of  freedom;  while  the  perceptual  content, — the 
environment  of  logical  structure,  of  learning,  of 
observable  furtherances,  and  the  like, — is  much 
more  continuous.  And  in  this  case  it  is  often 
a  matter  of  observation  that  the  so-called  "free- 
dom of  choice"  is  due  to  the  forgetting  of  the 
steps  which  lead  to  the  present  responses. 

145.     Meanings  are  implicit  in  any  definable 

pattern   of  response.     In  psychology,   at  least, 

anything  means  what  one  perceives  it  to  he,  as 

well  as  what  one  is  about  to  do  in  the  presence 

286 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
of  it.  Environmental  pattern  and  motor  pat- 
tern,— besides  these  two  there  is  nothing  to  be 
said  at  the  start.  Meaning  for  logic  is  equiva- 
lence. When  an  author  writes,  "That  is  to  say," 
or  "I  mean  by  this,"  he  always  gives  an  equiva- 
lent expression,  to  get  his  idea  into  those  con- 
sciousnesses which  may  be  somewhat  oblique  to 
his  own, — his  own  having  been  satisfied  by  his 
first  expression.  Psychologically,  this  would  be 
a  case  of  the  substitution  of  stimulus,  and  a  re- 
cognition not  only  of  the  latent-period  of  per- 
ception in  others,  but  also  of  the  lack  of  any  psy- 
chological congruence  between  his  vocabulary 
and  that  of  his  readers.  Again,  when  a  sound 
is  heard  in  the  dead  of  night  and  some  say 
"mouse,"  while  others  say  "burglar,"  there  is 
no  equivalence  in  anything  but  the  probability 
of  either,  and  in  the  sensorial  partial  equiva- 
lence of  both.  On  the  other  hand,  when  one 
says,  "I  mean  that  it  shall  take  place,"  the  strict- 
est psychological  interpretation  of  this  state- 
ment becomes,  "focally  no  inhibitions  are  caus- 
ing my  predictions  to  lose  their  pattern."  But 
in  either  case  there  is  motor  readiness, — the 
urgency  attendant  upon  a  meaningful  percep- 
tion. 

146.     This  brings  us  to  what  we  call  pre-per- 
ceptions.    The  learned  readiness  to  take  one  ele- 
287 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
ment  of  the  stimulus  for  the  whole,  (the  motor 
discharging  upon  any  complex  situation  in 
terms  of  one  of  the  specific  elements),  marks  the 
so-called  "intelligent"  man,  as  distinguished 
from  the  imbecile.  Stupidity  is  a  complex  of 
interminable  latent-period  and  motor  incoordi- 
nation. In  such  a  case  the  chain  reflexes  lack 
automaticity,  and  the  cue-stimulations  have  so 
many  common  parts  that  they  fail  to  arouse  any 
definite  pattern  of  activity  upon  the  environ- 
ment. This  pre-perception  or  apperception,  as 
it  has  been  equivocally  called,  is  not  the  same 
as  the  introspection  upon  what  one  is  about 
to  do.  When  a  motor  response  has  been  nipped 
in  the  bud,  or  inhibited,  and  one  is  asked  to  re- 
port upon  what  he  would  have  done,  had  not 
such  interruption  prevented,  the  report  as  given 
need  not  be  taken  as  equivalent  to  what  is  uni- 
formly the  case  when  no  nipping  occurs.  For 
the  report  arises  out  of  congested  conscious- 
ness,—a  thing  quite  different  from  freely  func- 
tioned reactions.  Of  course,  the  introspection 
in  such  a  case  may  be  valuable  in  that  it  defines 
the  introspection,  for  often  by  its  means  one  can 
tell  how  unified  is  the  personality  from  whom 
it  proceeds.  The  difficulty  with  introspection 
in  such  a  case  is  that  it  makes  focal  certain  ele- 
ments which  normally  would  never  become  so, 
288 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 

and  as  such  subverts  the  elements  involved. 
That  which  is  brewed  in  introspection  is  usually 
only  the  unimportant  non-focal  material  becom- 
ing focal,  plus  the  grammatical  effluvia  incident 
to  the  symbolization  of  the  former  contents  and 
processes  by  means  of  speech.  Introspection  is 
not  only  reduplicated  consciousness,  but  it 
manifests  characteristics  which  the  original 
consciousness  did  not  properly  have.  Pre-per- 
ception  is  potential  consciousness,  but  pre-per- 
ception  as  reported  in  introspection  may  not  be 
at  all  the  same  as  it  might  have  been.  And  the 
way  to  test  the  validity  of  pre-perception  is  by 
check  experiments  in  the  laboratory,  or  by  out- 
side reference  to  the  verbosity  of  the  subject. 

Now  potential  consciousness  is  indefinable 
except  in  terms  of  what  does  actually  happen 
without  the  interruption  of  introspection.  Can 
this  be  told  by  speech?  Evidently  not.  Intro- 
spection may  now  and  then  get  a  few  of  the 
overtones  of  consciousness,  but  introspection  is 
a  reversal  of  the  general  current  of  its  data,  and 
as  such,  is  valuable  for  that  sort  of  reversed  data 
and  none  other.  I  neglect  and  disparage  the 
word  "apperception"  because  it  is  a  term  which 
implies  that  we  make  up  our  perceptions  out  of 
tag-rag  sensations  by  adding  to  them  from  a 
"mental"  storehouse.  Things  are  summed  and 
289 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
get  additional  properties  thereby,  not  out  of  a 
hypothetical  "mental"  storehouse,  but  by  vir- 
tue of  the  interaction  of  the  neural  currents  to 
function  an  interacting  environment.  The  old 
idea  of  the  soul  being  something  that  thinks  and 
thereby  adjudicates  sensory  content  has  been 
evaporated  to  its  last  whiff,  and  with  it  has  gone 
every  notion  of  dualism  and  duplicity,  for  these 
two  are  indeed  twins. 

147.  Along  with  pre-perception  comes  pre- 
sensation.  This  is  one  of  the  cardinal  items  in 
memory.  When,  for  example,  upon  the  mere 
mention  of  the  name  of  an  object  we  obtain  sen- 
sory contents  of  it,  we  are  said  to  remember  or 
to  have  pre-sensations  of  it.  This  comes  about 
by  virtue  of  the  fact  that  we  have  gained  identi- 
cal responses  to  the  various  elements  in  the  ob- 
ject, so  that  its  color,  shape,  name,  and  so  on, 
are  all  functionable  by  the  same  response.  Now, 
the  qualities  and  properties  of  objects  have  no 
more  rigidly  defined  geographical  position 
than  have  their  names,  and  pre-sensation  is  but 
a  case  of  obtaining  part  of  an  object  in  sensory 
content  from  the  motor  response  to  that  which 
for  us  is  the  "open  sesame"  to  such  content. 

148.  With  a  brief  consideration  of  the  na- 
ture of  speech,  this  long  chapter  must  close.  So 
far  as  evidences  are  to  be  trusted,  speech  can 

290 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
be  traced  evolutionally  to  cries  of  danger,  coo- 
ings  and  purrings  in  the  mating  season,  wait- 
ings, cacchinations  and  "burblings."  Speech 
arose  apparently  from  the  needs  of  communica- 
tion, but  seems  also  to  be  a  derivative  of  self- 
amusement  as  well.  From  the  first  wild  cries  of 
savage  life, — whether  from  anger,  fear,  affec- 
tion or  other  situations, — we  have  derived  the 
potent  elements  of  speech,  these,  later  on,  being 
added  to  out  of  the  need  of  orientation  to  a 
more  complex  and  tranquiller  environment. 
Part  of  language  is  onomatopoetic,  that  is,  the 
words  are  direct  imitations  of  the  sounds  of 
the  things  referred  to.  The  rest  is  quite  arbi- 
trary and  conventional.  The  vowel  element  in 
language  appears  to  be  more  directly  related 
to  the  primitive  order  of  things  than  does  the 
consonantal  element;  for  in  every  situation  in 
which  language  is  used  forcibly  and  emotional- 
ly, the  pitch  element  takes  precedence  over  all 
else,  and  with  vowels  alone  these  nuances  of 
pitch  are  functionable. 

149.  Language  is  also  geographical  rather 
than  hereditary.  A  child  of  Chinese  parents, 
brought  up  from  the  beginning  in  the  midst  of 
people  of  a  different  nationality,  will  speak  only 
the  language  of  its  foster  parents.  This  is  not 
accounted  for  by  the  shape  of  the  mouth  cavity, 
291 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
even  though  the  palatal  arch  of  different  peoples 
is  of  different  height  and  form;  but  it  is  due  to 
the  extreme  flexibility  of  the  movable  parts  of 
the  vocal  apparatus.  These  are  the  tongue,  the 
lips,  the  lower  jaw,  and  the  muscles  of  the 
throat.  The  extremely  important  socially  or- 
ganizing part  language  has  played  in  his- 
tory is  attested  both  by  the  social  amalgamation 
of  races  having  a  common  language,  and  the 
political  unions  of  people  of  a  common  tongue. 
But,  over  against  this  fact  is  the  anciently  re- 
ported historical  event  of  a  conquering  people 
making  the  language  of  the  conquered  the  po- 
lite language  of  their  court.  In  these  cases, 
however,  the  absorption  of  culture  has  gone 
hand  in  hand  with  the  passion  for  knowing  the 
language  in  which  such  culture  was  developed. 

150.  Language  is  also  a  reaction.  To  men- 
tion the  name  of  something  seen,  heard  or  han- 
dled, is  to  deal  with  it  twice;  and  such  dealing 
involves  diff'erent  elements  of  consciousness, 
and  consequently  differing  effects.  Further- 
more, the  voice,  by  virtue  of  its  being  produced 
in  the  head,  has  an  advantage  over  other  reac- 
tions in  several  ways.  In  the  first  place,  the  re- 
action to  auditory  stimuli  is  quicker  than  to  al- 
most any  other  kind.  Furthermore,  the  domi- 
nance which  the  head  plays  in  personality,  as 
292 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
well  as  the  fact  that  the  face  is  far  and  away 
the  focus  of  all  social  intercourse,  makes  the 
language  of  a  person  his  piece  de  resistance  in 
a  majority  of  social  matters.  When  one  con- 
siders how  largely  information  comes  by  way 
of  words,  the  place  that  words  have  in  human 
aftairs  seems  clearly  the  chiefest.  Language,  as 
a  reaction,  is  thus  a  doubling  of  responses  to  the 
situations  in  which  it  is  used.  Very  little  of  it 
is  absolutely  necessary,  for  most  discussions  end 
with  the  definitions  of  the  terms  first  employed, 
and  concerning  which  so  many  misunderstood 
statements  were  made.  For  words,  as  symbols, 
are  not  bound  to  follow  the  orders  of  the  things 
symbolized,  and  as  a  result,  evaporation  of 
meaning  frequently  occurs.  But  it  is  undeniable 
that  relations  and  functions  could  not  have  been 
mutually  considered  without  their  aid. 

151.  The  order  in  which  a  child  learns  a 
language  is  curious.  Contrary  to  the  report  of 
fond  parents,  the  imitation  by  a  child  of  the 
sounds  and  mouth  movements  of  its  parents  is 
fiot  flattering  to  the  famous  intelligence  of  the 
human  race.  The  child  responds  to  the  stimuli 
of  its  teacher  by  the  best  way  it  can,  but  hard 
consonants,  such  as  'k,'  'f,'  't,'  and  the  like  are 
imitated  by  the  use  of  their  softer  forms,  'g,' 
'v,'  and  'd.'  Furthermore,  it  learns  class  names 
293 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
or  general  terms,  before  it  learns  words  of  se- 
lective discrimination.  It  speaks  of  itself  in 
the  third  person  before  it  uses  the  pronoun  I, 
for  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  it  is  thoroughly 
realistic  in  its  absorption  of  all  data. 

152.  Nevertheless,  the  importance  of  lan- 
guage does  not  lie  in  the  factors  of  its  origin. 
Language,  as  a  quotidian  commodity,  gets  used 
in  certain  ways  not  to  be  explained  by  reference 
to  its  source.  Words  slip  their  moorings  and 
exhibit  common  parts  whose  existence  was  little 
suspected  beforehand;  besides,  the  perception 
of  new  relations  in  things  does  not  always  go 
with  the  invention  of  a  new  word, — instead,  we 
put  together  the  old  ones  and  make  them  do 
a  little  longer.  In  fact,  all  the  new  words  are 
either  derived  from  dead  languages,  or  are 
blurted  out  unexpectedly  in  slang  and  banter. 
These  developments  are  not  introspectable 
either.  We  speak  by  momentum,  and  mostly 
out  of  the  co-conscious,  when  speaking,  in  our 
normal  speed  and  confidence.  In  this  point, 
language  is  exceptionally  typical  of  all  unhin- 
dered consciousness:  to  function  speech  and 
then  to  recall  it  is  the  same  sort  of  manifesta- 
tion as  seeing,  hearing  and  the  like,  and  then 
introspecting  upon  it.  The  alterations  that  oc- 
cur to  us  in  point  of  what  we  would  have  better 
294 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 

said,  is  the  same  sort  of  consciousness  as  the 
introspective  consciousness.  For  neither  is 
speech  ordinally  correlated  with  the  chrono- 
genetic  order  of  our  ideas,  nor  is  it  the  same 
as  later  corrections  of  it  would  indicate  to  have 
been  our  exact  meaning.  It  has,  however,  com- 
mon parts  with  both.  The  later  correction  indi- 
cates logical  determinations,  while  its  lack  of 
correspondence  with  the  play  of  ideas  illustrates 
that  things  can  get  into  another  than  the  first  or- 
der of  cross-sectioning, 

153.  Now  an  idea  is  either  an  attribute  of 
a  thing,  a  part  of  a  whole,  the  pattern  of  a 
thing  or  a  part,  or  the  terminus  of  such  a  pat- 
tern, functionally  construed,  and  so  on.  Ideas 
are  anything  being  functioned  by  a  nervous  sys- 
tem. Functioning  is  the  same  here  as  knowing, 
and  the  only  reason  we  distinguish  between 
things  not  yet  known  and  things  known  at  the 
present  time,  is  because  the  stages  of  their  being 
first  functioned,  spoken  of,  and  logically  or- 
dered, reveal  in  this  order  relations  which 
through  summation  and  fusion  have  been  over- 
looked. We  use  the  term  idea  also  to  indicate 
usually  that  some  such  development  is  in  pro- 
gress, rather  than  that  bare  noticing  is  all  that 
is  being  done.  The  language  reaction  helps  sig- 
nificantly here,  for  by  means  of  it  we  are  en- 
295 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
abled  to  select  more  elements  for  retention  than 
otherwise,  and  to  respond  specifically  to  things 
to  which  speechless  animals  cannot  be  discov- 
ered to  be  at  all  tropistic.     Consequently,  the 
more    accurately   language   is    used,    the   more 
things  can  be  enumerated,  the  more  patterns  and 
relations  can  be  specified  and  filed  away,  and 
the  more  comparing  of  ideas  can  be   accom- 
plished.    Following  this,  the  business  of  argu- 
ment   reorders    the    data    and    reveals    coinci- 
dences   and    contradictions.     We    thus    obtain 
considerable  positive  information  by  the  inter- 
play of  language,  quite  apart  from  the  phys- 
ical presence  of  the  data  to  which  it  refers.     It 
is  due  to  the  fact  that  language,  apart  from  the 
things,  may  reveal  relations  not  before  noticed 
in  the  things  themselves,  that  we  have  devel- 
oped the  notion  of  ideas  of  things.    For  ideas, 
in  that  they  are  attributes  of,  parts  of,  plans  of, 
and  the  like,  imply  on  this  account  no  duality 
between  thought  and  thing.    Insofar  as  they  are 
turned    into    words, — auditory    symbols, — they 
seem  on  this  account  to  necessitate  a  cleft  be- 
tween  matters   of   another  sense   than   that   of 
sound,  as,  for  instance,  when  we  mention  tastes 
and  sights,  and  then,  by  momentum  and  pre- 
ponderance, to  cover  the  whole  of  consciousness 
with  this  sort  of  debilitating  predicate.     Unless 
296 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
"consciousness  of"  means  that  there  are  several 
orders  in  the  cross-section  into  which  things  can 
get,  it  has  no  meaning;  for  besides  this  and  se- 
lective response,  nothing  is  fundamental  upon 
which  it  can  be  based. 

154.  The  parts  of  speech,  actually  disre- 
garded except  in  grammars,  are  significant  for 
this  treatment.  Nouns  are  language-equiva- 
lents of  things,  principally,  as  well  as  of  parts, 
and  frequently  of  orders  and  patterns.  But  or- 
ders are  equivalent  to  verbs  whenever  there  is 
functional  significance  in  them.  Also,  genetic- 
ally, nouns  refer  to  sensation  masses,  while 
verbs  refer  to  motor  intention.  Attributes  of 
"things"  are  primarily  adjectives,  while  the 
functional  elements  of  "wholes"  and  "things" 
are  adverbial.  The  noun  is  thus  either  made 
of  adjectives,  or  made  of  verbs  and  other  parts 
of  speech.  Relations  are  expressed  by  the  use  of 
prepositions,  conjunctions,  and  verbs,  while  sud- 
den inhibitions  are  functioned  by  the  interjec- 
tions. Of  all  the  parts  of  speech,  the  personal 
pronoun  is  the  latest  in  development.  Its  mer- 
curial character  is  a  matter  of  even  common 
notice,  for  besides  referring  to  the  cross-section 
equivocally  for  different  spaces  of  time,  it  refers 
either  to  a  very  insignificant  part  of  conscious- 
ness one  moment,  or  to  the  dominant  motive  at 
297 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
another.  The  intentional  suppression  of  ideas, 
commonly  called  lying,  is  thus  made  exceedingly 
easy,  for  the  pronoun  I  is  a  shifting  center  of 
reference  at  best,  and  all  that  is  said  about  it 
must  be  said  in  terms  of  the  elements  contrib- 
uting to  it  as  a  center.  Being  guaranteed  by  its 
periphery,  and  not  being  something  subtle  and 
within,  the  pronoun  I  and  what  it  means  must 
always  be  omitted  when  the  accuracy  and  truth 
of  a  matter  is  at  stake.  The  reader  is  at  liberty 
to  indulge  in  all  the  implications  in  the  above 
statements. 

155.  Language  when  printed,  as  in  this  pres- 
ent form,  is  to  be  distinguished  from  the  utter- 
ances of  steady  speech.  For  if  one  wishes  to 
be  read,  he  must  seek  to  present  his  words  in 
such  a  form  that  as  many  common  parts  will  be 
present  as  there  are  persons  for  whom  the  ut- 
terances are  to  be  stimuli.  And  while  conces- 
sions are  always  made,  they  are  not  to  be 
thought  of  as  concessions  which  betray  the  au- 
thor of  a  book  into  compromises.  To  be  able 
to  get  a  hearing  on  account  of  using  motor 
terms,  well-chosen  illustrations,  and  the  like,  is 
not  the  same  as  sneaking  up  behind  a  person 
and  making  him  consent  before  he  is  aware  of 
what  the  drift  of  the  matter  is.  Seldom  is  the 
flow  of  any  person's  ideas  good  enough  to  speak 
298 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 
or  print  without  castigation  and  reordering, 
neither  is  any  hard  and  fast  plan  in  composition 
ever  strictly  adhered  to.  Likewise,  in  speech 
and  writing  we  respond  to  the  environment  of 
the  audience  and  the  environment  of  the  sub- 
ject matter,  and  seek  to  find  and  express  com- 
mon parts  in  both  environments,  so  that  as 
many  as  we  wish  to  stimulate  may  be  shown  the 
object,  and  have  their  threshold  lowered  by 
removing  the  inhibiting  inessentials.  In  the  plan 
of  a  book,  however,  there  need  be  no  conces- 
sions. The  logical  order  of  presentation  is  not 
either  linguistic  nor  individual. 

156.  Sensation  and  perception  in  the  con- 
scious cross-section  are  thus  seen  to  be  items 
whose  structural  differences  are  chiefest.  We 
shall  now  turn  to  another  set  of  responses  in 
which  we  shall  not  find  structure  central,  but 
rather  disorganization,  due  to  continual  inhibi- 
tion, fusion  and  confusion.  1  refer  to  the  emo- 
tions anci  the  instincts.  To  a  large  degree,  also, 
we  shall  have  to  consider  consciousness  lateral- 
ly and  developmentally  in  order  to  understand 
the  status  of  any  emotion  in  the  cross-section.  As 
it  is,  moreover,  this  book  is  but  an  outline,  and 
sketches,  rather  than  fills  in,  the  patterns  it  em- 
ploys in  passing.  But  it  makes  no  attempt  to 
explain  away  anything  that  is,  unless,  per- 
299 


THE  CONCCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
chance,    it    be    certain    beliefs    in    non-existent 
things,  and  this  is  not  only  within  its  province 
to  do,  but  also  its  particular  business  not  to 
leave  undone. 

Bibliography 

I.  General. 

Holt,  E.  B.,  "The  Concept  of  Consciousness," 
especially  Chapter  XI,  "Sensation  and  Percep- 
tion in  the  Conscious  Cross-Section,"  and  Chap- 
ter XV,  "The  Emancipation  of  Physiology  from 
Philosophy." 

Sherrington,  C.  S.,  "The  Integrative  Action 
of  the  Nervous  System,"  Lectures  I  to  VII. 

II.  Touch. 

Rivers,  W.  H.  R.,  and  Head,  Henry,  "A  Hu- 
man Experiment  in  Nerve  Division,"  in 
"Brain,"  November,  1908. 

Titchener,  E.  B.,  "A  Text-Book  of  Psychol- 
ogy," especially  pp.  143-159. 

Myers,  C.  S.,  "A  Text-Book  of  Experimental 
Psychology,"  Chapters  II  and  XVII. 

III.     Smell  and  Taste. 
Titchener,  E.  B.,  op.  cit.  pp.  114-141. 
Myers,  C.  S.,  op.  cit.  Chapter  VIII. 

IV.     Kinaesthetic  Senses. 
Titchener,  E.  B.,  op.  cit.  pp.  160-182. 
Myers,  C.  S.,  op.  cit.    Chapters  V  and  XVI. 
300 


THE  SENSITIVE  AND  PERCEPTIVE  ORGANS 

V.  Hearing. 
Titchener,  E.  B.,  op.  cit.  pp.  93-112. 
Myers,  C.  S.,  op.  cit.    Chapters  III  and  IV. 
Mach,  E.,  op.  cit.  "Sensations  of  Tone." 

VI.  Vision. 

•      Titchener,  E.  B.,  op.  cit.  pp.  59-92. 
Myers,  C.  S.,  Chapters  VI  and  VII. 

VII.     Space  Perceptions. 
Titchener,  E.  B.,  op.  cit.  pp.  303-373. 
Myers,  C.  S.,  op.  cit.    Chapters  XVIII  to  XXIII. 
Pierce,  A.  H.,  "Studies  in  Auditory  and  Vis- 
ual Space  Perception." 

James,    W.,    "Psychology,    Briefer    Course," 
Chapters  XV,  XVII,  XX  and  XXI. 
Mach,  E.,  op.  cit.  pp.  41-118. 
Holt,  E.  B.,  "The  Place  of  Ilhisory  Experience 
in  a  Realistic  World,"  in  the  "New  Realism." 


301 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 

1.  This  chapter  will  consider  emotions,  in- 
stincts, and  their  derivatives.  Strictly  defined, 
both  instincts  and  emotions  are  motor  responses 
to  disordered  situations.  Their  stimuli  are  ob- 
jects consisting  of  series,  many  of  whose  terms 
are  missing.  Thus  mal-adjustment  of  the  or- 
ganism, and  a  disordered  object  are  the  func- 
tional and  content  sides  of  emotions  and  in- 
stincts. 

2.  Responses  define  environments,  and  thus 
the  emotional  reaction  may  be  functioned  by 
one  organism  in  a  situation  which  arouses  no 
such  reaction  in  another  organism.  On  the  oth- 
er hand,  a  disorderly  environment  may  be 
flanked  on  all  sides  by  an  orderly  one,  and  so 
arouse  various  types  of  orderly  or  disorderly 
reactions  on  the  part  of  organisms  confronting 
it,  with  the  result  that  the  ensuing  motor  dis- 
charges, and  not  the  nameable  sensory  content, 
must  often  be  taken  as  the  criteria  of  "what  the 
organism  is  doing."  Environments  alter  and 
organisms  change,  and  the  steps  by  which  these 
alterations  and  changes  occur  need  not  be  or- 
dinally  correlated.    So  that  the  mal-adjustment 

302 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
of  the  organism  to  the  situation  is  one,  but  not 
the  only  disturbing  factor  in  emotional  and  in- 
stinctive action.  Nevertheless,  the  usual  effect 
of  such  mal-adjustment  is  cumulative, — it  in- 
creases the  disorder.  The  fusion  we  met  with  in 
sensation  is  antityped  here  in  confusion,  attend- 
ed by  the  instant  arousal  of  general  skeletal  re- 
action and  glandular  secretion,  usually  resulting 
in  entire  translation  of  the  whole  body  through 
space.  Instinct  is  as  sudden  as  reflex,  and  emo- 
tion as  positionless  as  feeling-tone,  and  both  in- 
stincts and  emotions  lack  that  element  in  per- 
ception known  as  pattern.  They  both  arise  in 
situations  we  are  unable  to  grasp  significantly, 
and  consist  of  the  suddenest  and  strongest  out- 
goings of  energy  of  which  we  are  capable.  They 
follow  a  complete  chopping  off  of  former  focal 
consciousness  and,  instead  of  leading  to  further 
activities  of  profitable  orientation,  lead,  unless 
brought  to  a  close  by  exhaustion  or  mutual  in- 
hibition, to  a  situation  of  tatterdemalion  con- 
sciousness. 

3.  The  term  "emotional  complex"  is  used  to 
indicate  that  these  reactions  usually  keep 
crowding,  impelling,  or  inhibiting  each  other. 
Furthermore,  they  often  get  insufTiciently  shot- 
off,  and  as  a  result  become  suppressed, — the  un- 
shot  residue  smouldering  away  as  an  uncon- 
303 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
scious  readiness  of  neural  response.  The  un- 
conscious has  no  content,  but  it  constituted  sole- 
ly of  functions,  and  it  is  this  condition  which 
renders  obscure  the  causes  of  the  breaking  loose 
of  smothered  emotions.  When  a  form  of  con- 
sciousness has  no  content,  it  cannot  be  satis- 
factorily described  by  the  use  of  nouns.  Verbs 
and  adverbs  are  alone  to  be  used.  This  is  even 
witnessed  by  the  fact  of  the  current  terms  for 
the  emotions  and  instincts:  fear,  flight,  pugnac- 
ity, wonder, — such  terms  are  all  basically 
verbs,  and  only  made  over  into  nouns  to  satisfy 
the  pragmatic  urgencies  of  speech.  There  is 
no  object,  fear;  there  are  only  persons  fearing: 
nothing  is  flight;  there  are  only  legs  animatedly 
decreasing  the  parallactic  angle  in  the  eyes  of 
the  observer.  This  is  not  to  be  taken,  however, 
to  mean  that  fears  and  anxieties,  for  example, 
are  groundless.  It  means  nothing  of  the  sort. 
But  in  every  case  of  emotion  or  instinct,  one  is 
functioning  a  content  less  definable  than  one 
finds  to  be  the  case  with  sensation  or  percep- 
tion. And  just  as  one  has  a  red  sensation  or  a 
logical  perception,  so  in  the  case  of  these  disor- 
dered responses  now  being  considered,  one  has 
a  fearful  or  a  pugnacious  consciousness,  and 
this  consciousness  always  has  an  object. 

4.     Emotions    and    instincts,    then,    are    the 
304 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
names  chiefly  applied  to  the  functional  aspect 
of  disorderly  consciousness.  The  content  of 
such  consciousness  may  be  composed  of  any  ob- 
jects whatsoever.  Thus  we  may  be  afraid  of 
a  green,  a  black,  a  tall,  a  hollow,  or  a  scurrying 
object,  each  of  which  are  yet  green,  black,  or 
tall,  etc.,  exclusive  of  their  emotional  status.  We 
are  emotional  or  instinctive  toward  anything 
at  all.  And  it  is  on  account  of  the  lack  of  spe- 
cific arousers  of  these  mal-adjustments  that  we 
have  no  terms  which  specifically  differentiate 
the  environment  into  special  contents  for  this 
and  that  emotion  or  instinct.  Our  strictest  defi- 
nition in  this  case  will  therefore  concern  the 
neural  discharges  incident  to  their  appearance. 
Two  main  points  are  profitably  noted  here.  The 
first  of  these  is  the  phenomenon  of  irradiation  of 
the  generating  impulse  which  arouses  centers  of 
functionation  not  normally  stimulated  by  the 
object  of  emotion  or  instinct  when  it  is  in  an- 
other environment.  The  second  point  is  what 
is  called  the  auto-catalytic  character  of  neural 
release.  The  first  of  these, — irradiation, — is  not 
exclusively  a  phenomenon  of  the  neurology  of 
instincts  and  emotions.  We  spoke  of  it  in  the 
first  few  pages  of  the  last  chapter  as  significant 
even  for  the  simpler  responses.  Synaesthesia 
has  also  been  defined  as  correlated  with  it.  Like- 
305 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
wise,  pre-perception  and  pre-sensation  are  ir- 
radiation phenomena  as  well.  What  then,  shall 
we  say  is  idiomatic  in  the  irradiation  aspect  of 
the  mal-adjustment  phenomena?  Why,  this: 
that  the  irradiation  is  of  such  a  type  as  to 
arouse  non-perceptual  (i.  e.,  non-stabilizing)  re- 
flexes of  the  chain  type.  Thus  it  is  that  the  as- 
pect of  the  total  situation  confronting  the  or- 
ganism is  inseparable  from  a  full  account  of 
the  responses  generating  the  cross-section, 

5.  Now  for  the  second, — the  auto-catalytic 
character  of  the  neural  releases.  Auto-cataly- 
sis occurs  when  one  of  the  products  of  a  reac- 
tion acts  as  a  catalyser,  catalysers  being  those 
things  (substances)  which  hasten  reactions  by 
their  mere  presence,  without  entering  into  the 
formula  themselves.  The  friction  of  the  match 
sets  free  the  chemical  energy  of  the  powder  in 
the  magazine,  but  the  friction  is  not  an  element 
in  the  formula.  Again,  the  decomposition  of 
hydrogen  peroxide  by  platinum  black  is  a  case 
of  catalytic  action.  From  the  best  evidence  we 
have  today,  it  is  safe  to  assert  that  neuronic  re- 
lease is  a  type  of  catalytic  action,  especially 
in  the  matter  of  the  establishment  of  settled  dis- 
positions in  the  organism.  For  upon  the  very 
first  functioning  of  a  nerve,  the  nerve  path  be- 
comes sensitized,  the  threshold  lowered,  and 
306 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
further  stimulation  rendered  easier.  Indeed, 
this  fact  might  be  said  to  be  the  neural  basis 
of  logical  classification,  and  we  might  also  add 
that  the  reception  or  rejection  by  the  various 
organs  of  the  body  of  nutriment  and  sensory 
contents  is  exactly  what  choice  in  its  lowest 
terms  means.  The  sensitization  of  the  neural 
paths  is  indeed  the  formation  of  an  asymmetric- 
al series.  To  return  to  auto-catalysis,  the  re- 
lease of  reflex  energy  in  the  nerve  cells  is  ac- 
companied by  the  accumulation  of  deposits  that 
unite  to  form  a  veritable  storage  cell,  "which  is 
capable,  under  appropriate  conditions,  of  being 
discharged  and  [thereby]  restoring  the  same 
specific  current  by  which  it  was  produced."  All 
the  neural  responses  tend,  indeed,  to  become  of 
this  general  character, — that  is,  auto-catalysed, 
— but  some  paths,  being  traversed  oftener,  and 
more  vigorously  than  others,  (while  at  the  same 
time  producing  vivid  irradiation  among  their 
neighbors),  get  a  momentum  as  well  as  a  prom- 
inence in  consciousness  which  the  others  do  not 
have.  Attention  is  just  a  clear  pathway  of  per- 
ceptual neural  response,  or  release,  and  is  a 
derivative  of  acuity,  threshold,  interest,  and 
other  furthering  ingredients.  Between  selective 
attention     and     restricted     neural     momentum 


307 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
there  is  no  one  so  wise  as  to  be  able  to  draw 
even  a  hair-sized  line. 

6.  Neural  momentum  is  also  the  dominant 
element  in  habit.  Habit,  unlike  emotion,  is  us- 
ually unintrospectable.  Unlike  emotion  again, 
it  has  a  definite  pattern,  and  serves,  or  can  be 
made  to  serve  some  other  set  of  responses  than 
its  own.  Considering  habit  in  general,  it  is  nei- 
ther useful  nor  useless;  but  considering  it  from 
the  standpoint  of  psychology,  it  is  the  adjust- 
ment of  the  organism  to  some  constant  feature 
in  its  environment  with  about  the  least  friction 
possible.  Contrariwise,  emotions  arise  from 
mal-adjustments  to  the  environment,  and  in 
their  continuance  lead  to  worse  and  worse  ad- 
justment, for  only  by  exhausting  the  organism, 
or  by  sudden  changes  of  focality  do  they  bring 
about  any  possibility  of  readjustment  on  an 
equable  basis.  Curiously  enough,  there  is  a 
lack  of  correspondence  between  neural  momen- 
tums  and  the  speech  reaction  they  arouse.  Neu- 
rally  construea,  greatest  ease  of  function  comes 
when  the  wonted  impulses  are  traversing  the 
paths;  our  statements,  however,  very  often  as- 
sert that  we  prefer  a  complete  change  of  activ- 
ity. At  the  bottom  of  this  lies  the  emotional 
complex,  and  the  presence  of  emotions  is  usual- 


308 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
ly  indicative  of  some  disorder  in  neural  con- 
tinuity. 

7.     Now   the   disordered   environment   men- 
tioned above  is  but  one  of  the  environments  en- 
veloping the  organism.     When  General  Wood 
purified  Havana,  and  by  so  doing  cut  down  the 
death  rate  prodigiously,  he  was  not  responding 
to  the  disease-making  environment  so  much  as 
he  was  responding  to  the  scientifically  prophy- 
lactic environment  of  bacteriological  laborato- 
ries.   Havana  was  but  a  perplexing  term  in  his 
entire  environment  for  which  some  reagent  was 
to  be  supplied  in  order  to  neutralize  it.     The 
needs  of  Havana  and  the  visible  condition  of 
that  city  were  two  terms  prime  to  each  other; 
but  by   responses   to   a   third   element,   having 
chemical  common  parts  with  both,  he  was  able 
to  make  the  Cuban  city  a  member  of  a  series 
of  other  cities,  a  series  defined  by  its  high  posi- 
tion relative  to  vital  statistics.     On  the  other 
hand,  the  Havanese  had  been  responding  solely 
to  the  disorder.     Now,  to  perceive  nothing  but 
a  disordered  environment  is  not  to  perceive  in 
the  strictest  sense  at  all;  but  to  perceive  a  dis- 
order in  the  midst  of  a  larger  order  is  virtually 
to    function    the    discrepancy    between    them. 
Thereafter  the  motor  readjustment  of  the  dis- 
crepancy will  take  place  just  as  fast  and  just 
309 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
as  far  as  there  are  common  parts  between  them, 
and  as  fast  and  as  far  also  as  there  is  unification 
among  the  perceptions  and  impulses  of  the  re- 
ad justor.     There  are  disordered  minds  in  the 
presence  of  what  to  others  appears  order  and 
positive  pattern,  but  these  minds  are  still  func- 
tioning the  residues  of  unshot  impulses, — sup- 
pressions for  which  there  has  been  no  utilized 
outlet.    In  many  such  cases,  the  environment  is 
well  said  to  be  within  the  body.    It  is  here  also 
that  the  doctrine  of  the  soft  soul  had  its  source. 
8.     I   take  particular  umbrage  at  the  con- 
ventional treatment  of  instincts.     As  in  many 
another  case,  obscurity  of  source  has  been  made 
the  basis  of  the  tenacity  of  belief.    For  the  in- 
stincts are  generally  treated  as  unlearned,  sud- 
den tendencies  to  action;  race  habits,  "designed 
to  promote  the  welfare  of  the  race,"  and  they 
are  furthermore  said  to  be  "uncontrolled  by  in- 
telligence."      Volume   after  volume   has   been 
written  on  this  subject  of  instinct,  and  the  gen- 
eral treatment  indicates  that  bibliography  plays 
a  larger  role  than  does  observation  and  clear 
insight.    Much  obscurity  results  from  this  meth- 
od of  procedure,  for  the  writers  who  employ  it 
have  their  eyes  only  on  the  organism,  and  not 
on  "what  the  organism  is  doing"  in  the  midst  of 
its  environment.  The  insufficiency  of  such  treat- 
310 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
ment  will  at  once  appear  if  we  consider  any- 
thing more  than  the  organism.  Sensations  are 
objects  and  perceptions  are  objects,  and  like- 
wise emotions  and  instincts  cannot  be  severed 
from  their  exciting  stimuli  and  remain  in  the 
system  of  things  known  as  the  psychological 
order.  The  statement  that  instincts  are  un- 
learned does  not  signalize  them  as  unique 
among  the  events  of  the  cross-section.  In  the 
first  place,  none  of  the  tropisms  are  premeditat- 
ed, sedulously  tried  out,  and  stamped  with  the 
hall-mark  before  they  become  settled  disposi- 
tions. Secondly,  suddenness  cannot  be  their 
distinguishing  mark,  for  short  latency  is  applic- 
able to  more  of  the  responses  than  they. 
And  that  all  the  individual  members  of  a 
race  do  this  or  that  is  more  indicative  of 
gregariousness  than  of  anything  subtly  orig- 
inal. Instinctive  action  only  appears  sud- 
den because  of  the  diremption  in  percept- 
ual consciousness  that  goes  with  it,  and 
instinctive  actions  are  racial  only  in  so  far  as 
the  predicaments  of  the  individuals  of  a  race 
are  identical.  A  race  is  a  constant  function  of 
its  environment,  a  derivative  of  circumstances, 
and  it  is  the  environment  that  shapes  it.  The 
ubiquity  of  instincts  is  no  more  special  than 
the  ubiquity  of  ears  or  eyelids.  The  instincts 
311 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 

are  said  to  be  "designed  to  promote  the  welfare 
of  the  race," — an  expression  which  is  supposed 
to  possess  splendid  oratorical  possibilities, — but 
which  upon  analysis  turns  out  to  have  no  mean- 
ing. For  instinctive  actions,  arising  from  dis- 
ordered environments,  lead  to  nothing  stable 
until  they  are  superseded  by  clear  perceptions, 
the  latter  not  being  in  any  necessary  way  pre- 
ceded by  disorderly  functioning.  Furthermore, 
self-preservation  is  said  to  be  the  kernel  of 
every  instinct.  But  upon  examination  it  will 
appear  that  this  means  bodily  preservation,  not 
preservation  of  the  self  in  its  developed  condi- 
tion, and  so  we  have  to  narrow  the  concept 
"self"  in  order  to  satisfy  such  a  definition. 

9.  1  use  the  word  instinct,  then,  not  because 
there  is  any  internal  origin  for  it  save  mal-ad- 
justment  to  the  situation  met  with,  neither  be- 
cause it  could  not  be  superseded  by  a  more  em- 
pirical expression,  but  merely  in  order  to  show 
that  a  realistic  psychology  is  not  obliged  to  leave 
anything  out  of  its  account  of  mind.  The  im- 
possibility of  self-observing  the  instinctive  reac- 
tions, and  the  general  loss  of  focal  mind  which 
they  entail  have  been  the  roots  of  the  notion 
that  some  special,  internal  readinesses  were  bas- 
ic in  each  individual.  There  are  response  pos- 
sibilities in  each  individual,  but  to  call  these  by 
312 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
a  name  that  implies  a  stage  all  set  ready  for  the 
curtain  to  rise  is  as  reasonable  as  saying  that 
ordnance  is  cast  with  the  ammunition  inside  ol 
it. 

10.  The  truth  of  the  opening  thesis  of  this 
chapter  and  its  consequent  development  is  wit- 
nessed by  certain  modern  cataloguing  and  ex- 
planation of  what  are  still  called  the  "original 
tendencies."  I  refer  to  the  w^ork  of  James  and 
Thorndyke,  whose  lists  of  "instincts"  are  so 
broad  as  to  be  subversive  of  the  general  idea 
underlying  their  construction.  James'  account 
may  be  found  in  his  "l^rinciples  of  Psychology," 
Vol.  11.,  Chapter  XXIV.,  while  Thorndyke's  is 
given  in  his  "Educational  Psychology,"  Vol.  I. 
Now  the  exact  diliiculty  in  these  treatments  is 
that  when  they  were  written,  the  Ego-complex 
was  not  so  much  as  even  heard  of, — at  least  not 
assimilated  by  the  writers  of  these  treatises. 
The  infant  had  been  regarded  as  "trailing 
clouds  of  glory"  for  about  five  years  and  three 
months,  and  then  as  suddenly  becoming  sheared 
of  his  nimbus  and  mortgaged  as  are  the  rest  of 
us  with  inhibitions  and  a  tough  environment. 
But  the  Ego-complex,  or  the  evolution  of  per- 
sonality, has  been  traced  quite  a  ways  into  the 
nimbus,  and  psycholog>^  now  includes  the  study 
of  cradles  and  cognate  apparatus.  With  this 
313 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
change,  moreover,  there  has  come  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  futility  of  regarding  the  so-called  "in- 
stincts" as  universals,  or  unlearned  tendencies 
at  all,  and  we  are  slowly  coming  to  recognize 
that  the  environment  begins  to  be  specifically 
functioned  with  the  first  breath,  and  not  after 
an  indeterminate  and  subtle  interval.  On  the 
basis  of  this,  then,  1  make  bold  to  define  the  in- 
stincts and  emotions  as  mal-adjustments,  and 
to  select  from  the  list  of  generally  given  original 
tendencies  those  which  fall  rightly  under  this 
category.  The  boldness  of  the  venture  is  appre- 
ciated, and  so  finality  of  conviction  rests  upon 
its  accustomed  supports. 

11.  The  most  modern  treatment  of  instincts 
and  emotions  appears  in  McDougall's  "Social 
Psychology,"  and  1  shall  quote  his  list  in  the 
order  in  which  the  terms  follow  the  greatest-to- 
least  condition  of  mal-adjustment  of  the  organ- 
ism to  its  environment.  As  follows: 
Instinct.  Emotion. 

Flight  Fear 

Pugnacity  Anger 

Repulsion  Disgust 

Curiosity  Wonder 

Self  Display  Positive  Self-feeling 

Self  Abasement  Negative  Self-feeling 

Parental  Instinct  Tender  Emotion 

314 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
Reproduction  No  one  specific 

emotionality 
Gregariousness  *Fear  of  solitude 

Acquisition  *Various  self-feelings 

and  jealousies 

(The  terms  marked  (*)  are  not  found  in  Mc- 
Dougall.) 

The  instincts  and  emotions  appear  usually 
together,  the  former  being  detected  by  the 
movements  of  the  skeleton;  the  latter,  by  the 
amount  of  vascular  disturbance  summing  into 
confusion  and  glandular  secretion.  Further- 
more, Sympathy,  Suggestion  and  Imitation  are 
enumerated,  as  well  as  Play.  There  is  also  a 
list  of  complexes  of  emotions  both  involving 
and  not  involving  the  existence  of  sentiments, 
these  latter  being  an  organized  system  of  emo- 
tions about  some  object. 

12.  Let  it  now  be  understood,  however,  that 
these  various  manifestations  enumerated  in  the 
above  table  are  capable  of  many  degrees  of  in- 
tensity, and  when  they  lose  their  edge,  are  not 
classifiable  among  the  seriously  disturbing  mal- 
adjustments. Particularly  note  the  instinct  of 
curiosity.  When  this  appears  alone,  as  it  may, 
without  wonder,  it  is  often  linked  with  interest 
and  attention  in  such  a  way  as  to  lose  its  non- 
perceptual  character.  Gregariousness,  when 
315 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
adapted,  may  also  become  a  matter  of  very  lit- 
tle disturbance,  if  the  environment  of  other  hu- 
man beings  is  quiescent  and  in  order.  Similar- 
ly, acquisition  may  become  bare  thrift,  and  as 
such  be  pacific  in  its  motivation.  The  others, 
however,  are  not  so  readily  soothed  into  fur- 
therances, as  a  little  observation  will  readily 
show.  This,  however,  as  a  last  word  here;  that 
when  the  instinct  and  its  attendant  emotion  oc- 
cur together,  they  are  more  likely  to  »e  disor- 
derly responses  than  otherwise,  and  some  of 
these  pairs  of  responses  cannot  be  adapted  nor 
made  subservient  to  dominant,  furthering  pur- 
poses. 

13.  Somewhat  in  detail,  then,  let  us  consid- 
er the  above  pairs  of  responses  together.  One 
cannot  always  use  self-observation  as  a  basis 
for  studying  them,  for  accurate  self-observa- 
tion is  only  attained  by  considerable  study;  and 
to  ask  some  one  how  he  feels  when  he  is  afraid 
is  to  ask  but  for  summation  and  fusion,  rather 
than  for  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  facts.  Flight- 
fear  occurs  as  early  as  any  of  the  complexes  of 
the  list,  and  much  has  been  written  on  it  that 
is  well  worth  reading.  James'  account  in  his 
"Principles  of  Psychology,"  Darwin's  "The  Ex- 
pression of  the  Emotions  in  Man  and  the  Ani- 
mals," are  typical  of  the  best  in  this  line  that  is 
316 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
extant.  Perhaps  no  other  emotional  complex 
than  flight-fear  involves  such  a  shattering  of  fo- 
cal continuities  in  consciousness.  The  result  of  it 
is  a  general  super-violent  efferent  discharge, 
resulting  in  either  paralysis,  or  in  the  swift  pro- 
jection of  the  whole  body  by  running  as  far 
from  the  stimulus  as  possible.  But  the  self-pro- 
tective character  of  this  is  only  on  the  assump- 
tion that  the  deep  sea  and  the  devil  are  both  in 
front  of  one,  and  that  to  run  in  the  opposite 
direction  is  to  obtain  sanctuary.  The  running 
away,  of  course,  is  no  guarantee  of  the  percep- 
tion of  safety  at  the  terminus  of  flight,  but  the 
general  utility  of  it  lies  in  a  fifty-fifty  chance 
of  stopping  somewhere  this  side  of  the  devil. 
Children  are  not  afraid  of  everything  strange, 
but  principally  of  noises  and  situations  intend- 
ed to  upset  them.  Of  lightning  they  are  often 
unaccountably  afraid;  but  of  thunder,  and  of 
dark  closets  and  bugaboos  only  in  proportion  as 
their  parents  threaten  them  by  voice  or  atti- 
tude before  introducing  them  to  the  stimulus. 
The  parent  is  as  much  a  part  of  the  child's 
environment  as  are  the  furniture  and  milk  bot- 
tles, and  the  part  the  parents  play  is  too  fre- 
quently and  in  ignorance  excluded  from  an  ac- 
count of  the  child's  reaction  to  the  stimulus. 
Besides,  I  have  been  told  by  military  men  with 
317 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
medals  that  much  of  the  rashness  of  ijravery  is 
plain  ordmary  fear, — ^the  soldier  being  in  a  pre- 
aicament,  and  one  thing  to  him  about  as  good 
as  another.  Now,  by  virtue  of  ideas  having 
common  parts  with  things,  and  by  virtue  of  the 
fact  that  wholes  can  be  vicariously  functioned 
for  by  their  parts,  the  emotions  can  be  aroused 
by  the  presentation  of  any  part  of  the  original- 
ly exciting  stimulus,  provided  it  is  bolstered  up 
by  effective  helps.  Most  of  our  functioning 
anyway  is  due  to  the  serial  focality  of  the  barest 
common  parts. 

14.  The  pugnacity-anger  complex  arises 
clearly  in  situations  which  are  too  much  for  us 
to  manage,  and  starts,  at  least,  a  series  of  events 
whose  other  end  is  often  the  annihilation  or  hu- 
miliation of  the  object  or  person  confronting 
us.  Many  authors  regard  the  distortion  of  the 
lips  during  anger  as  a  remnant  of  the  animal 
habit  of  frightening  one's  prey  by  the  sight  of 
the  teeth  about  to  bite.  At  any  rate,  pugnacity 
differs  from  flight  in  the  direction  of  bodily 
translation,  and  in  anger  we  are  conscious  of 
our  bodies  as  larger  than  we  are  in  fear.  Pro- 
fessor Cannon  has  done  significant  experiment- 
ation upon  both  of  these  complexes  in  point  of 
their  physiological  concomitants.  In  the  first 
place,  he  finds  the  peaceful  tabby  cat  of  a  bet- 
318 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
ter  digestion  than  her  cantankerous  mate,  as 
evidenced  by  the  fact  that  "fear  and  anger. . . . 
are  attended. . .  .by  cessation  of  the  contractions 
of  the  stomach  and  intestines."  Furthermore, 
the  disturbances  of  digestion  which  outlast  emo- 
tional excitement,  (after-image),  are  correlated 
with  the  action  of  the  ductless  glands  which  se- 
crete adrenalin,  a  substance  which,  when  cir- 
culated in  the  blood,  causes  glycosuria  and  oth- 
er significant  disorders.  "It  seems  to  act  as  an 
antidote  to  muscular  fatigue,  and  renders  more 
rapid  the  coagulation  of  blood."  Both  of  these 
concern  the  pugnacity-anger  complex,  as  well 
as  that  of  flight-fear;  for  the  angry  or  fearful 
person  often  performs  acts  which  seem  fully 
beyond  his  normal  strength.  Likewise,  our  dis- 
regard of  wounds  and  their  sudden  healing  in 
many  cases  of  violent  emotion  are  accounted 
for.  (See  "Recent  Studies  of  Bodily  Effects  of 
Fear,  Rage  and  Pain"  by  W.  B.  Cannon,  Jour. 
Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Sci.  Meth.,  March  12,  1914.) 

15.  Repulsion  and  disgust  are  more  chem- 
ical than  anything  else.  Certain  bitter  tastes 
and  nauseating  smells  are  both  noxious  and 
originally  annoying.  The  sense  environment  in 
which  they  figure  is  out  of  balance,  and  mal-ad- 
justment  at  once  supervenes.  The  first  func- 
tioning to  this  sort  of  an  environment  is  strictly 
319 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
chemical  in  its  character;  later  on,  by  analogy, 
these  responses  can  be  obtained  in  connection 
with  a  set  of  stimuli  which  are  not  primarily 
chemical  at  all.  Sneers,  scorns,  and  loathing, 
which  we  direct  at  persons  rather  than  at  chem- 
icals, are  responses  to  disordered  situations 
made  on  the  basis  of  verbal  common  parts.  Of 
course  there  are  the  unwashed  and  unscented 
to  whom  we  respond  chemically,  but  for  a  book 
to  be  loathsome,  an  analogical  situation  must 
supersede.  Certain  very  expensive  books  are 
printed  on  a  most  ill-smelling  paper,  and  yet  the 
response  is  to  the  printing  and  other  beauty 
about  the  book, — the  publisher  having  betted 
on  the  long  latent-period  of  the  odor,  and  the 
inhibitory  properties  of  the  literature. 

16.  The  curiosity-wonder  complex  is  less 
disturbing  than  the  two  previously  mentioned, 
and  is  the  basis  of  the  questions  what,  how,  and 
why.  But  science  only  begins  in  wondering 
why;  it  ends  in  finding  out.  And  after  this  is 
done,  no  mal-adjustment  is  present.  Wonder 
as  an  element  in  philosophy  is  of  the  same 
character,  and  only  mystics  keep  on  wondering 
after  they  have  gotten  under  the  top  crust  of 
things.  To  say  that  the  instincts  are  the  springs 
of  human  action  is  but  to  speak  half  of  the 
truth.  They  are  not  the  regulators  of  human 
320 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 

action,  for  these  are  perceptions  instead.  The 
curiosity-wonder  complex  differs  from  the  two 
others  thus  far  discussed  in  that  it  involves 
sensory  elements  rather  than  motor,  and  so 
does  not  function  the  shearing  off  of  focality 
as  is  the  case  with  the  more  vigorous  complexes. 
But  that  the  object  wondered  at  is  in  a  series 
too  prime  for  orientation,  none  will  be  able  to 
deny. 

17.  Self-display  and  self-abasement,  with 
their  attendant  emotions  of  positive  and  nega- 
tive self-feelings,  are  responses  to  social  dis- 
turbances of  an  intricate  character.  They  are 
inevitably  related  to  shyness,  bashfulness,  mod- 
esty, vanity  and  other  so-called  psychological 
simples,  involving  certain  sexual  elements  of 
which  some  mention  must  be  made.  Exhibition 
is  a  cardinal  feature  of  the  mating  season  of  all 
creatures,  and  displays  and  abasements  are  used 
to  increase  mutual  desire.  When  the  exhibition 
complex  outlasts  the  specific  incident  in  which 
it  arose,  or  becomes  suppressed,  as  is  often  the 
case,  it  may  crop  out  in  very  unusual  situations. 
Thus  the  blushing  reflex  and  the  "sidelong 
glance"  are  suppressions  being  partly  released. 
This  is  not  to  say  that  manifestation  of  an  im- 
pulse goes  necessarily  with  focality  of  the 
knowledge  of  its  origin,  for  in  regard  to  most  of 
321 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
our  nature  we  are  naively  ignorant.  The  old 
Socratic  maxim  "know  thyself"  has  recently 
been  inverted  into  "knowing  oneself  is  a  func- 
tion of  knowing  others."  Thus  an  item  in  con- 
sciousness of  a  sexual  origin  may  not  be  accom- 
panied by  the  focality  of  the  desire  for  repro- 
ductive relations  with  another  of  the  species, 
although  we  may  be  able  to  show  that  normally 
such  would  be  the  case  were  no  inhibiting  per- 
ceptions present.  The  reproductive  instinct  is 
devoid  of  any  specific  emotionality, — it  being 
usually  a  periodic  function  of  certain  glandular 
motivation,  and  only  embellished  by  emotions 
in  certain  concrete  situations.  The  disorderly 
element  in  this  instinct  is  the  fact  of,  what  might 
be  called  upon  analysis,  its  promiscuous  char- 
acter. The  insecurity  attendant  upon  this  con- 
dition leads  to  the  above-mentioned  emotional 
embellishments  of  display  and  abasement.  Self 
display  and  self  abasement  also  originate  in  an 
environment  where  the  truth  is  suppressed,  and 
reappear  quickly  whenever  analagous  situa- 
tions occur.  Thus  the  general  adornment  of 
the  body,  as  well  as  the  humility  of  a  pension- 
er, may  be  entirely  asexual,  but  the  adornment 
and  humility  are  both  calculated  to  affect  fa- 
vorably the  one  at  whom  they  are  directed,  and 


322 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
as  such  are  forms  of  those  suppressed  ideas 
known  as  lying. 

18.  The  parental  instinct,  with  its  attendant 
emotion  of  tenderness,  is  a  function  of  the  help- 
lessness of  the  young  over  which  the  parent  be- 
comes solicitous.  The  child's  self  help  cannot 
be  forced,— it  must  be  slowly  developed,  and 
slowly  strengthened.  The  realization  of  the 
discrepancy  between  its  present  condition  and 
that  of  mature  development,  as  well  as  the  ne- 
cessity to  do  nothing  but  wait  until  such  self 
help  matures,  constitute  the  disorder  in  the 
situation  evoking  this  form  of  response.  Not 
unfrequently  is  the  parental  instinct  manifested 
as  a  form  of  scepticism,  which  is  a  selective  re- 
sponse to  the  abstract  disorder  of  the  cosmos. 
Again,  the  background  of  tender  emotion  may 
become  studded  with  all  sorts  of  violent  emo- 
tions. The  extremes  to  which  all  creatures  go 
in  order  to  defend  their  young,  the  chastisement 
which  sometimes  gets  meted  out  to  children 
upon  the  most  trivial  occasions,  and  the  alter- 
nations of  imperiousness  and  fawning  which 
parents  bestow  upon  their  offspring,  illustrate 
the  point.  Under  the  spell  of  the  tender  emo- 
tion, perceptual  distortion  is  the  rule;  the  "cute" 
acts  of  one's  own  children  may  at  the  same 
time  be  equivalent  to  vandalism,  and  a  "prank" 
323 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
in  one  environment  may  be  an  evidence  of  con- 
cealed misanthropy  in  another.  Later  on,  the 
confidence  in  the  superiority  of  one's  own  chil- 
dren,— on  account  of  parental  joy  in  being  a 
cause, — is  the  basis  of  the  plebian  dogma  that 
no  one  is  quite  good  enough  to  mate  with  them. 
All  these  events  are  mal-adjustments,  and  the 
nearsightedness  which  must  go  with  such  in- 
stinctive and  emotional  reactions  appears  to  be 
incurable  if  treated  strictly  within  its  own 
terms. 

19.  Gregariousness  is  the  social  instinct  par 
excellence.  Only  the  few  are  hermits,  the  rest 
of  us  are  beholders  and  beholden  all  the  while 
to  the  rest  of  society.  Perhaps  no  other  in- 
stinct could  be  gotten  along  so  poorly  without, 
and  yet  no  other  instinct  demands  as  its  tax  so 
much  equilibration  to  render  it  harmless.  In- 
deed, the  virtues,  so-called,  are  the  taxes  we 
have  to  pay  for  gregariousness.  It  arises  out  of 
the  fear  of  solitude,  the  uneasiness  we  feel  at 
being  absent  from  our  fellows.  But  I  take  it 
that  it  is  not  bound  up  with  any  affection  for 
our  fellows,  for  we  do  not  necessarily  like  those 
with  whom  we  prefer  to  be.  The  main  discom- 
fort of  solitude  comes  through  the  realization  of 
unfilled  spaces  between  our  body  and  those  of 
others.  Cities,  states,  clubs,  fraternities, 
324 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
churches,  and  all  other  organizations  are  pri- 
marily social  aggregations  for  the  annihilation 
of  solitude.  Solitary  confinement  in  prison  is 
the  rational  psychological  limit  of  punishment, 
since  we  are  not  so  constituted  as  to  systemati- 
cally punish  a  man  by  utter  "cold  shoulder." 
Were  such  the  case,  doubtless  the  person  so  re- 
jected would  immediately  put  himself  off.  The 
jokes  about  bachelors  and  old  maids  are  con- 
cealed scorn  at  a  lack  of  gregariousness,  regard- 
less of  how  dismal  a  predicament  many  of  the 
"unclaimed  blessings"  so  discriminated  against, 
have  escaped.  This  instinct,  however,  does  not 
in  any  way  guarantee  that  the  satisfying  person 
shall  be  met  by  the  mere  fact  of  there  being 
other  bodies  in  the  vicinity,  and  as  such  it  rep- 
resents again  the  general  principles  of  disorder 
and  absence  of  clear  perception. 

20.  It  is  hard  to  draw  the  line  between  the 
play  motive  and  the  instinct  of  acquisition.  We 
saw  in  the  former  chapter,  that  the  movements 
of  the  stomach  were  gone  through  with  regard- 
less of  the  presence  of  nutriment  in  that  organ. 
Thus  it  is  in  many  another  situation  with  re- 
gard to  the  human  body, — series,  rather  than 
reasons  are  the  ultimate  bases  of  situations.  In 
play  and  acquisitiveness  we  find  basic  certain 
odd  fumblings,  manipulations,  gatherings  and 
325 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
scatterings,  apparently  from  an  excess  of  ener- 
gies, though  not  a  surfeit  of  them.  Certain  mo- 
tions can  be  gone  through  with  at  a  low  ex- 
penditure of  energy  without  the  slightest  degree 
of  exhaustion  ensuing.  Acquisition  also  arises 
out  of  fumbling,  but  the  resulting  conscious- 
ness,— predominantly  motor, — of  having  things 
in  a  certain  spacial  and  motor  relation  to  the 
body,  produces  further  stimulations  to  the  same 
end,  and  we  keep  gathering  rather  than  throw- 
ing away.  When  such  occurs,  we  have  a  case 
of  perception.  For  the  word  "mine"  principal- 
ly means  "that  thing  frequently  responded  to." 
Furthermore,  thinking  about  the  things  we  have 
so  responded  to  is  auto-catalytic  in  its  charac- 
ter. At  the  basis  of  miserliness  and  wealth  lies 
this  instinct  of  acquisition, — both  differing  sole- 
ly in  the  co-presence  of  the  instinct  of  self  dis- 
play. But  there  is  no  evidence  for  believing 
that  there  is  an  intention  behind  this  response, 
— those  forever  planning  to  become  rich,  rare- 
ly becoming  so.  On  the  other  hand,  let  Socra- 
tes come  up  and  ask  the  possessor  of  wealth 
why,  or  to  what  end  he  is  accumulating,  and  he 
cannot  for  the  life  of  him  tell.  No  reason  given 
is  exclusively  in  the  field  of  inquiry.  In  this 
connection  one  will  observe  that  the  instincts 
are  not  characterized  by  any  specific,  nameable 
326 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
content.  Hoarding  and  jealousy  may  become 
co-functioned,  but  hoarding  and  generosity  may 
also  appear  together.  The  successful  business 
man  may  dislike  the  whole  scheme  of  his  en- 
deavors, or  the  unsuccessful  one  be  of  the  opin- 
ion that  his  plans  cannot  fail.  In  all  such  cases, 
the  non-focality  to  the  person  himself  of  his 
ruling  manifestation  is  indicative  of  the  general 
principle  of  disorder  as  the  basis  of  instinct. 

21.  Constriictiveness  is  frequently  named 
among  the  instincts,  but  for  our  purposes  only 
the  random  fumbling  of  objects  preparatory  to 
the  possible  ordering  of  them  on  the  basis  of 
perceptions,  could  be  called  by  any  such  name 
as  "original  tendency."  Furthermore,  fumbling 
is  typical  of  mal-adjustment,  and  appears  to 
have  no  specific,  attendant  emotion.  Psycholo- 
gists have  never  admitted  that  destractiveness  is 
as  "original"  as  is  constructiveness,  for  they 
have  steadfastly  overlooked  the  fact  that  young 
children  maltreat  and  destroy  long  before  they 
ever  build  or  construct.  Constructiveness  and 
destructiveness  might  be  profitably  treated  of 
together,  even  if  but  for  the  diff'erences  they 
show  which  are  not  manifest  in  the  spelling  of 
the  words.  For  the  first  of  these  lacks  those 
anger  elements  which  the  second  possesses. 
Random  fumbling,  again,  may  be  suddenly  su- 
327 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
perseded  by  the  perception  of  order,  and  thus 
be  brought  to  some  sort  of  furthering  conclu- 
sion;  while   destructiveness   meets   all   orderly 
situations  only  to  disregard  their  perceptual  ele- 
ments, and  to  reduce  them  to  disorder.     Once 
more,  certain  successful  achieving  of  a  pattern 
is  frequently  followed  by  the  loss  of  that  pat- 
tern, and  so  the  orderly  and  disorderly  series 
may    alternate    with    considerable    frequency. 
Only   in   point   of   its   intermittent   clumsiness, 
then,  do  we  call  construction  an  instinct,  for 
when  a  dominant  pattern  is  attained  and  stead- 
ily functioned,  the  environment  becomes  stable, 
and   the  responses   non-contradictory.     On   the 
other  hand,  destructiveness  is  functioned  by  a 
strabismic  consciousness,  that  is  to  say,  a  cross- 
section  in  which  many  un-shot  complexes  are 
smouldering,   whose   functioning  is   anti-social 
in  its  tendency.    Vandalism,  the  joy  of  produc- 
ing carnage,  the  antique  postulate  of  a  trans- 
temporal  oven  in  which  those  not  holding  views 
tangent  to  our  own  were  to  be  eventually  kept 
at  n  degrees  Centigrade, — such  are  common  ex- 
amples  of   this   response   to   internal   disorder 
with  its  attending  manifestations.     Even  to  see 
one    building    torn    down    to    replace    another 
causes  some  orderly  minds  to  avoid  the  sight, 
as  well  as  to  feel  resentment  at  the  act.     And 
328 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 

there  is  perhaps  validity  in  the  legal  status  of 
those  who  butcher  for  an  occupation,  in  that 
they  are  excluded  from  certain  jury  service  on 
the  basis  of  lacking  perceptions  of  the  orderly 
status  of  an  organism  amongst  its  kind. 

22.  Three  other  forms  of  complexes  may 
suitably  be  presented  here.  These  are  sugges- 
tion, sympathy,  and  imitation.  The  first  has  to 
do  with  the  inducing  of  a  non-perceiving  con- 
sciousness to  function  the  ideas  of  another  when 
put  into  w^ords  calculated  to  appeal  to  his  in- 
stincts or  emotions;  and  also  to  formulate  pre- 
maturely his  motor  functioning  on  that  basis. 
Sympathy  is  the  appeal  to,  or  sharing  of,  the 
surface  emotions  of  another,  with  or  without 
attempting  to  stir  up  the  background  of  sup- 
pressed and  smouldering  complexes.  Imitation 
is  either  copying  the  motor  responses  of  an- 
other, especially  gross  movements,  or  copying 
the  effects  produced  by  another, — all  such  copy- 
ing being  virtual  in  its  identity  rather  than  fact- 
ual. No  resident  benefit  lies  in  any  of  these 
three,  considered  as  bare  descriptions  of  what 
happens  in  cases  where  they  are  exhibited.  Nev- 
ertheless they  can  be  made  subservient  to  al- 
most any  purpose  promulgated,  and  this  is  of 
large  account  in  the  educational  world,  as  well 


329 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
as  in  advertising  and  selling,  and  the  general 
business  of  social  organization. 

23.  McDougall's  enumeration  of  the  com- 
plexes of  emotions  falls  into  two  groups.  The 
first  one  does  not  necessarily  imply  the  existence 
of  sentiments,  while  the  second  one  does.  "Senti- 
ment" is  taken  to  mean  "an  organized  system 
of  emotional  tendencies  centered  about  some 
object."  In  the  first  group  there  are  the  fol- 
lowing emotional  complexes. 

(a)  Admiration.  This  is  a  compound  of 
wonder  and  negative  self-feeling.  (By  com- 
pound is  meant  a  simultaneous  occurrence, 
sometimes  in  the  form  of  partial  fusion,  some- 
times not.) 

(b)  Awe.  This  is  composed  of  admiration 
and  fear. 

(c)  Reverence.  This  is  derived  from  a 
blend  of  awe  and  gratitude,  both  of  the  ele- 
ments of  awe  being  clearly  present. 

(d)  Gratitude.  This  is  composed  of  the 
tender  emotion  and  negative  self -feeling. 

(e)  Scorn.    A  mixture  of  awe  and  disgust. 

(f)  Contempt.  Composed  of  scorn  and 
positive  self-feeling. 

(g)  Loathing.  A  compound  of  fear  and 
disgust. 

(h)     Horror  is  the  acme  of  loathing. 
330 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
(i)     Fascination.    This  is  a  mixture  of  loath- 
ing and  wonder,  fairly  well  balanced. 

(j)     Hate  is  composed  of  anger,  fear  and 
disgust,  while 

(k)  Envy  is  derived  from  negative  self- 
feeling  and  anger.  It  must  be  kept  focal  that 
the  binary  and  tertiary  character  of  these  com- 
pounds is  incapable  of  any  such  clear  exhibi- 
tion or  demonstration  as  is  possible  with  sensa- 
tions and  perceptions.  And  the  "organized" 
character  of  them  is  little  more  than  bare  "with- 
ness."  Structure  they  lack,  and  are  thus  re- 
sponses to  situations  involving  disorder.  But 
by  virtue  of  possessing  among  themselves  com- 
mon parts,  or  common  functions,  the  transition 
from  one  to  the  other  is  readily  made  in  the 
presence  of  the  same  exciting  object.  All  it  re- 
quires is  that  the  object  be  in  mal-adjustment, — 
the  train  of  these  complexes  is  then  easy  to  fol- 
low. As  a  tacit  verdict  of  humanity  that  these 
emotions  are  not  solely  referable  to  the  body, 
we  have  the  expressions,  "loathsome  sight," 
"fascinating  woman,"  "hateful  delay,"  "he  treat- 
ed me  with  contempt,"  and  the  like;  and  this  is 
one  of  the  signal  examples  of  naivete  being 
acute,  whether  by  intention  or  not,  with  per- 
ception or  without  it.  But  naivete  is  far  more 
concerned  with  complexes  than  with  the  other 
331 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
data  of  consciousness,  and  for  this  unexpected 
correctness  it  must  not  fail  to  have  due  credit. 

24.  The  following  are  the  complex  emo- 
tions which  do  imply  the  existence  of  senti- 
ments. 

(a)  Reproach.  This  is  composed  of  anger 
and  the  tender  emotion. 

(b)  Jealousy.  In  this  we  find  a  painfully 
checked  positive  self-feeling  plus  an  oscillation 
between  revenge  and  reproach. 

(c)  Vengeful  emotion.  This  is  a  compound 
of  anger  and  a  wounded  self-regarding  senti- 
ment. By  the  latter  expression  is  meant  that 
the  insults  one  receives,  if  not  at  once  resented 
and  paid  for,  lower  one  in  the  eyes  of  his  fel- 
lows. And  in  this  predicament,  (manifesting  a 
wounded  self-regard),  it  is  curious  to  note,  that, 
no  matter  how  many  eyes  are  turned  upon  one, 
the  social  center  of  gravity  is  not  thereby  set- 
tled in  the  object  of  such  regard,  but  way  off, 
as  it  were,  clear  outside  the  situation.  It  is  as 
if  the  terms  "beholder"  and  "beholden"  in  this 
case  had  absolutely  nothing  in  common. 

(d)  Resentment.  This  is  what  becomes  of 
the  vengeful  emotion  when  the  insult  is  at  once 
avenged.  It  is  perhaps  nowhere  better  illustrat- 
ed than  in  the  treatment  of  a  subjugated  na- 
tion by  its  victor.     I  do  not  mean  the  payment 

332 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 

of  indemnity,  or  the  other  material  symbols  of 
conquest,  but  the  lasting  desire  of  the  conquer- 
ors to  see  the  individuals  of  the  losing  nation 
humbled  and  browbeaten.  It  is  as  if  on  the 
material  side  an  eye  would  pay  for  an  eye,  but 
on  the  sentimental  side,  a  whole  jaw^  were  none 
too  much  to  satisfy  the  loss  of  a  tooth.  Stir- 
ring a  nation  to  patriotism,  likewise,  is  often 
nothing  more  than  arousing  a  feeling  of  injury 
by  generalizing,  and  sentimentally  magnifying 
some  forgivable  misdemeanor  that  was  never 
meant  to  provoke  the  use  of  cartridges. 

(e)  Shame.  This  is  a  struggle  between 
self-display  and  self-abasement,  with  their  at- 
tendant emotions  of  positive  and  negative  self- 
feeling.  Just  why  shame,  as  a  weakening  con- 
dition, should  have  been  so  largely  used  in  mat- 
ters of  moral  significance,  is  easier  to  determine 
from  a  legal  than  from  a  psychological  stand- 
point. The  legalistic  view  of  good  and  bad 
makes  special  use  of  this  sentiment  on  the 
ground  that  the  intensest  subjugation  is  justifi- 
able. Psychologically,  there  is  nothing  to  op- 
pose justifying  the  means  by  the  end,  if  the 
end  is  worthy;  but  as  soon  as  the  question  of 
which  end  is  worthier  is  introduced,  the  status 
of  the  shamed  individual  must  come  in  for  its 
share  of  consideration.  When  the  struggle  be- 
333 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
tween   self-display    and   self-abasement,   as   in 
shame,   becomes  reconciled  by   a   blending   of 
the  two,  we  have,  instead, 

(f)  Bashfulness. 

(g)  Remorse  is  shameful  and  angry  regret, 
(h)     Joy  is  separable  into  what  is  called  the 

esthetic  pleasure  of  contemplation,  (with  which 
we  shall  deal  in  the  last  chapter  of  this  book), 
combined  with  sympathetically  induced  pleas- 
ure, the  tender  emotion,  and  positive  self-feel- 
ing. 

(i)  Sorrow,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  the 
negative  of  the  above,  but  rather  composed  of  a 
Daffled  tender  emotion,  (such  as  occurs  in  death 
and  the  loss  of  the  recipient  of  affection),  pride 
and  hope  negated,  and  negative  self-feeling.  Sor- 
row and  joy  are  usually  spoken  of  as  antithetic- 
al, but  by  analysis,  only  one  term  is  seen  to  be 
logically  negatived  in  passing  from  one  to  the 
other.  Their  antithetical  character  depends 
upon  the  motor  possibilities  which  can  be  stim- 
ulated under  their  dominance  of  the  organism. 
In  this  respect,  psychological  opposition  and 
logical  opposition  have  many  interesting  dif- 
ferences, which  the  student  should  carefully 
find  for  himself,  inasmuch  as  erroneous  infer- 
ence arises  from  the  confusing  of  the  two. 
(j)  Pity,  McDougall  calls  the  tender  emo- 
334 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 

tion,  tinged  with  sympathetically  induced  pain. 
Pain  in  this  sense,  as  well  as  pleasure  as  above 
used,  never  refers  to  what  we  meant  in  the 
first  chapter  by  the  sensation  pain  or  the  sen- 
sational attribute  pleasure.  For  pain,  one  should 
here  substitute  unpleasantness,  and  in  emotion- 
al complexes  he  should  also  regard  it  as  much 
stronger  than  sensorial  feeling-tone,  inasmuch 
as  emotional  discharges  are  stronger  than  tro- 
pistic  releases.  Furthermore,  when  there  is 
lacking  the  release  of  the  suppressed  energy  in 
emotions,  there  is  functioned  both  negative  self- 
feeling,  and  that  which  McDougall,  whom  I 
have  generally  followed,  means  here  by  pain. 

(k)  Happiness  is  enumerated  at  the  close 
of  the  account,  and  it  appears  to  mean  a  gen- 
eral bodily  Duoyancy  as  a  result  of  clear  percep- 
tion and  satisfactory  functioning.  But  we  are 
here  on  the  border  line  of  ethics,  the  psychology 
of  which  must  be  reserved  for  the  following 
and  final  chapter. 

25.  Mood  is  hereby  defined  as  a  co-con- 
scious appearance  of  any  emotion  or  sentiment. 
It  may  be  strong  or  weak,  and  when  linked  wdth 
some  specifically  characteristic  motor  manifest- 
ation, it  is  called  temperament.  It  is  significant 
to  note  that  both  mood  and  temperament  may 
be  functioned  side  by  side  with  certain  further- 
335 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 

ing  perceptions,  but  this  fact  of  togetherness 
does  not  make  mood  and  temperament  strictly 
perceptual  in  character.  All  suppression  is  ac- 
companied by  the  expenditure  of  energy,  and 
whenever  suppression  occurs,  it  means  both 
less  than  the  normal  amount  of  clear  perception 
and  less  definite  motor  functioning  on  the  basis 
of  a  furthering  pattern.  In  all  these  sentiments, 
it  is  plainly  seen  that  the  thesis  of  this  chap- 
ter in  regard  to  the  disorderly  object  or  situa- 
tion as  their  stimulus,  and  a  mal-adjustment  to 
the  situation  as  their  motor  aspect,  need  not  be 
recanted. 

The  Crowd. 
26.  The  social  order,  in  which  we  find  our- 
selves irrevocably  embedded  all  the  while,  is 
one  of  the  environments  to  which  we  cannot 
help  but  respond.  It  is  not  the  only  one  of 
this  kind,  however,  and  even  though  it  be  a  dis- 
ordered object,  it  yet  lies  in  the  midst  of  an- 
other environment,  called,  for  want  of  a  parti- 
san term,  the  universe.  Now  the  conscious 
cross-section  not  only  contains  responses  to  so- 
ciety, to  sense  data,  and  to  perceptions;  but  we 
also  respond  to  principles  of  order,  and  to 
things  which  are  neither  mental,  physical,  mor- 
al, social,  or  artistic,  but  which  are  the  stuff 
or  stuffs  out  of  which  these  orders  are  generat- 
336 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
0(1,  and  into  which  they  plunge  more  or  less  firm 
roots.  This  merely  in  passing,  for  the  business 
of  psychology,  while  concerned  with  responses, 
(and  thereto  with  all  the  responses  that  an  or- 
ganism makes),  has  not  within  its  province  the 
ordering  of  non-human  responses  and  tenden- 
cies, but  only  of  those  which  can  be  glued  to 
pronouns  of  various  calibre.  And  one  of  these 
pronouns  which  we  shall  straightway  consider 
is  the  pronoun  "we." 

27.  The  pronoun  we,  with  its  other  forms 
of  they,  us,  ours,  their,  them,  and  the  like,  is 
symbolical  of  that  domain  known  as  the  Crowd. 
In  this  connection  the  material  here  pre- 
sented is  drawn  from  Gustave  Le  Bon's  account 
of  "The  Crowd,"  all  of  which  would  amply  re- 
pay perusal.  The  crowd  is  a  curious  organiza- 
tion. Its  intended  perceptions  are  swamped  by 
instincts  and  emotions,  and  its  deliberative  pow- 
er is  in  inverse  proportion  to  its  size  and  the 
proximity  of  its  members.  A  crowd  may  be  any 
group  of  people  in  one  area,  in  sight  of  or  bod- 
ily contact  with  each  other,  or,  it  may  be  com- 
posed of  spacially  isolated  individuals  respond- 
ing to  the  same  or  duplicated  stimulus.  The 
crowded  spectators  of  a  base-ball  game  are  a 
crowd,  as  well  as  the  isolated  readers  of  the 
morning  paper  at  the  breakfast  table.  There 
337 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
are  two  main  types  of  crowds, — heterogeneous, 
and  homogeneous.  The  first  of  these  consists 
of  individuals  casually  and  haphazardly 
brought  together.  No  deliberation  or  choice 
exists  on  the  part  of  the  members  of  such  a 
crowd,  leading  them  to  just  that  place,  or  expos- 
ing them  to  just  those  other  human  beings  thus 
met.  The  heterogeneous  crowd  is  of  two  sub- 
sidiary types, — anonymous  and  not-anonymous. 
Street  crowds,  base-ball  crowds,  circus  crowds 
and  the  like,  are  anonymous;  while  juries,  par- 
liamentary assemblies,  college  faculties,  lodges, 
and  church  gatherings,  are  of  the  second  type. 
28.  All  such  assemblies,  whether  suddenly 
congregated,  or  slowly  agglutinized,  are  under 
the  sway  of  unconscious  sentiments.  Every  dif- 
ferent nation  is  typified  in  the  manner  in  which 
groups  of  its  individual  citizens  get  excited  and 
pledged  to  some  cause  or  movement.  A 
crowd  will  demand  anything  its  leader  emotion- 
alizes them  to  demand.  But  who  is  its  leader? 
Not  the  speaker  who  happens  to  be  addressing 
them  or  leading  them  on.  Not  the  principles 
enunciated  from  a  rostrum  or  the  slogan  into 
which  he  crystallizes  their  opinion.  Their  lead- 
er is  rather  the  summation  of  their  smothered 
emotions,  their  unformulated  dissatisfactions; 
for  the  tiling  for  which  they  vote,  cheer,  or  pour 
338 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
out  their  energies  may  not  l)e  at  all  that  which 
they,  as  individuals,  in  calm  moments,  might 
determine  upon  as  something  desirable.  It  is 
only  the  fact  that  something  is  presented  to 
them  as  being  in  a  like  condition  to  what  they 
imagine  themselves  to  be  which  arouses  their 
enthusiasm,  and  this  vicariously  functions  the 
exhibition  of  emotions,  sentiments  and  instincts 
in  its  behalf.  All  heterogeneous  crowds  are  an 
example  of  co-conscious  and  unconscious  func- 
tioning of  a  disorderly  object.  In  all  such  groups 
there  is  a  slight  inclination  toward  anarchy  and 
barbarism. 

29.  Homogeneous  crow^ds  are  divided  into 
these  three  groups,  sects,  castes,  and  classes,  (a) 
Sects,  wdiether  political  or  religious.  In  all  sects, 
the  individual  members  may  differ  very  much 
as  to  education,  caste,  or  profession.  But  the 
unifying  element  in  them  is  some  principle 
which  is  of  another  series  than  their  education 
or  profession,  and  to  which  these  make  no  dif- 
ference. Some  belief  is  aroused,  some  need  for 
its  application  is  shown,  and  the  rest  follows. 
Further  unification  comes  through  the  expendi- 
ture of  motor  energies  to  the  cause;  wealth  is 
poured  out,  buildings  are  erected  to  house  the 
assemblies  of  the  members,  and  the  strength  or 
weakness  of  the  belief  in  the  principle  of  the  sect 
339 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
is  manifested  by  the  number  of  things  they  fur- 
ther in  connection  with  their  material  develop- 
ment. A  belief  is  a  meaning,  and  therefore  it  is 
tested  for  its  tenacity  by  what  those  function- 
ing it  will  do  upon  occasion  or  in  a  crisis.  Its 
strength  or  weakness,  and  its  truth  or  falsity 
need  have  no  connection.  The  pragmatic  test  of 
history  as  to  whether  beliefs  have  held,  and 
the  logical  analysis  of  their  terminology  and  co- 
herence, are  two  separate  and  distinct  items; 
the  pragmatic  test  is  an  emotional  one  in  this 
case,  and  the  test  of  analysis  is  one  of  percept- 
ual character.  The  first  is  an  example  of  in- 
formal logic,  the  second,  of  the  logic  of  exact 
formulation.  It  need  not  surprise  the  student 
of  exact  logic  to  find  that  analysis  usually  dis- 
covers nothing  stable  in  all  forms  of  popular 
beliefs.  It  is  only  in  the  science  of  psychology 
that  we  find  a  complete  account  of  erratic  emo- 
tional functions. 

30.  (b)  There  are  three  chief  castes 
among  Anglo-Saxons,  namely,  the  priestly,  the 
military,  and  the  host  of  occupations.  In  these 
we  find  the  highest  type  of  crowd  organization. 
The  labor  unions,  it  is  safe  to  say,  represent  the 
most  unsettled  type  of  caste, — the  other  two, 
the  priestly  and  the  military,  represent  more 
systematic  stratification,  with  a  resultant  of  sat- 
340 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
isfaction  and  contentment  with  their  lot.  In 
heterogeneous  races  the  vohitile  and  mercurial 
elements  are  necessarily  predominant,  and  the 
era  of  strikes  is  unavoidahle  in  a  people  just 
coming  into  individuality.  In  such  cases,  the 
caste  may  be  said  to  be  crystallizing.  On  the 
other  hand,  where  several  generations  of  the 
same  family  follow  the  same  occupation, — thus 
making  a  homogeneous  race  in  point  of  com- 
pleted stratification, — no  disturbance  whatever 
is  so  emotionalized  as  that  which  threatens  the 
downfall  of  such  a  caste  system  into  which  the 
individuals  have  been  cemented.  One  might 
again  point  out  the  fact  that  no  matter  how- 
much  we  clamor  at  times  for  a  change,  the  rec- 
ord of  past  events  shows  that  those  who  clam- 
ored loudest,  were  the  most  unwilling  recipients 
of  it,  as  well  as  those  who  sank  back  the  soon- 
est into  their  former  condition. 

31,  (c)  We  usually  enumerate  three 
classes, — the  peasant,  middle,  and  aristocratic. 
The  habits,  education,  and  interest  of  the  in- 
dividual members  of  each  of  these  are  very 
similar.  Sometimes  it  is  difficult  to  draw  the 
line  between  the  members  of  these  three  classes, 
there  being  many  kinds  of  recognized  aristocra- 
cies, such  as  those  of  wealth,  of  talent,  of  intel- 
ligence, and  so  on.  In  classifying  classes,  how- 
341 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
ever,  the  monetary  test  is  usually  applied,  and 
the  border  line  cases  omitted.  By  this  means, 
also,  it  is  easy  to  see  why  these  classes  have  the 
poorest  form  of  organization  of  all  crowds, 
whether  heterogeneous  or  homogeneous;  for  all 
those  in  the  peasant  and  middle  classes  who  are 
struggling  out  of  them  do  not  want  any  organ- 
ization that  solidifies  their  position  in  that  class, 
and  the  rest  are  too  busy  maintaining  their  posi- 
tion to  become  organized.  The  noiweaii  riche 
furnish  in  this  instance  curious  hints  of  the  mo- 
mentum which  economic  conditions  give  to 
functions  of  a  social  character,  for  their  un- 
conscious complexes,  becoming  suddenly  re- 
leased, indicate  the  disorder  which  the  condi- 
tion of  sudden  wealth  produces. 

32.  When  a  crowd  functions  some  punish- 
able disorder,  it  becomes  a  criminal  crowd,  or 
mob.  But  no  one  person  in  a  crowd  is  doing 
exactly  what  the  whole  crowd  may  be  said  to  be 
doing  in  such  a  case.  In  fact,  nobody  is  at  the 
head  of  a  crowd.  It  has  no  head,  for  it  is  only 
releasing  collective  complexes,  only  satisfying 
its  collective  grudges.  The  ringleaders  are  us- 
ually punished,  because  the  law  demands  a  vic- 
tim; but  the  ringleaders  are  often  only  those 
spacially  in  front  of  the  others,  and  only  seem- 
ingly more  indecorous  than  those  pushing  from 
342 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
behind.  Thus  when  one  asks,  "who  started  the 
rumpus?",  it  is  not  altogether  a  joke  when  each 
suspected  culprit  avers  to  the  contrary.  But,  as 
Lc  Bon  says,  "All  collectivities  have  it  in  them 
to  develop  to  a  high  degree  certain  ferocious 
and  tender  instincts."  For  the  collective  mind 
is  an  accumulation  of  suddenly  uncorked  sup- 
pressions, and  what  is  done  by  it  is  a  function 
of  the  environmental  possibilities  of  the  situa- 
tion as  well  as  of  the  individual  complexes.  The 
crowd  usually  demands  some  one  to  be  its  lead- 
er as  well  as  some  candidate  for  anathema  or 
praise.  If  a  crowd  is  witnessing  a  fire  at  night, 
when  a  rescue  is  attempted,  it  is  sometimes  pa- 
thetic, sometimes  ridiculous,  and  again  some- 
times terrifying  to  see  how  the  crowd  both  ten- 
derly nurses  along  the  rescue,  and  also  threat- 
ens an  unsuccessful  rescuer  with  the  death  he 
failed  to  avert.  It  roars  and  defames,  it  weeps 
and  cries,  it  groans;  it  uses  the  same  words  in 
a  "sacred  and  hushed  tone"  as  it  does  in  yelling 
and  shouting.  Here  the  object  eliciting  the  re- 
sponses is  clearly  a  disordered  one,  though  oft- 
en hard  to  name  in  exact  terms. 

33.     Deliberative    assemblies    have    worked 
out  a  system  which  substantiates  my  thesis  in 
this  chapter.    Important  measures  are  first  pre- 
sented, then  debated,  then  referred  to  a  com- 
343 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
mittee,  and  so  on,  in  order  for  the  emotional 
element  to  have  its  little  part,  if  need  be;  but 
also  in  order  for  the  measure  to  have  its  logical 
and  perceptual  inning  as  well.    Often,  indeed,  a 
committee  or  a  single  individual  drafts  and  ad- 
judicates a  matter  with  but  the  scantest  refer- 
ence to  the  collective  body  that  finally  passes 
on  it.     On  this  principle,  absolute  monarchy  is 
worthy  of  some  consideration,  psychologically, 
as  well  as  such  forms  of  government  known  as 
oligarchies  and  aristocracies,  in  the  strict  sense 
of  these  terms.     Popular  government  is  baseci 
on   the  idea  that  the  many  think  better  than 
the  few.     Psychology  has  nothing  to  say  about 
government,    but   only   about   crowd    organiza- 
tions in  point  of  which  this  further  quotation 
from  Le  Bon  is  pertinent :    "In  any  deliberative 
assembly,  called  upon  to  give  its  verdict  about 
a  matter  not  entirely  technical,  the  intelligence 
of  the  individual  members  counts  for  nothing." 
34.     The    jury    is    a    heterogeneous    crowd, 
formed  on  occasion  into  a  deliberating  body. 
Why  twelve  members  should  constitute  it  is  re- 
ferable  to  informal  logic.     Juries  are   usually 
made  up  of  strangers,  and  as  such  represent  an 
organization  in  which  the  knowledge  of  other 
minds  engaged  in  the  same  work  as  one's  own 
is  supposed  to  count  for  nothing.    This  may  or 
344 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
may  not  be  so,  but  it  is  only  for  us  to  say  here 
that  after  a  jury  gets  into  the  jury  room  to  con- 
sult and  deliberate,  the  results  show  something 
quite  irreconcilable  with  the  notion  that  the 
jury  does  not  behave  as  a  heterogeneous  crowd. 
Juries  are  not  unimpressible  by  the  prestige, 
wealth,  beauty,  widowhood,  countenance,  and 
so  on,  of  those  witnessing,  or  on  trial  before  the 
bar;  and  their  emotions  are  often  the  only  hope 
of  the  lawyers  functioning  in  the  case.  Even 
though  argument  and  debate  are  indulged  in  in 
the  jury  room,  the  crowd  character  is  never 
sujj-focal  there.  Stubborn  men  have  also  been 
Known  to  completely  reverse  the  tendency  of 
the  first  ballot, — it  being  a  test  of  endurance 
rather  than  a  careful,  cool  deliberation  which 
decided  the  case.  It  is  the  opinion  of  more  than 
the  writer  that  all  juries  should  be  forced  to 
taKe  a  cold  bath  before  going  into  the  jury  room, 
ana  should  further  be  obliged  to  avoid  all  vaso- 
motor constrictions  by  whatever  means  would 
be  safest  and  quickest  at  the  same  time. 

35.  The  informal  logic  of  crowd  reasoning 
is  evidence  of  the  disordered  environment 
which  it  is  functioning.  The  most  exaggerated 
and  ingenious  sentiments  are  indulged  in.  The 
crowd  never  distinguishes  between  the  actual 
and  the  virtual,  between  the  possible  and  the 
345 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
impossible,  or  between  the  internal  and  external 
aspects  of  the  thing  presented  to  it.  It  de- 
mands "equality,"  or  "liberty,"  or  asks  things 
which  are  entirely  beyond  its  power  to  use.  It 
scorns  a  feeble,  but  reveres  a  strong  authority; 
a  reported  weakness  in  the  government  will 
raise  a  mob  very  easily,  but  the  report  of  even 
iron-handed  dealings  will  at  once  quiet  their 
emotional  unrest.  "Might  makes  right"  is  act- 
ually crowd  reasoning,  whether  it  be  also  true, 
false,  or  absurd.  Catch  phrases,  slogans,  and 
shibboleths,  are  just  the  material  out  of  which 
crowd  reasoning  is  constructed.  The  orator 
who  addresses  the  crowd  on  the  street  need  say 
nothing  rational,  just  so  long  as  he  speaks  in 
terms  which  the  crowd  will  interpret  as  being 
"w^hat  it  thought  also."  An  emotional  collec- 
tivity thinks  and  speaks  anything  at  all,  the 
more  disconnected  it  is  the  surer  is  it  of  being 
emotionally  functioned;  and  so  such  things  as 
analogical  reasons  are  cheered  as  the  very  acme 
of  truth  and  right.  Crowds  are  also  impressed 
by  the  marvelous.  They  demand  some  author- 
ity, and  in  lieu  of  living  governors  of  men,  any 
dead  hero  or  nebulous  ancestor  will  do  very 
nicely.  National  figures  of  the  past  century, 
traditions,  the  longevity  of  customs,  the  great- 
ness or  decline  of  an  institution, — all  these 
346 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
stimuli  manifest  a  universal  tyranny  over  all 
sorts  of  crowds  in  all  sorts  of  nations  and  ages. 
"The  one  tyranny  humanity  has  always  been 
under  is  the  memory  of  its  dead."  But  shake 
once  the  confidence  of  a  people  in  its  past,  and 
you  will  find  that  "the  end  of  a  belief  is  the 
beginning  of  a  revolution."  And  it  is  not  amiss 
at  this  point  to  recall  the  passages  in  this  book 
on  auto-catalytic  action  as  the  basis  of  neural 
momentum,  with  the  other  remark  about  the 
desire  for  change  we  so  often  function  in 
speech.  For  the  crowd  is  after  all  only  a  magni- 
fied individual,  and  in  the  midst  of  a  crowd  we 
can  often  detect  more  of  our  smothered  emo- 
tions and  tendencies  than  in  any  other  situa- 
tion that  ofil'ers  itself.  Neural  unification  is  rare, 
while  self  contradiction,  which  is  a  function  of 
chronic,  unresolved  neural  inhibitions,  appears 
to  be  not  only  one  of  the  chief  products  of  any 
and  all  instinctive  and  emotional  manifesta- 
tions, but  indeed  their  source. 

36.  Another  form  which  the  emotional 
complex  takes  is  the  dream.  This  normally  oc- 
curs in  sleep,  and  is  the  rearousal  of  forgotten 
or  suppressed  ideas  which  have  not  been  func- 
tioned during  waking  hours.  It  is  substan- 
tially the  revelation  of  a  wish, — by  which  may 
equally  be  meant  the  hope  that  something  will 
347 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
happen,  as  well  as  the  fear  that  something  might 
happen.  But  in  either  case  a  dream  is  an  un- 
shot  residue  of  emotional  or  instinctive  func- 
tioning,— the  back-water  of  consciousness.  Be- 
fore entering  into  the  physiological  or  ideation- 
al processes  which  give  dreams  their  being,  it 
will  be  profitable  to  consider  briefly  other  forms 
of  the  rearousal  of  past  consciousness,  in  order 
that  comparison,  contrast,  and  orientation  may 
serve  as  means  whereby  they  may  be  better 
understood. 

37.  These  other  forms  are  memory  and 
imagination.  Memory  has  until  recently  been 
considered  as  something  which  resided  in  cer- 
tain cells  of  the  cerebrum,  and  which,  by  a 
process  of  irradiation  or  some  such  neural  re- 
lease, got  into  consciousness.  Both  of  these 
views, — that  of  its  being  a  single  process,  and 
that  of  its  being  the  dormant  content  of  special 
brain  cells, — are  not  to  be  upheld  in  this  book. 
There  have  been  found  in  laboratory  investiga- 
tions not  one  but  four  dififerent  modes  of  re- 
arousal  of  past  events,  none  of  which  give  mem- 
ory contents  exactly  identical  with  the  original. 
Memory,  far  from  being  a  reduplication  of  the 
object,  is  a  tendency  to  approach  the  class  of 
objects  of  which  the  sense  datum  remembered 
is  but  an  instance,  or  a  member,  and  when  this 
348 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
memory  content  is  fully  developed,  we  have 
concepts,  rather  than  percepts  or  sensory  de- 
tails. So  that  every  remembered  object  is  on 
the  way  to  generalization  or  conceptual  content. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  four  kinds  of  rearousal 
of  the  content  differ  much  from  one  another. 
And  there  is  always  a  gap,  a  latency,  between 
the  sensorial  presentation  and  the  recall,  and 
what  is  going  on  in  this  gap  escapes  introspec- 
tion. We  have  seen  the  particular  object,  let  us 
say,  but  when  the  rearousal  comes,  we  shall 
then  be  visualizing  only  that  general  class  of 
visual  phenomena  instead;  and  this  gap  or  la- 
tency is  the  time  in  which  the  particularity  of 
the  content  is  being  lost.  But  this  is  nothing 
outrageous,  for  the  particular  object  was  also  a 
member  of  its  class,  particular  in  this  case 
meaning  only  that  certain  specific  members  of 
the  series  constituting  it  were  functioned  togeth- 
er. And  each  of  these  members  had  affiliations, 
common  parts,— functional  or  contential,— 
with  many  other  members  of  those  series.  Such, 
indeed,  is  often  the  case  even  with  sensation. 
The  paradoxical  cold  and  heat,  the  tickle  sen- 
sation, the  estimation  of  movement  and  so  on, 
all  differ  at  times  from  the  mathematical  and 
physical  status  of  the  stimulus  in  ways  that  are 
familiar  enough  to  need  no  exclamation  points 
349 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
as  we  pass.    So  that  while  in  the  focal  area  of 
consciousness  we  function  with  the  words  "this 
particular    one,"    the    sub-focal    areas    of    con- 
sciousness could  be  as  well  functioned  by  the 
expression,  "one  of  those  which  has  been  func- 
tioned before,"  as  by  other  words  referring  to 
focality.    Thus  it  is  that  when  the  object  is  re- 
moved from   sense  focality,  and  we  recall  it, 
while  mentioning  it  or  not,  what  gets  restored 
in  after-imagery  is  that  cross-section  of  the  se- 
ries making  the  object,  which  will  be  normally 
functioned  with  the  least  effort  possible.     But 
mark,  that  an  intense  effort  to  recall  something 
is  always  accompanied  by  a  tension  in  the  body, 
as  well  as  by  an  effort  to  place  our  organism  in 
the  identical  relation  to  the  absent  stimulus  as 
it  was  to  it  while  present.    For  ideas  are  func- 
tioned by  the   aid   of  bodily   attitudes,  just  as 
emotions  are  functions  of  the  general  disturb- 
ance caused  by  our  bodily  mis-orientation  with 
the  situation. 

38.  The  four  ways  of  reinstating  absent 
stimuli  are  these.  1.  Perseveration,  which 
means  that,  shortly  after  its  disappearance, 
without  any  mediating  focal  ideas,  there  is  a  re- 
currence of  the  original  idea.  2.  Persistence, 
(which  usually  occurs  in  fatigue  or  exhaustion), 
w^hereby  is  meant  that  ideas  become  repetitive 
350 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
because  we  no  longer  perceive  differences,  or 
react  in  a  discriminating  manner  to  the  sensory 
present.  3.  Iteration,  or  the  random  recur- 
rence of  fleeting  impressions,  and  4.  The  free 
emergence  of  those  things  we  have  often  func- 
tioned, especially  motor  habits.  Now  if  any 
one  wishes  to  know  how  the  absent  object  gets 
reinstated,  or  past  functioning  repeated,  the 
answer  is  that  the  pastness  or  absence  of  the 
object  is  one  thing,  and  its  non-dependence 
upon  consciousness  for  its  existence  is  another. 
An  object  is  something  that  will  stimulate, 
whether  it  be  orthogonally  disposed  to  the  body 
and  its  sense  organs  or  not.  The  time  series  is 
one  series  and  the  space  series  is  another,  but 
there  are  other  series,  neither  in  time  nor  space, 
as  we  pointed  out  in  the  first  part  of  Chapter 
III.  Things  have  position  in  the  order  of  knowl- 
edge, as  well  as  in  Florida  or  the  year  1914. 
Things  also  have  position  in  space  twice  at  the 
same  time  and  even  twice  in  the  same  space,  if 
we  but  open  our  eyes  to  that  fact. 

39.  Let  this  specifically  serve  as  an  exam- 
ple. When  we  hang  a  mirror  on  the  wall  of 
a  room,  and  stand  in  front  of  it,  we  can  see  our- 
selves doubled, — literally  projected  through  the 
wall  into  the  space  beyond.  If  the  wall  of  the 
room  is  continuous  wdth  the  sheer  edge  of  a 
351 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
precipice,  we  do  not  see  the  object  mirrored 
behind  the  wall  tumble  into  the  chasm  below, 
even  though  its  position  relative  to  us  is  beyond 
the  threshold  of  safety.  And  yet  the  mirrored 
object  is  colorful,  shapely,  motile,  almost  every- 
thing that  we  are, — except  that  it  has  no  weight. 
Bat  neither  have  our  shape,  color,  and  motility 
any  weight.  So  that  the  mirrored  object  is 
composed  of  all  those  qualities  which  are  not 
physical  objects.  This  is  also  the  substance  of 
ideas.  This,  likewise,  is  the  substance  of  mem- 
ories. The  mirrored  object  is  faithful  to  the 
shape,  color,  and  movements  of  the  original, 
but  the  mirror  merely  analyses  out  the  non-ma- 
terial properties,  and  is  thus  a  logical  instru- 
ment as  well  as  a  sense  organ,  strictly  defined. 
If  a  man  is  standing  in  front  of  a  mirror  and 
shaves  himself,  the  mirror,  of  course  reversing 
every  horizontal  movement  relative  to  the  ob- 
server, will  betray  the  slight  abrasion  that  the 
"real"  skin  suffers.  But  while  the  man's  face 
has  a  tiny  drop  of  blood  upon  it,  the  mirror 
face  has  not, — it  has  only  a  drop  of  red,  which 
is  one  of  the  essential  properties  of  the  contents 
of  the  capillaries.  Again,  "the  painted  hawser 
will  hold  the  painted  ship,"  but  it  takes  a  rope 
hawser  to  hold  a  wooden  ship.  And  so  on. 
Thus  the  point  is  well  taken  that  the  physical 
352 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
order  of  things  is  not  the  only  order  into  which 
they  get,  regardless  of  the  status  of  those  other 
orders.  But  certainly  they  are  not  in  the  same 
time  and  space,  nor  entirely  under  the  same 
laws  as  are  the  physical  orders  commonly  ap- 
pealed to  for  truth  and  validity. 

40.  This  is  not  only  an  aside;  it  is  a  neces- 
sary prologue  to  the  proper  understanding  of 
memory  and  other  co-  and  sub-conscious  phe- 
nomena. The  rehabilitation  of  the  object  in 
some  sort  of  sensory  content,  faint  and  unfaith- 
ful though  it  be,  is  no  more  mysterious  than  is 
the  phenomenon  of  mirror  space.  Nor  is  the 
motor  readjustment  of  the  body  to  a  situation 
in  which  some  instinct  or  emotion  is  repeated 
by  the  mere  mention  of  a  word  or  the  presen- 
tation of  an  idea,  any  more  subtle  than  are  the 
original  orders  of  things  which  get  cross-sec- 
tioned into  sensation  and  perception.  The  ob- 
jects of  memory  and  imagination  have  no  po- 
sition, and  may  be  anywhere,  just  as  the  quali- 
ties of  sensation  may  be  anywhere.  And  mem- 
ory that  comes  pat  with  the  provoking  stimulus 
is  primarily  a  function  of  the  bodily  attitude. 
We  are  set  for  that  recall  by  a  definite  motor 
pattern, — we  have  crystallized  toward  a  certain 
set  of  perceptions,  and  the  sensory  or  motor  ele- 


353 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
merits  follow  as  readily  as  the  water  from  the 
faucet  when  we  turn  it  on. 

41.  Memory,  like  the  word  "experience," 
is  used  both  as  a  noun  and  a  verb.  The  distinc- 
tion is  well  taken  in  connection  with  sensory 
content,  but  when  we  come  to  the  motor  mem- 
ories, we  have  a  more  intricate  matter  to  deal 
with.  The  memory  (subconscious)  of  the  oper- 
ations of  dressing  is  both  a  content  and  a  pro- 
cess, let  us  say;  but  just  where  one  begins  and 
the  other  ends  is  rather  obscure.  And  the  rea- 
son is,  that  the  clothes  we  wear  and  therewith 
clothe  ourselves  in  the  morning,  are  themselves 
best  defined  by  the  things  we  do  with  them.  A 
hat  is  something  that  is  worn  on  the  head,  shoes 
are  things  that  are  worn  on  the  feet,  and  so  on 
throughout  the  wardrobe.  So  that,  since  these 
articles  are  of  the  class  of  attributes-things- 
functions,  so  are  memories  which  involve  their 
accustomed  use.  Emotions  and  instincts  are 
also  of  this  class  of  objects,  curiously  tangled 
and  interwoven,  so  that  we  have  called  them 
functions  of  the  body,  not  because  they  are  in- 
side of  the  skin  and  ooze  through  the  pores,  but 
because  their  position  is  obscure.  We  thus  re- 
fer to  the  body  out  of  a  desire  to  spacialize  them 
and  give  them  position  somewhere. 

42.  Imagination    differs    from    memory    in 

354 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
that  it  is  just  a  more  agile  and  less  personal 
transformation  of  the  elements  of  the  ohjects 
reinstated.  James  rightly  spoke  of  "the  date 
in  our  past"  which  all  remembered  things  have, 
while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  imagination  con- 
tent was  everybody's,  being  nobody's.  But  this 
little  hint  may  serve  to  make  the  distinction 
clearer.  Memory  is  the  result  of  having  a  motor 
pattern  congruous  with  more  elements  that  have 
become  ingrained  in  us  than  is  the  case  with 
imagination.  There  is  no  difference  in  the  con- 
tent, relative  position,  clearness,  or  other  fea- 
tures in  both  of  these  rearousals,  but  only  in 
the  familiarity  with  which  we  greet  them,  and 
memory  is  called  mine  sooner  than  is  imagina- 
tion; and  mine  in  this  case  means  both  period- 
icity, ingraining,  and  readiness  of  motor  func- 
tioning. 

43.  Now  for  dreams.  Two  main  condition- 
ers are  to  be  mentioned  in  this  instance, — the 
physiological  and  the  ideational.  On  the  side 
of  the  organism  as  a  contributing  element,  we 
find  that  sleep  is  the  usual  state  in  which  dreams 
occur.  Day-dreams  resemble  night  dreams  in 
that  they  demand  a  certain  lack  of  motor  focus 
in  the  body  before  they  come, — a  certain  pre- 
ponderance of  co-conscious  elements.  Sleep,  by 
which  we  mean  the  condition  of  a  tired  body, 
355 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
relaxed,  unstimulated  by  sense  data,  and  be- 
coming ineffectual  with  regard  to  its  environ- 
ment, is  principally  accompanied  (a)  by  a  loss 
of  blood  to  the  brain  and  a  gain  to  the  extrem- 
ities, (b)  by  a  relaxation  of  tone  in  the  vaso- 
motor system,  (c)  by  the  retraction  of  the  den- 
drites, and  (d)  by  a  diminution  of  the  supply 
of  oxygen  in  the  brain.  And  yet,  while  the  ma- 
jority of  functions  are  dormant,  the  thresholds 
are  not  all  high.  A  mother  who  wakes  not  at 
the  thunder  storm,  but  yet  at  the  slightest  stir- 
ring in  the  cradle,  is  set  not  for  thunder  but 
for  the  needs  of  her  child,  and  her  sleep  is  thus 
only  partial.  Indeed  we  all  sleep  thus  partial- 
ly, unless  the  sleep  be  caused  by  intoxication. 
Let  us  at  once  state,  furthermore,  that  this  par- 
tial sleep  is  the  physiological  element  in  our 
dreams, 

44.  Let  us  clarify  this  further.  If  there  are 
any  suppressed  ideas  in  our  consciousness  when 
we  fall  asleep,  they  usually  get  functioned  in 
some  manner  not  anticipated.  Any  slight  stimu- 
lus will  be  sufTicient  to  arouse  them,  even  if  there 
is  nothing  more  than  an  informal  logical  rela- 
tion between  the  conscious  elements.  We  do 
not  predict  dreams,  but  we  nevertheless  infer 
their  origin  with  surprising  certainty.  Psycho- 
analysis, which  is  usually  misreported  in  popu- 
356 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
lar  accounts  of  it,  has  been  the  method  by 
which  dreams  have  been  pinned  to  the  objects 
which  have  stimulated  them.  This  analysis  con- 
sists in  obtaining  from  the  subject,  either  verb- 
ally or  in  his  own  writing,  all  of  the  ideas  which 
leisurely  come  in  train  at  the  mention  of  one 
of  the  elements  in  his  dream, — particularly 
those  concerning  which  there  is  obscurity  as  to 
their  place  or  meaning.  The  subject  must  be 
truthful  and  keep  back  nothing,  regardless  of 
its  intimacy  or  scandal.  From  the  few  blessed 
regenerates  who  are  willing  thus  to  admit  their 
human  nature,  we  obtain  valuable  information 
in  regard  to  dreams. 

45.  Such  a  train  of  ideas  is  called  "free 
association,"  but  I  do  not  mean  by  this  that  it 
has  anything  to  do  with  the  notorious  doctrine 
of  association  which  every  book  on  psychology 
seems  to  find  virtue  in  repeating.  According 
to  it,  ideas  are  said  to  follow  one  another  in 
the  same  order  as  they  have  been  together  be- 
fore, by  virtue  of  their  similarity,  contrast,  con- 
tiguity in  time,  or  contiguity  in  space.  Titch- 
ener  dealt  this  doctrine  its  first  fatal  blow  in 
his  reduction  of  these  four  categories  to  one 
only, — namely  contiguity  in  space,  which  for 
him  summarizes  them  all.  I  shall  wipe  even 
this  one  away.  Very  little  that  is  temporally 
357 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
or  spacially  together  gets  remembered,  or  even 
functioned.  And  the  order  of  recall  does  not 
follow  the  order  of  presentation  except  when 
motor  ingraining  has  thoroughly  taken  place. 
Ideas  are,  according  to  this  doctrine  of  associa- 
tionism,  not  identical  with,  but  rather  complete- 
ly distinct,  from  things,  and  between  the  two 
God  has  put  a  gulf  so  wide  that  no  one  can  cross 
it  in  less  than  two  leaps.  These  ideas  were  said 
to  come  and  go  in  the  manner  of  visitors,  and 
furthermore  said  to  have  laws  of  entrance,  eti- 
quette, and  exit.  No  such  rationality  disposes 
the  ideas.  Logic  is  no  description  of  how  we 
think,  for  thinking  as  independent  of  the  prop- 
erties of  objects  is  a  downright  fabrication  on 
the  part  of  those  who  must  perforce  provide 
something  for  the  soul  to  do.  Functional  de- 
pendence is  the  law  of  the  connection  of  ideas 
that  have  pattern  and  sequence  relative  to  the 
objects  of  which  they  are  a  part;  and  such  triv- 
ial categories  as  similarity  and  togetherness  are 
wholly  secondary.  How  much,  indeed,  of  the 
temporal  or  spacial  present  gets  recalled  in  com- 
parison with  what  never  gets  focally  recalled? 
The  proportion  is  almost  painfully  small.  What 
gets  recalled  is  what  gets  into  the  pattern  of 
motor  manifestations,  so  far  as  focal  conscious- 
ness is  concerned;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  inso- 
358 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
far  as  the  dream  consciousness  is  concerned, 
the  order  of  recall  and  presentation  is  just  as 
random  as  the  emotionality  that  functions  it, 
while  the  vagaries  of  the  dreamer  are  just  those 
shreds  and  clippings  which  the  release  of  his 
suppressions  brings  to  some  sort  of  focality. 

46.  The  material  of  dreams  is  mostly  de- 
rived from  the  day  before  the  dream  occurs. 
Dr.  Sigmund  Freud,  the  Viennese  psychologist, 
who  has  rendered  signal  service  in  ferreting  out 
dream  material,  divides  it  into  two  main  parts, 
namely,  the  "latent  content,"  or  the  whole 
thought-mass  of  the  dream,  and  the  "manifest 
content,"  or  the  part  we  recall  and  mention 
upon  aw^akening.  This  manifest  content  is  an 
allegory  of  the  latent  content,  frequently  con- 
taining imagery  of  the  most  unsuspected  things. 
For  example,  wishes  and  emotions  expressed 
in  the  dream  may  go  by  contraries.  Suppose 
we  have  in  waking  life  disliked  some  one  ex- 
ceedingly. The  dream  may  represent  us  as 
putting  that  person  out  of  the  way,  and  then 
being  bitterly  sorry  for  the  deed.  Or,  we  may 
be  dreaming  of  saving  his  life  as  a  sign  that  we 
wished  him  some,  but  not  the  extremest,  harm. 
The  important  space  and  time  values  of  the 
events  of  waking  life  may  all  become  distorted, 
— the  things  occupying  the  smallest  or  largest 
359 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
spaces  in  dreams  usually  being  opposite  to  their 
size  in  the  waking  estimation.  Again,  two  per- 
sons manifesting  the  same  emotion  in  a  dream 
usually  are  found  to  represent  the  same  per- 
sonality. As  a  general  thing,  also,  the  concept 
enters  in  largely, — dreaming  of  an  immigrant 
will  typify  strangeness,  timidity,  or  the  fear  of 
a  new  venture,  and  so  on. 

47.  Now  all  of  this  material  comes  from 
past  life  and  not  from  some  spook  who  inhabits 
the  corners  of  the  brain  or  the  sleeping  room. 
The  sensory  vividness  of  the  dream  usually  re- 
fers to  the  events  of  the  day  before,  while  the 
rest  of  it  is  the  releases  of  tension  which  social 
and  other  pressures  have  necessitated.  Five 
main  sources  are  to  be  mentioned  in  this  con- 
nection, (a)  Any  interrupted  thought  not  fin- 
ished at  the  time,  (b)  All  unsolved  problems, 
which  will  tend  to  be  flashed  again  and  again 
upon  the  dreamer's  consciousness  in  kaleido- 
scopic form.  (c)  Rejected  or  suppressed 
trains  of  thinking,  (d)  Parts  of  co-conscious- 
ness aroused  from  the  previous  day's  life,  recol- 
lections of  where  we  hid  things,  or  inadvert- 
antly put  them  away,  (e)  Indifferent  or  float- 
ing impressions  of  things.  The  making  of  the 
dream  out  of  these  materials  is  accomplished  in 
the  following  way.  First,  there  is  the  principle 
360 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
of  condensation.  Every  element  in  the  mani- 
fest content  represents  several  things  (not  one) 
in  the  latent  content.  Common  parts  ahound. 
Many  anxieties  are  crowded  into  one  terrifying 
situation,  which  by  itself,  and  taken  singly,  may 
have  little  reference  to  the  past  of  the  dreamer. 
Tlic  second  element  in  dream  making  is  dis- 
placement. The  intensity  of  an  element  in  the 
manifest  content  is  no  index  of  its  intensity 
in  the  latent  content.  Hyperbole  is  the  name 
we  apply  to  this  in  matters  of  spech  in  waking 
life.  We  dream  that  we  are  being  slaughtered 
or  pushed  over  a  steep  precipice.  This  may 
merely  refer  to  former  situations  when  some 
one  unwittingly  jostled  us,  or  caused  us  a  slight 
annoyance.  The  magnitude  of  the  distortion, 
however,  depends  upon  the  emotionality  and 
unification  of  the  personality;  the  most  out- 
w^ardly  modest  and  pious  people  may  have  the 
worst  dreams,  but  this  modesty  and  piety  are 
no  index  of  their  suppressions,  which  may  be 
maintained  in  vanity  as  well  as  in  sincerity.  A 
third  feature  in  dream  making  is  dramatization. 
Curious  anachronisms  accompany  this.  Pres- 
ent and  past  are  intermingled,  and  the  here  and 
the  far  are  juxtaposeu.  The  absurd  things  of 
waking  life  become  mocked  instead,  the  proud 
person  is  given  a  sceptre,  the  humble  is  relig- 
361 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
iously  turned  into  a  worm,  the  teacher  who 
"flunked"  us  is  made  tlie  fireman  in  a  crema- 
tory, the  girl  who  loved  us  becomes  a  superb 
angel.  In  the  informal  logic  of  dreams  any- 
thing can  be  expected  to  happen,  for  almost 
anything  does  happen.  We  can  analyse  it  after- 
wards, but  not  settle  upon  its  course  in  advance. 
The  fourth  and  last  feature  in  dream  making 
is  regression.  The  abstract  things  become  con- 
crete, and  single  attributes  appear  as  things. 
On  account  of  this  fact,  people  have  frequently 
been  inclined  to  place  large  stock  in  the  flying 
vagaries  of  their  sensoi-y  content  during  sleep. 
Indeed  armies  have  been  raised  to  conquer,  vast 
sums  of  money  been  poured  out,  deprivation 
endured,^ — all  because  some  enthusiast  with  a 
picturesque  vocabulary  narrated  heatedly  his 
visitations  from  the  "other  world."  The  "inner 
self"  of  dreams  possesses  no  such  attractiveness 
to  the  empirical  student  of  psychology  as  the 
naive  mind  takes  for  granted  to  be  the  case. 
Dreams  typify,  and  dreams  elucidate,  but 
dreams  are  indices  of  erratic  refraction,  rather 
than  evidences  of  tangency  to  another  cosmos 
than  the  one  to  which  w^e  are  subservient. 

48.     Bodily  postures  during  sleep  or  bodily 
happenings  while  we  are  supine  make  up  a  con- 
sideranle    amo"P*    of    the    stimuli    to    dreams. 
362 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
Tickle  the  neck  of  an  enthusiastic  dreamer,  and 
he  will  be  likely  to  dream  of  being  guillotined 
as  not.  Drop  a  little  water  on  his  forehead, 
and  he  will  think  the  club  of  Herakles  is  de- 
scending with  its  usual  velocity.  Turnings  over 
in  bed,  whether  involuntary,  or  elicited  by  an 
experimenter,  will  usually  have  their  effect  in 
the  dream  content;  while  too  much  heat  of  the 
bed-clothes,  as  well  as  being  uncovered  while 
sleeping,  will  be  dramatized  into  situations  of 
burning  or  freezing.  Dreams  of  flying  and  fall- 
ing are  usually  correlated  with  sexual  and  anx- 
iety complexes  respectively,  and  so  far  have 
the  students  of  dreams  pursued  their  analysis, 
that  it  is  but  necessary  to  tell  one  of  them  his 
dreams  and  be  psycho-analyzed  with  care,  in 
order  that  these  phenomena  be  tracked  to  their 
true  stimuli,  and  in  many  cases  quite  eradicated 
from  the  future  sleeping  consciousness. 

49.  No  sketch  of  the  emotional  life  would 
be  complete  without  some  account  of  the  soul. 
This  word,  I  am  convinced,  has  both  a  reputable 
as  well  as  a  vicious  signification,  and  1  shall  try 
here  to  separate  them.  "Psychology  without  a 
soul"  has  been  the  vogue  for  some  years,  if  not 
decades,  and  it  is  the  abuse  of  the  term  which 
is  responsible  for  this  state  of  affairs.  Private 
motives,  "moral"  reasons,  and  other  traducing 
363 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
factors  have  long  been  called  into  play  when 
empirical  evidences  were  lacking;  and  thus  the 
soul,  evaporating  out  of  psychology,  is  men- 
tioned only  by  a  certain  few  who  lay  no  claim 
to  its  validity  except  on  the  grounds  of  custom 
and  reverence  for  the  past.  The  notion  of  the 
soul  originated  in  untutored  and  uncritical  per- 
sons, who  were  at  a  loss  to  explain  certain 
phenomena  of  mental  life,  as  well  as  in  a  hurry 
to  get  names  for  things.  The  names,  however, 
swallowed  up  the  things,  and  it  took  some  time 
for  this  fallacy  to  be  undermined.  The  dreams 
of  the  primitive  man,  his  personification  of  the 
elements  and  forces  of  nature,  his  mysterious 
regard  for  everything  he  could  not  control,  and 
similar  functions  of  ignorance,  brought  out  his 
naive  beliefs  into  crystallization,  with  the  re- 
sult that  he  knew  not  the  difference  between 
himself  and  the  rest  of  nature.  When  such  a 
situation  occurs,  unknowns  are  in  the  majority, 
and  the  unknowns  are  taken  as  the  criteria  of 
the  Knowns.  One  of  the  products  of  such  think- 
ing is  faith, — a  form  of  scepticism  which  disbe- 
lieves in  the  full  manifestation  of  the  universe 
at  any  one  time,  and  is  inversely  proportional 
to  the  amount  of  true  knowledge  which  the 
individual  is  willing  to  assimilate.  Ideals  are 
some  of  the  products  of  faith,  and  these,  by  con- 
364 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
taining  an  element  of  uncertainty, — a  perpet- 
ually unrealizable  end  term, — are  forms  of  the 
same  scepticism.  Religion  itself  is  a  theory  of 
the  soul,  as  well  as  a  theory  of  the  structure 
of  the  world,  and  the  place  which  human  activi- 
ties have  in  it.  Of  these  three,  its  theory  of  the 
soul  is  perhaps  the  most  important,  for  its  meta- 
physics is  frequently  deduced  from  its  psychol- 
ogisms,  while  its  morality  is  a  function  of  the 
changing  customs  of  the  era  in  which  it  flour- 
ishes. I  shall  offer  the  following  theories  of 
the  soul,  each  of  which  has  figured  in  the  past, 
and  each  of  which  is  as  likely  to  figure  in  the 
future. 

(a)  The  soul  as  glandular  secretion.  All 
reference  to  the  soul  as  being  in  the  body  is 
connected  with  some  organ  of  the  body  in  which 
it  has  its  "seat."  "The  brain  is  the  seat  of  the 
mind,  has  sometimes  been  uttered  in  rash  mo- 
ments; and  likewise  the  heart  or  the  liver  or 
the  other  organs  of  vegetation  have  been  given 
the  honor  above  specified.  There  is  something 
both  reputable  and  otherwise  in  this  statement, 
for  the  body  is  both  the  center  of  the  individ- 
ual's existence,  as  well  as  dependent  for  its  sta- 
bility upon  the  cardiac,  respirator>%  alimentary 
and  other  functions.  In  all  emotional  states, 
likewise,  there  are  certain  well  defined  func- 
365 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
tions  of  the  ductless  glands,  such  as  the  supra- 
renal, the  thyroid,  and  the  like,  causing  the 
animal  better  to  endure  wounds  and  heal  them 
than  otherwise,  or  at  other  times.  But  the  dif- 
ficulty with  this  theory  is  that  it  makes  physi- 
ological processes  fundamental  without  recog- 
nizing that  they  are  physiological.  The  emo- 
tions are  disorders,  signs  of  abnormality,  and 
to  make  the  soul  as  an  emotional  state,  the 
fundamental  thing  in  human  life,  is  to  choose 
the  worst  and  call  it  the  best.  That  which  was 
the  obscurest,  the  least  known,  the  upholders 
of  the  internal  soul  have  made  the  cap-stone 
of  their  belief,  a  procedure  which  is  to  say  the 
least  of  it,  fatuous.  Psychologizing,  or  the  tak- 
ing of  unanalysed  psychological  data  as  the 
fundamental  thing  in  logic,  or  philosophy,  or 
ethics,  or  metaphysics,  is  the  name  of  the  error 
which  characterizes  all  accounts  of  an  internal 
soul  or  psyche,  which  inhabits  the  interior  of 
the  body.  Such  a  "gaseous  vertebrate"  as  this 
form  of  soul  would  have  to  be,  must  be  the  one 
"unmentionable,"  and  therefore  reducible  to 
zero  for  psychology, 

(b)      The  soul  as   all   the  functions   of   the 

bodij.     This  theory  easily  allies  itself  with  the 

doctrine   of  "self-expression."     One   is  said   to 

express  himself  when  he  does  anything  that  re- 

366 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
veals  his  "inner  nature."  Being  able  to  find  no 
satisfactory  meaning  for  these  terms,  I  shall 
have  to  pass  them  by.  But  the  doctrine  of  self- 
expression  must  turn  out  to  mean  that  any  and 
every  act  is  an  expression  of  a  self,  and  thus 
one  has  to  grade  such  actions  according  to  some 
other  standard,  if  the  expression  is  to  have  any 
meaning.  That  which  means  everything  means 
nothing.  Now  the  soul,  as  the  entire  life  his- 
tory of  the  person  concerned,  or  the  present 
personality, — manners,  habits,  acuities,  emo- 
tions, memories,  and  everything  one  can  name 
which  the  organism  is  doing,  is  a  notion  that 
has  so  far  supplanted  the  previous  one  that  we 
might  consider  it  the  present  day  tendency  in 
souls. 

(c)  The  soul  as  a  specific  organization  of 
functions  toward  a  permanent  type  which  con- 
stantly evolves  the  new  and  the  beneficial.  The 
writer  holds  that  this  view  is  the  only  one  so  far 
presented  which  requires  a  special  term  to  dis- 
tinguish it  from  mind,  personality,  or  the  whole 
of  the  cross-section.  For  the  whole  gamut  of 
functions  of  which  we  are  capable  is  necessar- 
ily a  developmental  series,  if  there  is  to  be  de- 
duction and  permanency  to  it.  We  saw  that  the 
cross-section  is  full  of  incomplete  series.  At- 
tributes come  and  go,  and  parts  have  a  share  in 
367 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
many  series.  Now  when  a  set  of  functions 
freely  operates,  and  operates  time  and  again, 
there  is  something  more  intimate  and  secure 
about  it  than  w^hen  only  random  sets  of  opera- 
tions transpire.  For  example,  there  is  a  vast 
difference  between  the  person  who  always  tells 
the  truth,  and  the  person  who  can  never  be 
calculated  to  tell  it;  for  in  the  former  there  is 
a  permanent  response  to  the  facts  of  the  case, 
and  a  lack  of  inhibitions  against  the  language 
reaction  becoming  a  derivative  of  that  function. 
Not  only  is  there  also  a  vast  difference  between 
these  two  persons  in  point  of  social  or  emotional 
rank,  uut  the  former  does  not  have  a  divided 
consciousness,  while  the  latter  has.  The  former 
has  no  complexes  strong  enough  to  traduce  his 
speech,  and  the  result  is  both  a  better  organ- 
ization of  his  functions,  and  a  chance  to  become 
a  predictable  person, — two  things  which  are 
denied  to  the  other.  This  is  just  a  passing  ex- 
ample, but  it  will  suffice  to  give  the  evidence 
why  such  a  person  whose  consciousness  is  uni- 
fied should  be  said  to  have  a  soul,  rather  than 
the  person  of  whom  the  same  things  cannot  be 
said. 

50.     No    more    than    a    bare    outline    of   the 
emotional  complex  can  be  included  in  this  chap- 
ter, and  the  student  must  look  for  special  treat- 
368 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
ments  elsewhere.  The  extent  to  which  com- 
plexes abound,  hinder,  and  split  our  conscious- 
ness asunder  is  revealed  in  almost  every  situa- 
tion of  life.  The  phobias  on  which  venders  of 
patent  medicines  thrive  is  but  one  example. 
Another  is  the  New  England  conscience,  or  the 
notion  that  everything  must  be  interpreted  in 
terms  of  duty.  The  delusion  of  "feeling  that  the 
eye  of  God  is  upon  one"  occurs  frequently 
among  the  slightly  insane.  The  general  awak- 
ening to  the  destructive  eifect  of  such  fears  is 
evidenced  in  certain  moral  and  religious  prop- 
agandas of  the  past  decade,  for  whatever  ab- 
surd metaphysics  or  cosmology  they  teach,  their 
general  stimulus  is  a  recognized  need.  And  yet, 
most  moral  propagandas  are  based  upon  the 
fear  of  something  to  a  large  degree,  rather  than 
upon  the  unification  of  the  personality  under  a 
positive  principle  of  incremental  benefits.  In 
many  a  religious  code  the  negative  suggestibility 
is  assumed,  and  certain  fears  are  played  upon 
in  connection  with  sickness,  dying  and  the  like 
predicaments,  on  the  ground  that  phobia  and 
negative  instruction  are  the  fundamental  mov- 
ers of  human  activity. 

51.     There   are   certain   other  matters   con- 
nected with  emotion  and  suppression  which  be- 
long partly  in  this  chapter  and  partly  not  in  it. 
369 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
These  are  the  items  in  the  cross-section  known 
as  interest,  purpose,  and  will.      They  are  not 
nouns,  however,  but  something  else.    Interest,  I 
take  it,  is  the  manifestation  of  constant  motor 
tendencies  toward  some  one  special  group   of 
objects,  plus  a  satisfyingness  at  their  develop- 
ment.   But  this  satisfyingness  is  not  necessarily 
emotional,  or,  if  so,  it  is  considered  best  as  emo- 
tion arising  after  the  results  have  been  achieved. 
The  success  of  the  motor  disposals  toward  ob- 
jects is  often  too  much  to  be  assimilated,  and, 
in  such  a  case,  the  disordered  state  supervenes. 
However,  interest  may  be  very  quiet  and  not 
accompanied   by   glandular  secretion   or   vaso- 
motor constriction.     It  has  normally,  the  same 
character   as   feeling-tone, — a    readiness    to   re- 
spond again  by  virtue  of  a  lack  of  inhibitory 
tendencies.     Curiosity,  which  enters  into  inter- 
est, was  spoken  of  as  one  of  the  safest  instincts, 
and  interest  is  often  stimulated  by  curiosity.     A 
person  is  interested  both  in  that  in  which  he 
says  his  interests  lie,  and  also  in  what  he  does 
most  without  restraint  or  forcing.     When  the 
personality  is  unified,  these  two  coincide.     One 
may  be  interested  in  what  he  groans  to  be  re- 
leased from.     Some   occupation   that  is   hated, 
some  iteration  that  is  disliked,  may  be  the  very 
thing  he  will  voluntary  return  to  after  being 
370 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
freed.     In  such  a  case  the  interest  is  certainly 
emotional,  and  as  such  is  a  symptom  of  dis- 
order. 

52.  Purpose  is  the  maintaining  of  a  motor 
pattern  in  the  midst  of  various  environments, 
each  equally  contributing  to  its  maintenance. 
It  includes  the  element  of  choice.  This  choice 
is  free,  when  it  operates  without  hindrance;  it 
is  not  free  when  it  is  hindered:  it  is  deter- 
mined when  the  end  to  be  gained  can  be  gained 
only  that  way;  it  is  indeterminate  when  any  end 
term  is  equally  suitable.  Along  with  these  are 
usually  considered  intention,  or  that  which  one 
is  functioning  furtheringly;  and  motive,  or  the 
reason  why  one  furthers  it.  This  "why"  is  cau- 
sal, it  being  the  chain  of  events  which  lead  up 
to  the  intention.  Introspective  psychology  was 
once  said  to  furnish  the  means  for  determining 
all  these  matters,  but  it  has  signally  failed.  One 
determines  them  by  observing  the  organism  and 
what  it  is  doing  in  the  midst  of  its  various  en- 
vironments, and  then  one  asks  the  doer  what 
he  is  doing,  and  these  two  reports  are  carefully 
compared,  and  the  result  balanced.  If  the  doer 
and  the  sayer  conflict  in  their  results,  the  per- 
sonality is  said  to  be  divided;  if  they  agree,  he 
is  said  to  be  unified,  truthful,  and  predictable. 

53.  The  will  is  characterized  as  the  domi- 

371 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
nant  purpose  in  the  individual.  James  has  giv- 
en a  scheme  of  the  various  kinds  of  wills, — de- 
liberative, explosive,  drifting,  and  the  like, — 
which  are  characterizations  of  emotional  and 
temporal  manifestations  rather  than  descrip- 
tions of  what  the  organism  is  first  and  foremost 
doing  in  the  midst  of  its  environments.  For  if 
we  but  analyse  all  cases  of  the  will,  we  find 
that  the  thing  done,  the  thing  willed,  is  the  most 
constant  response  to  that  environment  of  which 
the  person  is  capable.  The  divided,  inconstant 
person  alone  boasts  of  the  freedom  of  the  will 
that  is  inside  of  him.  The  rest  of  humanity 
are  even  now  falling  into  the  habit  of  desiring 
to  be  predictable.  The  honesty  of  the  bank- 
ers, lawyers,  merchants  and  other  persons  of 
the  social  mele  is  just  this  predictability  of  their 
actions  before  they  are  fully  functioned.  For 
when  a  person  says  that  he  has  choice  and  can 
do  whatever  he  cares  to  do,  it  means  at  the  ut- 
most that  he  can  function  thus  once  and  once 
only.  We  are  never  apprehended  by  tlie  law 
until  we  step  over  the  threshold  of  social  peace. 
This  threshold  may  be  high  one  hour  and  low 
the  next,  but  it  is  always  a  definite  function  of 
the  environment  and  the  organism  within  it. 
Freedom  of  the  will  has  long  been  a  most  un- 
pleasant topic  on  account  of  its  being  talked  of 
372 


THE  EMOTIONAL  COMPLEX 
and  never  carried  out.  For  the  carte  blanche 
we  each  of  us  hold, — the  privilege  to  do  what- 
ever we  please, — is  not  a  return  ticket  Irom  cer- 
tain destinations  we  could  inscribe  upon  it.  And 
those  things  we  say  we  can  do  and  choose  are 
limited  by,  first,  motor  possibility,  and  second, 
by  the  desirability  of  the  end.  And  this  end, 
unless  we  are  emotionally  distorted,  is  one  of 
the  terms  of  a  series  already  started,  and  not 
something  which  falleth  like  the  Palladium 
from  the  blue. 


373 


CHAPTER  V. 

MATTERS  AND   MINDS 

1.  In  the  foregoing  pages  I  have  endeav- 
ored to  present  the  nature  of  the  common  oper- 
ations going  on  within  a  consciousness.  Objects 
sensed,  objects  perceived,  objects  in  an  emo- 
tional complication, — these  are  the  three  chief 
disposals  we  make  of  the  various  series  which 
meet  one  another  to  form  quotidian  things.  The 
various  series  which  get  thus  concatenated  are 
the  ultimate,  neutral  entities  of  the  universe. 
When  they  are  considered  as  being  material  for 
responses,  they  are  called  matters,  and  when 
they  are  being  responded  to,  and  thus  united 
in  the  with-for  relation,  they  are  called  minds. 
In  other  words,  minds  are  what  human  bodies 
do  with  matters.  Matters  include  minds,  but  if 
human  beings  are  to  speak  in  certain  ways,  the 
two  expressions  are  required  out  of  conveni- 
ence and  logic.  Whether  it  is  underhanded  or 
not,  some  matters  are  commanded  by  way  of 
our  being  obedient  to  them,  while  again  out  of 
such  dealings  come  new  matters  of  an  order 
scarcely  predictable;  for  it  is  hardly  likely  that 
some  things  would  have  had  the  factual  exist- 
ence which  they  do,  had  not  human  activities 
374 


MATTERS  AND  MINDS 
played  upon  their  elements,  and  thereby  found 
parts  and  functions  possessing  significant  prop- 
erties of  union  and  mutual  furtherance.  We  ar- 
rive on  the  planet  with  an  organic  structure 
craving  food,  and  clear  from  the  first  intake 
of  fluid  nourishment  to  the  erection  of  grain 
elevators,  the  human  neural  response  involved 
is  basically  the  same;  embroidered,  to  be  sure, 
by  the  constructive  functions  necessitated  by  the 
vast  social  environment  for  and  against  which 
we  strive.  Similarly,  from  the  first  time  we  are 
modest  and  shy,  to  the  adornment  of  our  bodies 
with  the  smothering  regalia  of  collegiate  func- 
tions, the  same  kernel  of  impulse  dominates  the 
situation,  and  the  wholesale  manufacture  of 
clothes  and  adornments  is  the  organized  social 
structure  based  upon  it.  Such  a  list  could  be 
wellnigh  prolonged  indeterminately,  but  these 
examples  wlil  suftice  to  make  focal  the  manner 
in  which  the  dominating  responses  of  the  hu- 
man organism  not  only  limit  the  possibility  of 
shattering  the  orders  which  now  stand  solid 
from  the  mold,  but  also  reach  beyond  the  brief 
present,  and  control  the  futurities  of  most  that 
he  call  "mine"  and  "yours." 

2.     Nevertheless    it    would    be    fatuous    to 
credit  everybody  with  motives  of  a  furthering 
and   permanent   character.        It   is   contrary   to 
375 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
fact,  and  hopeless  to  find.  As  evidence  of  the 
truth  of  this  thesis ;  let  me  but  cite  how  unusual 
it  is  to  find  a  calm  mind,  or  a  creative  mind,  or 
a  mind  that  is  truthful,  or  unshattered  by  com- 
plexes. How  few  persons,  when  they  close  the 
house  door  and  enter  the  street  and  its  crowds, 
do  not  shut  the  door  upon  their  permanent  mo- 
tives! Their  environments  are  largely  wooden, 
stone,  and  wall-paper  constructions;  and  their 
morality  depends  largely  in  the  lack  of  an- 
noyances, rather  than  in  the  responses  to  the 
environments  of  neutral  orderliness.  Neverthe- 
less, it  is  quite  possible  that  perceptions  of  or- 
der may  be  obtained  in  the  midst  of  disorder, 
and  since  this  is  a  matter  germane  to  nothing 
else  than  psychology,  here  will  be  the  place  to 
outline  its  development. 

3.  One  is  allowed,  it  would  seem,  in  dealing 
with  those  responses  called  interests,  to  take  a 
broad  perspective  of  the  field  they  cover.  Psy- 
chology, as  the  study  of  the  conscious  cross-sec- 
tion, has  little  need  to  merely  throw  its  data  out 
for  inspection,  without  throwing  out  for  inspec- 
tion as  well  the  possibilities  of  their  organiza- 
tion. And,  if  I  mistake  not,  one  of  the  requi- 
sites in  stating  a  problem  is  to  do  it  in  such  a 
manner  that  the  solution  will  be  hinted  at  in 
the  first  fornmlation.  That  which  disturbs  our 
376 


MATTERS  AND  MINDS 
perceptions  is  the  emotional  complex,  and  the 
first  thing  to  do,  if  one  is  to  have  perceptions  of 
order  and  motor  responses  of  permanence,  is 
to  get  rid  of  all  the  complexes  he  can.  Death 
is  supposed  to  do  this  at  one  clip,  and  while 
there  are  some  complexes  which  are  resolved 
only  by  that  event,  there  also  lies  within  the 
principle  of  common  parts  another  solution 
which  we  are  at  liberty  to  investigate.  The 
word  "soul,"  which  in  the  preceding  chapter 
was  retained  in  psycholog}^  on  good  grounds,  is 
a  word  which  should  be  meant  to  imply  a  min- 
imum of  emotional  complexes  and  a  maximum 
of  clear  perceptual  and  motor  furtherances; 
and  it  is  this  business  of  obtaining  a  soul,  which 
is  the  present  topic  under  consideration. 

4.  In  William  James'  chapter  on  "The 
Self,"  he  enumerates  various  selves  which  come 
and  go  in  consciousness.  The  material  and  bod- 
ily selves  he  makes  fundamental,  and  the  self 
of  the  widest  and  solidest  relations  he  makes  the 
final  flowering  of  neural  responses.  But  the 
"passing  thought,"  which  James  made  "the 
thinker," — the  Ego, — is  not  to  be  included  in 
this  present  account,  however  much  assistance 
I  may  have  drawn  from  his  pattern  of  personal- 
ity as  outlined  in  that  chapter.  At  once  it  can 
be  stated  that  the  permanency  of  the  Ego,  or 
377 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
self,  is  the  ordinal  correlation  of  the  responses 
of  the  organism  to  the  permanent  orders  of  the 
universe.  The  "passing  thought"  of  James  is 
only  the  speaking  voice,  and  is  over  and  gone 
as  soon  as  it  is  vittered.  Not  that  I  would  claim 
a  permanence  for  the  self  beyond  the  rigidest 
empirical  evidence,  but  the  "now"  of  psychology 
is  not  necessarily  that  span  of  time  which  in- 
cludes the  passing  thought;  for  the  "now"  is  as 
long  as  any  permanent  interest  lasts,  and  may 
be  years  as  well  as  minutes.  The  engineer  who 
put  the  tubes  under  the  East  River  may  have 
planned  them  for  years  before  they  were  finally 
laid,  and  it  is  so  with  such  constructions  that 
the  permanence  of  the  idea,  and  its  focality  in 
mind  is  unwavering  during  the  time  that  the 
individual  is  functioning  and  furthering  it.  I 
should  call  such  an  idea  the  source  of  person- 
ality, and  I  should  say  also  that  the  mind  fur- 
thering it  was  just  as  permanent  as  that  interest 
which  he  was  developing  was  permanent. 

5.  The  self  has  had  a  curious  history  in 
philosophy  and  psychology.  Descartes  was  the 
first  acute  thinker  to  ally  it  with  functional  ac- 
tivity, for  he  decided  that  the  phenomenon  of 
inhibition  was  the  fundamental  element  in  a 
consciousness.  Since  then,  less  and  less  has  the 
notion  of  a  permanent  spirit  or  spook  been  the 
378 


MATTERS  AND  MINDS 
ruling  theory  of  the  self.  James  was  the  last 
renowned  Avriter  to  assert  that  "we  were  always 
aware  of  our  selves,  of  our  personal  existence." 
This  book  upholds  no  such  non-empirical  prin- 
ciple. We  are  our  functions,  we  are  our  en- 
vironments, and  "consciousness  of"  thus  turns 
out  to  be  merely  an  expression  by  which  we  pay 
homage  to  the  tyranny  of  language.  Thus  "our 
own  personal  existence"  is  a  term  which  is 
quite  incomprehensible  when  applied  to  any 
other  things  than  bare  organic  functions,  and 
the  focality  of  them  in  our  consciousness.  While 
writing  this  page,  I  am  not  aware  of  my  per- 
sonal existence,  but  of  the  readers  who  will  re- 
spond to  it  instead.  Fingers,  pens,  typewriter 
and  paper  are  but  the  media, — the  plan  it  has 
or  lacks,  and  the  receptions  it  will  receive,  are 
the  things  my  mind  is  made  of  while  perform- 
ing this  function  of  publication.  Even  the  per- 
sonal pronoun  "I,"  which  is  used  here  from 
time  to  time,  is  the  vocal  instrument  of  this  per- 
manent interest,  and  used  solely  on  account  of 
custom  and  convenience. 

6.  James  speaks  of  the  hierarchy  of  selves, 
and  makes  the  material  self,  which  consists  of 
the  body,  clothes,  relatives  and  property,  that 
from  which  all  the  rest  of  the  interests  originate 
as  well  as  depart.  The  responses  of  food-getting, 
379 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
self-display,  reproduction  and  acquisition  are 
the  elements  which  enter  into  this  type  of  con- 
sciousness, and  which  have  to  he  satisfied  be- 
fore anything  else  can  have  any  show  at  all. 
Next  comes  the  social  self,  which  is  a  product 
of  gregariousness,  and  includes  the  desire  to  be 
approved,  the  desire  to  excel,  together  with  the 
subsequent  blames,  honors,  and  satisfactions. 
Following  this  is  the  spiritual  self,  which  ap- 
pears to  be  a  certain  sentimental  attachment 
to  one's  entire  tissue  of  conscious  states.  In  all 
this  there  seems  to  be  a  wholesomeness  and  a 
catholicity  of  observation  which  deserves  to  be 
imitated  by  all  those  seeking  to  do  justice  to 
the  material  of  psycholog^^  But  in  his  later 
writings  James  appears  to  have  laid  down  an- 
other set  of  principles  which,  far  from  contra- 
dicting his  earlier  ones,  enlarges  them,  and  his 
last  statements  are  in  almost  entire  harmony 
with  this  book.  Consciousness,  as  a  separable 
substance  of  permanent  character,  he  denies  to 
the  realm  of  thinkables  and  existants.  "the  "I 
think,"  which  to  most  persons  means  their  soul, 
he  reduces  to  the  "I  breathe,"  and  regards 
consciousness  as  a  function,  and  not  as  an  ever- 
lasting pronoun. 

7.     I  cite  this  much  of  biography  in  order  to 
show  that  the  present  development  of  psychol- 
380 


MATTERS  AND  MINDS 
ogy  runs  tangent  and  not  counter  to  the  mat- 
ter of  this  book,  for  with  what  is  now  known 
in  abnormal  psychology  added  to  the  develop- 
ment of  the  old-line  psychology,  we  have  more 
than  either  of  them  could  have  furnished  alone. 
And  that  more  is  the  principle  of  the  ridding 
ourselves  of  complexes  by  vicarious  substitu- 
tion of  the  perplexing  object. 

8.  Emotional  complexes  are  usually  mani- 
fested in  fears  and  inhibitions  of  a  well  defined 
character.  The  situations  in  which  they  first 
arose  may  have  been  private  or  public.  We 
may  have  been  mistreated  or  shocked  as  chil- 
dren, and  the  recurrence  of  the  situation  ever 
kept  arousing  the  same  emotions  as  the  orig- 
inal. We  responded  in  a  disorderly  manner  to 
the  first  disordered  situation,  and  were  either 
prevented  from  resisting  it,  or  thrust  more 
deeply  into  the  mire.  Thereafter,  whenever 
enough  of  the  elements  of  the  original  situation 
were  present,  they  summed  into  a  stimulus  of 
the  same  character  as  the  first,  and  provoked  the 
same  result.  For  instance,  timidity  is  usually 
the  product  of  the  first  few  weeks'  environ- 
ment, and  timidity  is  a  form  of  fear.  It  often 
happens,  therefore,  that  the  new  as  well  as 
the  not-yet-known  will  provoke  the  fear  re- 
sponse. The  child  fears  dark  corners  and 
381 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
closets,  the  young  man  fears  the  examination, 
and  the  old  man  fears  the  executors  of  his  will. 
Those  who  fear  usually  pre-respond  to  the  sit- 
uation,— commonly  called  "anticipating  trou- 
ble.' Now  the  prevalence  of  phobias,  of  hesi- 
tancies, of  emotional  anticipations,  is  too  wide 
to  need  further  comment.  Once  started,  it  can 
ramify  to  all  situations  having  common  parts 
with  the  originals.  But  this  business  of  com- 
mon parts  also  shows  the  way  out  of  such  a 
fearing  consciousness,  for  by  virtue  of  perceiv- 
ing that  the  fears  do  not  develop  in  certain  spe- 
cial situations,  certain  other  situations  can  be 
produced,  in  which  more  fearless  than  fearful 
elements  predominate;  and  thereby  this  com- 
plex may  be  signally  reduced  if  not  eliminated 
altogether. 

9.  Again,  the  sexual  complex,  which  Walt 
Whitman  facetiously  calls  the  "procreant  urge 
of  the  world,"  is  one  that  frequently  dominates 
the  organism.  Besides  being  a  need  of  certain 
vitalizing  functions  within  the  body,  it  is  con- 
nected with  shyness,  bashfulness,  modesty,  the 
wearing  of  clothes,  and  many  other  less  obvious 
social  embarrassments.  Before  mating  with  an- 
other of  the  species,  fanciful  idealizations,  love 
songs,  homages,  and  various  forms  of  extreme 
politeness,  together,  perhaps,  with  dreams  and 
382 


MATTERS  AND  MINDS 
the  like  phenomena,  furnish  the  only  means  of 
harmonizing  this  predicament  with  the  rest  of 
one's  interests.  Our  acquaintanceships  being  at 
the  best  haphazard,  and  our  friends  being  those 
persons  we  have  inadvertantly  met,  (rather 
rather  than  being  chosen  from  a  catalogue,  or 
by  the  mediation  of  a  cosmic  duenna),  one  is 
privileged  to  call  this  insurmountable  diiiiculty 
of  choosing  the  best  permanent  companion,  the 
true  social  evil.  But  where  more  than  trivial, 
physiological  motives  are  present,  and  where 
the  environment  to  which  one  responds  in  such 
a  case  is  larger  than  the  fanciful  passion  for 
ownership,  the  chances  are  better  than  other- 
wise that  the  error  of  rashness  may  be  abro- 
gated. 

10.  Years  ago  there  was  established  in  the 
city  of  Boston  what  was  known  as  the  Lyceum. 
It  was  a  Greek  name,  having  a  flavor  of  erudi- 
tion and  the  classical.  Before  the  establish- 
ment of  this  form  of  amusement, — for  the  Ly- 
ceum was  a  sort  of  theatre, — the  New  England 
conscience  would  not  permit  itself  to  say  that 
plays  and  entertainments  should  figure  in  the 
daily  or  weekly  routine.  But  with  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Lyceum,  the  New  England  conscious 
was  appeased.  The  bare  change  of  name,  with 
the  feeling  that  something  solid  and  honorable 
383 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
was  always  to  take  place  under  its  tutelage,  suf- 
ficed to  release  the  complex  of  prejudice  against 
the  theatre.  Those  puritanically  inclined,  hav- 
ing always  secretly  wished  to  go  to  places  of 
amusement,  (but  being  vexed  with  orthophobia, 
or  the  fear  that  they  had  not  done  right),  were 
now  permitted  to  enjoy  themselves.  For  the 
Lyceum  was  nothing  more  than  a  theatre,  and 
as  such  was  not  quite  up  to  the  standard  of  the 
better  theatres  of  the  country.  Indeed,  some  of 
the  productions  were  so  much  worse  than  those 
of  the  regular  boards  that  the  Puritans  should 
not  have  been  entertained  by  them.  We  now 
have  a  replica  of  this  in  the  productions  of  non- 
theatrical  entertainers,  who  furnish  amusement 
under  what  are  advertised  as  "special  auspices." 
The  moaern  moving  picture  shows,  which  al- 
ways bear  the  seal  of  being  "passed  by  the 
board  of  censorship,''  are  another  partial  reso- 
lution of  the  complex  against  amusements.  This 
account  is  introduced  merely  to  show  the  way 
popular  psychology  has  attempted  to  reduce 
certain  disharmonies  in  society,  but  whether 
they  are  anything  more  than  lame  attempts  the 
reader  is  urged  to  decide  for  himself. 

11.     Suppressed   ideas   also    take    the   form 
known  commonly  as  lying.     In  this  case  speech 
does  not  function  for  the  facts  of  the  environ- 
384 


MATTERS  AND  MINDS 
ment,  but  rather  for  the  dominant  motive  which 
is  in  disharmony  with  the  sensory  and  percept- 
ual environment.  It  is  the  business  of  ethics 
to  decide  whether  there  are  justifiable  lies,  but 
it  is  the  business  of  psychology  to  infer  the  sub- 
sequent harmony  or  disharmony  of  any  such 
suppression.  The  effects  of  this  sort  of  func- 
tioning are  cumulative,  and  the  full  releasing 
of  the  complex  often  demands  that  one  put 
aside  dozens  of  acquaintances  and  almost  iso- 
late himself  from  all  those  whom  he  knows. 
The  fund  of  "conscience  money"  which  now 
amounts  to  considerable  in  the  United  States 
Treasury,  is  the  result  of  the  voluntary  release 
of  this  complex  on  the  part  of  the  contributors 
to  that  fund.  That  no  publicity  attaches  to  the 
reception  of  it  by  the  government,  is  a  sign  of 
the  general  increase  of  sanity.  For  we  are  com- 
ing to  know  that  it  does  not  require  an  emo- 
tional orgy  to  release  an  emotional  complex 
satisfactorily.  The  wilful  or  stubborn  child,  who 
may  become  so  through  the  parental  environ- 
ment of  cruelty  or  ignorance,  soon  learns  by 
imitation  to  accomplish  his  ends  by  means  of 
rendering  a  false  account  of  his  doings.  What- 
ever else  four-year  olds  are,  they  are  pcrccivers 
of  suuterfuge  and  insincerity,  and  the  "strange 
and  unaccountable  misbehavior"  for  which  they 
385 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
often  get  punished  is  nothing  more  than  the 
naive  responses  to  a  false  situation.  To  obvi- 
ate this,  a  genuine  disgust  at  indiscretions  on 
the  part  of  the  elders  should  take  the  place  of 
verbal  maltreatment;  for  unless  this  happens 
the  situation  will  be  one  that  gets  complicated, 
rather  than  obviated,  in  the  future.  This  is 
merely  a  hint  as  to  what  can  be  done  under  sin- 
cere conditions,  for  otherwise  the  sham  is  more 
obvious  than  the  attempt  to  conceal  it.  Of 
course,  one  must  be  forewarned  in  all  this  by 
the  dictum  of  Socrates, — "Virtue  can  be  taught, 
but  there  are  no  teachers." 

12,  In  certain  cases,  there  is  no  other  way 
to  release  emotional  complexes  than  by  the  use 
off  emotional  situations.  A  consciousness  in 
which  only  perpetual  turmoil  exists, — in  which 
the  complexes  are  too  numerous  to  be  released 
through  calm  considerations  of  the  larger  en- 
vironment habitually  refused, — can  perhaps  be 
resolved  into  something  harmoniously  fiirther- 
ing  by  an  emotional  explosion  of  large  propor- 
tions. This  is  one  of  the  things  which  both 
tears  and  laughter  accomplish.  We  do  not  point 
to  these  as  ends,  however,  but  only  as  second 
class  means,  for  the  consciousness  that  is  only 
brow-beaten  and  humiliated  is  fit  for  nothing 
but  the  milder  emotions  which  usually  super- 
386 


MATTERS  AND  MINDS 
vene.  Nevertheless,  this  form  of  release  is  found 
effective,  for  the  release  of  all  complexes  is  to 
be  desired  at  almost  any  cost,  though  it  some- 
times becomes  a  matter  of  choosing  between  the 
zero  of  stability,  and  the  maximum  of  instabil- 
ity. In  the  large,  there  is  less  clear  percep- 
tion than  emotion  in  the  common  conscious- 
ness, and  the  predicament  thus  entailed  is  obvi- 
ous. I  suppose  the  ethicist  would  say  that  what- 
ever enters  curatively  into  such  a  situation  is 
a  good,  but  he  is  not  urged  thereupon  to  de- 
cide. 

Psychology  of  Value. 
13.  The  phychology  of  value  enters  into 
considerations  of  the  cross-section  whenever  we 
have  dealings  with  the  good,  the  true,  and  the 
beautiful.  The  first  concerns  the  psychology  of 
morality,  the  second  the  psychology  of  reason- 
ing, and  the  third  the  psychology  of  art.  Val- 
ues are  the  permanent,  non-contradictory  sta- 
bilizers of  social  and  personal  interests.  A  value 
is,  for  psychology,  then,  the  functioning  of  this 
stability  and  the  satisfaction  derived  from  the 
things  thus  stabilizing  one.  A  thing  is  good 
when  it  stabilizes  human  relationships  with  re- 
sulting satisfaction, — in  other  words  when  nei- 
ther perceptions,  motor  responses,  nor  feeling 
tones  involved  are  contradictory.  A  thing  is 
387 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
true  when  it  compares  with  the  observations, 
when  it  is  not  functionally  opposed  to  the  state- 
ments one  would  make  in  which  those  same  ob- 
servations could  not  figure,  and  when  it  can  be 
shared  with  other  observers  and  makers  of 
statements.  The  psychology'  of  this  is  contained 
in  the  perception  of  the  facts  entailed  in  the 
statements,  and  in  the  naming  and  arranging 
them  in  a  connected  discourse.  Something  is 
beautiful  when  it  produces  a  harmonious  state 
of  mind.  The  criterion  here  is,  however,  the 
harmonious  state  in  minds  which  are  not  rid- 
dled with  emotions.  Beauty  can  be  measured. 
The  structure  of  paintings,  symphonies,  came- 
os, pottery,  is  open  to  any  investigator,  and 
their  order,  which  is  the  kernel  of  beauty,  is 
amenable  even  to  yard-sticks,  and  the  machin- 
ery of  physics.  The  psychology  of  beauty  is  the 
correlation  between  the  balanced  bodily  state 
and  the  balance  and  order  in  the  beautiful  ob- 
ject.   Now  all  these  in  slight  detail.         .4 

14.  If  one  asks  how  permanent  a  value 
must  be,  in  order  for  it  to  be  a  cardinal  value, 
no  answer  is  obtainable  from  a  psychologist.  He 
is  solely  concerned  with  the  continuance  of  the 
functioning  of  this  more  or  less  permanent 
thing  on  the  part  of  the  organism  which  is  his 
study.  It  can  be  functioned  for  a  fraction  of 
388 


MATTERS  AND  MINDS 
a  second,  or  for  a  lifetime.  Indeed,  some  of 
the  functioning  in  this  manner  is  but  analogous 
to  after-images, — the  existence  of  the  value  as  a 
content  of  consciousness  having  ceased.  Thus 
old  customs  and  discarded  slogans,  to  which 
many  persons  still  attach  a  huge  significance, 
are  but  functional  after-images  of  stimuli  which 
have  evaporated.  They  are,  then,  only  eccen- 
trically referred  to  an  environment  which,  on 
the  basis  of  emotion,  has  common  parts  with  the 
residual  functioning. 

15.  Morality  is  the  realm  of  goodness,  and 
the  psychology  of  it  is  concerned  with  the  per- 
ception and  motor  functioning  of  the  stabilizers 
of  society,  whatever  these  may  be.  Instinctive 
and  emotional  actions,  the  ubiquitous  crowd, 
the  functioning  of  more  interests  than  can  be  all 
at  one  time  furthered,  brings  us  either  to  the 
perception  of  order  and  plan,  or  to  the  brink 
of  unsettledness  and  hesitancy.  So  that  the  good 
thing  is  either  that  which  stabilizes  before  any 
disorder  occurs,  or  which  stabilizes  afterwards. 
The  words  of  Aristotle,  "virtue  is  not  virtue  un- 
til it  becomes  pleasant,"  may  be  said  to  apply 
to  the  first  case;  while  any  response  to  an  S.  O. 
S.  signal  would  be  gruel  for  the  second.  In 
either  case,  the  maintenance  of  an  unbaffled  in- 
terest, stable  enough  to  tide  one  over  the  next 
389 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
period  of  indecision,  would  have  to  be  called 
one  of  the  items  in  the  psychology  of  morality. 
1  he  selection  of  a  dominating  mterest  would  be 
another  item.  The  perception  of  its  poss. 
I'es,  its  history,  its  likelihood  of  getting  perma- 
nently functioned  by  the  organism,  would  come 
in  as  the  rational  elements  of  the  choice.  Then 
the  testing  it  out  with  all  sorts  of  conditions  op- 
erating, the  acceptance  of  it  with  intentional  en- 
thusiasm, with  intentional  scepticism,  and  with 
intentional  neutrality, — in  order  to  obtain  a  bal- 
ance,— all  these  enter  in  to  the  psychology  of 
settling  the  problems  of  morality.  And  while 
this  is  but  a  sketch  of  the  matter,  it  must  suf- 
fice. 

16.  Truth  is  a  hard  matter  to  get  taken  se- 
riously in  this  century,  chiefly  because  it  has 
been  taken  too  seriously  heretofore.  It  is  now 
generally  conceded  that  the  difficulty  was  sole- 
ly of  language, — we  were  asking  what  truth 
was  instead  of  asking  what  was  true.  It  is  thus 
with  most  of  the  old,  large  "mouth-filling 
words"  which  modern  logic  so  closely  scruti- 
nizes. Capital  letters  cannot  make  nouns  out  of 
casual  adjectives  and  adverbs.  We  ask,  then, 
what  is  the  psychology  involved  in  finding  a 
true  statement,  rather  than  in  finding  out  what 
is  capital  "T"  Truth.  Now  the  significant  item 
390 


MATTERS   AND   MINDS 

to  be  considered  at  this  point  is,  that  we  do 
not  start  to  "think"  logicalhj,  hut  only  with  the 
informal  logic  of  scattered  ideas.  The  pattern 
may  be  there,  but  the  set  terms  that  can  be  gen- 
erally understood,  as  well  as  the  fixed  expres- 
sions which  are  to  embody  them,  are  not  what 
we  get  in  the  first  functioning  of  the  material 
of  logic.  The  whole  process  can  be  well  com- 
pared with  that  of  distillation.  The  crude  stutT 
is  the  mass  of  ideas  with  which  any  formulation 
starts  out.  Then  comes  the  linguistic  expres- 
sion, or  the  first  thing  refined  out  of  the  viscous 
mass.  But  this  is  frequently  too  individual,  too 
private.  It  must  be  laid  aside  to  cool,  then 
taken  up  again,  and  redistilled,  and  spoken, 
then  oriented  among  those  terms  in  which  it  is 
to  be  embedded,  scrutinized  as  to  common 
parts,  common  functions,  special  importance  in 
that  environment,  and  so  on,  after  which  it  is 
ready  for  publicity.  This  is  the  work  of  words, 
whose  meanings  lie  in  what  others  will  do  upon 
their  being  singly  or  serially  uttered.  Logic  is 
not  a  study  of  how  we  think,  but  a  study  of  the 
responses  that  a  certain  pattern  of  words  will 
get  in  a  certain  environment.  If  one  wishes  to 
be  imderstood,  he  speaks  thus  and  so.  Only 
when  words  are  in  such  and  such  a  pattern,  will 
they  be  understood  as  meaning  this  and  not 
391 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
that;  one  must  speak  clearly  if  he  wishes  to  be 
understandable.  These  are  the  elements  of  the 
psychology  of  logic,  and  logic  has  validity  only 
after  such  a  thing  is  accomplished.  Any  psych- 
ologist can  tell  us  how  he  thinks.  Random,  in- 
choate, tattered  terms  or  ideas  are  the  first  step. 
Anything  whatever  in  the  way  of  an  idea  will 
start  it, — there  is  no  one,  identical,  invariable 
way  in  which  we  start  every  logical  utterance. 
For  patterns  that  will  do  in  logic  are  empirical- 
ly tried  and  disposed  of  in  one  way  or  another, 
and  not  cooked  up  in  some  dark  mental  abysm 
perpetually  veiled  so  that  none  can  enter  and 
peer  about  it.  Logic  has  nothing  to  do  with 
how  we  think.  Logic  has  only  to  do  with  how 
clearly  and  unequivocally  we  speak.  The 
psychology  of  language  is  the  closest  field  to 
logic,  and  thus  the  psychology  of  speech  con- 
cerns the  question  of  functioning  one  of  the 
dominant  motives  in  consciousness  at  the  time, 
whether  it  be  focal  or  sub-focal.  For  what  the 
logicians,  who  have  tried  to  describe  the  way 
we  think,  are  after,  is  the  vain  goal  of  contents 
in  the  sub-conscious, — things  which  do  not  ex- 
ist. 

17.     The  term  "reason"  and  its  derivatives 
have  been  used  more  often  with  a  psychological 
import  than  with  a  logical  one.     "He  acts  rea- 
392 


MATTERS  AND  MINDS 
sonably,"  "it  stands  to  reason,"  "rational 
thought,"  and  similar  expressions,  do  not  always 
mean  something  logical.  They  more  often  re- 
fer to  the  connectedness,  or  the  easily  flowing 
character  of  the  thing  mentioned  in  that  con- 
text. Coincidence  is  taken  for  intention, — a 
factor  which  is  psychological  rather  than  any- 
thing else.  Now  reason  is  not  so  much  a  noun, 
as  it  is  a  term  which  refers  to  the  pattern  of 
the  expression  that  is  used  to  convey  a  meaning. 
When  judgments  coincide  in  their  salient  fea- 
ture, there  is  said  to  be  a  case  of  reason.  Again, 
where  one  can  start  a  chain  of  expressions, — 
none  of  which  need  to  be  bristling  with  common 
parts  of  each  other,  but  which  all  together  make 
a  system, — whence  something  can  be  further 
implied  or  inferred,  there  is  said  to  be  ration- 
ality in  the  connection.  Judgments,  on  which 
these  connections  depend,  are  terms  in  relation, 
implying  classification  among  terms,  or  correla- 
tion with  relations  or  functions.  The  logical 
mind  is  the  one  which  judges,  tests,  and  form- 
ulates the  position  of  one  term  within  a  con- 
text of  other  terms;  tries  every  functional  con- 
nection it  has  with  all  the  terms  of  the  series 
implied,  and  concludes,  not  that  something  must 
be  true,  but  that  some  expression  has  been 
found  in  which  every  term  is  satified,  and  every 
393 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
term  of  which  can  be  exhibited.  But  logic  is 
also  concerned  with  any  and  all  statements, 
true,  false  and  absurd.  "And  thrice  he  slew  the 
slain,"  is  just  as  good  an  expression  in  logic  as 
"And  3/4  he  slew  the  slain,"  or  "And  3.14159  he 
slew  the  slain."  For  the  question  of  how  often 
the  slain  can  be  slain,  is  a  question  for  the  logic 
and  psychology  of  slaughter.  When  this  is  de- 
cided, if  there  is  anything  left  of  the  statement, 
then  logic  can  again  take  it  up  and  decide  its 
status.  But  slaying  is  not  logic, — slaying  is  mo- 
tor reduction  of  splanchnic  incoherence, — and 
thus  logic  is  the  arbiter  of  the  formulation  of 
expressions,  and  not  of  the  source  of  them. 

18.  From  the  foregoing  it  can  be  seen  that 
there  may  well  be  certain  expressions  which 
have  nothing  logical  in  them,  even  though  the 
same  expressions  may  be  effectual  for  motor 
arousals.  Take  the  case  of  a  patriotic  oration 
which  bestirs  its  hearers  to  deeds  of  valor  and 
sacrifice.  The  verbal  contents  of  the  oration 
may  be,  and  indeed,  nearl}^  always  are,  abso- 
lutely meaningless,  insofar  as  strict  logical  an- 
alysis is  concerned.  Again,  every  national  an- 
them, if  reduced  to  prose,  and  tested  by  defini- 
tion, is  found  to  be  incoherent.  1  need  not  re- 
count favorite  slogans  or  shibboleths  in  detail, 
but  if  one  is  interested  in  strict  logic,  let  him 
394 


MATTERS  AND  MINDS 
examine  the  so-called  "famous  expressions  of 
great  [or  excited]  men,"  and  he  will  see  that 
many  things  which  have  proved  "pragmatic" 
or  effectual,  are  verbal  responses  to  disorder, 
and  nothing  else.  That  they  have  moved  sects 
or  nations  to  attain  certain  ends,  is  not  the 
point;  the  point  is  whether  they  have  been 
worthy  of  the  motivating  influence  they  have 
had,  for,  as  they  stand  crystallized  into  words, 
they  deceive  us.  In  every  text-book  of  logic 
there  are  enumerated  certain  "fallacies,"  or  in- 
correct ways  of  formulating  one's  statements, 
and  these  fallacies  are  all  reducible  to  either  in- 
coordinate or  absurd  speech.  The  emotional 
complex  in  the  "fallacy  of  ad  hominem,"  the  in- 
coordination of  perceptions  in  the  "fallacy  of 
lion  seqiiitiir,"  the  emotionalized  pre-perception 
in  the  "fallacy  of  petitio  principii,"  are  more 
psychological  than  logical  fallacies,  since  they 
have  their  roots  in  the  primary  functions  of  re- 
sponse. The  strictly  logical  fallacies,  on  the 
other  hand,  are  those  which  involve  the  resort- 
ing of  data,  and  concern  inexact  formulation. 

19.  We  must  now  briefly  consider  several 
forms  of  art,  and  take  stock  of  the  chief  psy- 
chological elements  therein.  Arts  are  of  two 
kinds,— the  time,  and  the  space  arts.  Of  the 
first,  we  usually  enumerate  poetry  and  music  as 
395 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
the  chief  examples;  while  of  the  second,  paint- 
ing, sculpture,  and  architecture  are  the  most 
prominent.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  a 
"time"  art  is  one  that  chiefly  concerns  hearing; 
while  a  "space"  art  concerns  sight.  The  latter 
class  also  depends  more  upon  the  motor  mani- 
festations of  the  hands  than  does  the  former, 
though  this  dependence  is  not  exclusive. 

20.  Poetry  is  defined  as  rhythmical  words. 
This  does  not  mean  that  the  words  need  have 
a  connected  meaning.  Rhythms  are  sets  of  im- 
pulses which  have  a  pattern,  exhibiting  con- 
trast effects  correlated  with  organic  impulses. 
A  rhythm  differs  from  a  bare  repetition  in  that 
it  exhibits  grouping.  3/4,  4/4,  5/4  time  in  music 
or  poetry  means,  that  the  first  note  of  the  bar 
gets  the  only  voluntary  accent,  the  rest  being 
functioned  on  the  momentum  of  that  one.  No 
such  momentum  appears  in  a  bare  succession, 
and  such  a  succession  we  call  monotonnous. 
Professor  Muensterberg  calls  monotony .  any 
"succession  that  is  hated,"  but  such  a  definition 
does  not  exhaust  it.  For  the  monotonous  is  pri- 
marily that  form  of  succession  which  fails  to 
save  energy  in  the  organic  responses  we  give  to 
it,  and  thus  it  becomes  irksome.  Gummy  bear- 
ings in  machinery,  and  monotonies  in  succes- 


396 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
sions  of  impulses  are  more  than  analogically 
related. 

21.  Poetry  is  characterized  by  something 
further  than  rhythmical  language,  however.  The 
choice  of  fine-sounding  words  is  of  great  im- 
portance. Only  certain  words  will  produce  a 
poetic  effect,  by  which  we  mean  specifically  a 
mood-complex,  plus  a  rhythm.  Now  moods  are 
co-conscious  arousals  of  smouldering  emotions, 
and  thus  poetry  is  not  designed  to  effect  a  full 
focality  of  the  idea  involved  in  it,  but  rather  to 
arouse  a  consciousness  sympathetic  to  the  com- 
plexes of  the  poet.  Poetic  words  are  thus  not 
noted  for  their  clarity,  directness  or  specificity; 
they  are  musical  elements,  and  not  information- 
al. Further  than  that,  the  motor  elements  of 
the  recitation,  and  the  listening  to  poetry  both 
evidence  to  what  a  large  extent  the  co-conscious 
enters  into  art.  My  own  investigations  in  poetry 
have  led  me  to  state  that  "euphony"  is  reduci- 
ble to  "eu-kinaesthesis,"— any  sound  whatever 
being  pleasant,  whose  utterance  does  not  bring 
into  focality  the  mouth  movements  of  the  one 
speaking  it.  One  more  fact  in  respect  to  the 
words  in  poetry:  we  often  are  enabled  to  read 
some  works  in  a  foreign  language  and  get  the 
idea  of  them  without  being  able  to  tell  exactly, 
word  for  word,  what  it  differentiatedly  means. 
397 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
This  is  due  to  the  co-conscious  arousal  of  the 
mood  by  means  of  sounds  alone,  and  the  rest 
follows  readily  after;  for  just  so  long  as  the 
tones  of  the  stimuli  further  the  pattern  once 
started,  so  long  will  the  sufficient  half-hints  of 
meaning  come,  summate,  and  satisfy. 

22.  Rhyme  and  alliteration  are  musical  ele- 
ments. They  perpetuate  a  tonal  locality,  while 
they  also  produce  a  non-focality  of  concrete  dis- 
course. If  one  repeats  any  word  over  and  over 
again,  and  watches  how  the  meaning  slowly 
evaporates  the  while,  until  only  the  sounds  re- 
main, he  will  have  demonstrated  the  essential 
element  of  rhyme  and  alliteration.  The  pattern 
of  rhyme  having  once  become  established,  and 
the  mood  firmly  fixed  in  the  reader,  almost  any 
combination  of  words  may  get  taken  for  its 
face  value.  Now  the  point  to  be  stressed  in  all 
this  is  that  poetry  is  not  originally  clear  as  to 
its  meaning,  and  so  whenever  rhymes  need  to 
be  completed,  or  rhythms  filled  in,  the  poet  is 
not  beyond  the  temptation  of  completing  and 
filling  in  with  whatever  material  he  has  at  hand 
that  will  not  interrupt  the  mood.  Art  of  this 
form,  in  that  it  uses  words,  must  be  said  to  abuse 
them  from  the  standpoint  of  logic,  whenever 
such  a  sacrifice  of  sense  to  sound  takes  place. 
Ultimate  judgment,  however,  is  based  upon  the 
398 


MATTERS   AND   MINDS 
intention,  plan,  and  etiect  of  the  poetic  mate- 
rial; and  the  what,  how,  and  why  of  these  is 
just  as  determinable  by  those  not  carried  away 
by  the  poetry  as  much  as  by  those  who  are. 

23.  The  basic  psychological  elements  in 
music  are  those  of  tone  and  rhythm.  By  not 
employing  words,  music  is  a  purer  form  of  art 
than  is  poetry,  since  it  requires  no  reference  be- 
yond itself  for  its  means  or  ends.  Now  melo- 
dies are  rhythms  in  the  sense  of  possessing  pat- 
tern. "The  melody  goes  of  itself,"  we  some- 
times say,  and  by  that  phrase  we  mean  that  only 
the  first  impulse  needs  our  undivided  attention, 
after  which  the  rest  follows  as  a  sort  of  mo- 
mentum. Another  point  to  be  noted  is  that  mel- 
odies are  affected  by  tonality  in  a  way  not  de- 
ducible  from  the  original  presentation  of  them 
in  one  key.  Certain  musical  compositions  lose 
all  their  "character"  if  played  in  a  strange  ton- 
ality; even  the  composer  Schubert  was  once  en- 
tirely deceived  as  to  the  source  of  one  of  his 
own  "Lieder"  by  this  means.  For  dramatic  ef- 
fect, nevertheless,  a  composer  often  changes  key 
without  changing  the  melody;  and  canonic  and 
contrapuntal  forms  abound  in  similar  features. 
Such  a  procedure  effects  the  organic  accom- 
paniments of  music  to  such  a  large  degree,  that 
the  lack  of  doubled  intensity  with  doubled 
399 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
parts  is  often  counteracted  by  this  means.  Har- 
monization of  a  melody  is  actually  the  accom- 
paniment of  one  melody  by  other  melodies,  so 
that  in  listening  to  a  rich  harmony  we  are  focal 
to  but  one  or  two  of  the  melodies  then  operat- 
ing, and  CO-,  or  even  sub-conscious  to  the  others. 
It  is  upon  this  that  the  mood-character  of  most 
music  depends. 

24.  One  form  of  musical  composition, 
known  as  "program  music"  attempts  to  be  ono- 
matopoetic.  In  such  music  there  are  melodic 
structures  which  are  planned  ahead  for  the  ef- 
fect they  will  produce,  and  labeled  by  the  com- 
poser, furthermore,  as  such.  Certain  instru- 
ments lend  themselves  very  well  to  these  things, 
and  "storms,"  "pastoral  scenes,"  "military 
events,"  and  the  like,  are  quite  more  than  sym- 
bolized in  this  manner.  Recently,  however, 
(since  1840),  there  have  been  schools  of  com- 
posers who  have  attempted  to  portray  anything 
at  all  by  means  of  orchestral  tone-color.  That 
is,  they  have  endeavored  to  equate  musical 
phrases  with  poetic  speeches.  I  cite  this  fact 
here  particularly  to  show  that  art  forms  are  not 
all  developed  out  of  the  spontaneous  moods  of 
the  artist,  but  can  often  be  the  result  of  deliber- 
ate intentions.  For,  while  music  may  not  be  en- 
tirely reducible  to  physics  and  physiology,  yet, 
400 


MATTERS  AND  MINDS 
if  one  physically  studies  a  rhythm,  and  sees 
what  it  is  composed  of,  he  may,  if  he  is  astute 
enough,  deduce  a  "new"  form  from  it,  which 
has  value  in  art.  But  it  is  safe  to  say  that  the 
series  of  art  forms  which  get  constantly  devel- 
oped, are  asymmetrical,  and  single,  linear  ones, 
rather  than  bi-dimensional.  They  arise,  uncon- 
sciously, from  moods,  and  suddenly,  rather  than 
from  plotting  and  planning.  I  do  not  think  it 
rash,  therefore,  to  say  that  the  art  that  survives 
is  a  derivative  of  the  co-conscious  and  the  sub- 
conscious, and  not  something  that  came  when 
bidden. 

25.  One  word  on  the  psychology  of  song. 
When  a  composer  plans  to  set  w^ords  to  music, 
or  music  to  words,  as  is  sometimes  done,  there  is 
often  plainly  manifest  a  marked  discrepancy 
between  them,  if  exhibited  independently.  For 
while  a  set  of  stanzas,  for  example,  changes  its 
subject  matter,  grammatical  form,  and  signifi- 
cant punctuation,  so  far  as  correlating  each  line 
in  every  stanza  is  concerned,  the  music  which 
usually  goes  with  it  is  uniform  for  them  all. 
As  a  result,  there  are  discrepancies  which  must 
not  reach  the  threshold  of  focality,  for  if  they 
do,  the  harmonious  state  of  mind  will  be  upset, 
and  the  art  commence  to  evaporate.  For  art 
and  beauty  are  present  by  virtue  of  their  con- 
401 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
tributing  elements,  and  when  the  elements  are 
disturbed,  the  beauty  is  not  there, — it  ceases  to 
be.  If  any  one  asks  where  it  goes,  the  answer 
is  that  its  position  is  implicit  in  the  complex, 
and  when  this  has  no  coherence,  the  beauty 
ceases.  It  does  not  go,  not  being  in  the  dimen- 
sion of  things  that  travel, — art  being  another  in- 
stance of  "only  when," — and  not  a  case  of  some- 
thing mysterious  and  hidden.  Even  in  a  famous 
song,  the  beauty  present  is  present  by  virtue  of 
there  being  a  preponderance  of  co-consciously 
functioned  pattern,  despite  the  inevitable  lack 
of  co-ordination  between  the  grammatical  ele- 
ments and  the  rhythms  of  the  music.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  sentimental  and  so-called  "fa- 
vorite" songs  are  examples  of  crowd  conscious- 
ness, and  their  incoherent  character  points  to 
something  in  their  origin  which  cannot  be  art. 
In  such  a  case,  moreover,  one  can  correlate  the 
musical  preferences  of  the  organism  with  its 
preference  for  something  that  merely  super- 
ficially satisfies.  For  the  popular  notion  that 
music  must  make  one  weep  in  order  for  it  to 
be  choice,  has  many  common  parts  with  serious 
abnormalities. 

26.     In  connection  with  the  space  arts,  let 
us  only  consider  what  is  meant  by  an  artistic 
space,  or  beauty  in  the  visual  content.     Con- 
402 


MATTERS   AND   MINDS 
sciousness  being  one  with  its  object,  one  is  per- 
mitted to  speak  not  only  of  "a  musical  song," 
or  "a  musical  performer,"  but  "a  musical  con- 
sciousness" as  well.     It  is  the  same  with  the 
other  arts.     We  beautify  a  room,  for  instance, 
and  this  operation  consists  in  making  the  space 
relations  between  the  objects  harmonize.    Thus 
far,  simple  enough;  and  language  here  prom- 
ises much.     But  what  is  the  beautifying  of  a 
room,  or  the  harmonization  of  spaces?     Omit- 
ting the  norm,  for  the  time  being,  let  us  say 
that  the  harmonious  state  of  mind  which  is  the 
goal  of  art,  is  the  presentation  of  objects  in  such 
a  way  that  (a)  the  center  of  reference  will  not 
be  the  observer,  but  the  observed  instead.     In- 
deed, loss  of  self-consciousness  is  exactly  what 
this  means.    The  art  object,  to  be  brief,  cannot 
be  felt  to  be  owned  while  it  is  felt  to  be  beauti- 
ful.    It  is  not  "mine,"  nor  "yours,"  nor  "ours," 
but,  if  the  rhetoric  be  permissible,  we  are  its. 
(b)    In  the  presence  of  such  an  object  there  will 
be  no  motor  tendencies  to   do  anything  more 
than   to  preserve   the  situation  in  its  original 
form.    And  (c)  there  will  be  a  release  of  com- 
plexes in  the  presence  of  the  situation,  so  that 
the  latent-period  of  beauty,  upon  future  presen- 
tations, will  be  shortened.    Now  in  beautifying 
space,  it  is  necessary  that  the  fewest  possible 
403 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
motor  tendencies  which  disturb  the  equilibrium 
be  present,  and  one  of  the  ways  this  is  accom- 
plished is  by  balance  and  symmetry.  Here  again, 
something  "new"  enters  in.  Any  figure,  the  less 
extended  it  is  the  better,  but  no  matter  how 
ungainly  it  is  alone,  will,  if  doubled  on  one 
of  its  axes,  produce  an  effect  of  balance.  Bal- 
ance on  the  horizontal  and  vertical  axis,  never- 
theless, will  produce  the  most  satisfying  effect, 
and  in  many  cases  we  can  discover  a  threshold 
of  harmony  even  here.  For  when  a  figure  is 
doubled,  there  are  balanced  tendencies  in  the 
motor  elements  of  vision,  and  through  these  the 
gateway  to  non-personal  reference  is  reached. 

27.  Thus  one  factor  in  the  beautifying  of 
space  is  exhibited.  Rhythms  of  space  also  serve 
the  same  effect.  Rhythms  of  sound  are  in  time, 
and  as  such  cannot  be  exhibited  all  at  once; 
while  space-rhythm  is  presto  in  character,  and 
the  effects  are  those  of  fusion  and  summation, 
rather  than  of  serial  order  in  time,  and  sensa- 
tional continuity.  There  is  also  another  differ- 
ence between  these  two  types  of  rhythm.  A  row 
of  columns  in  rhythm  may  contain  far  more 
members  than  a  series  of  notes  in  music,  and 
still  be  grasped  in  a  pattern.  For  the  most  notes 
we  ever  grasp  as  a  unit  are  five,  or  at  the  ut- 
most six;  while  we  may  get  rhythm  out  of  twen- 
404 


MATTERS  AND  MINDS 
ty  coluiiins,  which  in  space  are  presented  at 
once.  Rhythms  are  not  only  possible  in  pillars 
of  the  same  length,  but  are  equally  elicited  from 
unequal  lengths.  The  receding  into  space  of 
the  more  distant  columns  toward  a  point  not 
specifically  indicated  in  the  scheme,  produces 
co-conscious  elements  which  balance  the  filled 
with  the  unfilled  space.  Such  co-conscious  ele- 
ments appear  also  in  the  framing  of  pictures, 
where  the  mathematical  center  of  the  canvas  is 
not  the  center  of  the  color  and  shape  masses 
balanced  within  it.  Indeed,  for  these  two  cen- 
ters to  coincide  is  atrocious. 

28.  Colors  will  balance  as  well  as  will  fig- 
ures. A  small,  dark  color  mass  at  one  side  of 
a  picture  can  be  brought  into  balance  with  a 
very  much  spread-out  color  mass  on  the  oppo- 
site side, — intensities  here  functioning  the  ef- 
fect. Needless  to  say,  all  of  the  attributes  of 
sensation  are  elements  in  all  forms  of  art,  and 
their  varied  exhibitions  often  produce  effects 
of  surprising  newness.  Indeed,  centering  seems 
to  be  most  subtle  of  all  the  artist's  nuances,  and 
by  the  varied  framing  of  certain  pictures,  ex- 
ceedingly varied  balances  and  instabilities  may 
be  obtained.  So  unlimited  is  the  color  reser- 
voir, and  so  delicate  is  the  threshold  of  effects, 
that,  if  one  asks  whether  there  are  any  exhaust- 
405 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
ibles  in  art,  the  answer  is  in  the  negative.  And 
be  it  finally  noted,  that  the  creative  interest  is 
largely  co-conscious.  Just  as  we  have  men- 
tioned the  fact  that  we  know  our  voluntary  acts 
only  after  they  have  occurred,  so  we  know  that 
we  have  created,  or  put  together  things  to  make 
a  beautiful  object,  only  after  the  plastic  mate- 
rials have  left  our  hands  for  crystallization.  As 
with  the  case  of  revising  ideas  for  the  printed 
page,  so  we  find  in  art  that  our  hands  or  voices 
have  bettered  our  original  plan;  and  this  bet- 
tering is  not  accomplished  except  by  non-self- 
consciousness, — that  is,  it  is  only  attained  by 
responding  without  personal  reference  to  the 
stimulus. 

29.  Some  passing  mention  must  now  be 
made  of  the  psychology  of  the  business  world. 
Such  things  as  advertising  and  selling  imply  the 
material  self.  Advertisements  therefore  exhib- 
it permanent  needs  in  such  a  manner  that  the 
readers  of  them  will  be  induced  to  puithase. 
This  implies  more  than  mere  interest  or  curi- 
osity. It  implies  that  motor  manifestations  shall 
transpire,  with  the  result  that  the  object  shall 
be  bought,  and  this  requires  that  the  operations 
of  purchasing  shall  become  focal.  To  bring  this 
about,  the  feeling  of  one's  lack  must  inhibit  the 
wish  to  retain  what  one  has  already  gotten,  and 
406 


MATTERS  AND  MINDS 
this  is  the  central  factor  in  selling.  Be  it  said, 
however,  that  psychology'  may  be  used  either  to 
protect  the  unwilling  buyer  or  to  further  the 
aims  of  the  man  selling  a  useless  article.  Any 
matter  engaging  the  social  self  is  psychology: 
whether  we  enter  a  store  willing  to  buy  any- 
thing that  attracts  us,  or  whether  we  go  deter- 
mined to  have  nothing  but  the  one  small  arti- 
cle that  is  in  instant  need, — these  and  all  inter- 
mediate cases  are  examples  of  some  feature  in 
psychology,  and  our  failure  to  recognize  it  as 
such  is  not  complimentarj'.  It  may,  however, 
not  be  systematic  psychology,  but  only  the 
psj'chology  of  inarticulate  thinking;  but  even 
so,  it  follows  all  the  laws  which  pertain  to  that 
special  domain.  The  psychologist  cannot, 
therefore,  tell  you  in  advance  what  will  be  a 
good  advertisement,  for  that  is  determined  only 
after  the  advertisement  has  brought  business, 
and  not  before.  But  the  psychologist  can  tell 
you  why  it  was  a  good  advertisement,  for  every- 
thing is  equally  analysable.  It  is  thus  seen  that 
analysis  and  deduction  are  not  necessarily  func- 
tioned by  the  same  protoplasm  with  equal  or 
comparable  success. 

30.     Selling     is     argiimeuta     ad     homincin. 
Business,    while   in   general    devised    to   supply 
personal  and  public  needs,  is  yet  so  crowded 
407 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
by  competition  that  profits  become  functions  of 
needless  accessories.  Very  little  of  the  profes- 
sional selling  is  addressed  to  persons  who  act- 
ually need  the  article.  But  the  desire  to  have 
as  much  as  others  have,  or  to  have  better  than 
others  have,  or  to  be  the  only  one  within  a  wide 
radius  who  possesses  this  or  that  prized  article, 
is  that  which  makes  the  salesman  flourish. 
There  is  a  literature  today  on  advertising  and 
selling,  which  unfortunately  goes  by  the  name 
"psychological,"  and  which  once  promised  to 
bankrupt  everybody  for  the  sake  of  the  mer- 
chant. This  literature  is,  fortunately,  becoming 
decadent,  for  the  reason  that  the  general  in- 
crease of  appeals  for  sales  has  inhibited  itself, — 
too  much  advertising,  and  too  many  "below 
cost"  sales  look  suspicious.  There  is  no  need 
for  letters  six  feet  high  for  persons  who  still 
have  to  examine  their  change  to  see  if  they  have 
lost  any.  Even  at  the  present  date,  also,  a  well- 
known  psychologist,  and  a  gifted  writer  to  boot, 
is  preparing  a  book  for  the  general  public  on 
"How  to  evade  the  salesman,"  or  "How  to  see 
through  the  fallacy  of  advertisements,"  or  some 
such  title,  and  so  the  tide,  even  of  psychology, 
is  setting  in  against  the  inflated  world  of  un- 
necessary buying  and  selling. 

31.     There  is  another  matter  in  connection 
408 


MATTERS  AND  MINDS 
with  the  psychology  of  business  which  is  some- 
what in  the  balance  today,  in  spite  of  the  recog- 
nition of  it  as  worthy  and  desirable.  I  refer  to 
the  so  called  "efficiency"  work  which  such  men 
as  Taylor  and  Gilbreth  have  made  almost  na- 
tional institutions.  Efficiency  work  is  time-,  and 
motion-saving, — two  things  which  very  greatly 
interest  the  business  man.  It  arose  from  the 
pressure  which  the  labor  unions  brought  to  bear 
upon  the  large  manufacturer,  for,  to  the  con- 
stantly decreasing  hours  of  work,  the  utmost 
output  is  necessarily  conjoined.  It  is  as  if  the 
capitalist  had  said,  "All  right,  work  as  short 
hours  as  you  please,  but  you  must  work  in  the 
strictest  pattern  so  long  as  you  do  work."  And 
thus  we  have  our  motion  studies,  and  our  sci- 
entific management  which  eliminate  the  unfit  by 
machinery.  The  psychological  effect  on  the 
worker  is  various.  In  the  first  place,  his  mo- 
tions are  studied,  and  he  is  made  to  perform  rig- 
idly identical  tasks,  rather  than  random  ones. 
He  is  thus  perfected  in  the  small  thing  he  does 
rather  than  introduced  to  the  whole  pattern  of 
the  work  he  is  furthering.  Only  time  can  show 
the  full  results  of  this,  for  while  it  seems  to 
some  to  make  him  a  mere  machine,  to  others  it 
seems  to  give  him  the  satisfaction  of  becoming 
a  specialist.  In  the  second  place,  the  condi- 
409 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
tions  under  which  he  works  are  studied  by  spe- 
cialists who  know  much  more  than  does  he  as 
to  what  are  the  best  conditions  under  which  he 
he  becomes  most  productive,  (regardless  of 
whether  he  "likes"  the  improvement  or  not). 
Moreover,  some  of  his  thinking  is  done  for  him 
better  than  he  could  do  it  alone.  Our  modern 
factories,  no  matter  how  much  they  may  be  said 
to  crush  the  "soul"  of  the  worker,  are  far  clean- 
lier and  healthier  than  the  workmen  would 
have  ever  evolved  alone,  if  left  to  think  out  im- 
provements in  after-hours,  or  while  they  were 
wasting  motions  and  time.  And  lastly,  the  eco- 
nomic conditions  which  have  made  the  modern 
factory  what  it  is  are  evolutions,  for  the  psychol- 
ogy of  the  crowd,  as  well  as  the  psychology  of 
general  business  have  crystallized  into  this  pres- 
ent form,  and  it  is  only  due  to  the  manners  and 
minds  of  men  that  either  the  good  or  bad  con- 
ditions of  the  present  exist. 

32.  There  are  many  other  instances  of 
psychology  in  every  day  affairs  which  could 
only  have  a  smattering  treatment  in  such  an 
account  as  this.  And  so  we  shall  omit  them. 
Be  it  remembered,  however,  that  whatever  is 
human  response  to  environment  is  material  for 
psychology.  He  who  has  analytic  insight  will 
carry  with  him  into  every  situation  he  meets, 
410 


MATTERS  AND  MINDS 
the  ability  to  sort  the  data  and  see  the  trend 
of  affairs,  especially  if  he  will  add  to  that  in- 
sight the  knowledge  afforded  by  a  study  of  the 
science  of  psychology.  That  it  is  a  science,  one 
cannot  safely  deny.  The  only  difference  be- 
tween it  and  the  so-called  physical  and  mathe- 
matical sciences  is,  that  there  are  more  insta- 
ble variables  in  it  than  in  the  others.  One  can 
know  the  human  mind  as  well  as  he  can  know 
the  reactions  of  bases  and  acids,  but  he  cannot 
predict  human  minds  unless  they  are  patterned 
in  such  a  way  as  to  plot  a  series  with  very  few 
lost  members.  In  this  connection,  let  it  be  ad- 
mitted that  we  are  close  to  the  realm  of  value, 
for  when  one  becomes  predictable,  he  functions 
the  permanent,  and  in  so  doing  gets  a  logical 
consciousness.  Otherwise,  of  course,  one  is  pre- 
dictable only  in  the  sense  that  he  is  independ- 
able, a  case  which  also  hints  of  value  in  the  neg- 
ative sense.  In  this  sense,  psychology  is  a  nar- 
row strip  of  existence,  and  as  such  seems  cu- 
riously enigmatical  until  one  learns  to  relax 
and  allow  it  merely  to  be  exhibited  to  him  with- 
out a  qualm.  For  all  our  knowledge  is  in  the 
conscious  cross-section,  and  this  fact  makes  up 
for  any  apparent  heterogeneity  among  those  se- 
ries we  find  in  strict  psychology'  to  be  unexpect- 
edly prime  to  each  other.  For  as  we  but  func- 
411 


THE  CONSCIOUS  CROSS-SECTION 
tion  the  universe,  and  nothing  else,  all  that  is 
complete,  incomplete,  valuable  and  valueless, 
as  well  as  permanent  and  non-permanent  is  pri- 
marily of  non-personal  reference,  and  exists  in- 
dependently of  us,  except  insofar  as  it  becomes 
content  of  consciousness.  And  knowing,  or 
functioning,  or  mentioning  any  matter  neither 
creates  it  nor  alters  its  power  or  being. 


412 


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